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WILLIAM GEORGE WARD

AND

THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD.

ÆTATIS 70.

From a Bust by MARIO RAGGI.

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD

AND

THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL

BY

WILFRID WARD

AUTHOR OF 'WILLIAM GEORGE WARD AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT'

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AND NEW YORK
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The accompanying letter, which is given as a specimen of Mr. W. G. Ward's handwriting, was written by him to Father (afterwards Cardinal) Newman, immediately after the acceptance by Mr. Ward of the editorship of the *Dublin Review* in 1862. It is endorsed, in Cardinal Newman's own handwriting, with an extract from his reply. A portion of the letter is printed in Chapter VII.

Freshwater, Isle of Wight
Oct 16 1862

My dear Freeman

I am desirous you should not hear for the first time from any one but myself that I have had the impudence to accept the editorship of the 'Dublin'! It is certainly a new phenomenon to have the editor of a Quarterly profoundly ignorant of history politics and literature & we are can we beyond myself in view on my incompetence. But it was really a

Quintus Curtius affair; & the
apparent alternative was the
seizing the review & making it
political organ I think even my
that is better than that.

I am in desirous to avoid as
as possible all appearance of ch
& my notion is when I go back to
to call on as many different hu
people as I can & see what
notions ~~[illegible]~~ are & what they can (& w
do for me. My absurd diffi
bout riding (when I am well
prevent my being in Birmingh

more than 36 hours. But I shd be
greatly obliged if you wd give me
some faith for point of that time. In
Italia, I want a view on to the degree
of responsibility undertaken by an editor
as to ~~any~~ very particular opinion incidentally
expressed.

I wish I cd. hope there was any
chance of persuading you to write. The
smallest contribution would be most
gratefully received whether pure or gay
lively or severe.

I hope also, while in Birmingham
(forgive the Irishism) to prove to
Oscott & check to hurricane, bequest

&c. In fact there is a certain analogy between my visits and those which you paid when you were preparing for the Dublin University.

I am here for a fortnight with my eldest daughter, who has had the measles & requires re a air. This is the only part of my dominions in which I can stay with even tolerable health & comfort.

(extract from my answer) Ever affectionately yours

Wm Ward

I could not write for the Dublin without writing also for the Home & Foreign, and I mean to keep myself, if I can, from these public collisions — not that in that way I can escape the evil tongues of man great and smaller but reports die away and acts remain

Wm W

PREFACE

THE kind reception accorded to my work *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, not only as a sketch of an important religious revival, but as a biography, has led me to hope that I shall meet the views of my readers by preserving the same double character in its sequel. But while in the days of the Oxford Movement Mr. Ward lived in the midst of those whom he influenced, and was present on the scene of controversial action—a "Rupert," as the late Lord Blachford described him, in the front of the fray—in later years he guided or urged on, in the retirement of his study, campaigns whose principal battles were often fought out at a distance. Some of his controversies were carried on more acutely in Rome than in England; and the men who adopted his most characteristic intellectual positions were not Englishmen but Germans.

This fact has necessarily caused a greater separation in this work than in the former, between the biographical and the historical parts; but the biographical is not less prominent. The materials at my disposal for this part of the book are in some respects more characteristic in this volume than in its predecessor; and the personal element not less important in its relation to the work as a whole.

I have ventured to hope that the story of my father's polemical friendship with John Stuart Mill, of the painful combination of public opposition with private tenderness and personal reverence in his attitude at a critical time

towards John Henry Newman, of the childlike simplicity on both sides in the plain-spoken intercourse between him and Tennyson, of the startling enthusiasms and unconventional freedom which characterised his conversations with Frederick Faber, of his influence—described by such men as Dr. Martineau, Mr. Huxley, and Professor Sidgwick—in the meetings of the old Metaphysical Society, of which he was at one time President, and which numbered among its members some of the most eminent thinkers, statesmen, and men of science of the day, will not be found uninteresting by those who followed with sympathy the story of his relations at Oxford with Arthur Clough and Archbishop Tait, with Dean Stanley and Mr. Jowett. Further, it would be impossible to understand the part played by Mr. Ward in the history of the time without keeping before us throughout the personality and character, to which quite as much as to his writings it was due.

On the historical side this book deals, as its title indicates, with one aspect of the great movement which this century has witnessed almost throughout Christendom, on behalf of those Catholic Ideals against which the Reformation of the sixteenth century was in great part a protest. Lord Macaulay expressed, fifty years ago, a hope that some future historian would trace the progress of the Catholic Revival of the nineteenth century. "No person," he added, "who calmly reflects on what within the last few years has passed in Spain, in Italy, in South America, in Ireland, in the Netherlands, in Prussia, even in France, can doubt that the power of this Church over the hearts and minds of men is now far greater than it was when the Encyclopædia and the Philosophical Dictionary appeared." The present work makes no pretensions to being a history of the Catholic Revival; but one part of it may be regarded as a contribution towards a not unimportant chapter in such a history. The share of the Catholic Church in the great transformation of Christendom which we are witnessing —a transformation which was initiated by the French Revolution

and the Napoleonic wars—is a subject which no student of the times can pass over. That share was characterised by two tendencies among Catholics, which have become popularly known as the Ultramontane and the Liberal.[1] The one has been in the direction of organisation and centralisation among Catholics themselves, the other towards the adjustment of their thought and action to the conditions of modern times. The former was associated at its outset with such names as those of Joseph de Maistre and de Bonald in France, and Leopold Stolberg and Frederic Schlegel in Germany. The latter found its first definite expression in such men as Lacordaire and Montalembert. The two tendencies were at first quite compatible with each other. Indeed, the Liberal Catholic movement was in some sense an offshoot of modern Ultramontanism. As time went on, however, each of the two was carried to an extreme. Adaptation to an age of liberalism and progress tended towards disparagement of tradition and authority, and advocates of authority became excessive in their claims. Ultramontanism incurred the charge of narrowness and aggressiveness in such a writer as Louis Veuillot; and Liberalism, in such men as Döllinger and his followers, stood convicted of disloyalty to the Pope.

The acute collision between the two extreme parties in the eventful years preceding the Vatican Council, the comparative disappearance of both since then, and the subsequent renewal, in a more permanent form, of the combination of Ultramontanism with the endeavour to find a *modus vivendi* with modern thought and modern political conditions, make undoubtedly a turning-point in the history of contemporary Christian thought. In the events surrounding this crisis Mr. W. G. Ward took, both directly and indirectly, an active share. He represented in politics and theology the unqualified opposi-

[1] I say "popularly" because, as I elsewhere explain, the original and true meaning of the word Ultramontane is not identical with that which it has come to bare.

tion to the extremes of Liberal Catholicism against which Pius IX.'s pontificate was a constant protest; and in philosophy his tendency was towards the fusion of Ultramontane loyalty, with a sympathetic assimilation of all that is valuable in contemporary thought, as the best means of purging it of what is dangerous. The history, then, of this crisis is naturally given in the story of his life; and the earlier events in the Catholic Revival which led up to it have been summarised in a separate chapter of my work.

The remaining subject dealt with in this book is that of Mr. Ward's treatment of the more fundamental problems of religious belief which have been exercising the minds of Englishmen during the latter half of this century. The effect of his polemic against John Stuart Mill and Dr. Alexander Bain on such critical questions as Freewill, Necessary Truths, the Nature of Conscience, the true analysis of our Powers of Knowledge, is borne witness to in documents cited in this volume, not only by those who shared his views as Dr. Martineau and Mr. Hutton, but by his chief opponents as Mr. Mill, Dr. Bain, and Professor Huxley. Although the statement of some of the problems has somewhat changed since Mr. Ward dealt with them, a considerable portion of his writing is as applicable now as formerly. His main contentions and his positions on the chief questions in debate are analysed in the thirteenth chapter of this work.

Any true account of the matters dealt with in my book necessarily involves some record of occasional collisions and misunderstandings between men equally zealous for the same cause. Dr. Johnson remarked that the ancient Greeks could argue good-humouredly about religion because they did not believe in it. In England, as in France, the intense devotedness of the men who took for a time opposite views as to the policy which was most advantageous for the cause of the religious revival, resulted in strong feeling on either side. The time has come when it is necessary to give some account of

this, if exaggerated or inaccurate rumours are to be arrested, and the story is to be told before those who knew its circumstances have passed away. So far as France is concerned these matters have already been related from one point of view or another in such works as the life of Dupanloup and the life of Foisset. In England, likewise, old friendships were tried and interrupted by misunderstandings. As Théophile Foisset and Louis Veuillot passed from their early close sympathy to being representatives of the opposite lines taken by the *Univers* and the *Correspondant*, so in England Cardinal Newman and my father were for a time strongly opposed in matters of ecclesiastical policy. While Newman persistently adhered to a *via media* compatible with moderate liberalism, at a time when exaggerations on both sides represented Liberalism and Ultramontanism as necessarily opposed, Mr. Ward, in his polemic against the anti-Roman Liberalism of the hour, threw in his lot at one time with the extreme Ultramontanes.

In relating what has to be related on this matter I have had the advantage of some assistance from Cardinal Newman himself. In two conversations in the year 1885, at which time I proposed to publish the present volume in company with its predecessor, he allowed me to consult him on the matters dealt with in Chapter VIII.; and I received his permission to cite some of his own letters as conveying the most accurate idea of his standpoint in these controversies. A little later he sent me, for publication, some of my father's letters to himself, one of them endorsed with a passage from another of his own letters in reply. I trust that these documents and conversations have enabled me to give an exact account of the matter so far as the facts of the case are concerned. I must add, however, that some of the views incidentally expressed, and the summaries with which I have supplemented the correspondence, were never seen by Cardinal Newman, and were in great part written since his death.

I have to acknowledge the kindness of many friends who

have assisted me in various ways in my undertaking. Reminiscences of great interest have been contributed by Cardinal Vaughan, Professor Huxley, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, Dr. Martineau, Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Father Mills, Father Lescher, Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, and Dean Goulburn; and among those who have read considerable portions of my work in proof, and given me valuable suggestions, I must especially mention Lord Emly, Father Gordon, Superior of the London Oratory, Father Ryder, Superior of the Birmingham Oratory, the Duc de Broglie, Mr. Edmund Bishop, Father Butler, and Baron Friedrich von Hügel. In some of these cases the personal share in the events recorded of those whose assistance I gratefully acknowledge has given to their opinion and advice very great weight. To Baron von Hügel, especially, my work owes very much; and his contributions to the "Epilogue" are so considerable that it may almost be regarded as a joint production.

I must add to my list of obligations the valuable unpublished documents placed at my disposal by the late Cardinal Manning, referring to the proceedings of the Commission (of which he was a member) which drew up the Vatican Definition in 1870. These papers and the passages I have cited from the seventh volume of the Jesuit *Collectio Lacensis*, published in 1890,—to the great importance of which Dr. Schobel of Oscott first called my attention,—give, I trust, a final answer to the exaggerations so assiduously propagated by Dr. Döllinger[1] as to the scope of the definition and the attitude of those who framed it.

My thanks are due also to Mrs. Bishop, the intimate friend of the late Madame Augustus Craven, whose correspondence she is preparing for publication, for her permission to use one of Madame Craven's letters; to Father Neville, for allowing me to print an extract from one of Cardinal Newman's letters referring to my father, of which I did not know until

[1] See the last chapter of this book.

after the Cardinal's death; to Miss Helen Taylor, for her permission to publish selections from Mr. J. S. Mill's letters to my father, as well as for sending me those of my father's own letters which Mr. Mill preserved; and to other correspondents of my father—Father Ryder, Dr. Bain, M. Ollé-Laprune, Mrs. Richard Ward, the Dowager Lady Simeon, and Lord Emly—for sending me letters of his, many of which are inserted in this volume.

MOLESCROFT,
EASTBOURNE, *April* 1893.

Postscriptum.—Since this Preface was written, and the whole of my work was in type, some very valuable letters from my father to Cardinal Newman have been sent to me by Father Neville. I have added the most interesting of these to the letters from Cardinal Newman given in Appendix C. Any reader who is interested in the relations between the two men will find more detailed information in this *Appendix* than in any other part of the book.

INTRODUCTION[1]

William George Ward was born on the 21st of March 1812. He was the eldest son of Mr. William Ward, M.P.,[2] the famous cricketer and proprietor of Lord's Cricket Ground; the grandson of Mr. George Ward of Northwood Park, Isle of Wight; and the great-nephew of the well-known statesman and writer, Robert Plumer-Ward.[3] He was educated at Winchester and Christ Church, Oxford. Many stories survive at both places of an original boyhood and early youth. "There were seemingly contradictory elements in his character," writes his schoolfellow, the present Lord Selborne, "which made him always good company. He had a pleasure in paradox and a keen sense of the ludicrous." A vein of melancholy seems from the first to have accompanied his keen powers of enjoyment and of amusing his friends; and even in early boyhood a deep religiousness of sentiment went along with a passion for amusement—notably for the opera and theatre. His likes and dislikes were very intense, and his acquirements at school were, similarly, marked by high excellence in some departments and total neglect of others. He was an excellent mathematician, and is said to have discovered for himself, as a boy, the principle of Logarithms. He took the medal for Latin prose in 1829. On the other hand he professed himself totally unable to understand history

[1] For the sake of those who have not read my book *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, I prefix to this volume an "Introduction" containing a brief outline of Mr. Ward's early career.

[2] Mr. William Ward represented the City from 1826 to 1835; and in 1830, at the Duke of Wellington's request, he assumed the duties of chairman of the Select Committee appointed to report to the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company, previous to the opening of the China trade. His achievements at cricket are recorded in Mr. Pyecroft's popular work *The Cricket Field*.

[3] Mr. Robert Ward, the friend of William Pitt, assumed, by royal license, the additional name of Plumer, on his marriage in 1828 to the heiress of the Plumer estates in Hertfordshire, Mrs. Plumer Lewin, a granddaughter of James, seventh Earl of Abercorn, by his marriage (in 1712) to a daughter of Colonel John Plumer. *The Political Life and Literary Remains of Robert Plumer Ward*, by the Honourable E. Phipps, was published in 1850 (Murray).

or poetry. Some of his verse compositions,—"tasks" as they were called at Winchester,—which he purposely made grotesque or prosaic, are still remembered, for instance the opening of his poem on the Hebrides :—

> There are some islands in the Northern seas
> —At least I'm told so—called the Hebrides.

And the lines later on in the same poem—

> These people have but very little wood
> They therefore can't build ships. They wish they could.

A great simplicity of character is also to be noticed in the records of his schooldays, and a singular deficiency in habits of observation. On eating a sole he is reported to have said, "These are very nice: where do they grow?" Passing to Oxford in 1830, his chief interest during his undergraduate days at Christ Church was the Union Debating Society, which was then at its zenith. "He developed," writes Dean Church, "in the Oxford Union and in a wide social circle of the most rising men of the time, including Tait, Cardwell, Lowe, Roundell Palmer, a very unusual dialectical skill and power of argumentative statement—qualities which seemed to point to the House of Commons." "Ward Tory chief," is his description in an undergraduate poem of those days, on the Union; but owing to the influence, later on, of his close friend Arthur Stanley, afterwards Dean of Westminster, he became more liberal in his views, and in some sense a disciple of Dr. Arnold. He was elected Fellow of Balliol in 1834. During the Liberal phase of his intellectual life he was strongly opposed to the Tractarian movement, which had begun in 1833,—looking on it as holding up superstitions and myths for admiration rather than that high ethical ideal which it is the highest office of religion to encourage and enforce. "Why should I go and hear such myths?" was his answer to a friend who pressed him to go and hear Newman preach.

The peculiar candour, which is spoken of in the accounts of his early days at Oxford, must be referred to as being the key to much of his subsequent career. In his examination for "greats" in the classical schools he refused to get up the necessary historical and collateral work at all; and the frankness of his confessions of ignorance caused great amusement. After construing the passages set before him admirably, he disappointed the hopes of the examiners by answering all further questions with such exclamations as "I really don't know," or "I haven't the faintest idea!"

His influence after his election at Balliol is spoken of as very considerable. "No tutor in Oxford," writes Dean Lake, "seems to me to have had so much intellectual influence over his pupils;"

and Mr. T. Mozley says, "Ward's weight in the university was great. . . . He represented the intellectual force, the irrefragable logic, the absolute self-confidence, the headlong impetuosity of the Rugby school. . . . As a logician and a philosopher it was hard to deal with him."

A sermon of Newman's, which he was persuaded to hear, and the appearance of Froude's *Remains* in 1838, quite changed his attitude towards Newmanism. He found the ethical ideal which had attracted him in Arnold, and which had been so effective an antidote to a certain sceptical tendency in his discussions on religious philosophy, more fully exhibited in Newman and Froude than in Arnold himself. According to the saying which he so often quoted, "True guidance in return to loving obedience is the prime need of man," he came to look on Newman's teaching as affording a higher and truer guidance than Arnold's; while the Catholic conception of Church authority gave a logical account of that necessity for an external teacher which experience had already made him recognise, and which was in his own case a safeguard against religious doubt.

He avowedly joined Newman's party towards the end of 1838; defended and strengthened the positions of the famous Tract 90 in two pamphlets of the year 1841; and thenceforth pressed the Oxford Movement avowedly in the direction of the Roman Church. He maintained that the Church of Rome had preserved the reality of Church authority, and that in spite of its corruptions it had retained the true *ideal* of a Church, which the Church of England had lost. "Her change," he wrote to Dr. Pusey in July 1841, "seems to have been objective, ours (which seems a much more radical change) subjective. With all her corruptions, with all the toleration of a low standard in the mass of men . . . she has always held up for the veneration of the faithful the highest standards of holiness." Conscience, rather than intellect, he maintained to be the true guide in such religious inquiry as was at that time engaging the attention of all Oxford. A full intellectual examination of pros and cons, in numerous and complicated theological arguments, was a matter for which human intelligence was far too imperfect, and human life far too short. The result of such an inquiry under present conditions could only be suspense, and the recognition that there was a good deal to be said on every side. But holy men whose lives appealed to the conscience as the embodiment of all that is highest and noblest, were from that very fact safe guides to what is true in religion. And he gradually came to hold that the Catholic Church, as the society in which sanctity had thriven and its true ideal had been preserved, fulfilled in the highest degree that function of true guidance which the ethical greatness of an Arnold or a Newman only partially secured.

These views he advocated in the *British Critic* from 1841 to 1843, and elaborated more fully in the *Ideal of a Christian Church*, published in 1844.

Newman had by this time left Oxford and retired to Littlemore. Ward's influence during these critical years, not only as a leader of the Oxford Movement, but on men who were not disciples of the movement, has been borne emphatic testimony to by representatives of very different schools of thought. "Few persons in our time," writes Mr. Jowett, Master of Balliol, "have exerted a greater influence on their contemporaries than he did at Oxford." The present Dean of Westminster speaks of him as "succeeding Dr. Newman as" the "acknowledged leader" of the Tractarians.[1] Dean Stanley has written of him that his "unrivalled powers of argument, his transparent candour, his uncompromising pursuit of the views he had adopted, and his loyal devotion to Dr. Newman himself," made him "the most important element of the Oxford School at this crisis."[2] And the testimonies of Dean Church and Dean Lake are equally emphatic.

The *Ideal of a Christian Church* which the *Church Quarterly Review* has described as producing a greater immediate sensation than any ecclesiastical book of the century, plainly advocated not only reunion with, but ultimate submission to Rome, on the part of the English Church. But it did not advocate it as an immediate programme, but rather exhorted members of both Churches to prepare the way to union by leading devoted lives, and encouraging the highest ideals of sanctity and asceticism.

For writing this work Mr. Ward was deprived of his degrees in the memorable meeting of Convocation on the 13th February 1845, which has been perhaps most graphically described by Dean Stanley in his Essay on the "Oxford School."

Mr. Ward lived for nearly a year afterwards at Rose Hill, Oxford, having married Miss Frances Mary Wingfield, daughter of the Rev. John Wingfield, Prebendary of Worcester and Canon of York. He joined the Roman Communion early in September 1845.

[1] See *Recollections of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley*, p. 65.
[2] See *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 214.

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CHAPTER I

EARLY CATHOLIC LIFE

1845–1851

Mr. Ward's reception into the Catholic Church was the first decisive Romeward step on the part of any of the prominent actors in the Oxford Movement. It was taken by English Catholics as an earnest of what was to come. This feeling is indicated in the following letter, written by the then Lord Shrewsbury to their common friend Mr. de Lisle:—

Alton Towers, *Monday*, 18*th July* 1845.

My dear Friend—Lest you have not already heard the good news about the Wards, I send it to you in a copy of a note from his friend Bridges; it is indeed glorious.

(*Copy*)—Feast of the Assumption

My dear Mr. Campbell Smith—You will be rejoiced to hear that Mr. and Mrs. W. G. Ward have determined to apply for admission into the Church in three weeks from next Monday. They wish all it at all concerns to know of their intentions as long as possible before they execute them, that they may not be taken by surprise, and may see how deliberate the step has been. He is writing a letter to a friend, which those who care may see, in which he will state his reasons, and show his consistency; for he does not think that his book is in any material points wrong. I left them yesterday, and am going to Oxford again as soon as I can, to spend a day or two with them. I have already spoken to the priest who will receive them.—Yours very sincerely, G. T. Bridges.

This is delightful. Surely Newman cannot lag long behind. Still it is better not to be in the papers, and I hope the *Tablet* will not have it. We leave home to-morrow for the sea, but know not where as yet, stopping a *few days* at *Mivart's*, where I shall be glad to hear from you.—Adieu in haste, yours, Shrewsbury.

What awful weather, but Ward makes up for all.

Newman's reception came in October; Oakeley, Dalgairns, Faber, and many others had been received before the year was over; and for some time there was an uneasy feeling throughout the country as to the possible consequences of the Movement. "The Church of England reeled," to quote Lord Beaconsfield's phrase, from the blow of that October; and the growth of "Popish" and "Puseyite" superstition was contemplated with unfeigned alarm.

The events of the years immediately following did little to allay this feeling; and the Gorham decision four years later brought a fresh accession of recruits to Rome, only less noteworthy than those of 1845. The Puseyite movement became identified with Popery in the popular mind; and the general alarm may be said to have reached its crisis about the time of the "Papal Aggression." On the 7th of October 1850, Cardinal Wiseman issued a pastoral from "the Flaminian Gate of Rome," announcing the redivision of Catholic England into dioceses, each having a Bishop with a territorial title. Westminster was to be the title of the archbishopric and of the province. "Catholic England," wrote the Cardinal, "has been restored to its orbit in the Ecclesiastical firmament, from which its light had long vanished."

The English Parliament and press for the moment lost their balance. The *Times* of October the 14th characterised the step as "one of the grossest acts of folly and impertinence which the Court of Rome has ventured to commit since the Crown and people of England threw off its yoke." A month later the effect on the country is thus indicated by the same journal: "It is melancholy to think that to gratify the fire-new zeal of a few restless converts and the inflated pride of a few ambitious ecclesiastics, this country, but two months ago so perfect and so united, should be the theatre of dissensions which have urged on one party even to the shedding of blood." The Lord Chancellor at the Lord Mayor's banquet quoted Gloster's words:—

> Under our feet we'll stamp thy Cardinal's hat
> In spite of Pope or dignities of Church.

The Anglican Hierarchy presented an address to the Queen, protesting "against this attempt to subject our people to a tyranny from which they were freed at the Reformation." An

Anglican clergyman, in denouncing the Confessional from his pulpit, went so far as to say that the hearing of confessions ought to be a capital offence. "Transportation," he said, "would not satisfy me, for that would merely transfer the evil from one part of the world to the other. Capital punishment alone would satisfy me. Death alone would prevent the evil. That is my sober conviction."[1] Effigies of the Pope were burnt in one town, of Cardinal Wiseman and the bishops in another; in a third a public meeting passed a resolution defying "the Pope and the devil," and disowning "all bishops, deans, canons, priests, or deacons who have the least tendency towards Puseyism." In another town a torch-light procession was formed, in which banners bearing the inscriptions, "No Puseyites" and "Down with Popery," were carried to an accompaniment of the *Rogues' March*.[2]

The abortive Ecclesiastical Titles Act was the *ridiculus mus* which was the outcome of all this excitement; but the excitement itself has to be recalled as a witness to the state of public feeling at the time, and as affording some explanation of the sanguine expectations which the reception of Newman, Faber, Ward, Dalgairns, and their friends aroused among English Catholics.

In these expectations, however, Mr. Ward himself at no time shared. He had a profound conviction of the anti-Roman temper of Englishmen, and was not hopeful as to Cardinal Wiseman's schemes for influencing the country at large. He held indeed that anti-papal bigotry was a necessary consequence of the traditions which Englishmen inherited. "If I were a Protestant," he wrote, years later, "I could not bring myself to tolerate Catholics. Fancy if there were a body of Englishmen who followed obsequiously the Lord Mayor of London as a matter of conscience! And they think much worse of the Pope than I of the Lord Mayor."

He retired in 1846 to the little house which Pugin built for him at Old Hall, close to St. Edmund's College, and lived there for three years in great seclusion. Some account must, however, be given of these years and of those immediately

[1] The clergyman afterwards expressed regret for his words; but their use in the pulpit is significant of the state of feeling.

[2] Cf. Appendix to Newman's *Occasional Sermons*, pp. 299 *seq.*

succeeding them, before passing to Mr. Ward's later share in the intellectual movements of our time. His early Catholic life had its importance as a time of gradual adaptation to new surroundings, and ultimately of valuable intellectual training.

Mr. Ward's life at Old Hall was one of almost conventual regularity. He assisted at all the church offices — at Matins and Lauds and Mass — every day. He was on terms of intimacy with most of the professors and many of the students; and the place was in many ways very well adapted to the work of acquainting him with the real nature of Catholic Ecclesiastical life, which he had so long admired from the outside. Its traditions and customs were of English Catholic growth. It shared with Ushaw the honour of descent from the English College at Douay, founded by Cardinal Allen amid the storms succeeding the Reformation. At Douay College, as at St. Omer, Valladolid, Lisbon, and Rome, Englishmen, the descendants of those who had refused to break with the "Holy Roman Church" of *Magna Charta,* were educated for many generations; and kept, free from all contact with surrounding Anglicanism and Protestantism, the Catholic traditions and faith of their forefathers. When the Revolution drove its students from France, they took advantage of the new-born toleration in England, and transferred to English soil the unbroken descent. Several of our Benedictine convents similarly preserved the pre-Reformation traditions. The English convent of Ghent, whose Abbess was the revered counsellor of Charles II., and which is said to have been the scene of James II.'s reception into the Roman Church, still exists and flourishes at Oulton near Stone; and the Benedictine convents of East Bergholt, Stamford, Colwich, Teignmouth, are also the descendants of communities which were exiled for centuries.[1] Four of the existing English Catholic colleges belong to the same category—Ushaw, Old Hall, Downside, and Stonyhurst.

Old Hall was, early in the present century, specially interesting on several grounds. It was founded by Bishop Challoner in 1753 at Standon Lordship, in Hertfordshire, two

[1] At Carisbrooke, Taunton, Darlington, New Hall, Abbot's Leigh, are convents of orders other than the Benedictine, which are lineally descended from English convents founded abroad in penal times.

miles from its present site. The Bishop's immediate object was to replace the Catholic School of Twyford,—the scene of the early education of Pope the poet,—which had been recently shut up.[1] The students migrated, in 1769, to the "Old Hall,"—about a mile from Puckeridge,—which was purchased by Bishop James Talbot, great-uncle of the Earl of Shrewsbury whose letter concerning Mr. Ward's conversion has been cited above. Its early years were years of anxiety and difficulty. The keeping of a Catholic school subjected its conductors to imprisonment for life, until the mitigation of the penal laws in 1778; and Old Hall School on several occasions broke up in consequence of friendly warnings, to escape the penalties of the law. It was by the advice of William Pitt that the refugees of 1793 from Douay and St. Omer Colleges finally took up their abode at Old Hall, as being a course less likely to irritate Protestant prejudices than the founding of a new college. The office of President was undertaken by Dr. Stapleton, formerly President of St. Omer. Both Pitt and the Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, who was a personal friend of Dr. Stapleton,[2] promised to subscribe towards the enlarging of the college for the reception of the new students, Pitt undertaking that the Government should contribute £3000.[3]

Old Hall College was, in 1846, in every sense secluded. Coming in contact with scarcely any one beyond the college walls, seldom on speaking terms with their Anglican neighbours, the masters or "Professors" took, moreover, little interest in the proceedings of the world outside. The students were not even allowed to see the newspapers. The whole college still shared the spirit begotten of the penal laws, which remained to so large an extent among English Catholics, and shunned all publicity. How completely Catholics had passed out of the life of the nation, and even out of the knowledge of the

[1] Twyford School had been shut up in 1745 in consequence of the "No Popery" cry which the campaign of Charles Edward aroused.

[2] Dr. Stapleton was a son of Mr. Nicholas Stapleton of Carlton Hall, Yorkshire, and a member of the family of the present Lord Beaumont. He was imprisoned, with other members of Douay College, in 1793, under the Terror.

[3] The *History of St. Edmund's College, Old Hall*, by the Very Rev. Bernard Ward, President of the College (Kegan Paul), gives in full the circumstances here referred to.

average Englishman, has been described by Cardinal Newman in a striking passage :—

"No longer the Catholic Church in the country," he writes, "nay, no longer, I may say, a Catholic community, but a few adherents of the old religion moving silently and sorrowfully about as memorials of what had been. 'The Roman Catholics,'—not a sect, not even an interest, as men conceived of it,—not a body, however small, representative of the Great Communion abroad, but a mere handful of individuals who might be counted like the pebbles and detritus of the great deluge; and who, forsooth, merely happened to retain a creed which, in its day, indeed, was the profession of a Church. Here, a set of poor Irishmen, coming and going at harvest time, or a colony of them lodged in a miserable quarter of the vast metropolis. There, perhaps, an elderly person, seen walking in the streets, grave and solitary and strange, though noble in bearing, and said to be of good family and a Roman Catholic. An old-fashioned house of gloomy appearance, closed in with high walls with an iron gate and yews, and the report attaching to it that Roman Catholics lived there; but who they were and what they did, or what was meant by calling them Roman Catholics, no one could tell, though it had an unpleasant sound and told of form and superstition. And then, perhaps, as we went to and fro looking with a boy's curious eyes through the great city, we might come to-day upon some Moravian chapel or Quaker's meeting-house, and to-morrow on some chapel of the Roman Catholics, but nothing was to be gathered from it except that there were lights burning there, and some boys in white, swinging censers; and what it all meant could only be learned from books, from Protestant histories and sermons; and they did not report well of 'the Roman Catholics,' but, on the contrary, deposed that they had once had power and had abused it. And then, again, we might on one occasion hear it pointedly put out by some literary man, as the result of his careful investigation, and as a recondite point of information which few knew, that there was this difference between the Roman Catholics of England and the Roman Catholics of Ireland, that the latter had bishops and the former were governed by four officials, called Vicars Apostolic. Such was about the sort of knowledge possessed of Christianity by the heathen of old time, who persecuted its adherents from the face of the earth and then called them a *gens lucifuga*, a people who shunned the light of day."[1]

The present Bishop of Southwark (Dr. Butt), a student at Old Hall in those days, tells me that the college was remark-

[1] See *Occasional Sermons*, p. 172.

able for the universal prevalence of the old style of Catholicism with its unostentatious faith and piety — a type faithfully represented by the works of the well-known Douay writers, Alban Butler and Bishop Challoner. There was not much intellectual culture; and the religion itself was of the silent kind. There were few of the novelties in devotion in which Italy and France have abounded in the present century. Little interest was taken in theoretical discussions on religion; and men who never missed their morning's meditation and daily Mass were unaccustomed to analysing the nature and advantages of the Catholic life, as many men whose appetites are excellent may be disinclined or unable to explain the physiological laws which determine the effect of food on the organism. In short, the intellectual appreciation of all the treasures of Catholic piety and doctrine, for which Mr. Ward looked, was not, superficially at least, to be found. Theology was not a welcome subject of discussion. The Catholic life and habits were there, but, apparently, not the reflective appreciation of them. Catholicism was injected into the veins; it was not tasted before it was assimilated. Even the chief theological student in the college, a man of undoubted ability and learning, did not seem to grasp principles or to master divinity as a science. "I never met any one who knew so much theology without being a theologian," Ward remarked of him.

And if speculation of any kind was avoided, much more were the speculations of a recent convert viewed with trepidation. Both the Dons at Old Hall and the Church authorities shared in this feeling. Men deficient in intellectual attainments and breadth of view, however exemplary in piety, were in many cases in power; and they feared the revolutionary influence of those who had so recently passed over from traditions and customs which were strange and suspect. Rome, indeed, appreciated throughout the zeal and devotion of the neophytes; and the chief representative of the Roman culture in England — Cardinal Wiseman — was their true friend. But he was not yet at the helm; and it was not until a later date that he was able to secure them free play and full scope. Men like Lord Shrewsbury, Mr. de Lisle, Father Gentili, Father Ignatius Spencer, were eager to gain for the

Church, from Oxford learning and enlargement of view, much that was sorely needed. But such views were not in the ascendant in 1846. When Mr. Ward reached Old Hall towards the end of that year, Dr. Griffiths, the Vicar Apostolic of the London District, was the ruling power over the Catholic Church in England. He is described by those who knew him as a representative type of the grave, undemonstrative, unenterprising, conservative ecclesiastic of the old school. He was an able administrator and a strict disciplinarian on the traditional Catholic lines, and had been almost a new founder to Old Hall. His reception of Mr. Ward was characteristic and certainly not encouraging. Arriving with great hopes that he might have some share in the ideal work of preparing students for the priesthood in England, and waiting with simple docility to do what he was told, the new convert was greeted by the bishop thus: "We are glad to welcome you, Mr. Ward. Of course we have no work for you."

In such surroundings Mr. Ward began his Catholic life, and visited at last the Yarrow of his dreams. He had a few congenial friends at the college—Dr. Whitty, afterwards Provincial of the Jesuits, and Frederick Oakeley among them; but he had to face the absence, among his new associates, of that intellectual activity which he theoretically disparaged, and which was yet so fascinating and almost necessary to him. The outcome was, nevertheless, taken all in all, great peace and rest. The intellectual disappointment, to which I have referred—which at its greatest was small indeed compared with the happiness of the new religious life—was only temporary. Four years later he had the fullest scope for all his energies; a scope which was never again denied him to the end of his life. But of this I must speak shortly.

His home life during these years was one of the utmost poverty. But friends who remember those days describe him as not in the least depressed or anxious. Mrs. Ward performed many of the duties of a general servant, washing the plates and dishes with great cheerfulness. One day, however, when the year 1847 was not very far advanced, gifts and literary earnings were found to have been insufficient, and they had to face the fact that only £5 remained to carry them on for a whole quarter. For the first time thoroughly perplexed and out of spirits they

paced up and down the lawn in front of their cottage at Old Hall, when a tall and rather stout gentleman was descried making his way towards them from the road. He introduced himself as a Mr. M'Donnell, and explained that he was very anxious that his son should have the kind of higher University education from which English Catholics were generally cut off. Knowing of Mr. Ward's Oxford distinction, he had come to ask if he would, for £300 a year, undertake the office of tutor. The son was to live at Old Hall, and to be entirely under his tutor's control. The proposal seemed to come as a literal fulfilment of the promise made to those who "seek first the kingdom of God and His justice." The amount offered was riches in such circumstances. Still Mr. Ward considered the whole question before accepting the offer. He had no idea of undertaking what he could not conscientiously perform, for the sake of saving himself from difficulties. He doubted his power of looking after a young man without the apparatus of University discipline to help him; and he made several stringent conditions before agreeing. I recollect his telling me that among other things he stipulated that he might send his new pupil away at a day's notice if he found him unruly.

The conditions were agreed to, and Mr. Francis M'Donnell arrived. Ward undertook to teach him what his father wished: and astronomy, which he had absolutely refused to learn when he went up for honours at Oxford, he had now to teach. He made no secret of his ignorance. He procured a good text-book, and said to young M'Donnell, "The subject is new to me. I am reading two chapters ahead of you. Ask me no questions on anything which comes later in the book."

Before long his difficulties from poverty were at an end. His uncle died towards the end of September 1849, and Mr. Ward inherited his property in the Isle of Wight, which was entailed on him by his grandfather. "I found myself," he said, "in the position of that class of the community on which I had expended most abuse—of a large landed proprietor." He used to say that during his uncle's last illness he felt a scruple of conscience at his inability to repress a wish that the end might be speedy. He consulted a priest who lived in the neighbourhood as to how far his feeling was a faulty one. The priest suggested the customary considerations.

"It is quite enough that you should feel a certain regret at the prospect of your uncle's *death*," he said, "though you may be pleased to inherit his property." But Mr. Ward's candour was not to be beaten. "I feel no regret whatever at the prospect," he insisted. "Well, you must have a certain wish, quite apart from other consequences, that he might be spared."—"No; not the slightest! I never cared for him in the least."—"Your poor uncle has been suffering—your spirits fall a little at all events when you hear he is worse?"—"On the contrary, they rise." The priest began to fear that he was dealing with a reprobate. "Good heavens," he said suddenly, "you would not do anything to *hasten* his death, would you?" The roar of laughter with which his penitent received the question was sufficient answer.

Almost immediately on receiving the news that the end had come, he wrote to Father Newman on the subject. The reply ran as follows:—

ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM, 30*th Sept.* 1849.

MY DEAR WARD—Your letter came last night, and I thank you for your kindness in sending it. I can easily understand how very trying your condition must have been the last several months, when you were in suspense about the issue of things, or rather the time. If there is any one who can bear wealth, it is you,—still I am sure, now you have got it, you will feel the trouble and temptation it involves,—and though it is pleasant in anticipation to use it well, the gratification of doing so in fact is not equal to the anxiety. However, it is a means of laying up merit in Heaven, and in this point of view, anxiety or not, temptation or not, it is a great blessing.

You will be glad to know that we seem prospering here more and more—*i.e.*, if being talked of, and getting large congregations, is prospering. Converts of course are being made steadily, but what makes the show is the notoriety, which is on the increase. If a blessing still goes with us, and St. Philip is not tired of us, in two or three years' time we shall be in a very respectable position in the place. We want *soggetti*,—subjects,—however; it is very hard work for a few to lecture daily. St. Philip has lately done us a *grazia*. A poor factory girl, a convert of Father Ambrose's, who did not seem to have had much faith in him, or any, and had had a severe illness, has been raised from extreme weakness, almost from death, by the application of his relics. . . .—Yours, my dear Ward, affectionately, JOHN H. NEWMAN, Cong. Orat.

The accession to the property brought much uncongenial work at the moment; but it was very soon decided by Mr. Ward, after taking advice of Newman and other friends, that he would not for the present at least live in the Isle of Wight; and with much relief at the decision he turned to the consideration of the proposal made by Dr. Wiseman, who had succeeded Dr. Griffiths[1] as Vicar Apostolic, that he should deliver lectures to the Divinity students or "Divines" at Old Hall. An arrangement was finally made in 1851, of which we shall have to speak in a later chapter. One characteristic anecdote of this part of his life may be recalled. His newly-acquired wealth would, he knew, pass eventually to a cousin if he had no son; and, consequently, one of his first acts was to provide for his family by insuring his life for a considerable sum. The questions asked by the insurance office were of a kind most trying to one whom Tennyson once described as "grotesquely truthful." "Are there any hereditary diseases in your family?" Here was a question opening out, as he said, "indefinite possibilities of lying." As usual his scrupulousness worked entirely to his own disadvantage; and it was the case of his examination in "greats" over again. "Is your general health good?"—"It is deplorably bad."—"Has your family any hereditary complaints?"—"I should fully expect so."—"Well, but you look well; I suppose you eat well and sleep well at night?"—"I have never had a good night in my life." And so on with the other questions. The end of it was that he was allowed the average terms for a man between sixty and seventy years of age, being in point of fact not yet thirty-eight.

Intellectually, the years 1846-1850 were in a sense tentative. Mr. Ward's career as a Catholic thinker and writer falls very definitely into three divisions. 1851 to 1858 were the years of his Theological professorship at Old Hall, terminating with the publication of the first part of his lectures, the Philosophical Introduction on *Nature and Grace*. 1860-1870 were spent in the vindication—chiefly as editor of the *Dublin Review*—of the papal authority against the liberalism of Döllinger and his friends; 1870-1882 in his elaboration of the proofs of Theism against the "experience"

[1] Dr. Griffiths died in 1848.

school of philosophy,—the school of Mill and Bain,—both in the *Dublin Review*, and as a member, and at one time chairman, of the Metaphysical Society.

The previous period was not one of homogeneous work. Mr. Ward touched lightly on each of the three departments of study which later on formed the work of his life. He was *en rapport* with the professors at St. Edmund's, continued his own theological reading, studied the curriculum and the needs of ecclesiastical students, and, as Bishop Butt tells me, exercised considerable influence on the tone of thought in the college. He wrote for the *Dublin Review* and *Tablet* and *Rambler*, partly on doctrinal questions, partly on questions in philosophy and political economy, raised by his opponent of later years, John Stuart Mill. He exchanged letters with the learned Jesuit theologian Father O'Reilly, and with Newman, on all the matters of theological interest which from time to time arose. He corresponded with J. S. Mill and Sir William Hamilton on the great questions connected with the philosophy of Theism. It had actually been arranged in 1849 that he was to deliver a course of lectures to the Divines; but the opposition of the conservative priests of the old school to the teaching of theology by a lay convert proved so strong that the President for a time abandoned the idea.

In his correspondence of the same year with Newman, the first traces appear of that difference of direction in theological sympathies which later on grew so marked. Both he and Newman had approached the Church from a distance; and each had seized on a different principle in its organisation, without perhaps doing at first full justice to its corrective. The works which they wrote on the eve of their change—Newman's *Essay on Development* and Ward's *Ideal of a Christian Church*—indicate the point of view of each. Ward, as the *Ideal* so plainly shows, had been attracted by the prospect of an Authority to which his mind could appeal, by completeness of system which, within certain limits, staved off all semblance of intellectual contradiction. The human element, the theological disputes between opposite schools, which by a gradual process of adjustment and elimination shaped the material from which the Church could infallibly select in its decisions, had less attraction for him. He did not deny it in the abstract, but

it was not what had fascinated him. He turned eagerly to the decrees themselves; and his feeling towards them appeared to be almost as though they were due to direct revelation or inspiration, emphatically as he denied, with all theologians, that they were so.

To Newman, on the other hand, whose imagination had been fascinated by the stately and orderly development of doctrine through a succession of erring human minds, and often through the medium of stormy controversy, the active play of intellect, in advocacy, criticism, and opposition, was as interesting a portion of the history of dogma as the final statements which formed the text of authoritative decisions. He realised of course equally with Ward that the final definition was the only portion for which inerrancy was divinely guaranteed; but the previous play of various lines of thought was an element essential to the understanding of the history of the definition, and the actual *modus agendi* of the living Church. Again, owing to the human element in the wording of definitions, they may be in some cases incomplete, and may require for their completion the limitations imposed by other definitions. Thus the process of reciprocal correction, which made the disputes between opposite schools issue in a true definition, had its parallel in the interpretation of definitions themselves.

With this sense of the complex and gradual formation and interpretation of explicit dogma in the past, he was less in sympathy than Ward with the comparatively frequent and definite authoritative rulings of the Pontificate of Pius IX.—more numerous, as Ward himself remarked, than those of any previous Pope. He no more denied the duty of submission to them than Ward denied the mixed elements concerned in the progress of dogma; but the decrees were not to him simply matters of rejoicing, simple additions to our knowledge, as they were to Ward. They might raise in his mind difficult questions. The ascertainment of their precise scope and bearing was necessary before he could know to *what* he had to submit. Digestion is as necessary to nourishment as eating; and digestion takes time, and keeps the digestive organs fully occupied. Constant authoritative decisions might mean ultimately increased strength, but they meant increased labour,

and they might mean temporary indigestion. Dealing with the interpretation and results of any authoritative utterance was generally a matter involving great intellectual effort. Its claim to determine Catholic belief had to be estimated. It had to be adjusted to the problems, social, political, and scientific, which it indirectly affected. It had to be adapted to the various intellectual antecedents of those who were bound to accept it. Ward's attitude was far simpler. The narrow field in which his intellect moved so actively did not include many of the problems which perplexed Newman; and thus while the latter had very much to consider before he could interpret the decrees to his satisfaction, the former applied them without difficulty in their simplest and most obvious sense, and rejoiced in them as fresh light without any shadow. Such was the *primâ facie* character of the divergence of which the details will appear later on in this volume.

Ward's temper on the whole question was brought out once in conversation. A friend was urging on him the difficulties raised by each doctrinal utterance, from the necessity of its adjustment to facts difficult to reconcile with its *primâ facie* meaning. Ward was quite unconvinced. "Well, surely," said his interlocutor, "there is some limit. You would not wish for new pronouncements every month." —"I should like a new papal Bull every morning with my *Times* at breakfast," was Ward's reply.

Even as early as 1849 there are symptoms of Newman's less eager attitude in respect of new papal decisions, and his sense of the difficulties they might raise. The careful reader will detect this in the following letter to Ward, referring to the Pope's Encyclical of that year on the subject of the *Immaculate Conception.* In February 1849 Pius IX. had written from Gaeta, where he was in exile, an Encyclical letter to the Bishops of the Catholic world, which was the precursor of the definition five years later of the Immaculate Conception. He asked the Bishops to ascertain the feeling of the faithful, each in his own flock, as to the expediency of such a definition. The response in Italy, Spain, and Portugal was unanimously favourable to the proposal; in France, Germany, and Switzerland, on the other hand, very eminent Bishops were opposed to it. This was not, indeed, as in the case of some

later decrees, a matter affecting modern social or scientific problems; but it had its bearing on the science of Church history, and its difficulties in this connection. Newman wrote as follows:—

ORATORY, ALCESTER STREET, BIRMINGHAM,
11*th March* 1849.

MY DEAR WARD—Of course you have seen, or at least heard of, the Pope's Encyclical in the *Univers*, I think it is very likely in the *Tablet* to-day. It is very remarkable. I am speaking of it in a doctrinal point of view. Has there ever been so strong (though incipient) an act on the part of the Holy See? The Bull *Unigenitus* has generally been appealed to on the question of the Pope's infallibility; but there what was doctrinal was indirect, viz. from the necessity of putting down a heresy which had risen; but now the Pope comes forward *proprio motu*, directly to decree a point of faith, which is demanded by the growth of opinion. Its bearing upon the doctrine of development is equally striking; I don't know whether the omission is usual in such letters, but he does not say a word, as far as I recollect, about the antiquity of the doctrine, but he wishes to know if the Catholic people call for it. By the bye, *what* will Dr. Wiseman report as the *opinion*, *feeling*, *view*, *desire*, of the faithful in the London district? What is their secret, but ever-flowing, precise, living tradition? We are pleased to believe that *we* are the last "Congregation" whom the Pope names as having requested to introduce the *Immaculata* in the Mass; and we got the great Oratorian Festival changed for us from the Assumption to the Conception. . . .

It would be very desirable, to speak of your suggestion at St. Wilfrid's, to bring out a Catena of Popes, Divines, etc., on the subject of implicit faith; but the *point to be proved* ought to be very clearly stated. *My* point of issue with the anti-developmentists seems to be this,—whether or not the whole revealed truth, as revealed *per modum unius* to the Apostles, has been explicitly present to the Church in all its parts from the first; or whether or not a given *age* may not be inadvertent of a certain portion of the revelation or deposit; or whether or not revealed truth does not grow in its parts to *the Church* as well as to the individual (Perrone does not seem to allow me to speak of the consciousness or intellect of the Church); whether or not all knowledge is not like that kind of knowledge which we call memory (I suppose this is not a correct mode of speech), or that points *de fide*, which have been deductions of revelation, are not known by the Church before they are deduced, so that as we know a thing in memory, though memory sleeps,—we have latent knowledge,—so we may have latent knowledge of doctrine: and as, were a matter which is past

sifted, our memory at first might err, but when wide awake would tell truly, so, divines may speak of doctrines carelessly and erroneously till controversy arises, and then be forced by its influence into correctness and completeness.

I should not mind at a proper time taking part in putting out a set of such passages from divines, in spite of what I said about the necessity of eschewing doctrine, *if* I got a man like Perrone to revise what was done; but I would not do it without the highest sanction. You see the Pope has in a way taken up Perrone.

And then I say, at a proper time. I should have thought it good to wait, and see what comes of the Pope's council of divines, or whether any controversy rises about his proposal. There might be a moment when it would be seasonable and useful, and only a moment.

Have you looked into Tournely on the subject of grace? Should he agree with St. Alphonso it is very important. St. Alphonso seems to speak the mind of the present Church; and the Dominican doctrine has in fact so gone with rigorism during the last century, while the anti-Dominicans (the Jesuits) were the anti-rigorists. You know, I have no difficulty about the Thomist doctrine, but I would gladly hold Tournely's, if it were (to appearance) the mind of the Church.

God keep us, what I trust we are, averse from every opinion, not only which may not be held, but which only *may* be held in matters of doctrine; that, in spite of the cruel suspicions of those who think there is heresy at the bottom of us, we may submit ourselves, as our conscience tells us to do, to the mind of the Church as well as to her voice.—Yours ever affectionately,

J. H. NEWMAN,
Cong. Orat. Pres.

P.S.—I have not said a word about the prospective decree itself. Certainly it is a joyful thing, and, in a queer way, I have not been able to think of our Lady since I heard of it, without a feeling like "I know something good has happened to you, but I can't recollect what it is." And then I have brought it to mind, and also reminded myself that it was only her accidental glory which it affected. However, it's very joyful and pleasant anyhow.

CHAPTER II

CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN STUART MILL AND SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON

TURNING now to Mr. Ward's concern with the problems of religious philosophy, something must be said of his relations at this time with Mr. John Stuart Mill. I have elsewhere spoken of Ward's essay in the *British Critic* of 1843 on Mill's *Logic*, and have cited Mr. Bain's testimony to Mill's appreciation of it. In July 1848 Ward reviewed his *Political Economy* in the *Tablet* at considerable length.

A personal acquaintance and correspondence followed, which as time went on revealed a degree of sympathy most singular between men of such different opinions and antecedents. Poles asunder in premiss and conclusion, Ward and Mill, in their purely intellectual intercourse, as completely understood each other as two mathematicians who are engaged in proving a proposition in geometry. Given the relevant hypotheses, there can be no dispute as to the proof. They may differ as to facts, if they apply their geometry or trigonometry to practical measurements. The initial understanding as to distances, which may determine whether an angle be of 90° or of 60°, or whether a triangle be equilateral or scalene, may involve points of dispute. Such things may have been ascertained by authorities which seem to one trustworthy, to another not so; but once the facts are agreed upon, the reasoning is clear to both alike. So, too, Ward and Mill,—utterly as they differed on the primary truths which were the *data* from which to reason,—in their method, and in the conclusions resting on a given hypothesis, reached an agreement which was very remarkable.

The two active intellects moved on such similar lines

as to make correspondence and controversy a fruitful source of intellectual pleasure. The mind of each was logical, abstract, and complete; each man was remarkably candid and plain spoken. The mixture of personal perception and feeling with abstract thought, of intuitive imagination with logical reasoning, the reserve, the constant tact, the preference for suggestion rather than full expression, which had so often perplexed Ward in his intercourse with the other great thinker who had been his guide and intimate at Oxford, had no counterpart whatever in Mill. Mr. Bain says of Mill, "he had an intellect for the abstract and logical out of all proportion to his hold of the concrete and poetical;" and while Newman's delicate perception of the facts of human nature and of practical results, and his instinctive apprehension of considerations too numerous and subtle for scientific expression, made his whole attitude intellectually complex, Mill's view of life problems was clear and simple, and, it must be added, sometimes in consequence unpractical. It was, indeed, often very thorough and very profound, but it had the simplicity of *a priori* reasoning on ideal assumptions; and while Newman tempered his abstract conclusions by an instinctive (and sometimes unexplained) allowance for the "friction" of the concrete world, for the failure of the actual to correspond with the ideal, and for the probable effect of his words on this or that mind over and above the literal truth of what he said, Ward and Mill alike dealt with ideal results, and reasoned for minds filled exclusively with the dry light of philosophy.

Mill's sketch of the Ideal State is like Ward's Ideal Church, both in the thorough and extensive development of its fundamental principles, and in its serene and unchecked movement in an ether in which human beings cannot breathe. Both need adapting to the actual conditions of human nature. Mill advocated a large extension of the suffrage; and yet he held that no man is fit to have the suffrage who does not look on his vote as a solemn matter of conscience and public duty, rather than as a right at his own disposal (*Political Philosophy*, p. 80). This may be consistent with advocating an extended suffrage in an Utopian State; but few persons acquainted with the average English voter will hold out hopes of the condition being generally fulfilled in our own country and time. So, too,

when Ward describes the qualifications necessary for the priest of the Ideal Church, the reader feels that there is little prospect of their full and general realisation. Mr. Ward's altars and Mr. Mill's polling booths must remain very sparsely tenanted. Both sketches are intellectual conceptions with no perfect counterpart in real life.

But there was more in common between the Catholic and Agnostic logicians than mere sympathy in abstract thinking. Both are described by their friends as singularly free from personal feeling in their intellectual judgments, and singularly independent of party considerations. Sterling said of Mill: "He made the sacrifice of being the undoubted leader of a powerful party for the higher glory of being a private in the army of Truth, ready to storm any of the strong places of Falsehood, even if defended by his late adherents;" and enough is cited in Ward's biography, from the testimony of contemporaries, respecting his various phases of opinion, as Arnoldite and Newmanite, and as allied with the party nicknamed Ultramontane, to illustrate his share in this temper of mind. But above all, the intense philanthropy and moral earnestness of Mill, and his simplicity of intention and aim, won upon Ward and secured a good understanding.[1]

Both men were by mental temperament divested of the numerous prejudices and small purposes and designs, which so often mar the simplicity of even noble natures. This was due, no doubt, in part to a lack of the subtlest form of observation of human nature. Yet the sympathetic understanding of fallen man often comes under the shadow of the tree of knowledge; and the insensibility of both thinkers to many small things brought with it a simplicity and *momentum* in the pursuit of a few great objects, and the intellectual grasp of a few great principles; something which recalled the saying of the Florentine preacher, "*Le mie cose eran poche ma grande.*"

The sympathy, such as it was, was perhaps the more

[1] In a remarkable letter Mr. Gladstone has described Mill as the "saint of rationalism." Speaking of his Parliamentary career, he writes, "Of all motives, stings, and stimulants which reach men through their egoism in Parliament, no part could move or even touch him. His conduct and his language were in this respect a sermon."

remarkable from its limitations. Not only were their practical convictions opposed, but in personal temperament there was the greatest difference. A meeting—their first and last—was effected between them in November 1848 by their common friend, Mr. Frederick Lucas, editor of the *Tablet*, afterwards member for Meath. Ward had, as I have said, reviewed Mill's *Political Economy* for the *Tablet*, and was anxious to talk over the questions he had raised. I remember my father's description in later years of the interview. He was surprised at Mill's dryness of manner and want of *abandon*. There was none of the exuberant humour which was so much to Ward in personal intercourse. "Clear, calm, and cold," Mill is described by Miss Caroline Fox. "He looks at you like a basilisk, relentless as fate," she adds; and Ward's description was somewhat similar. Their interview did not, however, diminish their previous good understanding; and they discussed at length Ward's essay in the *Tablet*, which had been the occasion of the introduction.

Ward had in his article combined the strongest eulogiums of Mill's candour and love of truth, with emphatic denunciations of his "population" doctrine. Mill had treated the whole question from the point of view of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Improvident marriages, as leading to overpopulation, were offences against the community; and no moral offences had a deeper source of evil than this. He treated the conception that results of the nature of *moral* evil were quite different in *kind*, and therefore not commensurate, as a "religious prejudice." This practical denial of the whole conception of "sin" as such, naturally drew from Ward indignant remonstrances. The following passages are specimens of his language: "As if under the influence of some madness caused by his fear of excessive population he is led to propose schemes the most sharply and jarringly at variance with principles held sacred by all Christians, and that in a tone of solemn, confident, unsuspicious gravity which reminds one rather of some of Bentham's extraordinary freaks than of the present staid and considerate writer." Again: "His very fundamental proposal itself is proof sufficient how very little sensitive Mr. Mill is on the subject of any inherent turpitude characteristic of [offences against morality], of any

turpitude which they possess considered *as* sins and not merely as productive of external evils and inconveniences." Later on Ward writes: "Most shocking it is to have to say that this very idea from which the most ordinary moral instinct recoils with horror is precisely Mr. Mill's."

Mill was, perhaps not unnaturally, puzzled at the combination of warm praise on the score of disinterested moral purpose, with these round denunciations of his moral shortcomings. "How," he asked, "can you feel moral approbation towards a person in whom you find such serious moral faults?" Ward replied by touching on a question of curious interest—namely, the amount of the moral character, of right moral sympathy, judgment, taste, which is due to the individual's conscientious moral action, and the amount which is an inheritance or an acquisition—which comes with the inborn character, or is due to the qualities of our ancestors, or is imbibed early from the public opinion which surrounds us. The "good will" he held, indeed, to be all in all as the means of attaining to the highest moral character; but he emphasised the conditions which may warp the moral judgment for a long time, in spite of the conscientious cultivation of the "good will." The "good will" is the instrument; but the perfect moral judgment, and still more the perfect moral character, is, or may be, a later product. This view of things he developed in a lengthy and very characteristic letter which he wrote a week after their interview. I proceed to make some extracts from it:—

I was very sorry that an engagement which it was absolutely impossible to break or defer broke off the very pleasant interview I had with you last Tuesday week, and I trust to your kindness to excuse me if I trouble you with a most disproportionately long letter, to supply what there was no time to say by word of mouth. You need not read it all at once, much less need you think of being in any hurry to answer it, though I should undoubtedly take it as a favour if you *were* to answer it in due course of time, *e.g.*, within six months.

To one explanation, indeed, you have almost a right, viz., on the subject which we got upon just as I rose to go. That subject, if you remember, was the severe language I had used in regard to your character in one of my papers in the *Tablet* on your *Political Economy*. As I then said, I have no doubt my way of expressing myself was coarse and inartistic enough, but the thing I meant to express I am fully prepared to defend; otherwise, indeed, it would

have been unpardonable to say it; I mean to write without deliberation on so very serious a subject.

The first question you raised was, on what principle I could attribute, not merely dangerous *tendencies*, but a *very faulty state of mind* to one in whom I professed to recognise so much that is generous, disinterested, truth-seeking, and high-minded; and especially you asked, as I understood you, how anything can go to make up a virtuous or faulty character except a right or wrong direction of *the will*. I will first try and explain my meaning on that head, and then proceed to the special points I attacked in regard to your *Political Economy*.

Now, I should have thought that you would yourself admit that great defects of character might exist, notwithstanding right direction of the will. For example, a person holds as a principle the duty of implacable resentment against those who have injured him. Or, again, a person holds the principle of non-resistance in political matters as a most sacred duty. In either of these opposite cases, which I put merely as instances, you would allege (and I think very truly) that the *habit* and *temper* of mind is in itself faulty, *quite apart* from the question how far it is through the individual's fault that such *is* his temper of mind, and also quite apart from the question of results, except so far as on your principles (if I rightly understand them) *all* virtue is concerned with the question of results. You may say, of course, that a rightly directed will gives the best chance of a person's being *drawn out* of a faulty state of mind, and there I should quite agree with you. But I do not see how you can deny that, from circumstances over which he has absolutely *no* control, *e.g.*, education, public opinion, etc., his state of mind may be in itself a very faulty one. Indeed, if you will allow me to make the remark, I do not see how *on your principles* the question of will bears on virtue more than any other particular, seeing you look on the bias received by our will as being no less necessarily determined by circumstances (external and internal) than our stature of body or our natural disposition of mind.

For myself, as you well know, I contend for the doctrine of freewill as for a most sacred and essential principle, insomuch that absolute annihilation would be to me a less terrible prospect than the abandonment of that principle. And yet over and above what to me appear the absolutely undeniable and unmistakable proofs of that doctrine in the constitution of our mind, there appear to me equally undeniable and unmistakable proofs, in the *phenomena* of the moral world, of another fact which does not seem very naturally to harmonise with freewill; the fact, namely, that a very faulty (or, as I should naturally express it, very sinful) temper of mind, *i.e.*, very far indeed from accordant with the eternal principles of right, has commonly a number of other causes altogether

additional to and irrespective of a wrong exercise of freewill—such causes as bad education, a bad state of circumjacent public opinion, etc. So that in no case can you have any decided opinion as to how far the individual is responsible for his faults, and in many cases one has a most consoling hope that to a great extent he is *not* responsible for them.

Now, these two truths are certainly not in terms or in ideas *contradictory* to each other, and yet there is that amount of obscurity in their relations to each other, and that amount of apparent contradictoriness in their respective *tendency*, which suffices to constitute what we call in theology a *mystery*. And both sides of the mystery which appear to me so plainly written on the surface of phenomena have also been always recognised in the Catholic Church—the one in the doctrine of *sin* and of *accountability* and future judgment, the other in the doctrine of *original sin* and of *grace*. No doubt more may be done than has as yet (so far as I know) been done to trace this mystery to its ultimate points and adjust its opposite sides; but it has always been held by Catholics that a view of that field of truth which so embraces both sides as to bring their tendencies into harmony is radically inaccessible in the present life; that it is part of that great abyss of God's secret counsels, whose knowledge is to be part of our future reward.

Will you please to excuse this sort of dogmatic way of writing, which I don't see how to avoid if I wish to express what I mean with any clearness and without infinite circumlocution. All that remains to be added on this part of the subject is that it is also a matter of clear undeniable experience how much of *good* temper of mind may exist with how much of *evil*.

The letter proceeds to deal with the population problem, and while not denying that the question of ability to support a family is an important one, it renews the extremely outspoken protests of the *Tablet* review, against placing on a similar footing consequences which entail merely earthly discomfort, and the direct offences against morality to which Mill's suggestions appeared to his critic to lead by logical consequence. Ward owns to his outspokenness, and claims indulgence:—

You will, I am sure, be yourself the first to excuse any apparent rudeness or incivility in anything I have said above. We have no hope of coming to an understanding without plainness of speech; and I am, of course, prepared to receive in return attacks and imputations quite as strong and as plain-spoken against Catholicism and Christianity.

Having once sat down to write to Mill, the temptation was overpowering to ply him with questions; and the letter ran on in the end to over thirty pages of very minute writing. He looked on Mill as a wonderful repository of those "facts" which he was ever longing to know in order to satisfy his eager interest in all that concerned human happiness. He consulted him on such subjects much as a Greek citizen in search of wisdom would go to a philosopher. He as little looked for limitations in Mill's acquaintance with facts—historical, scientific, and psychological—as for agreement in his conclusions; and he was as docile in accepting the first as he was prepared to be combative in rejecting the last. There was something, too, in Mill's sense that the whole pursuit of knowledge was "the great cause," in working for which one man should help another in all simplicity, which, as Ward often intimated, made him feel it possible to approach him without a sense of intrusion. The questions ranged widely, and revealed the interests and difficulties which haunted their proposer:—

Would you allow me now to ask you one or two questions for information? For one thing, I am exceedingly anxious to have some general idea, or even accurate idea if possible, of the state of life among the lower classes; the amount of their suffering, the depression of their spirits in consequence, etc. etc.; the amount of work they have to do; the amount of crime. I feel most painfully my total ignorance on this subject, arising, partly, from an Oxford life, but more from an (in one sense) *unpractical* turn of mind. I mean, I have no power at all to go among the poor and judge for myself; my faculty of *observation* is so deplorably inadequate. Can you tell me what books, if there are such, will give me the best and most trustworthy information? Do you, or do you not, think that the poor are on the whole better clothed and fed, and enjoy life more than in Queen Elizabeth's time, or in the feudal time? And what are the sort of *data* on which a conclusion may be formed? You know Macaulay, in one of his articles, dwells a great deal on an alleged fact that *fish* was a luxury to the poor in old times, and is *rejected* by them now as insufficient. Again I have been told that Disraeli is an accurate observer of such facts. Is this so? does his *Sybil*, for instance, give a just idea of the mechanic's *mind?* His notion is evidently just the opposite to Macaulay's; and next to Judaism he seems to prefer the Catholic machinery of the Middle Ages.

By the way, you asked me, apparently with some surprise,

whether I agreed in all your *Political Economy* except the population doctrine. To the best of my judgment I do; though on many of these matters I have no right to an opinion. But what doctrine of yours was it *in particular* with which you were surprised at finding me in accordance?

Now for a mathematical question. My mathematical powers are very good, and I am well acquainted with great part, *e.g.* of Poisson's *Mécanique.* Now I have a great inclination to pursue the subject into the *Mécanique Céleste;* and I wish to know what book you would recommend. I have heard that Laplace himself is such very hard reading for a beginning; then is there some *commentator* on him who will make him easier (I think I have heard of some American)? or would a book like Pontécoulant (which I possess) make the great man more easily accessible? I think I have heard *Mrs. Somerville's* book spoken of as rather below the mark.

Also, as to Laplace's theory about the origin of the planets. Is it involved in it that if we knew for certain which is the extreme planet, we could tell when the sun's atmosphere *began* cooling? Is it also involved in it, that new planets *continue* being thrown off? Also does not the gradual diminution of the sun's volume gradually affect its *attraction,* and so the orbit of the planets? I daresay these questions of mine display great ignorance; indeed my ignorance of astronomy *is* very profound; the study of *plane* astronomy was always so distasteful to me, and *physical* astronomy I happened not to have time to pursue.

Might I further ask a question not now merely for information but with a *controversial* "connotation," viz., have you any particular idea *when* the existing state of things began and why? *e.g.,* why did not the sun's atmosphere begin cooling sooner? etc. etc.

I have been reading your *Logic* through a second time, and with very great admiration of a great deal in it. But I confess I am more than ever surprised at your acquiescing in the theory which would attribute to *sensible experiment* the first principles of *arithmetic and geometry;* and claim for them no higher certainty than for the law of universal causation. You observe, in one place, that it is quite conceivable that in some distant star there may be *no* law of causation; that phenomena may succeed each other quite at haphazard. In all which I quite agree. Now do you really mean that it is quite conceivable that in such a star two straight lines may enclose a space, or the sum of equals be *un*equal? or do you really mean that the contradictory to this is not absolutely certain? I am quite perplexed by such an opinion. Again, what you say of the possibility of proving geometrical first principles by merely *mental* experimentation, is not this of itself a proof that their truth depends exclusively on the *laws of the mind?* This last argument I pressed, I remember, in my review on your *Logic.*

I should also say, in speaking of your *Logic*, that you have not converted me to your general view of logic, not even on the hypothesis that your opinions were just as to experimentation and induction being the sole means whereby we obtain accession to our knowledge. Even if I held this, I should still think the process of *reasoning* quite sufficiently important and sufficiently "ingenious" to require an art of its own; and to be kept separate from inductive logic *most important* though the latter be.

I met the other day, by accident, with the following passage in De Lugo, one of the latest and very greatest of the scholastic writers (he was a Spaniard, contemporary with our Charles the First); does it not strike you as indicating that the doctrine you enforce so earnestly in your *Logic* concerning *propositions* (*i.e.*, that they are comparisons of *things* not *ideas*) was one fully recognised in scholastic philosophy, however departed from in modern systems?

"In judicio per compositionem, non requiritur cognitio reflexa *apprehensionum* extremorum, sed directa de *identitate inter ipsa extrema objectiva.*"

He is merely mentioning it by the way, as an acknowledged principle, in illustration of a further point concerning syllogisms for which he is contending. It is a strange thing to say, but (Newman was the first person from whom I heard the remark) there is a great similarity in many respects, to my mind, between the scholastic treatment of theology and the *positive* of philosophy; Newman was speaking particularly of Bentham, and comparing the precision with which he described phenomena and his zeal in tracing them to their ultimate elements, with the parallel habits of dogmatic writers. On the other hand, directly I get upon such writers as Kant (though I know *very* little of him and that little through a French *medium*) I get quite bewildered by the general atmosphere of *vagueness*, and, as M. Comte would say, "metaphysicalness."

However, as to logic, I am rather projecting a series of papers on the subject in a Catholic monthly periodical called the *Rambler*. I will write you word if I begin them, because there will be several comments on your *Logic*.

Will you also tell me whether you concur with Mr. Mill, your father, in his low opinion of Butler, the author of *The Analogy?* He is a writer for whom I feel myself an enthusiastic veneration; he seems to me to tower above the Stewarts and Reids and Browns, as a being of another world. I am assuming that Mr. Mill was the author of a book called *A Fragment on Mackintosh.*

But a subject of deeper interest found its place in this correspondence. Here was a man who was at once the representative of the "unbelieving" school, the spread of whose fundamental tenets Ward anticipated, and whose method and

spirit were absolutely accessible to his capacity. The opportunity was not to be lost of obtaining light on this anxious and all-important subject, even at the risk of appearing inquisitive:—

You will not be surprised, I am sure, considering the deep interest I myself feel in theology (the only study in my feelings which to pursue is really to *live;* in following others one does but *vegetate*) that I am rather anxious to understand to the bottom your grounds of unbelief. I hope you will not consider me intrusive in speaking on the subject, and I can assure you whatever you may think fit to reply will be received *in the strictest confidence;* because I quite understand, in the existing state of religious feeling, that a public profession of infidelity is what no Englishman can be fairly expected to make; and I have been always very much struck, if you will allow me to say so, by the skill with which you have united such perfect honesty of expression with the reserve which your opinions necessitated.

Now as to the doctrine of *final causes*, though I most strongly incline to the opinion that that argument admits of being stated in a most forcible and unanswerable manner, yet I am never surprised, under present circumstances, at that argument appearing to one versed in physical science as the merest folly and superstition. Untenable propositions are so mixed up with tenable in all the religious books on the subject I happen to know, and such a spirit of declamatory exaggeration, and a pressing of the theory of innate ideas to such preposterous lengths, that even myself I get quite tempted to turn Atheist while reading them. I should tell you, however (which you may possibly not know), that the modern language, as to the almost self-evidence of Theism, is quite at variance with the older Catholic writers. For instance, De Lugo, whom I lately quoted about logic, says "existentiam Dei *vix potest eximius philosophus evidenter demonstrare*"; and Suarez, a name equally renowned in our schools, "ex dictis omnibus evidentissima quadam experientia constare potest, quam a veritate aliena sit sententia supra relata quae asserebat *per se notum* Deum esse. Constat enim ex dictis magnâ consideratione et speculatione opus esse ad veritatem hanc efficaciter persuadendam; quomodo ergo existimari potest haec veritas per se nota? . . . Multi gentiles de hac re dubitarant . . . et haeretici . . . et nonnulli etiam fideles et docti negant eam veritatem esse evidentem." That is, some, even Catholics, *deny* that it can be *demonstrated* at all; much more, therefore, says Suarez, does it follow that at least it is a truth which *requires* a great deal of argument to demonstrate.

Without entering, however, here into the question, what means the heathen had of learning this truth (as I should express myself),

I am really very anxious to have your feeling as to the external positive facts on which Christianity rests. For example, what is your view of *St. Paul's* character? Take such a book as Paley's *Horae Paulinae*, what is your idea about it? Did he fanatically believe himself to work miracles? or how? Of course, in asking such a question, I imply that I quite wish to have an answer, *i.e.*, that I could not wish you to refrain from any language which you feel deserved, however severe against St. Paul, though I invoke him as a saint. . . . I would much rather you would write exactly as you feel.

I remember, it is true, that in your *Logic* you maintain that belief in God must necessarily precede belief in miracles; but in so saying surely you go counter to all inductive philosophy. It was the movement of the heavenly bodies which led to a discovery of gravitation; it would have been very odd logic to say, *prove* gravitation on its own grounds, or else I will not believe that the planets are influenced by it. Surely if you saw a man whose whole demeanour impressed you with a perception of his integrity and also common-sense, whose past history was well known to you as the history of a most upright and conscientious person, whose knowledge and ability and cool-headedness were beyond dispute, if such a person were to say, "pour me out a glass of pump-water," and when you had done so, were to add, "now, as a proof that God has sent me, I will change this into sherry wine," and if the change accordingly took place in your presence, and you kept the wine and showed it to wine merchants, and all agreed it was real sherry —would not this be a proof that there *is* a God? I am of course choosing my own circumstances, in order to illustrate a general principle, viz. that a person has no right, on grounds of his *a priori* disbelief in God, to refuse an examination of the definite miracles alleged in the Gospel.

You will not, of course, understand me to mean that there is no real evidence of God apart from Christianity, and no real evidence of Christianity apart from miracles; much less that miracles could prove an *immoral* religion (for if there *were*, *per impossibile*, an *immoral* omnipotent being, it would be no sin, but a virtue, to disobey him); but I think that with many minds the plain fact of miracles is one on which one may especially insist as a beginning. For surely so much as this is true, that if there are broad facts in the history of the world such as St. Paul's miracles, St. Paul being what he was, an able, upright, and generous man (to put it at the lowest), which facts a person sees no way of contradicting—he is bound in such a case at least to *suspend a confident judgment* as to the falsehood of Christianity and inclusively of Theism. But, as Butler has very well pointed out, a person who admits that Christianity may possibly be true, thereby becomes at once bound,

by the duty of prudence, to a certain line of conduct; and the question is whether by pursuing that line of conduct he will not find *evidence* continually to *increase*.

The final paragraph of the letter is interesting from its date (1848). It supports a line of criticism on Mill's modified Utilitarianism which has since been fruitfully developed, but which had at that time hardly taken shape. Logicians will remember that Mill in his *Logic* speaks of our ultimate ideas or states of consciousness as being, necessarily, the limits of all "explanation" of phenomena. Ward applies this statement to the conception of duty, maintaining that it *is* ultimate and irresolvable, involving something generically distinct from the associations of pleasurable consequences by which Utilitarians explain it. And it need hardly be added that Mill's admission of quality as well as quantity into the happiness with which ethics are concerned, adds point to the criticism, as showing a latent suspicion in Mill himself that the Benthamite "greatest happiness" analysis had not really got to the bottom of the question.

Going back to a point of philosophy; while I cannot for my own part at all concur with those who maintain that the idea of *God* is innate in the human mind, the more I think the more convinced I am of what I maintained in my article on your *Logic*, that the idea of "*right*" is so: "duty," "obligation," "ought," these are the words which point to the idea I mean. It seems to me that on the principle contained in your chapter "On the Limits to the Explanation of Laws of Nature," and again on your often-repeated principle that no manipulation of *names* or *ideas* can give one a knowledge of *things*, my conclusion is irresistible. From whence can come all our ideas of the inherent superiority of one thing over another? *e.g.*, that a life of self-restraint is more admirable than a life of license? The idea "beneficial" seems to me as obviously different an idea as "warm" does from "light." And again trace things back ever so far, children have no natural idea of God, but as plainly they *have* a natural idea of "ought" and "duty." This is quite apart from the question what particular course of conduct *is* right, *is* our duty; it merely points out that we have a definite idea conveyed by the *word* "right" or "duty," as much as by the word "sweet." All this, of course, you utterly dissent from; and I should much like to hear your line of argument on the other side.

I should also like to hear what you thought of a line of remark in my article on your *Logic* (in case you happen to remember it), in which I maintained that a belief in uniformity of sequences

in *phenomena* is in no way inconsistent with a belief in the active and constant operation of God's Providence *under* these sequences? I should like to know whether you think my ideas on the subject *self-contradictory* or not. Long afterwards I found I had unawares been drawing out a line of argument which *Dr. Chalmers* had preceded me in.

And now I bring to a close this gigantic and multifarious letter. There is hardly any one else in the world to whom I should venture to write so much at length where there are such vast differences of opinion; but you always appear so singularly accessible to argument and free from prejudice, as to draw upon yourself such inflictions as the present. Pray, at all events, excuse the liberty I have taken, and believe me to remain, with great regard, ever, my dear sir, very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

That Mill did answer Ward's communication at some length is plain from a letter of Ward's written in the following year; but his answer is not preserved. He does not appear to have kept a copy of it as he did of subsequent letters; and the original has perished. There are indications of occasional notes passing between the two men in the years immediately following, but I have nothing of importance. The correspondence was more continuously resumed, after a long interval, in 1865. Much had happened during the intervening years. Both men were then in the decline of life, and were fixed and confirmed in their views on most subjects. This further correspondence was connected with the public polemic between them, which occupied Mr. Ward's closing years, and must be reserved for a later chapter.

Two years after the communications with Mill which have just been spoken of, Mr. Ward consulted another great thinker—Sir William Hamilton—on his difficulties in connection with the foundations of religious belief. Ward's own letter is not extant, but its substance is indicated in Hamilton's reply. And it is interesting to gather from it how early his opinion was manifested that the traditional arguments for Theism leave much to be desired. Sir W. Hamilton's reply ran as follows:—

I have to apologise for not sooner answering your letter; but it arrived at a juncture when I was much occupied with the opening of our college session, and at the same time not very well able to get through the necessary bustle and business of the season. I was

therefore under the necessity of adjourning the acknowledgment of your note till I should have more leisure at my disposal. I beg leave to say that you are by no means a stranger to me; at least I have both read and admired your *Ideal of a Christian Church*, and likewise, as a member of the same college, I felt much interested in your case. I only regret that my answers to your questions will be so very meagre and unsatisfactory.

1. In regard to what you say about the argument from design, it appears to me that Kant's objection to it, as proving no more than *very great* power and wisdom in a Creator, is logically unanswerable. For all our experience, indeed all our possible conception, is only of the finite (be the universe in itself finite or infinite); and we cannot logically infer more in the conclusion than was contained in the premises. But as the progress is uninterrupted and continuous, finding always, the deeper we go, the greater intelligence, we may, I think, with high probability infer that the process will be indefinitely, or infinitely, of the same character. On this point I am happy to find that your opinion is at one with mine.

2. In regard to the argument from man's moral constitution, you are of course aware of Kant's celebrated proof of the Deity on that ground. What Kant says in his moral argument, along with what he admits of the physico-theological proof, seems to me very strong, if not absolutely convincing.

3. I am not sure that I rightly understand your inference from "the impossibility of a past infinity of succession in time, clearly proving a being or beings external to time," for infinity in all shapes is beyond the limit of our faculties.

You say that you are perplexed for "a proof of *one* Creator not many." On this I think the law of parsimony may be allowed to decide—*Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.*

I quite agree with you as to the difficulty of "the step from *enormous* power to *infinite* power," but the logical objection may, I think, be extenuated as mentioned above.

In regard to authors who have discussed these points (presuming that you read German) you will find, as I recollect, a great number of excellent observations scattered through the treatises of Kant and relative writers; especially among the writings of Jacobi. I would, however, wish to recommend to your notice in particular a treatise, in two parts, by the celebrated George Hermes of Bonn, entitled *Einleitung in die Christkatholische Theologie*, second edition, Münster, 1831. There is at the end of my copy of the first volume a "Studir-Plan der Theologie," which you would probably find useful. Hermes was a powerful thinker and had none of the fantastic extravagance of so many Germans. He, however, had a quarrel with the Archbishop of Cologne, and his doctrine was, in

some subordinate points, condemned by the Catholic Church—at least by the Pope. He has been dead for a considerable time, but before his death above twenty professors, philosophical and theological, in various German universities, owned themselves his disciples. In fact the Hermesian is one of the recognised schools of German speculation.

These fundamental problems of religious metaphysics were, however, in great part set aside by Mr. Ward for some twenty years; and the interval brought about some change in his point of view. The events which have now to be recorded turned his attention to more practical matters. His professorship at St. Edmund's changed the current of his thoughts. It brought him across the rising generation of Catholic priests, and led to a work and influence quite as much ethical as intellectual. It was the beginning too of his intimate association with three men, Wiseman, Manning, and Vaughan, who were all destined to become great powers in the Church, and to be wearers of the Roman purple.

CHAPTER III

TEACHING THEOLOGY

1851–1858

Mr. Ward finally accepted the position of Lecturer in Moral Philosophy at St. Edmund's College in October 1851. The chair of Dogmatic Theology itself was offered to him and accepted[1] a year later. According to the saying, "If you want to learn a thing you should teach it," he acquired, during the seven years of his professorship, a minute acquaintance with the whole range of theological literature which stood him in good stead through life.

But besides the importance of these years as an intellectual training, they were also in the end a source of considerable influence in the Catholic Church. St. Edmund's College was at that time the St. Sulpice of the Catholic body in this country, in which the clergy of all the southern dioceses went through their theological studies. The great ascendancy which Mr. Ward obtained over the minds of his pupils thus extended, eventually, to a large section of the priesthood in England. Some who afterwards attained to considerable eminence were among those who attended his lectures. Dr. Herbert Vaughan[2] (now Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster), Father Keogh (afterwards Superior of the London Oratory), Monsignor Gilbert (Vicar General of Westminster), Father Butler (now Rector of St. Charles's College), may be mentioned among this number. Some of them continued their course in Rome; and

[1] It was accepted in fact although not in name as will appear shortly.

[2] It will appear in the sequel that the Cardinal Archbishop was Vice-President during part of Mr. Ward's professorship. He attended the lectures, however, regularly, and appended his signature to the farewell address presented to Mr. Ward by his pupils in 1858.

men who were closely associated with Roman authorities, such as Wiseman, Manning, Vaughan, became intimate with Mr. Ward in his professorial capacity. Hence arose his relations with leading Roman professors, such as Father Perrone, Cardinal Franzelin, Father Cardella, and with the friend and constant companion of Pius IX., Monsignor George Talbot.

The feeling which had made the college authorities hesitate before placing a convert and a layman in the position of Professor of Theology, did not cease after the appointment; and Mr. Ward commenced his task in the face of strong prejudice on the part of professors and divinity students alike. He felt considerable diffidence, moreover, at the outset, as to his power of interesting his pupils. He often described to me his first lecture. The priesthood had ever been to him an unattainable ideal of all that was truly great. An ecclesiastical student was three-fourths of the way to this unearthly dignity, and he entered a lecture room filled with some forty objects of his deepest reverence. This feeling, coupled with his inveterate shyness in company which was strange to him, brought him to an extremity of nervousness. For some time he hardly dared to look up from his notes, and felt sure that he was "boring" his hearers to death. "At last," he used to say, "I looked up for a moment, and my fears were confirmed. I saw A. B., who sat just opposite to me, preparing to yawn. It was not an ordinary yawn, but a long, deliberate yawn of infinite ennui. He stretched his arms and moved back his head, and opened his mouth and yawned out and out."

And so the lectures commenced with a suggestion, which as they went on his worst enemy did not venture to repeat, that they were dull. He to some extent disarmed the opposition which rested on his not being in Holy Orders, taking the bull by the horns and raising the objection himself. "When first the Cardinal and Bishop of Southwark [Bishop Grant] asked me to give some lectures to the divines," he wrote shortly afterwards to Dr. Manning, "I felt as a layman that the only service I could do would be to try and enlarge and strengthen their minds. I lectured, therefore, on a philosophical subject, but one as closely bearing on theology as any I could select. The next year, when the Cardinal begged me to give another course, the President, Dr. Weathers, asked of me as a favour

to make it entirely theological. I objected as being a layman, and made a condition that he or some other priest should always be present. To this he assented, and so it has been from that day to this. When my lectures took root (as I may say), and the President wished to make my position permanent, he wished to instal me as Professor of Dogmatics, but I would not assent to any other title than that of 'Assistant Lecturer,' that the name itself might mark my subordinate position."

The extent to which Mr. Ward did, in fact, surmount the difficulties of the position, and secure the confidence of his pupils and the trust of the really responsible superiors, is best shown by the testimony of some of those concerned. Father Alexius Mills, one of his first pupils, gives the following account of the lectures themselves and of Mr. Ward's influence:—

I was one of the first of Dr. Ward's pupils, and enjoyed the privilege of his instruction for several years. I look upon it as nothing less than a great grace that I was allowed all this; and any good that I have been able to do since my ordination I attribute to your father. It may have contributed to bind us, his first students, more to him and him to us, that we had to suffer no little persecution together, and this from those of "our own household." I do not know whether you have ever heard of these matters, but the opposition of priests (and of good priests, too, which made the trial all the more severe) was so strong that, after a while, it succeeded in depriving St. Edmund's of his priceless labours. That he was a convert and a married man was deemed an unanswerable argument against his position. You can conceive how high the feeling ran when such a good pious man as A. B. refused to have myself or the late C. D. as assistant priests at his mission, because we were what they chose to call "Wardites." The case was taken to Rome, and Pius IX. (who was fond of conveying a rebuke in a pleasant way, and who probably saw through the character of the opposition) said to the prelate who was engaged over the case, "My lord, it is a novel objection to any one who is engaged in the work of God that he has received one Sacrament of Holy Church which neither you nor I can possibly receive."

Dr. Ward's manner of lecturing, I should suppose, was entirely his own. He dispensed with all the usual externals of the lecturer; he sat in the midst of us in one of our own places, and might have been taken by a visitor for a student himself, except when he was speaking:—seldom any action—it was more like one

who was reading with a clear and beautifully musical voice what he saw written upon his own mind. You could not be distracted in his presence while he lectured, for his bright eye caught and fixed you. I suppose he has seldom had his equal in power of illustration, by means of which he made every point not only clear but interesting also; while the illustration itself (always a remarkable one) served us all the purpose of a technical memory.

His moral influence over us was simply unbounded. In fact it was this power which, perhaps more than anything else, brought down upon us and him no little portion of our persecution. I may say it now, when it has passed away, without being suspected of being led away by feeling after all these years, that it was Dr. Ward's power over us that was chiefly objected to by superiors. I have no doubt but that we young men behaved imprudently and thoughtlessly in our joy at the possession of such a teacher. But then the grave elders who had charge of us should have remembered two things—first, that we *were* young, and secondly, that we had never seen such light before and were naturally dazzled by it.

But no one could be with Dr. Ward as a pupil who was indifferent. He could not have borne with him. . . . I should suppose that the chief secret of his success with his pupils lay in his great gift of compelling you at starting to admit that you were engaged in a great cause, and that the only road to avoid failure was that which he led you into. After a while you felt yourself growing into a partisan of something which was worth defending, and ended by becoming (our opponents said) a fanatic whom it was best to leave undisturbed.

I may supplement this account by some reminiscences by Father Lescher of Notting Hill. After speaking of the thoroughness of Mr. Ward's treatment of the questions raised by his pupils—"We were completely floored by his answers," he writes, "and felt the ground taken from under our feet"—he continues:—

But what chiefly gained our hearts was his wonderful earnestness. He carried us away with him, and often we came out of his lecture as if we had been to a retreat sermon. He said simple things so forcibly. I remember to this day the way in which he quoted Butler on Conscience, "Which, had it might as it has right, would rule the world."

His great love of the poor also, and his extreme desire that we should carry to them the real substantial food of the Gospel, of doctrinal truth, won the love of all of us. He got quite moved to tears, whilst, with uplifted face to Heaven, he dwelt on their unfair

position;—the beautiful truths of the Church often unknown to them, and nothing to gratify their propensions but sin.

I must not forget to say a word on his great personal love of God which came out in these lectures. Coming from his lecture was like coming from the lectures of St. Thomas, whose heart burned with what he taught. I shall never forget the way in which he brought before us strongly the Presence of God amongst us, and the ingratitude of forgetting One who, though our greatest benefactor, stood like a forgotten friend in a corner of the room. It was like an electric shock. The manner in which he got absorbed in his subject when he poured out the claims of God, with his eyes lifted up to Heaven, was something which leaves a picture which cannot be described. Yet, with all this power of conquest over us, he has told students that he went often to his lectures with fear and trembling, lest he should be a bore to us.

He used to say in the beginning, "I am only teaching you human nature. When I have taught you so much I shall hand you over to some one fitted to lead you into the regions of grace. I can only take you to the border land of that unspeakably great subject." But it was clear that no one could do that as well as he, and to our great joy he was allowed to unfold real Theology to us.

I am afraid that we should have resisted any other teacher, if a new one had been forced upon us. We believed in Ward and Ward only. One of the college professors was complaining to him about our self-conceit. "Why, they will not listen to a word against your teaching!"—"Well," he said, "that is rather *Ward conceit* than self-conceit."

Dr. Weathers, the President (now Bishop of Amycla), soon became a firm supporter of Mr. Ward's position; and the confidence of Cardinal Wiseman was his mainstay in holding his ground against the prejudice of some of the other college authorities. In both cases the actual effect of the lectures, in arousing interest and securing thorough work among the students, was quite decisive in their favour. When, in 1854, Mr. Ward spoke of retiring, in consequence of the known opposition of the clergy of the diocese, the Cardinal wrote: "I should sincerely deplore your thinking of leaving us. Indeed I will say and do everything in my power to avoid such a calamity." In the same year Pio Nono, at the Cardinal's request, conferred on Mr. Ward the degree of Doctor in Philosophy as a mark of confidence. He sent at the same time the degree of Doctor in Divinity to Father Faber, with whose views and teaching Ward was closely

associated. A well-known prelate, who resided at some distance from London, went there on purpose to throw in the weight of his influence against Mr. Ward. The Cardinal, however, although his constitutional nervousness (Mr. Ward used to say) made it almost impossible for him to say "no" to a man's face, submitted to be lectured for the whole day, accompanied his visitor, elated with apparent success, to the station, and, as the train was actually moving off, appended to his cordial "good-bye" the remark, "By the way, I am arranging for Mr. Ward to continue in his post as lecturer." In 1855 fresh difficulties arose, and the Cardinal again ultimately secured for Mr. Ward the conditions which he found necessary for his continuance in office.

Mr. Ward's own method of preparation for his lectures has been described to me by the most intimate of the friends who had been his pupils, Father Butler. The scheme for the whole year, with its divisions and subdivisions, was mathematically arranged at starting. The general plan of the lectures was thought out some weeks beforehand. A few notes or headings, based on his theological reading and thought, were then written down. The final preparation for each lecture was achieved in a solitary walk shortly before its delivery. The notes were read before starting, and in the course of the walk the whole lecture was developed with entire completeness and accuracy, and committed to paper immediately on his return home. There were three lectures a week, and the half hour preceding each lecture was a time of similar intensity of concentration. The sketch of the lecture was read, and every point in order worked up, even so far as the very words to be used in any matter which required special care in its expression. He worked it up as an actor may work up his part at the last moment.

The lecture once ready, Mr. Ward's next concern was to make sure that every one profited by it. "His plan," writes Father Mills, "was the following: To deliver his lecture while we took notes. At the end he gave us a series of questions upon all that he had said. They were invariably most exhaustive—perfect *extractum carnis*, the whole essence without any superfluity. These questions we had to answer, and send him our answers before the next lecture, when he would bring

them corrected. I think it was the great task of going over these hundreds of pages that brought on Dr. Ward's first illness. The result of his system was that each of us, at the end of the year, was in possession of several magnificent treatises obtained from him, but still in a very useful second-hand manner our own."

On Thursdays a "private audience" was given to any of his pupils who wished to avail themselves of it. Theology and ascetics were discussed in their speculative and practical bearing alike, and difficulties were answered. This and the frequent walks and rides with them, were his chief opportunities for private influence.

And it was in these personal relations with his pupils that we get the key to his often-repeated saying that this period was the happiest of his life. It was a period of many trials, of much opposition to his influence, of much misunderstanding. But he was daily coming in contact with men who were to be priests, and was receiving daily evidence that he was helping to form their characters and minds. If the priestly ideal was out of the question for himself, here was the next best thing. And so it came to pass that not theology as a merely abstract science, but the formation of the priestly character, was his one great interest. He enlarged his acquaintance with the literature of the "interior life," which had ever been so attractive to him, and endeavoured to blend it with Dogmatic Theology. In the voluminous correspondence with Cardinal Wiseman and the other responsible superiors at that time, an ideal priesthood, and the discipline necessary to its formation, is the one topic. The "science of saints," the spiritual exercises, the art of meditation, spiritual direction—these were the subjects with which he wished to make the future priests more and more familiar. Dogma was treated not merely as the teaching of theologians, but as the food of saints; and the lectures themselves were designed to show its practical use in the spiritual life,—in the daily meditation of the educated priest, in the simpler prayers of the poor. The recognised danger that the theologian may become abstract, unreal, and unpractical—interested as it has been expressed in the truth of conclusions rather than the reality of facts—was insisted on. Father Mills, referring to the fre-

quent walks and talks, says that the conversation constantly came back to these points.

"Mission work," adds Father Mills, "the importance of preaching Dogma to the people, the Incarnation in all its fulness, making them get a glimpse of the invisible realities—these were our constant topics. He was wont to say that a Christian priest, without a personal knowledge of Christ, ought to seek out some desolate island so as to live alone and do no harm."

Life at this time became so identified with theology and ecclesiastical training, that the scholastic phraseology passed into the conversation of everyday intercourse. And the Roman habit, so easily misunderstood by Englishmen, of using this technical language in illustrations and jokes came naturally to him.

"I remember," writes Father Mills, "when riding out once (he was always a nervous horseman) we came to quite a narrow gully, which, if crossed, would save a great detour. He was afraid to attempt it. His groom leaped backwards and forwards over it several times to show him how easy it was, assuring him at the same time that he knew exactly what he could do as a rider and what not, and that he was certain there was neither difficulty nor danger in the least degree. Still Dr. Ward hesitated, and at length turning to us, he said: 'I shall go back. I cannot cross it, yet all the while I know perfectly well that I can. You see here I am a striking instance of Faith without Hope. I have perfect belief in the statement of the groom; he knows better than I do my capabilities in his line. I have not the slightest doubt but that he is right. Yet I cannot bring myself to hope that I should do it—therefore I never shall. Faith is useless without Hope.' And we had to go all the way back."

Old Oxford friends were all the time puzzled at Ward's burying himself in Hertfordshire, teaching a handful of men who were to be "Roman priests," keeping away from the world and from his property. The whole life seemed to them to be on such unimportant lines, cut off from that great world of English thought to which he had a right to belong. But to Ward himself perhaps the most characteristic feeling about the life was its importance. What was the interest of intellectual coteries or of a landed property when compared to the great war between good and evil in the

world? And he conceived of that war after the model of St. Ignatius's celebrated meditation of the two standards. The world was in two camps—the camp of Christ and of Satan. The Catholic Church was the advanced guard of the former. The priests were its picked men. To fashion good priests in England was to be in the very front of the most important public work. That English public opinion did not recognise this affected him not one jot. Indeed, he rather enjoyed disconcerting its representatives. "May I ask," said a man of the world, who talked to him at Cardinal Wiseman's about matters of public interest, and was struck by his powers and information, "to whom I have the pleasure of speaking?"—"I am a master at a Roman Catholic college," was the only account of himself which Ward gave in reply; and he chuckled over the surprise and slight contempt which at once replaced his interlocutor's interest in him.

The college chapel at Old Hall impressed his imagination as the scene of far more important events than Downing Street. "What place do you think in all England does the devil look to for his most dangerous work?" he suddenly asked of the Vice-President in the course of a walk. "That building," he continued, pointing to the college, and he proceeded to explain his meaning. "The Catholic religion is the great hope for England. The advance of Catholicism depends, under God, almost entirely on a good priesthood. The large majority of the priests are formed at the college. If he can succeed in damaging the priestly spirit at the college, the bulk of England's future priests are damaged, and the country is irreparably injured."

The following letters to Cardinal Newman—the first of them accompanying a gift of his examination questions in Theology—give incidentally his own impression of the nature of the work before him. They were written in the earliest years of the lectureship, and in the interval between the two Achilli Trials. Newman was staying with Lord and Lady Arundel, afterwards Duke and Duchess of Norfolk:—

23 Westbourne Terrace, Hyde Park, London,
20*th December* 1852.

My dear Father Newman—I find from Faber that a copy of the enclosed, which I had sent him for you (expecting you to be

in town) is not likely to reach you for some time. So I send you another copy.

You must understand that the questions *have* been answered; and are now put together for the convenience of the fellows in getting up the thing for examination. At the end of each lecture I gave questions on the matter of it; looked over the answers before the next lecture; and judged *from* the answers how far I could go on, or whether it would be necessary to repeat the old ground.

The present intention, on part both of Cardinal, Bishop of Southwark, and President, seems to be that I shall continue; but I always feel that my lecturing existence hangs upon a thread. I am getting up for the month of March "De Ignorantia," "De Libero" and (if time), "De Peccatis et Virtutibus." It is far the most interesting work I ever had in my life. About *half* of my class *like* it (some very much indeed); about half find it a *bore*, and some grumble a good deal at being carried (as they consider) quite out of their professional course. . . . Having an extra lecture to give at the end (*i.e.*, without being able to give *questions*), I took the opportunity of arguing out this position; alluding to the immense importance of dogmatic studies with a view to catechising the poor (children or adults), teaching them to revolve the mysteries while they say the Rosary, etc.

I trust you are getting better from your rest. I am quite certain you could have found no place nor company more thoroughly conducive to refreshment and enjoyment. I think Lord Arundel the most *refreshing* man I ever came across. He and Lucas are my two ideals (in their different ways) of a model layman.—Believe me, ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

23 WESTBOURNE TERRACE, 11*th Jan.* 1853.

MY DEAR FATHER NEWMAN—I had this morning a most kind letter about my lectures from *the President*, mentioning (what he was so good as to call) the great good he had already found them working in the fellows' minds, so I can't help being somewhat hopeful. *They* also, I am told now, with very few exceptions, take to them much; several included who were much prejudiced against them at first. One of these was part of a deputation, who (entirely by their own suggestion, Dr. Weathers says) called on me with a most complimentary sort of address; and the Examination in them (which was subsequent to my letter to you) showed that they had all really taken the *greatest pains* to get them up.

In my last lecture I tried to put before them a *view* as to the bearing of the matter on their future work; specially catechising children or instructing adults.

So much on that attractive subject, my own praise. But I

forgot to tell you, when last I wrote, that one of the cleverest of them told me he thought the constant reading of your "Discourses" had already quite revolutionised their idea of *preaching*. And certainly their sort of practising sermons this year have been very solid and good in the majority of cases, so you see

Quae regio in terris vestri non plena laboris?

I am much grieved by the tone of your letter. If things are so, why don't you get back "home" as fast as you can? I wish we could hear better accounts of you.

Please don't take the trouble to answer this. How very tiresome the uncertainty about your trial! Should you not tell them not to let you *know anything* about it, till it is quite necessary? It only keeps the thing alive in your mind.

My brother-in-law[1] is the most wonderful of men. He is as poor as a rat, will take help from nobody, and is always sending gifts to pious objects in England. I will take care he has your message.—Mrs. Ward's best respects and regards, ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

Such was his absorbing interest up to the year 1858. It filled his whole capacity for enthusiasm. His other occupations were looked at as uninteresting duties or as necessary recreation; and the keenness of some of his friends about other aspects of his life often even irritated him. His great indignation is remembered at the excitement caused among his acquaintance by the birth of his eldest son in November 1853. Four daughters had come in succession, and it was feared that the Isle of Wight property would pass away from his children.[2] The birth of his eldest son put an end to this. The President gave a holiday to the divines in honour of the occasion—to Ward's great irritation, for he had his lecture ready. But worse than this were the letters of congratulation which he had to answer. They made him seriously angry. "I have been for years," he said, "doing valuable intellectual work at Oxford and in this place which few men have the knowledge or ability to do, and no one ever wrote to congratulate me. I have a son—*a thing any man may do*—and I receive fifty or a hundred letters of congratulation.

[1] William Wingfield, a Christ Church contemporary of Ward's, who became a Catholic shortly after Newman's conversion.

[2] The next heir to the property, after his brothers who were both unmarried, was his first cousin George, now General Ward.

It is intolerably absurd." One of these letters, which gives us a glimpse of the kindly and affectionate nature of Cardinal Wiseman, may be here inserted:—

MONTE PORZIO, ROME, 22*nd Nov.* 1853.

MY DEAR MR. WARD—I have just seen to-day that Almighty God has blessed you and Mrs. Ward with a son and heir. At this distance allow me to join my congratulations to those of many nearer home, assuring you that none can be more hearty, affectionate, or devout. To-morrow I will offer up the adorable sacrifice for the health, happiness, and salvation of this new member of Christ's body. . . . If I had been in England I should have perhaps claimed the privilege of baptizing your new treasure; but at any rate, if you will let me know his name, I will bring him a relic of his patron saint with a special blessing of the Holy Father for you and Mrs. Ward likewise. Present her with my sincere felicitations, and as far as one dares bless from Rome, I send her my most hearty and paternal benediction.

I have found myself in many respects much better in body and mind for my journey hither. I have come here with a young invalid to give him change of air, and myself quiet and leisure to write. And I am writing this at night, in the same room, in the same chair, and at the same table, at the same hour, and in the same stillness, and with the same bright heavens as I used to fifteen years ago, writing articles on Puseyism for the *Review* or meditations for the college! It brings back the old world to me of peace and blissfulness which cannot be renewed at this side of the grave. Excuse my getting prosy.—Yours ever affectionately in Christ,

N. CARD. WISEMAN.

Mr. Ward used religiously to visit his property about once a year, staying generally at Plumbly's Hotel[1] at Freshwater, a part of the island which, in those days, was attractive for its wild beauty and seclusion. His lectures at Old Hall did not prevent his going up frequently for an opera in London, and as usual he took a certain pleasure in the contrast between the two occupations. "I give my mornings to things dogmatic," he said, "my evenings to things dramatic." He continued up to the year 1863 to consult Newman on nearly all matters of practical importance to him though the divergence in theological and ecclesiastical attitude was growing. He paid occasional visits to the Birmingham Oratory, and Newman came once or twice to Old Hall. He kept

[1] Now Lambert's Hotel.

up habits of intimacy with a few Catholic families of congenial interests, as Mr. de Lisle's and the late Colonel Vaughan's, but mixed little in general society. The most constant and unreserved friendships, however, of these years were with Father Faber, and still more with Father, now Cardinal, Vaughan. Of these friendships and of his renewal of old Oxford intimacies after 1858, I shall speak a little later. A few extracts from letters and papers between the years 1851 and 1855 will help to give the picture of the different aspects of his life at this time.

Mrs. de Lisle's diary of January 1851 records a visit to Grace Dieu, in which discussions with George Ryder and Ambrose de Lisle were constant and absorbing. Mr. Ward proceeded to Birmingham, where he combined a visit to Oscott with a visit to Newman, whose advice he was anxious to obtain on the whole question of his lecturing at Old Hall. "J. H. N. *most kind*," he writes on the 17th; "I had a long talk with him."

Two letters of the summer of 1855 to Mrs. Ward were written during one of his periodical visits to the Isle of Wight, where he unexpectedly fell in with two old friends, Bradley, then Head Master of Marlborough, now Dean of Westminster, and Father Faber.

PLUMBLY'S FRESHWATER BAY HOTEL, *Saturday.*

I was very vexed I didn't send you a letter yesterday; but after I had started for Sir John Simeon's, I found the post would be out before I returned, its time being 3.30.

I am going on capitally, and obtain great benefit from this air. To-night I sleep at Sir John's and return to-morrow. My idea is, if Faber agrees, to sleep at his house on Wednesday and return to you for a six o'clock dinner on Thursday.

I feel rather depressed in mind in consequence of my absence from home and also the college troubles. But in body I think I am doing excellent service. To-day we go with Mr. Squire to the Needles, where Bradley also, whom you remember at Rugby, is staying. . . .

Faber offers to stay till Friday; so I think I had better not come back till that day, same time, as it is very doubtful when I should catch him again.

The next letter was written on the following day:—

PLUMBLY'S HOTEL, *Sunday evening.*

. . . . I will now tell you my movements hitherto. On Wednesday evening, looked over one half-year's accounts and went to bed. On Thursday, from ten to twelve A.M., looked over the remaining accounts. At twelve went with A. B. to call at Westhill, where my aunts were most kind. Saw my new buildings in Cowes and lunched with A. B. at one. From two to four I went with A. B. over several farms, and I dined at half-past six, and came over hither. On Friday called on Sir John Simeon, who was most pressing in his invitations, and returned—a most beautiful drive. On Saturday went with Mr. Squire to the Needles and Alum Bay; saw also two or three farms, found there Bradley of Rugby, with whom I walked; and then returned. Dined here at a quarter to five, and after dinner went to sleep at Sir John Simeon's. Staid up talking *strong* till half-past eleven. This morning went with the Simeons to mass at Newport; stayed at Swainston to dinner; and at half-past seven left for this place, where we arrived safely at a quarter past eight, found your letter just arrived. I am deriving the greatest benefit, I think, corporally. They all tell me my improvement in appearance since five years ago is quite incredible. My spirits are rather better, but far from the thing; and I am already looking forward to Friday.

Returned to Old Hall, dogma and drama resumed their place. "My lecture went off very well," he writes, when Mrs. Ward had left him for a visit to London, a little later, "and the passage I read you was most effective. Mr. Dale said it drew tears from him. I should like to go to *Guglielmo Tell* on Thursday if you thought well. If so, would you send at once to get me a stall."

It was at Old Hall that two intimacies were formed which, in one case especially, became more and more to Mr. Ward to the very end of his life. The earlier was with Henry Edward Manning. Although, from a marked difference of temperament and of intellectual character, there was never between them the closest friendship, they were, nevertheless, very intimately associated for many years both in personal intercourse and in their public work. Manning came to see Ward in company with Mr. J. R. Hope Scott of Abbotsford soon after their reception into the Catholic Church in 1851, and was in succeeding years a frequent visitor at the college. The priestly Ideal was as much to the future Cardinal as to Mr. Ward; and there was, from the first, in this respect the keenest sympathy

of aim between them. The other friendship was with the present Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, then Father Herbert Vaughan, who was appointed Vice-President of St. Edmund's in 1855. He was the eldest son of Colonel Vaughan of Courtfield, and his early sacrifice of a considerable worldly position, and consecration of his life to the priesthood, had marked him out as one to whom the priesthood meant much. He had studied at the Accademia dei Nobili Ecclesiastici in Rome, and had developed there the enthusiasm for Rome and desire to form in England an Apostolic priesthood, which distinguished him. Cardinal Vaughan's energy of character and powers of influence are well known; and St. Edmund's was the first field in which they had their opportunity. He had made a special study of the Italian seminaries, notably of Milan and Novara, with a view to his future work at Old Hall, and consequently had a definite ideal of an ecclesiastical seminary before him, just as Mr. Ward had; and that ideal was inconsistent with the appointment of a layman and an Oxford convert to train the priests of Westminster and Southwark in Theological mysteries, and to instil into them the traditional Catholic view of the functions of the priesthood.

Shortly after his arrival, he came to call on Mr. Ward. Their interview was characteristic of both. Cardinal Vaughan has described in a letter to myself both the meeting itself and the circumstances which preceded it:—

"While I was studying in Rome in 1853," he writes, "I used to hear much of Ward from Father Whitty, who was his enthusiastic admirer. And when I was appointed Vice-President of St. Edmund's in 1855 by Cardinal Wiseman, I was naturally not a little interested in making his acquaintance. A considerable difference of opinion existed between the Cardinal and his coadjutor, Archbishop Errington, as to the fitness of employing Ward as a lecturer in dogmatic theology. The latter followed closely in the beaten track of tradition, and distrusted novelties. The former took larger and more generous views. He was quite ready to admit exceptional cases, and keenly appreciated not only the great sacrifices Ward had made for the truth, but also his extraordinary intellectual powers, and his touching humility and simplicity of character.

"I had not at this time any personal acquaintance with Ward, and arrived at the college with strong *a priori* views. The anomaly of a convert of quite recent date teaching dogmatic theology, of one

who had never gone through a regular course under a trained professor, of a married man too, being placed in a position of such trust and importance, struck me as a thing to be got rid of as soon as possible.

"The day after my arrival I went over to make acquaintance with this singular phenomenon. I found him hard at work in his study. He at once asked me to take a walk in the shrubberies with him.

"He always went straight to the point, and began somewhat in this way: 'Well, what are your views about the college and my relations to it?' I answered with equal frankness. I explained that I thought his position a curious anomaly, and that I should like to see his services dispensed with as soon as a good Professor of Theology could be found. Instead of showing the slightest annoyance or resentment, he at once burst out with such exclamations as, 'How very interesting! Yes. I quite see your point. Most interesting! Thank you; thank you. So very kind of you to be so frank.' We talked about many things connected with the college, and Ward had probably taken my measure very completely by the end of our short walk."

The Cardinal relates another amusing experience of Mr. Ward's quality, which came before the termination of their walk. "What fine beech trees!" Father Vaughan remarked, as they turned into an avenue. The reply to this not very pregnant observation startled him. "Wonderful man," exclaimed Mr. Ward. His visitor waited for an explanation. "What a many-sided man you are," pursued Ward; "I knew that you were a dogmatic theologian and an ascetic theologian; and now I find that you are acquainted with all the *minutiæ of botany*." The Vice-President was thoroughly puzzled; and it took him some little time to realise that to his new acquaintance the difference between a beech and an oak was one of those mysterious truths which, although undoubted, nevertheless brought home to him painfully and sadly the limits of his faculties.

Cardinal Vaughan proceeds to recount the sequel to this conversation,—his own immediate change of feeling towards Ward, his attendance at the lectures, his conversion from an opponent to a hearty ally, and his impressions and recollections of Ward's influence at the college.

"We parted," he writes, "in the most cordial manner. I was most favourably impressed with the man. A perfect gentleman

and a real Christian—open, sincere, enthusiastic, generous, and exceedingly able. During the next few weeks I used to go over often from the college to talk with him, and we soon became intimate friends.

"Ward was fully conscious of his great intellectual power. He had worked his way into the Church by a faithful use of the strong logical faculty God had given him. He was endowed also with a fearless simplicity of mind and heart. Given to him the fact that God had made a revelation to the world, his one overmastering conclusion was that men ought to desire nothing so ardently as to ascertain the truths of that revelation, in order not only to form and feast their intellects upon them, but to make them the rule of conduct of their lives. Dogmatic theology was, therefore, to him the science of sciences, and they who expound its truths the leaders and saviours of society. He had begun at St. Edmund's by teaching philosophy; he had now become Professor of Theology. To him no position in the world was equal to that of one chosen to form the minds and hearts of the teachers who were to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world.

"With this deep conviction Ward consecrated the whole of his powers to the study of theology. He tore the very heart out of Suarez, Vasquez, and de Lugo. All the time that he could give to study was given to theology. His position as a great landlord over broad acres, social influence, political power, were all simply contemptible to him as compared with the sphere and privilege of one who was thus closely associated with the interests of Christ in the formation of apostolic men. 'Good Lord,' he would sometimes exclaim, 'what are all those miserable, perishable baubles by the side of these splendid opportunities for promoting the real welfare of mankind and the interests of God!' I had little realised, when I blurted out to him during our first walk that I wished him far away, as an untrustworthy, because an untaught, teacher for such a post, how diligent he had been in educating himself upon the great theologians of the Church, and how sensitive he was to the danger which I had apprehended. I began to understand this and the great modesty of the man when I learnt that he had made it a rule, and a *sine quâ non* for the deliverance of his lectures, that some priest, occupying a responsible position, should always be present to act as a censor to his teaching, and as a security for the students against the possibilities of misdirection.

"Not being very much occupied myself, I was exceedingly glad to occupy this post of censor, for I had heard much of the enthusiasm kindled by his lectures, and of the devotedness of the divines to their Professor. I therefore attended his lectures regularly. From being neutral and cold I soon became an ardent admirer.

"Ward lectured three times a week. The divines assembled at the fixed hour in the library. Presently we heard Ward's ponderous tread coming upstairs, then his rapid heavy steps along the corridor. With gown flying he hastened into the room and took his place at the centre of a long table, amidst his students. Down he went in a moment upon his knees for the preliminary prayers, and no sooner were they over than he opened his small octavo MS. book, with black leather binding, and plunged at once *in medias res.* His plan was to prepare and write out in hieroglyphics, such as he himself was complete master of, his lecture. He followed the regular divisions of theology into treatises, worked up his matter thoroughly, and delivered it at a speed which few could follow comfortably with pen or pencil. What especially delighted me was the way in which he handled all the doctrines of the faith, constantly referring to their bearing upon life and conduct, and treating nothing as though it were a mere abstract and unimportant detail. I remembered often wondering in Rome how it was that so little piety and unction were brought into our lectures on dogma, and complaining that the most vital and essential doctrines of the faith were treated as dryly and logically as though they were no more than so many mathematical propositions. Well, of course, the reason of this was that they were being drawn out and defined with scientific precision, after the manner of St. Thomas and the schoolmen; the theory being that the business of the professor is to deal simply with the intellect, and to furnish the minds of his students with the exact scientific knowledge, which it will be their business to turn to practical account. It was also urged, with great force, that four years were all too short for a full course of theology, and that the professors could aim at nothing beyond getting in their matter. Nevertheless, I always regretted this dry and abstract way of procedure.

"And now I had come upon Ward. His method was entirely different. With him the heart and affections were roused, by the picture of the doctrines worked out to their logical conclusions by his intellect. It was often a wonderful sight to see him at that table, holding his MS. book in both hands, while there came bubbling up, pouring over, streams, torrents, of exposition, with application to daily life, followed by burning exhortation and reference to the future life and duties of his pupils. Sometimes his voice trembled and he shook all over, and I have seen him burst into tears when he could no longer contain his emotion. There were often strange and memorable sights; for the enthusiasm and emotion of the Professor were caught up in varying degrees by many of his disciples. Ward's course of theology, with all its intellectual characteristics, was truly a course of *théologie affective.* He was more like St. Augustine or some other of the Fathers teaching and haranguing

on the doctrines of the faith, than like a mere intellectual schoolman. Ward had the greatest contempt for mere intellect as such. 'My great intellect,' he used to say, 'is no more worthy of admiration or adoration than my great leg. The only thing worthy of respect and admiration is the doing our duty towards our Creator, the making some due return to our God for His unspeakable and infinite love for us.'

"Ward did not confine himself to the intellectual pleasure and excitement of lecturing. He made his men work. He collected their transcripts of the notes they had taken, read them over regularly and corrected them. Twice a week he would take one or other of the divines out with him for a couple of hours' walk. A walk with Ward meant as exhausting an intellectual exercise for his companion as any he had gone through during the week. Ward did not need the sympathy of an audience of twenty men to induce him to flow. He only needed that the subject matter should be, in his judgment, important and vital from one point of view or another. He would then take quite as much pains with a solitary companion as with a score. He would say that the formation of the mind of one priest upon a certain subject that he had in hand was 'of quite unspeakable importance'; and nothing would satisfy him until he had convinced his hearer that he was right. Sometimes the companion whom he took out for an intellectual exercise of this kind would be a wag, and would love 'to draw Ward,' and then he would come back with little stories of episodes which were characteristic enough of the Master and his simple directness and enthusiasm.

"The result, on the whole, of the intercourse between Ward and the divines was the creation of an enthusiastic appreciation of theology, and more hard study was done under Ward's inspiration and guidance than perhaps had ever been done before. The combination of moral and dogmatic teaching which he introduced, and his own intense devotedness to the truths he taught, raised men's minds above themselves, and introduced them into the regions of almost a new estimate of life and of the possibilities which were opening before them."

The friendship formed from the day of this first conversation with the new Vice-President was in some respects the closest and most unbroken one of Mr. Ward's life. "From the time when our friendship commenced," Ward wrote publicly to Father Vaughan years later, "you have been associated in every event of my life, public and private. . . . And I hope, I may add without impropriety, that I have found my knowledge of yourself a greater blessing than even your unwearied acts of kindness. I account your friendship as among the highest privileges I

possess." Their agreement as to the essentials of priestly training was absolute; and the work which the new Vice-President and the Dogmatic Lecturer carried on together was part of a general movement in English Catholicism, a reflection from one point of view of Continental Ultramontanism, of which I shall have shortly to speak. Father Faber's influence had much to say to this movement, which had for its object the introduction of a more active and recognised study of the high ascetic models and ascetic writings, and a closer imitation of Roman practices of devotion. Catholicism in a Protestant country had gradually become, it was thought, dry and undemonstrative, and had lost the warmth and *abandon* of earlier days and of Catholic Christendom.

There are those who, looking back at that time, consider that there was misunderstanding on both sides. While the zeal of the converts was unfairly set down to the interference of busybodies, they in turn are held to have judged mistakenly. The deep and thorough piety of Ushaw and Old Hall, with its peculiarly English character, was not, it is said, understood by those whose ideals were formed abroad, or without personal knowledge of the English Catholic training. That a want of enterprise existed in consequence of years of persecution, that a body which was barely allowed to exist, was not sanguine as to plans for the "conversion of England," is beyond question. But English reticence on the deeper life of the soul, and on the practices connected therewith, was often, in the judgment of persons well qualified to speak, misunderstood by the eager reformers. Much of the spirit at which they aimed existed already in abundance, although its manifestations were not comprehended. Still, greater activity and energy, a more hopeful zeal, and a fresh infusion of Roman influence, were needed; and even the critics of Mr. Ward's zeal for reform allow that he introduced these necessary elements: while it is impossible to read the Archbishop's eloquent tribute to the effect of his lectures, or the other testimonies I have cited, without the sense of a spiritual and intellectual animation among his pupils of a very unusual kind.

There were at Old Hall the usual accompaniments of reform; and Mr. Ward's own shortcomings were recognised and exaggerated by himself in later life. He proposed

frequent changes, and men of the old school complained that their good work in the past was condemned wholesale without being really understood. Mr. Ward spoke and acted with his usual promptness, and accused himself afterwards of exaggeration in language and impetuosity in action. "I did God's work," he said, "in the devil's way." He spoke, as he felt, strongly, and acted on his words and convictions. If a practice or a rule seemed to him out of harmony with his view, he said so, and did his best to get it changed. If the President disagreed with him, the Cardinal was sometimes appealed to, and was generally on his side. If a professor appeared to be opposing the system he was attempting to promote, he did his best to get him dismissed. But there was no personal malice. On occasion of one such endeavour he failed; and on meeting the professor in question greeted him cordially, and without any pretence of ignoring his attempt or his failure. "I feel like a slave dragged at your chariot wheel," he remarked.[1] But indeed this personal friendliness lasted during the very thick of such warfare as was carried on in 1854, when his own resignation was on the *tapis*. He dined in college once a week, and when Cardinal Wiseman came down to consult on some reform of the constitution, Mr. Ward was asked to meet him at dinner. Much joking and laughing during dinner was consistent with the fact that after dinner, or next morning, the crash of the falling torrent was to succeed to the smoothness and apparent safety of the waters above. The professors wondered for a time, but by degrees they learnt to fight with a smile.

Ward resigned his post as lecturer in 1858. The work was beginning to tell on his health; and, moreover, Father Faber and others considered that, now that his family was growing up, he should endeavour to give more attention to home life and to his children's education, and should live in his natural home in the Isle of Wight. These considerations, combined with difficulties, which were never entirely removed, in connection with his influence in the college, determined him finally to

[1] For this anecdote and much of this account of the state of things I am indebted to the Reverend Dr. Weiner, who was a professor and at one time Vice-President of the College. He became President in later years, after the college had ceased to be the ecclesiastical seminary of the diocese.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

take the step which had often before been contemplated by him. The parting with his pupils he felt most deeply. Two addresses were presented to him on his retirement—one by his former pupils, and one by those still at the college. He was much affected on the occasion, and his own farewell address, a printed copy of which he presented to each, gave evidence of the spirit in which he had regarded his work and his sense of its absorbing interest.

"There is no one object which I have kept from first to last so constantly in my mind," he wrote, "as the ascetical application of theological truth, nor is there any matter on which I should more grieve to be misunderstood. For what purpose has God revealed those great truths which we contemplate in theological studies, whether those which concern Himself directly, or those which relate to His operations in the souls of men? For what purpose, except that we might spiritually grow on such truths,—that we might be more and more conformed to the likeness of that God, of that crucified Saviour, whom Theology places before us? The Gospel doctrine, says St. Paul, is the power of God towards salvation to every one that believes; it is the very lever whereby He raises to all sanctity those who will surrender themselves to its wonder-working influence. . . . Moreover, as the scientific teaching of abstract dogma, without its ascetic correlative, would be, intellectually, a most maimed and imperfect work, so, practically, it must issue in the most terrible evils. I have been complimented from time to time by kind friends as having been of some service to you in forwarding an increased zeal for intellectual activity. Such compliments produce in my mind a strange conflict of feeling. On the one hand, I am ever most deeply grateful for any expression of interest in my work here; yet, on the other hand, I feel that if the result of my efforts had really been what my kind friends suppose, I should have been simply the minister of untold evil. May God ever protect you from so great a calamity as is here in question. May God ever protect you from an increased zeal for intellectual activity which shall not be accompanied, in at least a corresponding degree, by an increased love of the interior life, by an increased yearning for those only true joys which the Holy Ghost reserves for those who abandon to Him their whole hearts. May God ever protect you from seeking any part of your rest and peace in the empty, delusive, and most unspiritualising pleasures of mere intellectual excitement.

"It has been my very deep conviction on the fearfulness of this evil which has goaded me (as I may say) to the prominent introduction of ascetical truth. How often have I absolutely forced

myself to put before you those high lessons of spirituality which are at last the only matters really worth the attention of an immortal being! How often have I forced myself (I say) to speak of them while suffering most keenly under a sense of bitter self-contempt and self-reproach! Who am I, and of what kind is my daily life, that I should dare so to speak? And to whom was I speaking? To ecclesiastical students; to persons who had had the heart to correspond with that high and noble vocation with which God has favoured you, and who are looking forward to a career from which I should shrink in craven fear and ignominious despondency. Willingly, most willingly, would I have been silent, were it only for very shame, but that I have been stung with the remembrance of those great principles which I have just been stating. It was impossible for me to be neutral. Had I succeeded in obtaining your deep interest in a purely intellectual view of that great science committed to my charge, I should have been your worst enemy. I should have been preparing the way for the greatest calamity which under ordinary circumstances can hereafter befall you,—I mean the habit of *effusio ad externa*, of being carried away by the excitement of present work from the heart's deep and tranquil anchorage in God. I should have simply injured, the more seriously in proportion to the degree of my success, that very cause of Almighty God which I was labouring to serve. I would rather engage in the most irksome and menial occupation which could be found by looking through the world, than handle the sacred truths of Theology in so vile and degrading a spirit."

The addresses were presented and the answer given in the Divines' Library at St. Edmund's. Those who remember the scene describe it as deeply affecting. There were tears in the eyes of many, while Ward himself was quite overcome.

A word must be said as to the nature of some of Mr. Ward's lectures during these years. Of those which dealt with theology proper, any detailed account must be reserved for a work more purely theological than the present. But it may be said briefly that he aimed at returning to the method of the great Scholastics, in the positive exposition of the various branches of dogma, and departed from the controversial method of such writers as Perrone. His position as a theologian pure and simple will be estimated when his treatises are given to the public. Father Butler, who was for some years a pupil of Cardinal Franzelin at the Collegio Romano, writes of Ward, "He was as truly a representative theologian of the Church as

Franzelin himself . . . and in several respects he surpassed Franzelin." "His wide acquaintance with the whole range of Scholastic Theology," writes Father Whitty formerly Provincial of the Jesuits, "made the great Jesuit theologian, Father O'Reilly, say of him that he had never met his equal for minute and extensive dogmatic reading."

The lectures which dealt with philosophy and ethics were amplified and published in 1860; and they are perhaps the least technical and most characteristic. Many of them deal with questions afterwards more fully treated in his Essays on Theism. Perhaps one of the most interesting lines of thought, apart from these, is worked out in the series, "On the Adaptation of our Nature to Virtue." Based in part on Butler's treatment of the subject, most of it is, nevertheless, both in thought and expression, characteristically its author's. It is directed against a false and semi-Oriental conception of asceticism, which has had its devotees in all nations. The general result of his treatment is the picture of a Christian, not necessarily a saint, but still fulfilling the degree of perfection to which he is called, not by a self-repression which dries up all that is spontaneous, interesting, human in the nature, but by concentrating all the affections—or "propensions" as he calls them in theological language — on supernatural objects. "Christian mortification," he writes, "consists on the whole, not in thwarting, in checking, in endeavouring to root out our various propensions, but rather the very contrary . . . in giving them fuller and wider scope; in directing them to those objects which yield them a far higher and deeper satisfaction than any other objects can give." A measure of repression is no doubt the condition; but, like the work of pruning, it is directed towards the perfect life of the affections, and against their wildness and waste.

For fallen nature to gratify feeling without any restraint is to destroy its delicacy. Any inclination, he contends, becomes gluttony by unreserved indulgence. Reserve is the condition of the highest emotions and affections. It is direction and moderation which bind them up with the character. Without this they flourish in opposite and inconsistent directions. Inoperative love of virtue goes with indulgence in vice; æsthetic appreciation of heroism with a

life of inaction preferred in practice: and by degrees, the pursuit of the worse dims the vision of the better. Restraint is required to impart to any inclination a moral flavour, and to give it its due connection with well-ordered action. Anger, restrained and rightly directed, becomes righteous indignation; love of influence is directed to the one great end—making others better Christians; pride turns into the sense of the greatness of the Christian vocation to which St. Leo referred in his exhortation, "Recognise, O Christian thy dignity." It leads to that indifference to petty annoyances and trivial aims, that slow-moving and unswerving pursuit of one only aim—annoyance being reserved for what thwarts it, gratification for what helps it — which, in its pagan manifestation, Aristotle called *megalopsychia* or high-mindedness. It is the concentration on the Christian ideal of the sense of worth which the heathen philosopher attributed to an ideal self; the Christian manifestation of the courage born of great aims, which was happily referred to by a French writer in the saying, "Pour un grand cœur tout est petit—pour un petit cœur tout est grand."

Love of approbation must go through a similar process of purification. In the lowest, undirected, unrestrained, unreserved form, it leads to the constant smart or pleasure at every idle word from every foolish person. Under the guidance of Christian self-restraint it chooses its censors and its approvers. Professor Jebb has said of Erasmus that he was utterly indifferent to the opinion of the multitude, and devoted all his attention to that of the cultivated few. So, too, Aristotle's magnanimous man used irony with the crowd, and cared nothing for their opinion. The Christian's love of approbation, as described in these lectures, treats the world as Erasmus or the pagan treated the uneducated. His "conversation is in heaven," and his love of approbation is concerned only with the approbation of those who value things at their true worth—of God and the saints. It has all the indifference, though none of the self-approving contempt, of the other. It realises the saying of St. Philip Neri, "despise the world, despise no one, despise being despised." The Christian must be exclusive; but his exclusiveness is strictly conditioned by the moral unworthiness of what is excluded,

and his attitude is not that of looking down on what is lesser than himself, but of looking up to what is so much greater and more worthy than himself, that the lesser is forgotten and uncared for.

Perhaps Mr. Ward's treatment of the "Propension" of "personal love" is as characteristic as any; and some extracts may be made from it.

He points out how prominent a *fact* in the New Testament is the intense Personal love for our Lord of those who were with Him, and asks, Can it be maintained that there has not been a similar feeling evident in the words and lives of those who did *not* see Him in the flesh, as St. Paul?—

"No one, I suppose," he writes, "who believes in any sense the New Testament facts, ever doubted that St. John, *e.g.* 'who lay on Jesus' breast,' had a real personal love for Him; or St. Peter, who wept bitterly when He turned to look on him; or St. Mary Magdalen, when she was unable to apprehend any other thought, except the one pervasive and absorbing impression, 'They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him.' Now no one will dream of maintaining that Personal Love, once formed, is lost, merely because its object departs from this visible scene; and it follows, therefore, that all those pious men who mixed familiarly with our Lord during His earthly ministry retained for Him a life-long Personal Love. But those who believe in the Incarnation hold necessarily that Personal Love for Jesus is Personal Love for the Incarnate God; in their judgment, therefore, all these favoured disciples had a life-long Personal Love for the Incarnate God.

"Now, I ask, can there be an hypothesis more absolutely incredible than that this was purely an *exceptional* case? that those indeed who lived with our Lord *in the flesh* retained for Him a Personal Love, but that no other Christians could ever have the power of sharing their blessedness? that the humblest of the seventy could enjoy this high privilege, but that St. Paul had not even the physical possibility of arriving at it? yet this *must* be maintained by those who say that a real Personal Love for Him is now impossible."

As far as St. Paul himself is concerned, we have his own words, full of burning love:—

"What can St. Paul mean," he continues, "in such passages as the following, except that his love for Christ was similar to our love for a human object? similar, though of course immeasurably

higher and more pervasive. 'Mihi *vivere Christus est*, et mori lucrum' (Philip. i. 21). '*Desiderium habens* dissolvi et *esse cum Christo*' (*Ibid.* i. 23). '*Quis ergo nos separabit à charitate Christi?* tribulatio? an angustia? an fames? an nuditas? an periculum? an persecutio? an gladius? . . . Sed in his omnibus superamus propter Eum *Qui dilexit nos.* Certus sum enim, quia neque mors, neque vita, neque angeli, neque principatus, neque virtutes, neque instantia, neque futura, neque fortitudo, neque altitudo, neque profundum, neque creatura alia, poterit nos separare à charitate Dei, quae est in Christo Jesu Domino nostro.'"

Still, people will ask, How can it be? How can there be personal love without personal knowledge? Here the fact is, as Mr. Ward maintains, stronger than any theory against it. Still, an explanation is in a measure possible. The combination of the singularly vivid picture in the Gospels, which gives us the fullest knowledge of the kind supplied in a biography, with the absolute belief in the presence of the Object thus known, and in our power of communion with it, suffices. And this is made, in both respects, far more actual and practical by the Catholic system of meditation. He begins by stating the objection to the possibility of personal love of an invisible Christ, and then answers it:—

"True," they might have said, "many of our Propensions may be abundantly satisfied by invisible objects: our Love of Approbation may be so satisfied; or our Compassion; or our General Love of mankind. But *Personal Love* is essentially different; Personal Love requires personal knowledge."

To this our reply is now obvious. No doubt, in human friendships, personal knowledge supplies the firmest and surest basis for tenderness of personal affection: yet even in them it is far from indispensable. That I may take instances which Protestants will admit, consider such a personal knowledge as we obtain *e.g.* of Johnson from Boswell's life, or of Dr. Arnold from Mr. Stanley's. What student is there of these biographies who is not conscious of personal regard, and that indeed in no inconsiderable degree, towards the remarkable men there commemorated? But supposing we had reason to know that Johnson and Arnold appreciate us as we appreciate them,—that they know our various thoughts and sympathise in our various troubles,—what then would be wanting to a very complete personal friendship? The application is apparent. And I may refer in this connection to the comparison drawn out at length in [an earlier part of this work]

between Personal Love to our blessed Saviour and Personal Love to any human object whatever.

You will object that at least, in order to cultivate such Personal Love, we must give great and constant effort to the task of realising the invisible world. "Since we cannot actually see and hold palpable converse with our Blessed Lord, it will be the more requisite to supply the deficiency by specially fixing our thoughts on His various words and actions, the study of which brings home to our feelings and imagination His personal character." The whole practice of the Catholic Church is in full accordance with this statement. Meditation is recognised as a most important, integral part of the Christian life, and the great majority of meditation-books occupy far the greater part of the year in a study of the various Mysteries relating to our Lord. The truth alleged is indeed most undoubted. Let any one consider the terrible hold which the world has on our affections, (1) from the very fact that it *is* so importunately visible, and (2) from the tendency of our corrupt nature towards all those things which are antagonistic to God,—and what will be his certain inference? this, that unless we direct special and sustained efforts to this very purpose—the purpose of realising the invisible, of making ourselves practically and influentially conversant with the things of faith,—the things of sight, this dazzling and delusive world, will infallibly draw us into its vortex.[1]

[1] See *Nature and Grace*, pp. 341-346.

CHAPTER IV

OLD FRIENDSHIPS RENEWED

1858–1861

Mr. Ward's life during term-time at Old Hall had few distractions. An occasional visit to London, which meant a great many operas, a few dinner parties, attendance at Cardinal Wiseman's Tuesday receptions,[1] and many talks with Father Faber, formed the extent of his dissipations.

The friendship with F. W. Faber was at its height during these years. They had known each other at Oxford since 1833, but had not been very intimate there. They now drew together, in the thorough and enthusiastic line which they adopted in matters of Catholic devotion; and Faber was Ward's "spiritual director" from 1853 to the end of his life. Faber threw all the gifts of high imagination and musical utterance, which had made Wordsworth recognise him early as one who should be a great poet, into the service of the Catholic Church; giving up all effort on the lines which lead to literary fame. Mr. Ward always held that the events of 1845 transformed him; and that a nature which had seemed in early years to have something of the dilettante in it, revealed at last quite unexpected depths. Few had looked in the Oxford Faber for the almost unique influence as a spiritual guide at the London Oratory, which is still in the memory of many. Contrasted as the two men were in some ways, one gifted with high poetical imagination and the other before all things logical,

[1] It was at one of these receptions, directly after the second reading of the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, that Ward met Monckton Milnes, afterwards Lord Houghton, and said to him abruptly, "How d'ye do? I hear you voted for Lord John's bill."—"Voted for Lord John's bill?" stammered Milnes. "Only," he explained apologetically, "for the second reading of it."

and even mathematical, in his cast of mind, there was a strong common element in that realisation of the whole realm of the world beyond the veil, which lively faith gives to many who are not poets. The present writer has before him the picture of their intercourse in his early youth, the eager and rapid conversation, the impression that the two men were on fire with the importance of the views and plans which they discussed, the tremendous exaggerations of language—fully conscious perhaps on the side of the Oratorian, while with Ward they were partly due to the vision of logical consequences which made bad lead at once to worst and good to best; Faber's glowing and handsome face, and Ward, whose habitual expression was recently described by Mr. Mozley as "of one who is overflowing with some grand idea or fount of ideas."

Two letters from Father Faber, written when Ward was preparing the lectures on *Nature and Grace* for publication, give an idea of their more serious intercourse, and of the free and unconventional style of expression which was natural to both:—

ARDENCAPLE CASTLE, HELENSBURGH, N.B.
25th June 1858.

MY DEAR WARD—I have just read through your *De Natura et Gratia* Introductory with huge delight, and, if I were not afraid of reminding you of Dr. Griffiths, I should say, with the greatest edification. I long to see the *corpus* of which the sketch is so splendid and a thousand times more interesting than a novel. I have never seen the question of advertence treated more lucidly or with more unction anywhere. . . . I am very glad you have in two places spoken as you have of the saints. I have never yet been disquieted by any freedom of opinion in our congregation, . . . but I have been more nearly driven to disturbance with Father Keogh's view that all have grace to be technically saints, and that it is only our own wills which hinder us from being downright St. Philips, than ever before. He taught it to the novices in lecture, and I forbade it. I know of no authority for it in ascetic theology, and I think it fatal to the pursuit of perfection. I believe the note on the fourfold division of Christians in the *Creator and the Creature* to be the true view.

What you have said of the specialty of saints and the not aiming above a definite vocation, which by the aid of direction we are first and foremost to ascertain, is simply the voice of all the best writers on ascetics.

I am having a regular peg at mystical theology, and reading

Siuri's *De Novissimis* for relief. Best love to Mrs. Ward. I hope dear Mary will like my "Tales of the Angels," which I suppose are out by this time.—Ever most affectionately, F. W. F.

WORK AWAY AT THE BOOK.

ARDENCAPLE CASTLE, HELENSBURGH, N.B.
7th July 1858.

MY DEAR WARD—I do most fully agree with you that the *first* step in leading an interior life is the attempt to live *ordinarily* in the *virtual* remembrance of God. If we look into spiritual writers I think you will find a majority of them put the practice of the presence of God forward as the first step; and this is, when analysed, really the same as living in the virtual remembrance of Him. Guilloré puts recollection; yet this also is the same idea. It means, in his sense, attention to God within us. Do you not think that you may have been misunderstood? . . . What was asked of me *apropos* of what you had said was whether it was the first thing a *director* should take pains to do, viz., to make his penitent do everything with some *actual intention.* I said it seemed to me not safe as a universal rule, (1) because the actuality aimed at would often destroy liberty of spirit in the earlier stages of the spiritual life, and so had better not be enjoined *ab extra* on the penitent as possibly leading to scruples; (2) because often it is necessary not to let a man newly converted to God introspect too much. But as to the penitent himself and the virtual intention, I most cordially agree with you. What is an interior life but a life attending to God *within us?* Your doctrine is the best preservative against what I have called the "self-improvement system" of spirituality which is what makes mean little dwarfs of us all. . . .

Jack Morris brought some wonderful reports of rum doctrines back from Rome, which we will discuss when we meet. I don't know when I shall leave here, but I expect to be at Arundel about the Assumption, and would come to you from there. But I will let you know beforehand, so as to see if it suits you.

Best love to Mrs. Ward and the children. If Father Vaughan is with you, my affectionate regards to him.—Ever, my dear Ward, most affectionately, F. W. FABER.

Ask Mary to write me a little criticism herself when she has read "Ethel's Book."

The intercourse between Ward and Faber had also its more dramatic and even its humorous side. Both of them delighted in the imaginative picturing of the supernatural world with the simple directness of the ages of faith, and in startling contrast to the vague atmosphere of modern thought

on matters of dogma. The Oratorian fathers who remember that time recall Ward's presence during the recreation hour after dinner, when the two men, eager talkers alike, both "of mighty presence," with immense vocabularies, with equal positiveness of logic and superlativeness of rhetoric, sat opposite each other capping epigrams and anecdotes, while the other fathers were gathered round in a ring. Their discussions recalled at times the most speculative debates of mediæval scholastics. Theological definitions or phrases were taken up and treated as musical themes sometimes are, as subjects on which to play fantastic variations. The style is well remembered, and some of the actual points debated. One point of debate —parallel to the mediæval questions as to the habitual occupations of the angels—was the nature of our future employments in the next world. Of what kind is the daily life in heaven? "Take Stewart for example," asks Ward referring to the well-known and kind-hearted theological bookseller, "what can he find to do there?" Various suggestions are made. "Bind the Book of Life," Ward proposes. "But that won't last for ever!" Faber replies. "He and St. Jerome will talk without ceasing." —"Ah, but he will never be happy without work." Other plans are suggested till Faber hits on the best. "I have it—he should catalogue the angels."

The debates were sometimes intensely serious, and rose to such heights as the metaphysical conceptions involved in Theism as explained in the Athanasian sense, or the various analyses of the Catholic doctrine on Grace. But the inevitable step would come at times, with two such men, from the sublime to the not-sublime. On one occasion a discussion is in full course, on Grace and Predestination, Faber favouring the stringent Thomistic view, Ward the less rigorous opinion advocated by St. Alfonso Liguori. Definitions, citations from the great scholastics, are quoted with the exact memory and knowledge of men whose lives are absorbed in the study of such authorities. Ward, with the intensity of expression which his friends remember on such occasions, noticing nothing around him, is proving his view, throwing his arguments into syllogisms, illustrating them by sayings of the Saints. As he sways from side to side, all unnoticed by him a pamphlet falls from his pocket. One of the fathers picks it up, intending to restore

it to him when the heat of the contest shall give breathing time. In the meantime he mechanically opens it at the first page, thinking, perhaps, to see the title "De Actibus Humanis," or "On Grace and Free Will." But it is not so. "Benefit of Mr. Buckstone. The celebrated comedian will appear in his original character of Box in *Box and Cox*, the part of Cox being undertaken by Mr. Compton," are the words which meet his eye. The argument on Predestination is still going on, but the audience becomes less attentive. The playbill circulates and finds its way gradually back to its owner, and the general laughter, which by this time has become audible, is explained to him. Neither Thomism nor Alphonsism can survive it. Ward drops the discussion and joins in the laughter. The dramatic element wins the day over the dogmatic. *Solvuntur tabulae risu.*

There was often a humorous *arrière pensée* to the conception of the English Protestant world as to the untruthful Jesuitism to which the two converts had surrendered, and sentences were so turned as to shock its imaginary representative, and confirm his worst fears. A controversial point once arose about some priest's action, in which the facts had been misrepresented in the newspapers, but nevertheless the general course pursued had gone on a recognised and defensible Catholic principle. Ward was to write to the papers in his defence. He discussed with Faber the line which he should take in his letter. Both grounds seemed strong. But the Protestant would have read truly Jesuitical unscrupulousness into the question he called upstairs to Faber as he was leaving: "Which shall I do then, Faber; deny the facts or defend the principle?"

Not even all Ward's admiration for Faber could overcome his distaste for sermons, eloquent preacher though the great Oratorian was. He looked rather to their conversations and correspondence for spiritual guidance. He did, however, occasionally attend his sermons somewhat against the grain, and I gather from a letter of Father Faber's that his spiritual conferences containing the beautiful treatises on "Kindness," were due to discussions with Ward. The old King William Street Oratory, of which Faber was superior, was ultimately turned into a theatre, and the

Oratorians migrated to Brompton. Ward in the course of his visits to the theatres found his way to the old Oratory. "Last night," he remarked to Faber, "I went to see an excellent piece at the King William Street Theatre. Between the acts two thoughts came into my head. The first was, Last time I was in this building I heard Faber preach. The second was, How much more I am enjoying myself to-night than I did the last time I was here."

Faber's great breadth of sympathy and his reaction from the old conventional moderation of Puseyism, with its readiness to take scandal, were points of contact with Ward. "Keble used to say," Ward remarked, "that the chief characteristic of the English Church is *sobriety;* the Catholic Church on the contrary tells you to be 'inebriated' with the love of God"; and certainly nothing could be less like Keble's ideal than the religious discussions of Ward and Faber. They seldom met without some electric shock occurring in the course of conversation. "Shall I go into retreat?" Ward asked one day when he felt that the absorbing interest of his intellectual work needed some counteracting spiritual influence. "A retreat!" exclaimed Faber. "It would be enough to send you to Hell. Go to the play as often as you can, but don't dream of a retreat."

Faber and Ward carried their enthusiasm for scholasticism to the suitable length of having some rather sharp theological debates of a scientific character. One, on the "Conditions requisite for attrition," a subject which Ward was dealing with in the St. Edmund's lectures, filled many long letters; and this did at one time lead to a touch of acrimony in their correspondence, which, however, only brought out more strongly in the end, as such differences are wont to do, the affection and value which each had for the other. "Now, Charissime," Faber wrote, "let us bury the incipient irritability which is beginning to appear. Depend upon it no two men in England agree as we do. If you will be open and full with me I will be so with you, and act with you in all I can. But I will not argue this matter for fear now of harming our love, which is the highest of truths. Ever most affectionately and loyally, F. W. F."

During the years of Mr. Ward's Old Hall Professorship

two daughters and three sons were born. Considering his strong family affection in later years, and the absolute trust and confidence which his children had in him, it is a curious fact that he professed not to take the slightest interest in them when they were small, and he certainly hardly ever saw them. He lived all day in his study, and while his elder children—notably his eldest daughter—went to him for long talks, and often accompanied him when he left home, he scarcely ever saw those with whom he could not converse. He applied to them what Dean Goulburn has explained as a theory of his Oxford days, that he could have no merely instinctive affection for them, though he enjoyed their society when they had become reasonable beings. Like Cardinal Newman, he "put his conduct on a syllogism," "I can have no affection for persons with whose character I am unacquainted," he used to say; "I know nothing of the character of my younger childen; ergo, I can have no affection for them."[1] In fact he tended to look on a young child as a being intrinsically incomprehensible to him. His children looked on him with great awe and reverence, but with something of a feeling of mystery. Some of them had an idea that he was a priest. He is reported to have said, "I am always informed when they are born, but know nothing more of them." Occasionally, however, he came into the schoolroom in the midst of his work and made some puns or jokes, which were much enjoyed, although a certain feeling of fear always remained. He was also summoned from time to time to administer rebukes; on which occasions he got up his brief, and went through the process of reproof with great seriousness, which was in early days very impressive, though later, I think, we used to feel that his mind was occupied in reality with other things.

With his elder children, and with each of us as we came to be "reasonable beings," his relations were extremely intimate, and on a footing of almost absolute equality, except for occasional serious and separate talks on questions in which he thought reprimand or advice a duty (the former always most unwelcome to him). He disliked the donnishness and

[1] "You know," he writes in a letter, "I have no affection for my children *as such*."

expectation of subservience in expression and opinion from which he had suffered at the hands of his own parents, and used to term it the "parental heresy." Some of us eventually differed considerably in opinion from him, but it was from him that we learnt to think independently. The sense of his own never-failing earnestness and consistency of purpose was, in such cases, a more permanent lesson than some of the opinions themselves, which, though at first naturally adopted by us, were never forced on us, however vehemently maintained as true in the abstract.

I select from the reminiscences of his eldest daughter Mary —now for close upon thirty years a nun—passages which serve to show his relations at that time with those of his children who were his companions:—

"I suppose the first thing that strikes us all in thinking of our dear father," she writes, "is the fact that he was utterly unlike any one else. He was always very free from human respect, and sometimes took a kind of mischievous pleasure in shocking people by bringing out some of his most original feelings and opinions. But the two most striking features of his character, as I remember him, were first, simplicity; secondly, humility. His simplicity was something so unlike what is generally met with, that I should think it must have taken those who first made his acquaintance some time to understand it. It consisted chiefly in the fact that he always seemed to live in the presence of God, and that His glory was a thing he desired with so much passion that the longing for it seemed to swallow up smaller interests. It is most curious how from his earliest childhood the sense of God's rights seems to have taken possession of him without any extraneous teaching on the subject. He told me that he could not remember any time of his life when he had not a sincere wish to please God. He would tell stories of things he had heard said in which God's rights had been passed over or disallowed, sometimes in a tone of horror, and sometimes as if intensely tickled at the absurdity of them. I suppose you know one which he was fond of repeating, viz., his uncle George's account of his grandfather's (our great-grandfather's) death. 'The element of religion was not absent, but it was not insisted upon; he did not think too much about it.' 'Conceive,' said papa, 'a man just going to appear before his Creator to be judged who does not think too much about Him.' I need hardly enlarge on what you must know so well. God's rights and God's interests were the only things which aroused his deepest feelings. I remember how, in his early difficulties at St. Edmund's, when he thought that a

state of things was arising which would seriously injure the priestly spirit of the students, he could not sleep, and would spend the nights chiefly in walking up and down his room; and the illness in which for hours together he lost the use of his limbs was brought on by difficulties in connection with his efforts to counteract this danger. In some respects his feelings might be considered as personal in a case in which he himself was so much concerned, but when his connection with St. Edmund's had ceased, and we returned to Old Hall from Northwood, he was far more distressed at anything which he considered to be doing harm than he had been before. He had no longer a share in the management of the college, and felt his powerlessness to interfere. Two able professors were at one time introducing a strong and exclusive classical taste. A. B. told papa that youths who before had been giving their spare moments to the study of the New Testament were now giving them to classics. Only those who know papa as we do can tell the anguish that such news would give him. He was quite ill, and we had to leave Old Hall for a time. I forbear to enlarge further on this sort of passionate devotion because you must have seen so much of it.

"One curious peculiarity was his horror of being thought pious, and yet the way in which pious thoughts or words would come out spontaneously even in trivial matters. I remember mama giving him back a key belonging to a little garden-gate at the back of his study, which enabled him to get to the college without going round. He said so fervently, 'Thank God,' that she asked him what elicited such a warm aspiration. He said it went against his mathematical instincts to walk first to the left and then all the way back again to the right, as he had to do without this key. The name of God was always on his lips, but if I asked him what his particular devotions were he would probably answer, 'Gye and the Italian Opera.' One day I put that very question to him, though I knew as well as possible that the Sacred Heart and our Lord's Resurrection were the two mysteries he most loved; only I wanted to get him to talk about them. He answered by asking me a question. 'Are you often sublimely wrapt in ecstasy unconscious of all sublunary things?'—'No.'—'Is it not rather absurd for me to ask you?' he said. 'Well, it is just the same for you to ask me such questions. Those things are quite out of my line.'"

It would be out of place in speaking of one who so much hated the ostentation of piety to dwell at great length on his spiritual life; but the impression on this subject of the few that knew him intimately must be recorded. It was naturally at variance with that of those who knew him only under

the conditions of reserve which in connection with his inner history was remarkable in so outspoken a man.

"His tender love for our Lord personally," continues his daughter, "deserves to be dwelt on, though it may be that you could not bring it out much in a book meant for general readers. When I was very young he took pains to explain to me all about the union of two natures in our Lord, and told me how every sin I committed had given pain to the Sacred Heart because our Lord had foreseen it. He loved to dwell on the emotions of our Lord's human soul; and when I told him that the nuns I was going to at Stone each chose a motto for their ring, he said the motto of his choice would be *Anima Christi sanctifica me.* He had a very simple, familiar way of going to our Lord, and said to me one night as I was leaving him to go to Benediction, 'Give my love to the Blessed Sacrament.' Yet he had a horror of anything like taking liberties with God or the Sacraments, especially if people's lives were not altogether consistent with it. He did not like too frequent communion, except in those who were leading very holy mortified lives, and was very particular not to go himself if not well enough to prepare properly. Yet he would hardly venture to give an opinion on such matters as being quite above him; but you could see which way his bias tended. If he thought any one was pious, he looked up to them with a humility that was almost amusing. An Irish man-servant of ours was in many ways tiresome and not very bright, but was considered pious, and I remember the tone in which papa said, 'MacMahon is pious; I wish I was pious.' Shortly before I went to Stone I had been ill, and complained that I had not been able to go to Holy Communion for some time. He began telling me it was a good plan to make a spiritual communion with a careful preparation, but interrupted himself by saying that to be sure he was teaching his grandmother. Indeed the sort of reverence he showed one as soon as one's vocation had become a decided thing, would have been bad for one if it had not been so touching that it was rather an example of humility than a temptation to conceit. Still he liked the genuine article in point of piety, and never had any faith in sanctity if accompanied by any appearance of self-consciousness or conceit. In connection with his love for reality in piety, I may mention one little incident which also shows how little he understood children. He had a great idea that of course study was the one duty of a child's state of life, and that prayer should be directed to help one to perform one's duties; and when we were talking one day at dinner of Edmund's great love for going to the college chapel, and of his idleness at his lessons (he was about eight years old or nine), papa said, as if mystified, that he could not understand it. 'What

does he go to chapel for?' he asked. When I was very young he taught me the value of ordinary actions offered up to God, and especially of little mortifications; and I remember once, when it came on to rain just as I was going out riding, he said he was sorry for my disappointment, but he had no doubt I had taken the opportunity of laying up merit.

"He had a great belief in *vocation*, and always kept in mind that God did not ask the same things of different people. Papa once tried to make a retreat which was quite a failure; but I think his nature and disposition to melancholy and overstrain from the vehement workings of his mind and soul were the real explanation of this incapacity of tension more than lowness of vocation; and so also with his need for amusement which may be accounted for in the same way. And much as he used to laugh and joke about his longing for the play, I am quite certain that it was a most real humiliation to him, though he was too humble to feel great pain at it. He told me one day that the Opera, a few nights before, had done him so much good, and he had poured out so many 'acts of love of God' between the acts. Another time he said: 'When I look at the beautiful *mise-en-scène* in the Italian Opera, and listen to Mozart's music, I think that God cannot be only a God of terror and of vengeance when He allows us to see and hear such beautiful things.'

"This leads me to speak of the decidedly melancholy turn of his character. I remember when we were in the Isle of Wight about 1858-60 it showed itself even more than usual, because of the depressing nature of the Cowes air. One day I said that I always received rather more advice than I cared for from a certain priest in confession; he replied, 'He never speaks to me, except that the other day when I accused myself of my usual sin of utter want of confidence in God, he asked me if it had amounted to despair of my salvation, and I said it had not.' Yet he was very conscious that God's providence had watched over him, and said that he had had enough experience of it in the way in which the circumstances of his life had fitted into one another, leading to a definite result, to furnish an argument in favour of theism.

"One more point deserves mention—his great consideration for servants. The only severe reproof I ever remember to have had from him was for imperiousness of manner towards them. I remember crying very much when he spoke, and he told me quietly that he was not angry with me for crying, but he should go on all the same with what he had to say. A patient at (our hospital at) Stoke-on-Trent, who had been a servant, told me that she had heard from a man who had lived with us of his great kindness, and of how he had always insisted on the servants having a strong cup of coffee after dinner on fast days.

"Of his tender affectionateness and delicate sympathy and consideration I need not speak. No one could have been more responsive or more intensely sensitive to any want of response on the part of others. If he did not feel deaths he was keenly alive to the least want of affection, and so amusingly or rather touchingly grateful for one's love, as though he had no claim upon it and was so surprised at getting it. There must have been a veritable depth of wounded feelings in his early life, for it always seemed as if there were open wounds in his heart that wanted continual soothing and anointing. He told me that until his marriage he had felt a continual heart bleeding from being unloved. He said that he never suffered again from that particular feeling after his marriage. Yet it was of him that Uncle William Wingfield said, 'You would not surely marry Ward; he is a hard-headed mathematician.'"

The writer of these recollections, his eldest daughter, went, in 1863, at the age of sixteen, to be a nun at Stone under the holy Prioress, Mother Margaret Mary O'Hallahan. She had been the constant companion of his leisure hours for five years, and always attributed her early vocation to the religious life in great measure to his influence. Ward was quite astonished at the expressions of admiration and gratitude towards him which occurred in a letter written by her shortly after she had entered the convent. He was deeply touched, but added in writing of it, "It is a grotesque comment on the illusions of affectionate children."

The elder members of his own family were strong Protestants; and his connection with them ceased almost entirely after his conversion, except in the case of his aunts who lived at Cowes, and to whom he was sincerely attached. It was perhaps partly his love of paradox and of startling effects which made him take pleasure in depicting his total want of sympathy with some of them; and his picture as a whole was probably barely founded on fact. But he used to describe a state of mutual estrangement, which in its mixture of hostile demonstration with a feeling of total indifference, or even of passive friendliness, was almost grotesque. He once explained to me that it had always been the habit in his family, if two relations differed strongly, to arrange not to be on speaking terms. "Why," he said, "should we meet and quarrel? The world is large enough, and we all have friends enough. We arrange simply not to know each other—to meet as strangers."

This was the only thing in the nature of a family habit or tradition in which he ever took any pleasure. Generally the fact that any relation did a thing was a reason for doing the opposite. When reproached with being unsympathetic to his relations, he replied, "On the contrary. The Wards have always differed on every conceivable subject. Therefore I best agree with my family by differing from them."

I once asked him how much he had known of his father's first cousin, Sir Henry Ward, who had taken a very strong and effective line as Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. He replied quite gravely, "I only saw him twice—once as a boy, when he came to see my father; and then again I had an interview with him about a matter of business soon after I came into my property. We arranged at the end of it not to be on speaking terms;"—quite a superfluous arrangement, it may be added, as Sir Henry Ward lived at that time in Ceylon, of which he was Governor, and in fact never came again to England for a prolonged visit.

On one occasion the harmless nature of such estrangements was rather amusingly illustrated in the case of his brother Henry. They had been for a year or so on these terms, and one night they met at the Haymarket Theatre. Each of them had for the moment quite forgotten the quarrel, and friendly greetings passed and a talk about the play. Next morning came a letter from Henry Ward: "Dear William, in the hurry of the moment to-night I quite forgot that we had arranged to meet as strangers, and I write this lest you should misunderstand me, to say that I think we had better adhere to our arrangement; and I remain, dear William, your affectionate brother, Henry Ward." My father replied: "Dear Henry, I too had forgotten our arrangement. I agree with you that we had better keep to it; and I remain, your affectionate brother, W. G. Ward." With his brother Arthur, whom Cambridge men and cricketers remember as for many years president of the University Cricket Club, and a well-known figure at Lord's, there was a similar arrangement for a time, but I do not think it lasted long.

These differences, however, as I have already intimated seemed to me, when I knew the facts of each case, far more remarkable as a subject for my father's powers of descriptive

exaggeration than for anything else. Many a coolness, which I had supposed from his account to be life-long, or to have lasted many years, was in reality a matter of weeks or even days. Amusing stories belonging to these brief periods dwelt in our minds as typical of a permanent state of things.

Old Oxford friendships were in some degree resumed after 1858. It was about this time that Dean Goulburn found him out and called on him in London. The visit was very welcome to Mr. Ward. Old memories were revived; the call was returned and repeated. Other old friends heard that Ward was not "spoilt" by his popery, and approached him. The Bishop of Oxford and Lord Blachford met him at dinner at Goulburn's. Jowett paid him a visit in the Isle of Wight. Lord Coleridge and Dean Stanley dined with him in his house at Gloucester Square. Tait asked him to Fulham, and he found Lake,[1] and other old friends there. From circumstances it was natural that the intimacies were never again quite on their former footing. Lines of life had divided, and common interests had ceased to be. But thorough and unreserved cordiality was re-established. The strained and bitter feelings of 1845 were wiped away as though they had never been. Anecdotes survive about some of these meetings. Soon after Tait's installation as Bishop, he wrote to Ward and asked him to come to Fulham and talk over his prospects and duties. I remember how often my father referred with delight to Tait's perfect frankness of satisfaction at his own appointment, though he undoubtedly felt also its cares and responsibilities. Ward saw much in other quarters of a *nolo episcopari* which he did not believe to be sincere; and he found Tait's candour truly refreshing to look back on. "Don't you feel the responsibility of the position to be very heavy?" Ward asked. "I do," said Tait, "but" (after a pause), "I must in frankness add that its surroundings are *very agreeable*."

Ward was unable to sustain any attempt to conceal from his old friends either his intense delight in the spiritual side of the Church of his adoption, and his conviction of the hopeless unsatisfactoriness, intellectually and ethically, of the Anglican position; or, on the other hand, his

[1] W. C. Lake, now Dean of Durham.

sense of the intellectual and educational shortcomings which Catholic England had necessarily incurred from many generations of proscriptive laws. Mr. Jowett tells me that on one occasion, very soon after they had renewed their acquaintance, Ward made some extremely straightforward statements on the former subject, and then proceeded to remark: "English Catholics don't know what education means. Many of them can't write English. When a Catholic meets a Protestant in controversy, it is like a barbarian meeting a civilised man." And the peculiarities of the old-fashioned Catholics, both priests and laity, afforded him as much amusement and as many good stories as Dr. Jenkyns and the prim Oxford Dons had done in earlier days.

One such story is repeated to me by Dean Goulburn, at whose dinner-table it was told. "I had asked my late father," writes the Dean, "who from his own great love of fun and humour had taken a liking to your father, Lord Blachford, and the Bishop of Oxford (Wilberforce), who asked to be asked when I told him your father was coming, and a few others."

The conversation turned on Catholic preaching, and Ward spoke of the mechanical and routine performances of some of the priests of the old school. One of them habitually read translations from the old Court sermons of Bourdaloue, without any regard to the nature of his congregation, which consisted of the poorest of the poor. The subtle temptations of wealth and titles and worldliness were earnestly dwelt on, and exhortations to curb the love of the excitements of the Court, and of the delicacies of sumptuous living, were pressed on the attention of blacksmiths and carpenters.

On one occasion he and a Mr. Grafton were in church, and were, he said, the only persons present higher in position than workmen and tradesmen. Ward sketched to the company the most emphatic and eloquent part of the sermon. Some stern rebuke from the New Testament was quoted, and then, with voice elevated, the preacher read out, "Hear this, you young voluptuary! Hear this, you butterfly of fashion! Hear this, you that love to haunt the antechambers of the great!" "I looked at Grafton," Ward added, "to see how we could divide the parts—which was the butterfly and

which the voluptuary. For myself, I didn't think I looked much like a butterfly."—"No, Mr. Ward," said Judge Goulburn, the Dean's father, "the Court's entirely with you there." "Roars of laughter," writes Dean Goulburn, who tells the story, "and from none louder and heartier than your father."

Dean Goulburn gives the circumstances of this renewal of their acquaintance as follows :—

I had recently entered upon the charge of the district Parish of St. John Paddington, and heard that he had taken up his abode within two or three hundred yards of my Church. Willing to show that, though my convictions had forced me to act against him in his latter days at Oxford, I still nourished a kindly feeling for him, yet a little doubtful how he might take the proffered courtesy, I ventured to call. He welcomed me most warmly, and we had a long talk over old days and old friends—Stanley, Lake, Tait. Your father had tales to tell of his being invited to Fulham, and of the unfeigned cordiality with which the bishop received him. Of this first interview with him after long separation, I remember no more, except that, pointing to the books and papers on his table, he told me that Dr. Newman had invited him to join in a new translation of the Holy Scriptures for the use of English Catholics, in which I think he said some of the psalms had fallen to his share. "You know," he added, with the candour which was one of his main characteristics, "your authorised version is so grand, and ours so miserable in comparison." My visit was returned, invitations to dinner exchanged between us, and walks arranged for; and when the old intimacy was revived, he one day put to me point-blank this question, which for a minute or two disconcerted me, "My dear Goulburn, I should like you to explain an inconsistency in your conduct, of which you hardly seem conscious. Though we were great friends once, in my latter days at Oxford you turned the cold shoulder to me and would hardly speak to me; and now again you are all friendship and kindness." By way of extricating oneself from a difficulty there is nothing like telling the plain truth, especially when one has to deal with so honest and outspoken a man as your father. So I told the truth, and reminded him that he held a very different position now from that which he occupied when I turned the cold shoulder to him. "Then, you claimed to hold and teach[1] all Roman doctrine, while retaining your position in the Church which has accepted the Reformation and embodies its main doctrines in her Articles. This I think now, as I thought then, to be so dishonest a position that

[1] This is inaccurate. Mr. Ward claimed to hold but not to teach Roman doctrine as an Anglican clergyman.

persons maintaining it should not be countenanced. But the case is entirely altered now, as you are avowedly a member of the Church of Rome, and in making this great change have sacrificed for conscience's sake everything that men hold most dear. While I am totally opposed to your conclusions, I honour the thorough conscientiousness with which you have arrived at them; and I hope I shall never be narrow enough to turn my back on my old friends because they happen to belong to a different section of the Christian body from myself. It was not *as a Roman Catholic* that I voted to deprive you of your degree, but *as an English clergyman claiming to hold Roman Catholic doctrine.*" This he took with his usual candour and geniality, said that according to my own view of the subject I had quite vindicated myself from his charge of inconsistency, and even admitted that there was a great deal to be said for my view; but still persisted that the principles of interpretation set forth in "Tract 90," by which the Thirty-nine Articles are evacuated of any serious protest against Roman doctrine, were perfectly sound. "I am as strongly persuaded as I ever was that those Articles, worded as they are in the loosest and most slovenly way, were only meant to make a great splash of orthodoxy to the outward ear, but not to rule anything definite as against Rome, and so to alienate those subjects of the king or queen who had been born and bred in the old faith and clung to it still." For my own part I cannot understand now, more than I could when "Tract 90" first appeared, how this theory is tenable by honest men.

I need not say that all the walks I had with him at this period of my acquaintance, like all those of the earlier period, became, if they did not start by being, argumentative. Argument was to him what whist is to many—one of his most favourite pastimes. He was always so thoroughly good-humoured, so thoroughly candid, and so unusually clever at dialectical fence, that, though I always seemed for the moment and on the spot to get the worst of it, I was never angry or sore; and I must add that, though often unable to answer then and there, I was never convinced. Once when I had expressed surprise to him that seriously-minded Roman Catholics could, in view of the dogma *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, have any comfort or happiness in thinking of their Protestant relations and friends, he expounded to me the theory of "invincible ignorance," as excusing a large amount of heresy, and placing heretics who have erred under its influence within the pale of salvation. "And I am quite sure, my dear Goulburn," he added, with the greatest earnestness and emphasis, "*that your ignorance is* MOST *invincible.*"

A feature of his daily life at this time, new since his Oxford days, and which interested and amused his Oxford

friends, was his constant riding exercise, which the Dean proceeds to describe. The habit of riding for purposes of health is not an uncommon one, and may at first sight not seem worth recording; but in the present instance it must be spoken of, as it gives the most typical example of his own self-portraiture in caricature, and his enjoyment of a joke against himself. His doctors absolutely required of him at least an hour's riding every day. He had never been on horseback as a boy; and his great clumsiness and unwieldiness effectually prevented his riding even tolerably. He could not rise in his stirrups, and his tremendous weight was, in consequence, more than most horses could stand. Mrs. de Lisle's notes of his visit of three days to Grace Dieu in 1851 record the fact that he "lamed two horses which he hired from the horse-dealer Potter of the Talbot Inn. He used to ride," she adds, "for two or three hours every morning on the turnpike road."

Under these circumstances it was not always easy to get suited with a horse. He used to describe his dilemma as follows: "Two things are in the way of my riding; first, I am an awful coward; secondly, I am utterly incompetent to manage a horse at all. The horse-dealer comes to me and asks what I want. I say the quietest, tamest horse he has. He sends a feeble creature, and directly I start, down it comes and breaks its knees. Then he sends a big strong horse, and when I get on its back, I find, to my profound alarm, that it is utterly beyond my control. I have to call out at once to my groom, 'Take me off! Take me off!'"

He looked on the whole thing with a mixture of alarm—not unnatural, considering that two or three times in the year he lost his seat and fell off while at full gallop—and intense amusement at the expedients which were necessary to make his riding possible at all. He regarded his horses on principles of the most purely egoistic utilitarianism. The horse was a machine to give him health. If any "horsey" man expected to find points of sympathy, he was at once roughly disillusioned. "Don't you get very fond of your horses?" one such person asked him. "Fond of my horses! You might as well ask if I were fond of my pills," he replied.

He was proud of the fact that his extraordinary adventures and constant falls never did him serious harm. His friends were in continual alarm on the subject. "Some day you will be brought home dead on a stretcher," Macmullen[1] said to him. "I should be delighted," replied Ward, rubbing his hands and smiling; he had always wished to die suddenly. After one fall, which had apparently caused a good deal of anxiety, while he was at Northwood in 1858, a letter from Stanley at Oxford came, with tender inquiries from Jowett. "How on earth," writes Ward, in his reply, "did Jowett hear of any fall of mine? I have had three this year, but I am none the worse, thank you, for any of them. I have, however, suffered a good deal since I have been here . . . from the wonderful secularity of this place, especially in the season."

His adventures with his horses, the habits and ways of each in view of his peculiar method of dealing with them, the narrow escapes, the falls, the runnings away, the occasional catastrophe with which his connection with some of them terminated, furnished him with a series of stories with which he gave more amusement than it is easy to describe. "Acres" and "Flanders" and "Jane" and "Tilbury"—each horse's name was remembered and history recorded.

After a time he was dissuaded from riding on the high road, and a riding school was built for him, where he was comparatively safe. He had a riding school at Old Hall, whither he returned in 1861, and one in London. In the comparative safety and seclusion of the new *locale* the riding was not quite the nuisance which it had been. But it remained till the end a very objectionable prescription, yet so necessary that if it were omitted he could not do a stroke of work on the following day. Its only mitigation lay in the intense amusement he found in the incongruity of the whole performance. It was an ample illustration of the saying of Dean Church that his intellectual adroitness was in startling contrast to his physical clumsiness and helplessness: and the picture of himself rising at the appointed hour, leaving his scholastic folio for the riding school in fear and trembling, placing himself, with a profound sense of his own incompetence, unreservedly in the

[1] R. G. Macmullen, of Oxford memory, now Canon Macmullen.

hands of his groom, to do what he would with him, was one which tickled his imagination. I think he deepened the lights and shades a little beyond the necessities of the case, and heightened the contrasts. A theological or ascetic book was latterly brought with him to the riding school itself, and read between the "acts," in the intervals of rest he allowed himself while the horses were changed; and the helplessness of the riding itself was not lessened by any attempt to learn to rise in his stirrups or to mount without assistance. But it was the amusement that made the riding just endurable which led to this unconscious emphasis of the situation; and if he met a friend he would take him to see and enjoy the performance. "How d'ye do, Rogers?" he said on meeting the late Lord Blachford (then Sir Frederick Rogers) in Regent Street, for the first time after an interval of some ten years, "come and see me ride." Dean Goulburn has included in his "reminiscences" an account of one such occasion, which shows that he must have thoroughly satisfied Mr. Ward by his appreciation of the "points" of the entertainment:—

On my going to his house one day and asking him to come out for a walk, he said that this being his hour for riding exercise, he was going to his riding school, where the horses were awaiting him, but that if I would walk with him there he would be glad of my company, and we might talk by the way. He proceeded to tell me that riding exercise having been pronounced by the doctors to be essential to his health, he had built a riding school on a piece of ground belonging to the Paddington estate of the Bishop of London, his old friend Bishop Tait having very kindly facilitated the lease. He added that, as his weight was so great that the horses could only endure it for a short time, he had made a contract with the stable-keeper to supply him with six horses for an hour's fast trot, each horse not to trot more than ten minutes at a time. This excited my surprise; for though your father was certainly a bulky man, yet men quite as heavy as he are in the habit of hunting, and even sometimes take fences; but my surprise was at an end when we arrived at the ground and I saw what he meant by "riding." Meanwhile, however, before we arrived there, we had plunged into some grave theological argument, if I remember right, on some fundamental question. It may have been the reconciliation of the Divine Prescience with the freedom of the human will, though I cannot absolutely say it was so. On our arrival, this was necessarily dropped, and your father began to exhibit strong symptoms of repugnance and apprehension to the exercise he had to take. Like

some Homeric hero arming for the fray, he arrayed himself, being helped by servants to do so, in his riding costume. Then came the mounting. A fine powerful mare was brought round to the horse block, fresh and frisky, and held by the head while he mounted. But no sooner had he put his left foot in the stirrup, and before he could throw his right leg over her back, the mare whisked round her hind quarter, and left him supported only by the stirrup and his two hands with which he grasped the saddle. He was in a state of great alarm and trepidation, and shouted to the attendants, "Henry! George! don't you see? come under me! help me over!" It was the work of three or four men to get him into the saddle, which at length was done. Then, while the groom ran at the mare's head for a minute or two, till she fell into the routine of her trot round the arena, commenced the "riding," if so it can be called. It was really *sitting in the saddle without an attempt at rising in the stirrups*, with all the dead weight of a sack of sand. Jolt, jolt, jolt; and after every jolt the dead weight came down on the flanks of the animal, until after two or three circuits of the arena they quivered frightfully. A man stood in the centre with a watch, to keep the contract with the stable-keeper, calling out the minutes as they fled: "Two minutes, please, sir," "Three minutes, please, sir," until, at the glad sound, "Ten minutes, please, sir," which seemed to be familiar to her ears, the mare made a dead halt; and while a fresh horse was being brought out, your father rubbed his hands, and said to me as I came towards him, "Now, then, Goulburn, I'm quite ready to begin that argument again where we left it off."

CHAPTER V

THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL AND THE NEW ULTRAMONTANISM

RELEASED from his professorial duties, Mr. Ward found himself brought once more in contact with the three movements of thought which in Oxford days had engaged his attention. Elsewhere[1] I have attempted to describe those aspects of the Radical movement represented by the two Mills and Bentham, of the critical Protestantism inaugurated by Arnold and the Oriel Noetics, and of the movement towards Catholic devotion and doctrine, which affected him at Oxford. Each of these streams, in the microcosm of University thought, was the reflection of a great movement, not only in England, but still more in Continental Europe. The *Positive Polity* of Comte, and Mill's articles in the *London and Westminster Review*, which lay on the tables of Oxford common rooms, were echoes from the great revolutionary movement in thought and in politics, which had been for years so powerful a force on the Continent. The critical movement in history and Scripture started in one department avowedly from the standpoint of Niebuhr, and tended gradually in the other towards the conclusions of Strauss. De Maistre and Lamennais were favourite authors with the second school of Tractarians. It was in controversy with a French divine that Newman himself first defined the position embodied in the lectures of 1837—the Catholicism of the English Church and its relations with the Roman. The claim made by the *British Critic* on the *a priori* philosophy, in support of the Oxford movement, had its parallel in Germany. Kant's Ethics, in England through the medium of Coleridge, in Germany through that of Schelling, were

[1] See *W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement*, chap. iii.

invoked in defence of Catholicism. Möhler's *Symbolism* on the shelves of a tutor's library after 1841 made him a marked man; while the pictures of Overbeck and Cornelius on the walls of an undergraduate's rooms at Balliol caused Dr. Jenkyns to eye him suspiciously, and express a fear that he was "tainted." Oxford reading was not wide; and the movements took, on the whole, their own course in the University, independently of outside influence; but the relationship was in each case unmistakable.

In Mr. Ward's view the three movements were destined ultimately to become two.

The opinion which thinkers of so many different schools have urged of late years, that the ultimate conflict must be between Catholicism and negation in religion, was one which commended itself to him. "Protestantism," says Heine, "is the mother of free thought"; and "free thought" means in the last resort religious negation. The middle ground is being cleared; and those who held it are moving one way or the other. The Protestant Church in Germany has moved towards further negation; the English Church is moving towards Catholic principles and ideals. Individuals in each country, insignificant neither in numbers nor in influence, have gone far in both directions. Catholicism has largely increased in Germany; schools of thought have arisen in the English Church verging closely on Agnosticism. This being so, the most effective opposition to the principles of the negative school consisted in the cultivation and spread of Catholic principles.

Like so many other thinkers, Mr. Ward saw a close connection between the negative philosophy and the French Revolution—between the destruction of traditional faith by Voltaire and Hume, and the destruction of the old political order under Rousseau's influence. Mill and Bentham avowedly accepted the connection; and their political Radicalism was as pronounced as their aversion to established religion. And here again Catholicism was the truest representative of the constructive principle. The great Catholic revival which actually set in, as a reaction from the horrors of the Revolution, was, then, in Mr. Ward's view, due to a true instinct on the part of its promoters. It was an instance of the insight which a great crisis will give to leading minds. The bloody

orgies of '93 were the true outcome of the principles of '89. Master minds, hitherto satisfied with the compromise of Protestantism or Latitudinarianism, awoke in the crisis to a new sense that Christianity was the indispensable protector of social order, and that Catholic principles were the only permanent preservers of Christianity. Hence the cluster of great Catholic thinkers and writers, which the present century has produced after sixty years of almost complete stagnation—notably in France and Germany.

Almost at the outset of the Catholic revival arose a remarkable school of thought, which seized on this idea that the Church was to be the principle of construction for the civilisation of the future. A school arose in France and almost contemporaneously in Germany, and extended its influence gradually throughout Christendom, which, beginning avowedly with the vindication of the Ultramontanism of Fénelon, soon disclosed marked characteristics of its own. The vindication of papal authority against the Gallicans was in itself the renewal of a controversy proper to the *ancien régime*, and to the France of the Grand Monarque. But it proved to be only the first step in a great movement, which had direct reference to the circumstances of our own century. The old civilisation was destroyed; the last great memorial of the corporate faith of Christendom, the Holy Roman Empire, had ceased to be; —the Catholic Church remained. The imagination of the new exponents of Ultramontanism was possessed by the significance of facts which years later impressed our own Protestant historian. The Ultramontane doctrine—the infallibility and prerogatives of the Roman See — became in their hands the symbol of that principle of unity and effective authority, which had enabled the Church to stand immovable amid a society whose structure had been shaken to its foundations.

The Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had impaired the old constructive elements in politics and in religion. Traditionary principles of belief and ancient polities had been destroyed. They had been torn up by the roots, and a new basis of social order was needed. De Maistre, speaking of the monarchy in 1819, notes the error of supposing "que la colonne est replacée parce qu'elle est relevée." The old strength of

prescriptive right had been broken by a philosophy and a policy of anarchy. Thrones and constitutions had to be rebuilt; but where to build them in the quicksand which was almost universal? The old symbol remained the true one. The Church appeared to be the one stable foundation which remained; the See of Peter was the immovable rock—the centre of its strength. Count Joseph de Maistre and Vicomte de Bonald in France, Stolberg and Friedrich Schlegel in Germany, may be considered to be the protagonists of the new Ultramontane movement; but it was chiefly from the French writers that it took its most marked characteristics.

"La Révolution est une œuvre française, donc une œuvre exagérée," said de Maistre; and his own emphatic vindication of the opposing principle was characteristically French. The old *régime* was sick to death; a new state of society was coming; the Church must enforce the old doctrine of Fénelon as to the papal prerogative; but it must use it as a principle of united action and of social order of quite new importance, because the old principles were failing. A standpoint which had been for Fénelon mainly theological, came to bear an international and directly practical character. Ultramontanism was to be the principle of order and authority and the principle of unity among Christians, as the Revolution was among the representatives of democratic anarchy. It was needed, to use de Maistre's words, "to make the same blood circulate in all the veins of an immense body." Such was the general conception of the new Ultramontanism. It has borne fruit in various lines of thought and action: in de Maistre's system of papal and regal absolutism; in Lamennais's vision of the union of the papacy with the democracy; in the centralising tendency of the party represented in France by the *Univers;* in the vindication of the Pope's dogmatic authority, which culminated in the Syllabus and the action of the majority at the Vatican Council; in the policy which threw the weight of the Catholic vote in the German Reichstag in favour of the army Septennate bill, and which has recently struck so hard at Royalism in France. In a word, the Neo-Ultramontane movement represents the growth of those special relations between the papacy and modern Europe

which made Döllinger say in 1855 that its moral power was greater than it had been in the palmy days of Innocent III. or Gregory VII.

When Mr. Ward came in contact with the movements of the Catholic world in 1858, complications had arisen; and for a time the Catholic Revival, which had begun with such strenuous opposition to the Liberalism of the Revolution, appeared to be untrue to itself. Liberal Catholicism had put forth its principles and was claiming a right to be heard. It was the restoration to the movement of what he considered its essential spirit, of Ultramontane loyalty, which was the principal object of his endeavour in the controversies which culminated in the Vatican Council of 1870.

Some account must be given of the circumstances in which these schools of thought took their origin, before Mr. Ward's connection with them can be appreciated. The story of the effects of the Revolution on Catholic France need not be told again. After the awful scenes of November 1793, when Gobel, the Constitutional Bishop of Paris, entered the hall of the Convention with his clergy, abjured Christianity, trampled under foot his ring and crosier, and donned the red cap or Phrygian bonnet, there was inevitably a revulsion of feeling. Lecointre protested to the Convention a few months later that "a people without a religion, without a worship, and without a church . . . is destined inevitably to sink to the condition of slaves."[1] Catholic worship was decreed lawful in the following year. But the wholesale destruction of religious orders and priests left little material wherewith to rekindle Catholic devotion. "The Church presented to men and angels," writes Lacordaire, "the appearance of nothing but a vast ruin."[2]

The learned Church historian and intimate friend of Döllinger, Dr. Alzog, seems to date the beginning of the revival of Catholicism in France from the publication of Chateaubriand's romance *Atala*,[3] in 1801. "It marked the beginning," he writes, "of a literary, moral, and religious revolution in France." This was the year also of the Concordat, by which Napoleon gave to the Church some kind of fresh footing in

[1] Alzog, *Church History*, vol. iii. p. 646.

[2] *Considérations sur le système philosophique de M. de Lamennais* (Preface).

[3] *Atala* was afterwards incorporated in the *Génie du Christianisme*.

the country—which, in spite of the tyranny involved in the Organic Articles, at all events renewed its existence.

The churches were reopened; many of the *émigrés* clergy returned; the hierarchy once more performed its functions; but it was in many ways a period of slavery for the French Church, in spite of the spiritual revival which continued gradually to gather force. It is not to my purpose to trace in detail the difficulties which arose from the persecution of Napoleon, or from the impotence of the Catholic Bourbons in the face of the renewed revolution. Bonaparte's tyrannous ill treatment of Pius VII., and his great scheme for using the Church as one of his instruments for the subjugation of Europe, have a singular interest for the student of that wonderful personality; but their bearing on the Catholic revival consisted principally in the fact that persecution tends to chasten. His first attempt was to increase the centralisation of the Church and the directness of its relations with the Holy See, and to rule the Church *through* the Pope;[1] and when, after the Fontainebleau "Concordat," he quarrelled with Pius VII., the Gallican declaration of 1682 was made a law of the State.[2] Thus with characteristic dexterity he made use at one moment of Ultramontanism, at another of Gallicanism, as an instrument of oppression.[3]

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, February 1879, p. 224.

[2] Foisset, *Life of Lacordaire*, vol i. p. 114.

[3] The immediate effect of his imperiousness on the French clergy was not always edifying. The autocrat was frequently flattered by the episcopate and priesthood. The religious conferences of one preacher, whose ostensible theme was the existence of God, were made the vehicle for eulogising the Emperor; and it is significant of the state of things that Fouché, on behalf of his master, was by no means satisfied because the preacher had not introduced words in commendation of conscription.[1] Two questions and answers on the duties of Frenchmen towards Napoleon himself were printed in the Catechism by the Emperor's direction. Those duties included not only obedience but love; and with grim humour the Catechism proceeded to state that the penalty of shortcoming in this respect was "eternal damnation."[2] After the breach with the Holy See, Bishops were thrust into sees without the sanction of the persecuted Pope. The clergy did at times protest against such encroachments, and on one occasion 236 seminarists, who refused to assist at the mass of one of these intruders, were forthwith stripped of the soutane and incorporated in a regiment.[3] Such specimens of the brutal humour of the Corsican despot are enough to recall his attitude towards the Church.

[1] See *Discours, Rapports et Travaux inédits sur le Concordat de* 1801, p. 589.

[2] See "Leçon VII." of the "Catéchism."

[3] Alzog, vol. iii.

The Restoration improved matters but little. Gallican and Legitimist prelates who had refused to recognise the Pope's concordat with Napoleon, now returned;[1] and the dangers of a Church out of harmony with the Holy See were apparent.[2] Catholicism was, it is true, once more the religion of the State, and the king was externally loyal to it; but the Chamber came to include a majority of indifferentists or infidels. Napoleon had, at least, with his iron hand, kept down the revolutionary doctrines of Voltaire and Rousseau, as he had kept in subjection the Church. The Bourbons allowed the works of these writers to be printed again. They were greedily read. The spirit of the eighteenth century revived, with its hatred of the ecclesiastical office.

The proposed concordat of 1816, designed to satisfy the royalist bishops, was rejected by the Chamber; and the priests remained almost entirely unprovided for. This state of things improved by degrees. In 1822 an arrangement was concluded with Rome whereby the number of bishops was increased. The ordinations of 1823 were numerous, and Chateaubriand by his eloquence obtained a State grant for the clergy.[3] But the unpopularity of the Church remained.

It was in this state of things, with a Church divided into two parties, of which the Gallican rested for support on so feeble a reed as the throne of the Bourbons, that de Maistre made his famous plea for the great international bond of Catholic unity—the Papacy. He advocated a devotion to Rome, which he hoped would be the bulwark of Royalism, but which proved a far more powerful and permanent force than the constitution to which it was designed to lend strength. The influence of de Maistre had been a power for many years. His *Considérations sur la France*, published in 1796, had been widely read. But it was to his great work *Du Pape*, the gospel of modern Ultramontanism as Ueberweg has called it, that his unique position was due. The work, of which some account must now be given, was published in 1819 in the surroundings

[1] Foisset, *Life of Lacordaire*, vol. i. p. 24.

[2] How far French Gallicanism had gone in the circumstances may be seen from the terms of the test imposed on the French clergy resident in England by the English Vicars Apostolic. They had to declare that Pius VII. was "not a heretic nor a schismatic nor the author or abettor of heresy or schism."

[3] Alzog, vol. iii. p. 701.

which I have described—amid an impoverished clergy, with little organisation or means of education, few in numbers, and with less than no leisure for theology or speculative thought.

Comte de Maistre begins his book by referring to this state of things as a reason why a layman should deal with such a subject. "The Church," he writes of France itself, "is making a new beginning." Priests can only devote themselves to scientific polemic in "those times of calm when work can be distributed freely, according to power and talent." He enters the breach then to "fill the empty places in the army of the Lord."[1] The question he has to consider is, what principles it is important to urge on his fellow-countrymen in such circumstances. He does not propose a scientific theological review unsuited to the situation. He proposes to treat a great practical principle, which should be brought into prominent relief to meet an abnormal crisis. He desires to show that here as elsewhere "theological truths are general truths manifested and made divine in the religious sphere, so that one cannot attack them without attacking a law of the world." True to this programme the whole work is a rhetorical enforcement of the practical utility of the papal power. With the shadow of the French Revolution oppressing him like a nightmare, he is brought back again and again to this conception:—the Pope is the king; the Church is the "States-general." The king may assemble the "States-general" and consult them; the Pope may assemble a council and consult it. Once let the "States-general" get the upper hand, assign to them the final power, and it will mean the triumph of the *tiers état;* the regicide of '93; the division of rebels into parties alternately triumphing and massacring each other—Girondists, Jacobins, Communists; the horrors of '94 and '95. Place the ultimate appeal in the hands of the Ecclesia,—the Assembly,—and you have the same result. The principle of unity is gone. Schism and Revolution supervene. "In the sixteenth century," he writes, "the Revolutionists attributed the sovereignty to the Church, that is, to the

[1] It is noteworthy that neither the founder nor the chief exponent of the new Ultramontanism were priests or theologians. De Maistre and Veuillot were both laymen.

people. The eighteenth only transferred these maxims into politics; it is the same system, the same theory, down to its last consequences."[1] This analogy reappears in page after page.

And while the papal power is thus essential to order within the Church, the Church itself, ruled by the Pope, is the one hope for order in the world. The dangers of anarchy, so fearfully evidenced in the last century, are not past. The grand mistake, he says, would be to suppose that the Revolution is over. On the contrary, "the revolutionary spirit is without comparison stronger and more dangerous than it was a few years ago." The hope and the remedy lie in remembering this. To be forewarned is, in a measure, to be forearmed. We must realise the presence in the modern world of a spirit which inspired the authors of a movement, "Satanic in its essence, . . . unlike anything which has been seen in past times." That spirit can only be extinguished by the spirit of God which is found in the Christian Church.[2] And Christianity has no stability without the Papacy.[3] It was the Papacy which formed the Christian civilisation and monarchies.[4] It is the Papacy alone which can rebuild them. The movement which culminated in the Revolution began with the revolt from Papal authority in the sixteenth century. "The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," he writes, "might be called the *premises* of the eighteenth, which was only the conclusion of the two preceding. The human mind could not suddenly rise to the degree of audacity of which we have been witnesses. It was necessary again to place Ossa on Pelion to declare war against heaven."[5] We have now had bitter experience of the final consequences of the revolt. He appeals to Protestants to take the lesson to heart. "Let princes above all," he writes, "observe that their power is escaping them, and that European monarchy could not be formed and cannot be preserved except by a Religion which is one and only one."[6]

But while he appeals to those outside the Church to recognise this truth, he is still more concerned with urging on Catholics themselves the importance of union round the Chair of Peter. While guarding himself against any overstate-

[1] *Du Pape*, vol. i. p. 21. The references are to the edition of 1837 (Goemaere éditeur, Bruxelles).

[2] i. p. 15. [3] i. p. 345. [4] i. p. 347. [5] ii. p. 68. [6] ii. p. 55.

ment of Catholic doctrine as to the extent of Papal Infallibility, he urges the spirit of unquestioning obedience independently of fine distinctions. "Infallibility in the spiritual order, and sovereignty in the temporal order," he writes, "are words perfectly synonymous." "The king can do no wrong," is a maxim of the English constitution, and it represents the finality of the royal judgment. To go behind it is, whether warrantable or not, rebellion; and de Maistre takes up a similar ground respecting the Pope. "The monarchical form once established," he writes again, "infallibility is only a necessary form of supremacy, or rather it is absolutely the same thing under a different name." A French writer has said if there was no God it would be necessary to invent one, and the Ultramontane speaks somewhat similarly of papal infallibility. Even if "no divine promise had been made to the Pope, he would not be less infallible, or considered so, as a final tribunal; for every judgment from which one cannot appeal is and should be held to be just in every human association, under all the forms of government imaginable; and any true statesman will understand me when I say that the thing is not only to know if the sovereign pontiff *is*, but if he *ought to be* infallible. He who should have the right to say to the Pope that he is wrong, would have for the same reason the right to disobey him."[1]

This argument from utility is pressed and illustrated. If, he asks later on, Gallicanism be admitted, what are we to do in a crisis when general councils cannot be assembled? Perhaps, as Hume[2] has said, circumstances will not *allow* in our time of a general council. Again the shadow of the Revolution is seen.[3] He recalls the action of Pius VI. at the crisis of the civil constitution of the clergy, and of Pius VII. in his first concordat with Napoleon. "If the needs of the Church," he writes, "called for one of these great measures which do not allow of delay, as we have seen during the French Revolution, what should be done? The judgments of the Pope being only reformable by a general council, who is to assemble the council? If the Pope refuses, who shall force him? and meanwhile how shall the Church be governed?"

[1] i. p. 23. [2] i. p. 41. [3] i. p. 34.

And so throughout. Papal sovereignty is the real theme, rather than infallibility strictly so called. The world is considered as in a state of revolt. Military obedience rather than a dilatory constitution, a dictatorship rather than a consulship, is called for. The sovereignty of the Pope is regarded as the one effective institution embodying this necessary requirement. He upholds also the royal prerogative, on the lines of Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire, before Gallicanism had destroyed the harmony between temporal and spiritual orders; but papal authority is his main theme, and is in the last resort the support of regal. It touches directly the belief in the authority of religion, on which all secular authority depends. It is true that Popes have deposed this or that king, but such cases are quite exceptional. They have ever been the guardians of the principle of sovereignty, and, where they have deposed, they have really been a bulwark against the Revolution. Flagrant injustice in the rulers, which would have been a plea for revolt, was redressed and chastised in the name of higher authority.[1]

Such were the leading ideas of the work which inspired the Catholic movement in the first half of the present century. Its influence was felt by men and schools very divergent from each other. Many of the friends of Montalembert were "brought up at the feet"[2] of Joseph de Maistre. Lamennais adopted and developed his Ultramontanism. The *Du Pape* influenced such different men as Perrone in Italy, Donoso Cortez in Spain, Döllinger in Germany; while the uncompromising *intransigeants* of the *Univers* professed in later years to be the true exponents of its principles in their original purity.

A deeper thinker than de Maistre, though a less marked personality, was Vicomte de Bonald, the founder of Traditionalism. Traditionalism stood to the French Ultramontane movement in much the same relation as the philosophy of Butler and Coleridge stood, in a much smaller field, to the Oxford movement. It was the philosophical foundation of an energetic and practical agitation. De Bonald was its founder; but

[1] *Du Pape*, vol. i. p. 157.

[2] This is the phrase used in a private letter by Albert Dechamps in speaking of his early youth.

owing to the more popular character of de Maistre's works, and to the opposition aroused by Lamennais's exaggerated version of Traditionalism, the great debt which Christian thinkers owe to him has been, perhaps, insufficiently recognised. The most profound thoughts in the *Essai sur l'indifférence* are not Lamennais's but Bonald's; while its exaggerations, which Rome finally condemned, are the work of Lamennais himself. Bonald was Minister of Public Instruction under the Empire, and continued to be a well-known figure in public life until the Revolution in 1830; but his chief influence was due to his writings. His long life was a wonderful link between the old and the new. Born nearly forty years before the Revolution, he lived through the Consulate and Empire, through the two reigns of the restored Bourbons, and passed away when the reign of Louis Philippe—the turning point of the Catholic revival—was more than half over. The friends of his youth remembered Fénelon, and the friends of his old age — the generation succeeding that of his own son, Cardinal de Bonald, who died during the Vatican Council—were among the prominent Catholics of our own time. The glories of the *ancien régime*, of the Church of Massillon, Bourdaloue, Bossuet, were a green memory in his boyhood; the decay of Church and Constitution alike was not completed until he was over forty. He was seventy-eight years old, but still hale and vigorous, when it was finally acknowledged that the past could not return, and the citizen king replaced the heir to Louis XIV.; and he passed away, at the age of eighty-eight, when the old Gallicanism was nearly swept away, and the victory of Ultramontanism in France was an assured fact.

Beginning, as de Maistre did, with the sense of the necessity of some effective principle of reconstruction after, the anarchy of the Revolution, his more philosophical mind came to feel the necessity of a rational justification of the proposed remedy against the prevailing maxims of an infidel generation. It was well enough and true enough to say that the Pope and the Church were the great hope for society; but as long as the intellectual heirs of Voltaire and Rousseau represented Catholic faith as a surrender to superstition, and as long as the philosophy of the Encyclopædists ridiculed the ideas of God and

immortality as delusive, an impassable barrier remained in many minds to the success of de Maistre's movement. Having, then, in his earlier works vindicated, with de Maistre himself, the constructive elements in society, he set himself to consider, in his *Recherches philosophiques sur les premiers objets des connoissances morales*, the ground on which a sceptical philosophy should be opposed, and the religious reaction should be vindicated as reasonable as well as practically useful. The attack on the Church had been made in the name of philosophy, and he begins by testing the methods which have claimed that title. He first reviews the past failures of so-called philosophy. For three thousand years, in matters of the very highest moment, concerning God, the World, the Soul, philosophers, men of unquestionable genius, have searched in the human mind for the ultimate basis of our knowledge and for the test of truth. Each has investigated the problem in his own way; and they have never been able to come to any agreement in their solution. What an evidence of the insufficiency of the individual reason, even the best! Does it prove philosophy to be a pretence? And does it show that we can have no reasonable conviction of those great truths so necessary to the moral life of mankind? The sceptic will answer, "Yes." Bonald maintains, on the other hand, that the continued and indomitable effort of the human spirit to reach this knowledge, and the persistency among men of these great ideas, are a stronger proof that a true account of them is attainable than past failures are of its hopelessness.[1] Perhaps it may be with "philosophy as with the arts, with manners, with literature, that that which is easy, simple, and natural is always that which is obtained last of all, and often after long aberrations."[2]

Where, then, are we to look for this easy and natural solution of what has so long perplexed us? Let us find the source of the aberrations in the past, and by considering them hope to discover the right path. And if we look at the story of human conviction on these great subjects, we find that in the oldest civilisation, that of the Jews, the social truths were not sought for at all by an introspective philosophy.[3] God had spoken to the people of Israel,—so their sacred

[1] *Recherches Philosophiques*, etc. (Paris, 1818), vol. i. pp. 7, 79, 82.
[2] p. 80. [3] p. 5; pp. 8, 9.

writings affirmed, — and the ideas, Providence, Morality, Retribution, were accepted by the people as the legacy of the divine teaching to their ancestors. Later on and elsewhere we find that the tendency of the popular mind to mythical creation has asserted itself; and these social truths are found in various societies overlaid with extravagant legends. From these puerilities of popular mythology philosophy came as a reaction. But like other reactions it was thoroughgoing. It found the social truths bound up with an incredible mythology, and submitted the whole of the popular religion to the test of reason. It conceived not of the primitive tradition within the mythology which should share with philosophy the work of preserving truth while error was being eliminated. It regarded the whole as the offspring of popular fancy, which had run riot and should be ruthlessly tested by rational analysis. Here was the source of past aberration. The Jewish belief explained both the failure of philosophers and the persistency of the ideas. The ideas persisted because God had imparted them to the race; philosophers failed to find their source, because they looked within the individual mind for the origin of what was in reality given to the society by God.

But while the history of philosophy tends to this conclusion, the study of the individual mind confirms it; and in his treatment of this part of the subject we have some of the most striking thoughts of the French writer. External objects, he notes, are in some sense known to each by his own faculties, and men agree in their account of these objects. The sources and criteria of conviction are not; and no two thinkers can agree about them. We are aware of the presence of a tree or a horse. A hundred men will all agree as to their presence and general appearance. But if we ask *how* we know it, *why* the impression on our senses warrants us in the conclusion that external objects are in existence, the hundred men break up into idealists, realists, cosmo-thetic idealists, and so forth. The fact is that while we can know and measure outer objects by the individual reason, we cannot measure our own reason by itself. The first link in our chain of knowledge is outside and above ourselves, and to pretend to find it in ourselves is to play at thinking.

"Instead of attaching the link" to the point above us to which it belongs, "we hold it," he writes, "in one hand and we stretch out the chain with the other, and we think we are following it, while [in reality] it is following us. We take within ourselves the resting-place on which we want to climb up; in a word, we gauge our own thought by itself,[1] which puts us in the position of a man who wished to weigh himself without scales or weights. Playthings of our own illusions, we interrogate ourselves, and we take the echo of our own voice for the response of truth."

The individual reason, then, is intrinsically incompetent to supply a final account and justification of our beliefs. It is necessarily thrown on the convictions of society, which embody and preserve the primitive tradition. Once more, anticipating Herbert Spencer's conception of human society as an organism, he points out that the fundamental truths of morality and religion are necessary for its life. The instinct of self-preservation leads the society to seriousness and reality in its recognition of them. The society learns from experience, from punishment for their neglect, from reward for their recognition. What was given by revelation is preserved by practical experiment. The individual theorist has neither the revelation nor the experience. He is born after the first was given, he dies before the chastisement arrives which punishes the denial of social truths. His brief life does not afford opportunity of that verification which comes of experienced results. His reason should be to the general reason as his life to the general life, a part and a minister, not the final arbiter. The individual owes the very colour of his thought to the society which has educated him; and for him to attempt to judge the social convictions independently is as though a branch exulting in its life were to expect to live and grow when separated from the tree. The result for the branch is that the external source of life is cut off, and though it may live for a brief space, its death is certain. And so the man who cuts himself off from the accumulated wisdom of society may think actively for a time; but his thought grows sterile and dries up, and if others pursue a similar course, barrenness and death will be widespread.

[1] "Nous nous pensons nous-mêmes" is the French for which I have been unable to express an exact equivalent in English.

But here arises a remonstrance from those who, filled with the glory of individual research, cite the investigations of a Laplace, a Newton, a Bacon. Did not such men judge and reform the convictions of the society in which they lived? Was not the universal reason wrong and the individual right when Copernicus first thought of the true movement of the planets, Newton of the principle of gravitation? Were not doubting and questioning on the part of individuals the means of these great discoveries?

Bonald, without exhaustively discussing this question, gives pregnant suggestions in answer to it. It is in the ascertainment of those practical truths which are essential to the organic life of the race, that he vindicates the supremacy of the general reason over the individual. It is not in the theoretical analysis of details which do not concern that life. That the individual may carry further the analysis of certain truths he does not deny. But there is a condition which explains the distinction. The condition of individual analysis and questioning leading to knowledge, is that the process must end in synthesis and not in destruction. If the process of examining the movements of the planets destroyed them; if the tides ceased to ebb and flow while their relation to the moon was doubted and investigated, such investigations would not be of use. But as things are, physical experiment and analysis do not destroy; they construct. In physical discovery the individual reason fulfils its proper function of minister to the general knowledge. It gives a true speculative analysis of the practical observations of the race. But with those moral truths—the existence of good and evil, of a Supreme Being, of future retribution—on which the life of society depends, analysis means destruction and not construction. The very thing you wish to analyse melts away in the act of doubting and questioning. It is like wholesale vivisection. Rip open heart and lungs to find what they are made of, and you may make discoveries; but they will be of no avail for the person experimented on. So too destroy the virtues which make a good citizen or a good father—for to question their worth persistently is to destroy them—and you cannot reconstruct. And again in each case, in social virtue and in the living organism, there is the impalpable something which makes its life and essence, which

ceases to exist when analysis has destroyed. Not only you cannot reconstruct, but you cannot even examine in the dead what existed in the living.

What, then, is the reasonable course with respect to those convictions which are essential to the life of the social organism? Here again the analogy of the individual organism teaches what to do as it taught what to avoid. Faith and not doubt and inquiry leads each man to truth.

Does a man wait to eat and drink before he has proved by chemistry and physiology that food supports life? Does he, should he, begin by the inaction which a doubt on the subject would suggest? On the contrary, the experience of the race gives it to him as a certain truth that if he does not eat he will starve. He believes it on the authority of those who witness to the general and practical truths of life.[1]

[1] L'usage des choses nécessaires à notre existence physique n'a pas du tout été laissé à la disposition de notre raison particulière. Dans ce genre nous n'avons pas à choisir ni même à examiner, puisque cet usage précède toujours pour nous la faculté d'examiner et de choisir. C'est assurément sur la foi d'autrui que nous usons exclusivement de certaines substances pour nous nourrir et nous vêtir, ou que nous confions notre vie aux arts qui servent à nous loger ou à nous transporter d'un lieu à un autre, quoique cependant l'usage de ces choses soit pour nous d'une toute autre conséquence que le mouvement de la terre ou l'attraction de la lune. Nous mettons même souvent la raison des autres à la place de la nôtre pour des choses moins nécessaires et moins usuelles; et le géomètre, qui entre, lui, centième dans un bateau, ne consulte pas auparavant si la charge ne sera pas trop forte relativement au volume d'eau qu'elle déplace, mais il se fie à l'intérêt et à l'expérience d'un batelier qui n'a d'autre connoissance que sa pratique journalière. Ainsi, pour des choses d'où dépend la conservation de notre vie, de cette vie qui nous est si chère, nous nous réglons sur les habitudes que nous trouvons établies dans la société; nous n'avons d'autre raison, pour y conformer nos actions, que l'exemple des autres; nous ne faisons aucun usage de notre raison, de cette raison dont nous sommes si fiers; nous pensons que la coutume immémoriale de la société doit nous tenir lieu de raison; et cette opinion est si bien établie, que tout homme qui s'écarte dans des choses communes de l'usage généralement adopté, passe pour un homme singulier, un esprit bizarre, et quelquefois pour un fou.

Mais nous avons deux poids et deux mesures; les mêmes hommes qui usent sans examen des alimens qu'on leur sert, ne veulent pas quelquefois recevoir de confiance des vérités qu'ils trouvent établies dans tout l'Univers. Cependant les vérités morales sont toutes des vérités pratiques, vrais besoins de la société, comme pour l'homme les alimens et les vêtemens; et si l'homme physique *vit de pain*, l'homme moral *vit de la parole* qui lui révèle la vérité. Rien n'est troublé dans la nature matérielle pendant que l'homme examine, discute, approfondit la vérité ou l'erreur des systèmes de physique, parce que le monde physique n'est pas l'homme, et qu'on conçoit qu'il pourroit même exister sans l'homme; mais tout périt dans la société, lois et mœurs, pendant que l'homme délibère s'il doit

To sum up, then, the analogy of society to the individual life suggests in its entirety that "simple account" of the origin of moral truths which philosophers have missed. In each case the truths necessary for life are imparted to the organism at the outset, and supplemented and conveyed by means of the society. The individual organism receives from nature and learns from society in a spirit of faith that primary knowledge which is necessary for its preservation. This is the external point to which the chain of such knowledge is attached. Nature bids the child accept its food; its nurse and its mother supply food and clothing, and teach it by degrees the further truths necessary for its preservation. So too with the corporate organism. God imparted to society at

admettre ou rejeter les croyances qu'il trouve établies dans la généralité des sociétés, telles que l'existence de Dieu et la spiritualité de nos âmes, la distinction du bien ou du mal, etc. etc.; parce que la société est l'homme en tant qu'il soumet son esprit et conforme ses actions aux doctrines et aux préceptes de la société, et qu'on ne conçoit pas que la société puisse exister sans cette obéissance; en un mot, le monde moral n'a pas été *livré à nos disputes* comme le monde physique, parce que les disputes qui laissent le monde physique tel qu'il est, troublent, bouleversent, anéantissent le monde moral.

L'homme qui, en venant au monde, trouve établie dans la généralité des sociétés, sous une forme ou sous une autre, la croyance d'un Dieu créateur, législateur, rémunérateur et vengeur, la distinction du juste et de l'injuste, du bien et du mal moral, lorsqu'il examine avec sa raison ce qu'il doit admettre ou rejeter de ces croyances générales, sur lesquelles a été fondée la société universelle du genre humain, et repose l'édifice de la législation générale, écrite ou traditionnelle, se constitue, par cela seul, en état de révolte contre la société; il s'arroge, lui simple individu, le droit de juger et de réformer le général, et il aspire à détrôner la raison universelle pour faire régner à sa place sa raison particulière, cette raison qu'il doit toute entière à la société, puisqu'elle lui a donné dans le langage, dont elle lui a transmis la connoissance, le moyen de toute opération intellectuelle, et le *miroir*, comme dit Leibnitz, dans lequel il aperçoit ses propres pensées.

Mais si un homme, quel qu'il soit, a le droit de délibérer après que la société a décidé, tous ont incontestablement le même droit. La société qui enchaîne nos pensées par ses croyances, et notre action par ses lois, et à l'empire de laquelle nous faisons, tous tant que nous sommes, un effort continuel pour nous soustraire, la société sera donc livrée au hasard de nos examens et à la merci de nos discussions, et elle attendra que nous nous soyons accordés sur quelque chose, nous qui depuis trois mille ans n'avons pu nous accorder sur rien. Il faudra donc reconnoître dans tous les hommes le droit absurde et contradictoire de suspendre la marche de la société dans laquelle ils existent, ou pour mieux dire le droit de l'anéantir; car, semblable au temps qui en mesure la durée, la société ne pourroit s'arrêter même un instant sans rentrer pour jamais dans le néant.[1]

[1] See pp. 108 *seq.*

the outset those truths necessary for its preservation in its infancy,—for the very life of society,—with the gift of speech by which such truths are conveyed. The criterion for us now of these truths—our means of determining what is true and what is false in current beliefs—depends on the question, "Is this belief a part of the knowledge imparted to the race for its preservation?" And this is best tested by language, in which the primitive ideas were given, and which has preserved them. The experience of the society, which also finds its way into the language, supplements and completes what nature begins. Men have here and there corrupted and partially lost the social truths, as a child may be disobedient, and refuse to accept the necessity of eating its dinner, or of keeping from dangers which its nurse points out. Then comes the punishment which corrects and leads back to docility. The individual and the society alike grow sick or perish if they neglect the primary truths which nature has instilled. The French Revolution was a punishment for such neglect, no less than the broken head of the child that will not keep away from the steep stone staircase against which it is warned.

I have analysed at some length the fundamental philosophy of the Traditionalist writer in order to show the real and careful thought which lay at the root of a movement, which did not always in later days display the same characteristics. Of Bonald's superstructure less need be said. Having condemned individual scrutiny as a process in which "every one is judge and no one is witness," he presses far his attempt to find in language the symbol of the knowledge which nature has given and tradition has accumulated. Language educates the individual and even teaches him to think. The moral ideas are preserved in language even where mythology distorts their application. Man could combine the ideas and twist them, but he could not invent them. Thus language is the great test of the truth of an ultimate moral idea, and of its divine origin. Christian revelation supplemented what the primitive revelation and human experience had begun; and so Christian tradition shares with human language, and in a far higher degree, the position of source and preserver of moral knowledge. Beginning with the knowledge of natural religion the heart becomes purified, and sees in the papal Church the truest application

of the moral truths which nature teaches only roughly and generally.

There is in this system an obvious suggestion, from the standpoint of philosophy, of the connection, indicated by de Maistre from a political point of view, between the revolt of the sixteenth century and the events of the eighteenth. The individualism of private judgment culminated in the destructive philosophy, which was so closely connected with the Revolution. Bonald's wholesale attack on individualism converts the Catholic conception of trust in the Church into a philosophical principle of general application. The outcome of his teaching is that the Protestant principle of private judgment attacks in reality a fundamental law of which the history of philosophy gives unanswerable evidence. Human society is one vast Church, from which each individual learns and to which he ministers. He may help to keep its organisation pure and purge it from incidental error; but once he calls in question the fundamental truths of its constitution, he begins the destruction of the ultimate principle of his own life and thought. Luther did this in the sixteenth century to the Church; Voltaire and Hume to society at large in the eighteenth.

The Ultramontanism of de Maistre and the Traditionalism of de Bonald were fused and developed by a man whose name stands out prominently in the ecclesiastical history of the century. The famous Abbé Félicité de Lamennais, in his *Essai sur l'indifférence*, pressed to its extreme limit—and beyond the intentions of the founder of traditionalism—de Bonald's disparagement of the individual intellect, and formulated the doctrine of "universal consent" as the test of truth. Carrying into his philosophy the conception of the See of Rome as the divinely-sent witness to the Christian revelation, he regarded the Pope as the mouthpiece of this universal consent. He waged uncompromising war on Gallicanism, and may be said to have had a principal share in its ultimate defeat. He visited Leo XII. in Rome, and is supposed to have been made a cardinal *in petto*; and his influence at its zenith has been compared by Lacordaire to that of Bossuet himself.[1]

In the hands of Lamennais the Ultramontane movement

[1] "M. de Lamennais," writes Lacordaire, ". . . se trouva investi de la puissance de Bossuet" (*Considérations sur le système de M. de Lamennais*, p. 36).

was destined to undergo a violent change of direction, a change which opened the way for another great movement, which ultimately proved not only divergent but in some respects contrary to the views of de Maistre—the movement of the Liberal Catholics. Lamennais, in his early days, vied with de Maistre himself in his advocacy of absolutism, both papal and regal. He took de Maistre's ground that the papacy would prove the best support to the restored Royalism, which had lost the traditional reverence and prescriptive strength of earlier days. But with that tendency to press principles to startling conclusions which won for him from Sainte-Beuve the title "ce grand esprit immodéré," while he almost caricatured Bonald's traditionalism, he emphasised what de Maistre had barely implied, that the papal power must be accepted as supreme over the regal.[1] In 1826 he published a pamphlet in which he maintained that no one, "*without separation from God*," could refuse to allow to the Pope the right to depose kings.

The Catholic monarch Charles X. could not allow such a challenge to pass unnoticed. Already he was hated for his theocratic tendencies. Caricatures were invented of the king celebrating mass in his private chamber. Silence might imply acquiescence or even conspiracy on his part. Lamennais was prosecuted and condemned to pay a small fine. It was really a triumph for him. The conviction was purely technical and the fine nominal. But his was not the spirit to brook even the form of prosecution in the name of the Government. From that moment he spoke of the fall of the Bourbons as to be looked for in the order of Providence, and expressed his wish that it might come quickly. "What thou dost do quickly," he is reported to have said. Within two years appeared his *Des progrès de la Révolution et de la guerre contre l'Eglise*. The *volte-face* was clearly indicated, and needed only the opportunity of 1830 to be openly avowed. The test of certainty was still the consent of the people, and the sacredness of an institu-

[1] It is interesting to note Lacordaire's judgment, in 1829, on the nature of Lamennais's genius. After speaking of one of his works as "an exaggeration of the views of M. de Maistre," he adds: "Il m'a semblé souvent que cet écrivain n'invente pas; il ne fait que mettre en œuvre ses devanciers, en outrant les proportions" (See Foisset, *Life of Lacordaire*, i. 137). This illustrates what has been pointed out in the text with reference to Lamennais's relations to de Maistre and de Bonald alike.

tion was still, by analogy, established by the same criterion; but this consent was no longer simply identical with the tradition of the Church; no longer the conviction of a society, the condition of whose stable existence was the double rule of pope and king. It was in the political order the plebiscite. He raised the standard of universal liberty, and appealed to the will of the people;—a purified people indeed, he added, but still the people. He asked for "la liberté de conscience, la liberté de la presse, la liberté de l'éducation."[1] And a few months later he wrote more expressly still, "quand les Catholiques aussi crieront 'liberté' bien des choses changeront": and again, "il faut que tout se passe par le peuple, c'est-à-dire un peuple nouveau formé peu à peu sous l'influence du Christianisme mieux conçu au milieu des nations en ruines";[2] and again, "la liberté ou possédée ou cherchée est aujourd'hui le premier besoin du peuple." Hitherto he had looked to the king as the protector of the Christian people, that is of the Church. With de Maistre he had cherished the ideal of the days of Charlemagne, when the temporal sovereign protected the spiritual society, and the Pope its head. The king had failed him and turned persecutor, and he appealed to the people for protection. By this curious distortion the philosophy of Ultramontanism was converted into the basis of a Liberal movement. The theory was too unnatural to live, and it was speedily condemned, as we shall see, by Rome; but the enthusiasms which it stirred and the movement which it inaugurated form a new and important chapter in the history of the French Church.

The year of the Revolution, 1830, was the culminating point of the unpopularity of the Church in France. The Archbishop's palace was destroyed by fire; and for three years no priest dared to appear in the streets of Paris in his soutane. It marked the failure of the attempt, which it terminated, to restore the Church as nearly as possible under the conditions of the Church of the eighteenth century.

The Bourbon Government had misread the times. They had seen the external transformation effected by the Revolution, the violent disestablishment of the Church, the persecution of

[1] *Des progrès de la Révolution*, p. 3.
[2] Letter to Count Senfft, January 1829.

its ministers to death and banishment, the destruction of the *ancien régime.* They decreed that the past was to return. Banished noblemen and banished bishops were re-instated. The Church was re-established. But they did not realise the inner malady to which the spoliation of the Church had been due. They had to deal with something much deeper than a change of law could affect. The external disestablishment of the Church was but a symptom; it was not the real disease. To apply the cure of external re-establishment was like rouging pale cheeks as a cure for illness. It was not a change in the legal status of the Church, but the loss of Christian faith by the multitudes which had really to be reckoned with;—not the external disestablishment, but the intellectual and moral disestablishment of Christianity. "Jesus Christ," writes the historian of those times,[1] "had returned into the temples, but He had not returned into the hearts which unbelief had torn from Him. Almost throughout France at that time the majority of those who exercised a liberal profession were without religion."

The men who now came into prominence, and into whose hands the Catholic movement was soon destined to fall—Montalembert and Lacordaire—recognised fully that a new state of things was to be dealt with. They were fired by the genius of Lamennais, by his vast designs, his zeal for Rome, and above all, his new-born enthusiasm for liberty. The Catholic movement represented with them the efforts of Catholics to adapt themselves to a new order, social, political, intellectual. The Church was not a part of the *ancien régime.* It was her glory to be ever renewing her youth, and flourishing anew in a garb suited to new times and fresh places. They saw that the old corporate faith was gone, that the Church must retreat from the pretence of being what she really was not, under pain of becoming less than she really was. The intellectual disestablishment of Christianity and of all belief in the supernatural was growing apace. Even where the Voltairian scoffing passed away, public sentiment returned not to faith but to indifference, or at most to philosophic interest in religion as a social force. In these very years St. Simonianism appeared, and was moving on towards Positivism. Such were the facts, and Catholics must face them.

[1] M. Foisset.

Lamennais and his friends believed that the Church was more likely to thrive if freed from State patronage and State interference. They hailed, therefore, with satisfaction the declaration of the July Government that Catholicism was not the religion of the State. They attempted to ally it with the power to which the future belonged — the democracy.[1] "God and liberty" was the motto which they claimed as their own. The principles of '89 were to be maintained and Christianised. The plea for liberty was not indeed merely an adaptation of Catholicism to the times. It was also a plea for the very life of the Church. A united Church and State in which the most Christian sovereign protected the Church in temporals and obeyed it in spirituals was very well. But that had passed with the old state of things. Their union — partial under the Emperor, and professedly complete under the infidel Parliament of the Bourbons — was no longer a union of mutual respect. The cords which bound the Church to the State were not cords of love but prison chains. Lamennais and his followers started the *Avenir* newspaper to obtain redress. Education free from the control of an infidel State, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of conscience, the defeat of Gallicanism, with its traditional subservience of the spiritual to the temporal power, devotion to Rome as the principle both of unity and of ecclesiastical liberty, were the principal items of their programme.

Of the special standpoint of Lamennais in this movement enough has been said. Montalembert had been fired by the sight of the wrongs of Catholic Ireland, and it was partly through this medium that he had conceived the idea of uniting in one common enthusiasm the cause of

[1] It must be noted that while this statement is true of Lamennais and the *Avenir*, and of Montalembert and Lacordaire so far as they identified themselves with the *Avenir*, it would be inaccurate to describe Liberal Catholicism, as Montalembert and Lacordaire subsequently fashioned it, as democratic. Its zeal for constitutional methods and for liberty stopped short of this; and Lacordaire, as M. Foisset has told us, afterwards regretted that he allowed his popular sympathies to lead him to take his place in 1848 on the extreme left of the Chamber. So far as the *Avenir* was concerned, M. Foisset tells us that its founder thought that "the future belonged to the democracy. The Church should ally itself frankly with it, to reconcile it with religion in a common devotion to liberty." Hence the title chosen (Foisset, i. 152).

Liberty and the cause of the Church. It was from Ireland that he wrote to Lamennais, placing his services at his disposal in a campaign which he regarded as that of a French O'Connell.[1] Lacordaire had been an infidel. On his conversion to Christianity his eyes were opened to the fact that the infidel apostles of liberty were false to their own principles, in their dealings with the Church. Liberty of conscience was violated by an enforced indifferentist education. The liberty of the clergy was handicapped at every turn.

"In my youth," he writes, "the liberal question presented itself to me only as affecting the country and humanity. I desired, like most of my contemporaries, the final triumph of the principles of 1789 by the establishment and execution of the Charter of 1814. In this everything was included for us. The Church in our thoughts was nothing but an obstacle; it never entered into our minds to suppose that she too required to invoke freedom, and to claim her share in the patrimony of these new rights. When I became a Christian this second point of view became visible to me; my Liberalism thus embraced France and the Church together, and I suffered so much the more in the civil struggle that I had henceforward two causes to sustain in one,—two causes which seemed irreconcilable enemies, which no voice ought to attempt to bring together."[2]

Acting under the influence of Lamennais, the conductors of the *Avenir* were not likely to stop at half measures. They went so far as to advocate the absolute cessation of State subsidy for the clergy. The opposition of the French clerical authorities was naturally pronounced; and it was increased by the known sympathy of the *Avenir* with the democracy, which was little congenial to men who were wont to identify the cause of the Church with that of the dethroned king. Stung by general opposition, the editors of the *Avenir* went to Rome, to claim the sanction which their loyal devotion to the Church must, as they thought, command. The story of their reception has often been told. Rome, supporting the traditions of centuries, committed to principles which must stand the test of all civilisations and times and countries, was invited to sanction theories eagerly improvised by young men in view of a special crisis in France. Prudence, patience,

[1] Foisset, i. 158. [2] *Ibid.* i. 150.

slowness to act or speak, reserve—these were the characteristics of the papal court, according to the saying *Roma patiens quia aeterna.* After long weeks of waiting at last they received a message from the Pope. Its substance was, in Lacordaire's words, that the "Holy Father did justice to our good intentions, but that we had treated supremely difficult questions without the moderation which was desirable; that these questions should be examined, but that in the meantime we might return to our own country, where we should be told, when the proper moment came, what the decision was." Then and not till then they were granted an audience. They were received by the Holy Father with great kindness—but not a word was said as to the *Avenir.* "The Pope received us graciously," writes Lacordaire, "but without saying a single word as to our business."

The condemnation by the Pope, in the celebrated Encyclical "Mirari Vos," of the exaggerated theories of the conductors of the *Avenir,* taught Lacordaire that, as an abstract theory, Liberalism might be carried too far. Thus was abruptly terminated the first stage of the Liberal Catholic movement. Their scheme, in the shape in which Lamennais had fashioned it, was condemned. The great leader to whom they had trusted — Félicité de Lamennais himself — wavered in his allegiance to Rome and fell; and for some years Lacordaire had to endure in high quarters the suspicion which such events naturally entailed.

A second stage was entered on. Premature theorising was set aside; but the endeavour to fashion Catholic life in such a way as to influence the age, with its special prejudices and sympathies, continued; the exhortation to loyalty to Rome as the defender of the liberties of the Church continued; and the practical protest against persecution and Catholic disabilities was renewed a little later with energy and success. And in these points Montalembert and Lacordaire soon carried Catholic France with them, and determined for the time the direction of the Catholic movement. The old Gallicanism, typically represented by M. de Frayssinous, already weakened, soon became almost extinct.[1] Lacordaire's conferences at Notre

[1] Dr. Alzog says as much as this; and his statement is confirmed by the letter of M. Albert Dechamps cited elsewhere. "Jansenism and Gallicanism," writes

Dame, opposed for a time by the Archbishop of Paris (Mgr. de Quélen), gained in the end marked influence on all schools. The theme he so often returned to—of religion as necessary for the preservation of society—was one which commended itself to all. Even free thinkers found here a point of union with Catholics. The genius of Montalembert revived, in a form suited to the age, the monastic and saintly ideal, in such works as his *Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary*, followed up later on by his *Monks of the West*. His character, brilliancy, and liberal sympathies gained him a hearing in the Assembly; and he employed his great gifts as an orator in endeavouring to make the Catholic cause intelligible and persuasive to his fellow countrymen. Lacordaire's *Life of St. Dominic*, published in 1841, continued the work which Montalembert's writings had begun; and his establishment of the Dominicans in France was the most important attempt at re-introducing the "regular" life, since the destruction of the religious orders. The society of St. Vincent of Paul—founded a few years earlier as an antidote to St. Simonianism—was another Catholic institution which appealed to the temper of the hour, and at the same time claimed the sympathy of Catholics of all schools. Such were some of the forces at work during the twelve years which succeeded the Revolution.

Renewed life and organisation soon placed Catholics in a position to protest against disabilities. The cry of liberty was once more raised, but this time not in the form of unreal theorising, but as a practical protest against illiberal repression. In this form the cry was echoed by all Catholics,—even the survivors of the party most attached to the *ancien régime*. The first great political campaign of the Catholics was on the education question. Catholics saw their children under the existing law educated on principles of religious indifference. Never was truer tyranny exercised in the name of freedom. Indifference was as truly a creed as Catholicism; and the secularists had been doing since the days of the Revolution the very thing with which they had reproached Catholic authorities of an earlier time.[1] Montalembert and Lacordaire had never

Dr. Alzog, "which at one time had divided the French clergy into hostile camps, now nearly if not quite disappeared" (vol. iii. p. 712).

[1] "One of the abuses of his power," writes M. Foisset, "with which Louis

ceased since the days of the *Avenir* from protesting against this abuse; but it was in 1842 that the first systematic effort to obtain redress was made.

The party which was formed at this juncture under Montalembert's presidency, the "parti Catholique," united all sections of Catholics. Louis Veuillot, the strenuous opponent in later years of Liberal Catholicism, was as eager a member of it as Montalembert himself. "Ce Veuillot m'a ravi," wrote Montalembert in 1842, "voilà un homme selon mon cœur." The campaign in its early stages gave occasion for one of Veuillot's most brilliant essays, and for one of Montalembert's most eloquent speeches.[1] M. Dupin in April 1844 had delivered a hostile criticism on the attitude of the clergy, and had ended with the words "soyez implacables." Montalembert took up the gauntlet in the upper house. The peroration of his speech gives some idea of his special genius, and of the spirit of the party.

On vous dit: "soyez implacables." Eh bien! soyez-le; faites tout ce que vous voudrez et tout ce que vous pourrez. L'Église vous répond par la bouche de Tertullien et de Fénelon: "Nous ne sommes point à craindre pour vous, mais nous ne vous craignons pas." Catholiques du dix-neuvième siècle, au milieu d'un peuple libre, nous ne voulons pas être des hélotes. Nous sommes les successeurs des martyrs, et nous ne tremblons pas devant les successeurs de Julien l'Apostat. Nous sommes les fils des croisés et nous ne reculons pas devant les fils de Voltaire.[2]

As long, then, as the question was one which did but deal with the vindication of Catholic rights—all were agreed. The Catholic party achieved oratorical successes, and was tolerated and admired, but their numbers were insignificant; and uncom-

XIV. has been especially reproached, was his taking away their children from the French Calvinists to have them brought up in the Catholic faith. In our time no free-thinker has been able to think of it without horror. Nevertheless this is to the letter the treatment inflicted by the Revolution on Catholics. The State has taken their children to have them brought up in religious indifferentism, and no one was indignant. Thus they have silently perverted France from Christianity" (Boissard's *Life of Foisset*, p. 42).

[1] See Boissard's *Life of Foisset*.

[2] The remark of M. Molé, one of his opponents, on the occasion was characteristically French. "Quel dommage que Montalembert ait si peu d'ambition! Et pourtant, c'est beau. Si je n'avais que quarante ans, je ne voudrais pas d'autre rôle que celui-là."

promising assertions of principle in the face of an overwhelming majority of opponents were the limit of their action. But with the Revolution of 1848 came a change. It was a crisis which brought into relief the progress of the Church in its influence over Frenchmen since 1830. In 1830 the primary object of execration had been the episcopate and clergy; and now they were hailed as friends of the people. Events seemed for the moment—and only for the moment—to justify the sanguine hopes of Lacordaire and Montalembert that they could Christianise the Revolution, and Catholicise the principles of '89. The success of clerical candidates in the first Parliament of the Republic was great. Three bishops and twenty priests were in the Chamber.[1] Lacordaire himself won a seat. The alliance between religion and Republicanism seemed for a few short months a *fait accompli*. The Dominican orator took his seat on the extreme left in February 1848; but he soon repented such a step. He found at his side the unmistakable forerunners of the atheistic left of the present day. His Parliamentary career was short, and he resigned his seat in May. Then came the election of Louis Napoleon to the presidency, and the subsequent general election. Montalembert and other Catholics of weight had supported him. The Catholic element was indeed not as strong as it had been in the democratic Parliament of February; but Napoleon felt that he owed much to their support, and offered to Montalembert's friend, the Comte de Falloux, the post of Minister of Education and Public Worship.

The question of "Free Education"[2] at last came into the region of practical politics. M. de Falloux's task was a delicate one, as he had no hope of carrying any measure by a Catholic majority. He formed a committee under the presidency of M. Thiers, and after considerable difficulty succeeded in securing its consent to an equal measure of liberty for Catholics in primary and secondary education. M. Thiers endeavoured at first to give the University the monopoly of secondary education, while allowing the clergy the supreme control of the primary. In the proposed law, as finally drafted by the

[1] Boissard, p. 96.

[2] "Education libre," unlike our own "Free Education," meant the liberty to educate as Catholics, and not at the indifferentist institutions of the State.

committee, the State, by means of the University, was allowed the monopoly of conferring degrees, but with this reserve, and with the further admission of a general State control, the principle of "free education" was secured.

The question at once arose, Should Catholics accept this? and the two answers which were given by Veuillot in his journal the *Univers*, on the one hand, and by Montalembert and Falloux on the other, caused a division among French Catholics of which the results were far-reaching. Montalembert assured himself that this law was the very best he could hope to see passed. To preserve the rising generation from being educated on principles of indifferentism, Catholics must be content to take their degrees at secularist institutions. "The Church in its relations with temporal society," writes M. Boissard, in his exposition of Montalembert's view, "has never adopted the principle of everything or nothing." It seemed wiser and more considerate to French Catholics to secure for their children a Christian education at the necessary cost, than to maintain an unpractical *non possumus*. He therefore supported the law. Louis Veuillot, on the other hand, strenuously opposed the law, and accused Montalembert of being false to his former convictions. He would accept nothing for the Catholic educators which did not include the power of conferring degrees. Whether or no such an attitude began with the hope that more might be gained, it soon changed, as things became less rather than more hopeful, into one of general protest against the existing order of things. The party of the *Univers* became known as "irreconcilable."

It should be remembered that this measure almost immediately succeeded the events which led to Pio Nono's change of feeling, and inaugurated his own hostile attitude towards the "Revolution" and the liberalism of modern society. The murder of de Rossi, the triumph of the Republicans, the Pope's own enforced flight from Rome put an abrupt termination to his concessions to Liberalism. If he had begun in the spirit of Lacordaire, who sat on the extreme left in the Assembly, like Lacordaire he soon learnt something of the character of the men who flourished and dishonoured the standard of freedom. The French priest retired from public life. But the Pope had necessarily to continue to deal with the people

and with the secular power. For him there could be no *gran rifiuto.* What wonder that resentment at what seemed so ungenerous a response to his overtures made him disinclined for fresh concession? Rome, indeed, never identified itself with either of the two parties in Catholic France. As we shall see, it refrained, in the controversies which arose, from throwing in its weight on either side of the balance; but there is no question that the Pope's own personal sympathy went some way with the "irreconcilables" from this time onwards, as it had been at first to some extent with the Liberals; that he had little hope for the age, and held that those who really imbibed its spirit would soon cease to be Catholics or Christians.

His public action, however, was, as I have said, identified with neither party. And, at the outset of the discussion between Montalembert and Veuillot, the character of exclusive orthodoxy claimed by the *Univers* was somewhat roughly shaken, by a special message conveyed to Montalembert, through the Nuncio, expressing the Holy Father's gratitude for the part taken by him in the passing of the education law.[1]

But in truth the occasion of the difference which had arisen was not its cause; and the division only deepened and increased. The alliance had been in some sense superficial. The tone of the *Univers* had already offended many Catholics by its arrogance. Archbishop Affre had, in 1844, spoken of it as "most offensive" and "very unchristian." It tended to give the Catholic party the peculiarities of a sect; while men like Count de Falloux, on the other hand, were questioning the desirability of an organised Catholic party at all. Both schools had vindicated the rights of Catholics, but in a different spirit;—Montalembert in the name of liberty, Veuillot as an uncompromising assertion of Catholic claims. The crisis brought out the difference. The theory of Liberalism, in abeyance since the *Avenir,* came into prominence again. A third stage in the Liberal Catholic movement was reached. While Montalembert, in a spirit of practical compromise with the times, accepted what he could get, Veuillot, insisting on the absolute rights of the Catholic Church, would take nothing less.

The divergence of attitude on one point quickly extended

[1] *Le Comte de Montalembert,* by Foisset, p. 232.

itself to many; and two different conceptions of the line which the Catholic revival should take in France, gradually spread through the ranks of clergy and laity. If Montalembert and Lacordaire learnt, by degrees, to modify their simple trust in the abstract idea of "Liberty," as an unfailing cure for all the ills of the time, they never ceased to aim at doing all they could to find a *modus vivendi* between Catholics and the society of the age, and a place for Catholics in the national life. "God and Society" was the new motto which replaced "God and Liberty." But liberality of view remained after theoretic Liberalism had become qualified. The *Correspondant*, which was the organ of the school, and of which Augustin Cochin and Théophile Foisset—a man second to none in his influence on the counsels of the party—were chief directors, kept on friendly terms with sincere thinkers of all schools and religions. One of its chief aims was gradually to make the position of Catholics intelligible to fair-minded men outside the Church, and to find between them points in common.

The party represented by the *Univers*, on the other hand, tended to withdraw Catholics from contact with a wicked world, to take little interest in and have little belief in the progress of thought outside the "visible fold," and to extend to the non-Catholic world in general the feeling of suspicion which had been engendered by persecution. Veuillot looked in short to a state of war as most hopeful, and to a Catholic party as a compact phalanx resisting the encroachments of modern society and of the fatal secularist spirit. He accused the *Correspondant* of "making war on its natural friends the Catholics, and holding out its hand to the adversaries of the Church—academicians, philosophers, eclectics."[1] The representatives of the *Correspondant*, on their side, maintained that "not everything in the modern spirit is bad." Its original manifesto—for it had been in existence since 1829—had "appealed to all men of goodwill," had announced its design "to present Catholic truth to a society which no longer knows it," to "entertain no feeling for any one but goodwill and tender compassion." To this programme it still adhered at this juncture. In the words used by Frédéric Ozanam in describing the standpoint of its writers, it had "for its object

[1] Boissard's *Life of Foisset*, p. 159.

to seek in the human heart all the secret cords which can reunite it to Christianity, to reawaken in it the love of truth, goodness, and beauty; and then to manifest in revealed faith the ideal of these three things to which every soul aspires." It adhered to the principles of "liberty" advocated by Montalembert and Lacordaire, but they were expressed in a guarded form in its new manifesto, published in October 1855. "Si la religion seule," wrote the editors, "rend la liberté possible, elle trouve dans une sage liberté, une juste accord, l'élément humain le plus favorable à son développement au sein du monde moderne." These last words had an important bearing on the controversies which arose later on.

Carrying out their several principles, the *Univers* supported, while the *Correspondant* opposed, the Abbé Gaume's curious campaign in favour of excluding the Classics from the education of candidates for the priesthood, and of substituting patristic study in their place. So revolutionary a proposal, however, was not in harmony with the habitual moderation of Rome in such matters. The conductors of the *Avenir* had been reproved for being wanting in "moderation" in their Liberal theories; and now the opposite party failed to obtain papal countenance for its immoderate rigorism, as Lamennais had for his immoderate advocacy of freedom. The Pope in his Encyclical of March 1853 prescribed the continued use of the Classics, with all necessary precautions, and along with the patristic literature,—the plan which had already been advocated by M. Foisset in the *Correspondant*.[1]

Lamennais had ceased to be a Catholic for nearly twenty years, when the separation represented by the opposite lines of the *Univers* and the *Correspondant* became a *fait accompli*; and yet the force of that vigorous and perverse mind made itself felt even now, in a crisis in which he had personally no share. The influence of his earlier writings on both parties was unmistakable. Of the party which soon came to be called Ultramontane, to the exclusion of the Liberal school of Montalembert, no two men were more typical representatives

[1] It was characteristic of the tendency of Veuillot's mind that when Louis Napoleon posed for some years as the protector of the Pope, that writer's absolutist tendencies asserted themselves on his behalf. The *Univers* was staunchly Imperial, while Lacordaire and his friends retained their constitutional sympathies.

—though from different points of view—than Abbé Gerbet and Abbé Combalot. And Gerbet had been joint-editor of the *Avenir*, and Combalot had been Lamennais's disciple at La Chênaie. It is impossible not to trace much of the tendency to constant denunciation of the errors of the age on the one hand, and the hatred of compromise, the aggressive character which marked the school of Veuillot on the other, to this direct infusion of the spirit of Lamennais. On the other side, the cry of the *Avenir* for a "free Church in a free State," and the enthusiasm for liberty which Lamennais had fostered in Lacordaire and Montalembert, were still moving forces in the Liberal Catholic party.

The disastrous consequences of division became apparent; and as time went on the exaggerations of the *Univers* tended to drive Montalembert in a direction opposed to those who were most prominently identified with the assertion of papal claims. But both parties were equally noted, at starting, for this characteristic of the new Ultramontanism; and it was Montalembert who raised his voice in the early days of the Roman question, and checked the tyranny of Louis Napoleon for a time. That Prince proposed in 1849 to impose conditions on the re-establishment of the papal sovereignty, which were intolerable under the circumstances. *Amnestie générale, Sécularisation des emplois, Promulgation à Rome du Code Napoléon*, were the headings of the scheme. Montalembert protested in the Assembly. By a happy and successful rhetoric he gained general sympathy, and represented the contest as one between the weak and the strong. "When a man is condemned to fight against a woman," he said, "if that woman is not the most degraded of beings she can brave him with impunity. She says to him, 'Strike, but you dishonour yourself, and you will not conquer.' Well the Church is not a woman—she is much more than a woman, she is a mother. She is the mother of Europe, she is the mother of modern society, she is the mother of modern humanity. And though a son may be unnatural, rebellious, ungrateful, it is in vain for him to struggle—he is still a son; and there comes a moment in every struggle with the Church when this war becomes insupportable to the human race, and when he who has maintained it falls, overpowered, annihilated, either by defeat or by the unanimous reprobation of humanity." This speech, which was one of Montalembert's

great triumphs, aroused the enthusiasm of friend and foe. "I envy him for it," said M. Thiers; "but I hope the envy is no sin. I love the beautiful, and I love Montalembert."

In spite, however, of these loyal sentiments towards the Holy See, the Liberal party no longer held with the views of de Maistre. They had early abandoned Lamennais's non-natural interpretation of the Ultramontane theory; and they established, by their opposition to the exaggerations which Veuillot's friends advocated in the name of Ultramontanism, the popular antithesis of our own time between Ultramontane and Liberal. The original meaning of the word Ultramontane became almost forgotten. The Ultramontane or Transalpine had been to Fénelon and to his countrymen, the dweller beyond the Alps, who maintained certain papal prerogatives, notably the doctrine of papal infallibility, which the Frenchman—the Gallican or Cisalpine—denied. But the Ultramontane of the *Univers*—Veuillot, Combalot, Gaume—was, to the popular imagination, an uncompromising aggressor, and even fanatical opponent of modern civilisation in the name of papal claims. His temper was not that of the great exponent of Ultramontanism in the last century—the gentle and sympathetic Fénelon. So marked is the contrast that it is hard to persuade an average man of the world that the dogma of papal infallibility defined in 1870, which is popularly associated with modern Ultramontanism, is identical in substance with that so strenuously advocated by Fénelon.[1] The new school, starting with the somewhat aggressive attitude of de Maistre, adding to it that additional love of extreme statement which the days of Lamennais's supremacy had introduced, achieved their final development under the influence of the marked personality of Veuillot. They lost the ballast supplied by those able and moderate thinkers, Foisset and his friends, who threw in their lot with the *Correspondant*, and assumed an attitude almost as unlike in its exaggerations to the original genius of the

[1] It has been pointed out to me that the statement in the text is even short of the truth. Fénelon pressed the extent of papal infallibility in his controversy with the Jansenists beyond anything expressly defined by the Council. (See Appendix A.) On the other hand, the condition given by Fénelon for an act being ascertainably infallible, that it should be published with the consent of the Apostolic See, although it has no practical bearing at the present time, is to be observed in the shape in which he states the doctrine.

movement as was the democratic Ultramontanism of Lamennais himself.

The filiation of this later version of modern Ultramontanism from the earlier, and the distinction between the two, will be recognised by some examples. It took its stand, as did the earlier, on the principles of traditionalism. But a philosophy cannot long preserve its delicacy after it has become a creed for the many; and the difference between the earlier and the later conception of traditionalism, in ethos as well as in logic, will be seen in a citation from each. Here is a passage from a MS. by a disciple[1] and translator of de Bonald, typical of the temper of mind which grew out of the earlier philosophy of traditionalism:—

There is in the succession of facts from the apparition of Christ on the earth a connection so marvellous and so rigorously exact that every human science, mathematics included, pales in twilight by comparison; and the building up of the universal Church in which all languages, all races, all intellects, all persons enter as materials, finding their place according to the vocation which comes to them and the cardinal virtues which are communicated to them, forms the highest teaching and the basis of every other. There were in the ancient world sciences and schools as there were religions and peoples: in the new world there can be but one science, one teaching—that of the Word and that of the Church, the teaching of the whole human family. A retrograde step was taken at the time of the Crusades. Instead of continuing the conquest of the world by the Church and by teaching, they wanted to retake with temporal arms the empty tomb of Christ. It was reconquered, but not by a conquest which becomes an inheritance; and the vain sciences of paganism and of the peoples of the East were brought back to Europe to its scourge. These sciences have broken Christian unity and devoured Christianity, at first as an organisation and [then] actually in its organic parts.

The filiation from such ideas—conceived in 1820 and endorsed by their author twenty years later—of the traditionalistic element in the new Ultramontanism of the fifties, and the distortion and exaggeration which they underwent in the process, will be readily seen in the works of one of the most prolific writers of the later school.

[1] Baron Clemens von Hügel, an Austrian diplomatist, and afterwards keeper of the Secret State Archives in Vienna. I owe the MS. to the kindness of his nephew, Baron Friedrich von Hügel.

Le ver rongeur du dix-neuvième siècle, published in 1851 by L'Abbé Gaume, at the very outset of the separation between the *Univers* and *Correspondant*, was the first of a series of works written in a spirit of marked opposition to the tendencies of the age. I have already referred to its practical object—the abolition of the study of Classics in the *petits séminaires*. But while the Pope's distinct countenance of classical studies in his Encyclical marked the book in the eyes of the majority as extreme, its line of thought was accepted in many respects both in Rome and in France. It is hardly too much to say that M. Gaume attributes all the evils of Christendom, throughout its history, to the study of the Pagan Classics. Taking up that side of traditionalism which attributes all the highest and surest knowledge to the perpetuation of Christian tradition, he sees in classical study—as the Austrian writer saw in the Arabian philosophy—the introduction of an unchristian tradition which mars the Christian. "Catholic tradition rejected as a trammel and the infallibility of the reason erected into an axiom," led, in this writer's opinion, to the worst excesses in philosophy and the worst horrors in social life. Plato's spiritualism and Aristotle's empiricism account respectively for the pantheism of Spinoza and the sensism of Locke. Hence the pedigree is easily traceable. "Locke trouve dans la sensation l'unique source des idées; Condillac invente l'homme statue; Maillot arrive à l'homme carpe; et le baron Holbach, résumant dans le fameux *Système de la nature* le principe et les conséquences de cette école, nous donne comme le manuel de la raison et de la conduite, l'assemblage monstrueux de toutes les absurdités et toutes les turpitudes du matérialisme et de l'athéisme tant ancien que moderne."

And while the line from Aristotle to Baron Holbach is traced in the domain of speculation, Plato and the sophists alike are held responsible for the two most terrible upheavals of established order which Christendom has seen. "The ancient sophists opened the way to the barbarians; their modern disciples delivered society to the destroyers of '93. *The thought of the wise had prepared the Revolution, the arm of the people carried it out.*" Plato had "marked out the ideal" in his *Republic*. "Priests and laymen in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries set themselves to celebrate

this wonder. The hour of action comes. Mirabeau takes the first step downwards; Robespierre the second; St. Just the third; Antonelle the fourth; and Babeuf, more logical than all his predecessors, takes the last, to absolute communism—to pure Platonism."[1]

The papal condemnation in 1855 of Traditionalism, as a philosophical theory of the source of all knowledge, increased rather than diminished the tendency which this work manifested. Driven from the roots the traditionalist principle took refuge in the branches. Tradition, being no longer regarded as the necessary source of the knowledge of first truths, was cultivated as the guarantee of the innumerable legends, some authentic, some not, which have clustered round the figures of Church history. There had always existed in France as elsewhere those who loved traditional stories of a marvellous nature, and tended to multiply the number which were presented as facts rather than as legends. The existence of this school has always been inseparable from the element of pious belief which enters so much into popular devotion. But in pre-revolution days there had also been the critical school of the Maurists and their friends, which offered an alternative to minds averse to implicit reliance on traditions which appeared to them vague and uncertain. This had passed away, and was not yet replaced. The spirit which led Mabillon, in the face of strong opposition, to reject from his *Acts of the Benedictine Saints* all whom he considered to have no certain claim to be Benedictine, and to oppose in another work the custom of venerating the relics of unknown saints, the spirit now represented by the Bollandists or by such writers as Abbé Duchesne in his analytical works, had no prominent or learned representatives; and consequently able men of the school of M. Gaume were able to direct popular opinion all the more widely. The *Acta sincera Martyrum*, by Mabillon's companion and biographer, Ruinart, to this day the standard authority on the subject, was replaced by the thoroughly uncritical and inexact *Actes des Martyrs* of Guéranger. Church history was allowed to be represented by such men as the Abbé Darras; and many French Catholics were ready to accept without question what the Bollandist Père de Smedt has not hesitated to call "the historical errors and lies of M. Ch.

[1] p. 329.

Barthélemy." Incredible and unsupported stories in history and extravagances in dogma were the order of the day. Those traditions or doctrines which were most uncongenial to the modern world were placed in strong relief, and appeared to those who shrank from the new traditionalism to be depicted grotesquely out of perspective. The disparagement of the individual intellect, which Bonald had so carefully limited, was extended by later writers, without his genius, to the disparagement of scientific research itself; and even after the condemnation by Rome of such exaggerations, the temper which prompted them—of distrust of modern science and civilisation—remained. Thus after the traditionalists had set aside as untrustworthy the scientific methods, which establish a connection between the moon and the month, M. Gaume, in his *Traité du Saint Esprit*, accounted for the seven days in the week, by explaining that the devil marked out a day as suitable for the invocation of each of the seven sub-devils, who administer the seven deadly sins. In a similar spirit of emphasising what was likely to irritate the modern world, a whole treatise of four hundred pages was devoted by him to Holy Water. Its origin, not only from the days of our Lord but from the early days of the Old Testament, was illustrated by traditional stories. To its use were attributed the most far-reaching benefits, to its neglect the worst of evils. "What are the things," he asks, "which ordinary holy water purifies? Man and the world. Neither more nor less." It purifies "man and creatures from all which by the malice of the great homicide [the devil] menaces their life, their health, and tends to make them unhappy by turning them from their providential end." And elsewhere he compares the special properties of holy water to the peculiarities of the waters of Vichy, Plombières, or Luxeuil; and dwells on those wonderful powers in virtue of which the bare application of it can cleanse the soul, which is an "object of repulsion to God," steeped "in venial sin from head to foot."

It is obvious that such writing was not calculated to attract the free-thinkers of the time, or even average men of the world. Early in the day the methods of Gaume and Veuillot exasperated the more cultivated Catholics; and eventually the remonstrances of such men as Dupanloup assumed the indignant tone of which we shall have to speak

later. The collection together of all the most startling suppositions which individual theologians have tolerated, and the advocacy in some cases of forms of expression which appeared to most readers to go even beyond what could be tolerated, were extremely trying to those who considered that an age which did not understand the depth and beauty of Catholicism had to be won and not further repelled. Those who trusted that the need of the human heart for religion would lead Frenchmen back to the beautiful counsels of St. Francis of Sales and Fénelon, and who took hope from the conferences of Ravignan and Lacordaire, fairly lost patience at the devotion of talent to emphasising and exaggerating points which were, in the ordinary course, the last which could appeal to earnest inquirers. Serious controversy, the exposition of the fallacies in unchristian philosophy, had its value. Still more valuable was that persuasive writing which exhibits Christianity as the fulfilment of the deepest aspirations of the soul; as St. Paul declared the unknown God who had been ignorantly worshipped. But what could such writing as this effect? Frédéric Ozanam speaks on the subject with painful feeling.

"This school of writers," he says, "professes to place at its head Count de Maistre, whose opinions it exaggerates and denaturalises. It goes about looking for the boldest paradoxes, the most disputable propositions, provided that they irritate the modern spirit. It presents the truth to men not by the side which attracts them, but by that which repels them. It does not propose to bring back unbelievers, but to stir up the passions of believers."

M. Gaume, on the other hand, when defending his work on "Holy Water," simply appeals to the uselessness of controversy with the irreligious world, and the hopelessness of influencing it, as a fact of experience. "Nous ne convertirons pas," he writes to a friend, "ni Mazzini ni Garibaldi, ni leurs acolytes de l'ancien et du nouveau continent, libres penseurs, solidaires, spirites; nous n'éteindrons dans leur cœur ni la haine du Catholicisme ni la soif des places et de l'argent . . . nous ne ferons rien de tout cela. Mais quel qu'eût été le sujet de notre étude, l'aurions-nous fait? Vous qui êtes plus puissants que nous, vous l'avez tenté: avez-vous réussi? Vos beaux discours, vos savants écrits, vos protestations, vos superbes

articles, ont-ils retardé même une heure le progrès de la révolution? Ce n'est pas avec des arguments qu'on conjure les fléaux de Dieu; c'est par la prière et la pénitence." And he goes on to explain that he knows that Catholic devotional writing cannot, in the nature of the case, be understood by the modern man of letters. "Pour les lettrés de ton pays, du mien, et de tous les pays . . . ils vont hausser les épaules . . . que veux-tu? Ils nous mesurent à leur aune." [1]

The Church and the world then are, according to this view of things, simply different and hostile camps. Pray for the world, let Church tradition grow and thrive in its own channels. To strengthen and complete in all its smallest details the edifice of the Catholic devotional life was a writer's best object. Thus you feed the souls of the faithful, and enable them to pray the better for the outside world.

But allied with this view was a further one, which confirmed the school of the *Univers* in this attitude of estrangement from the modern world. They tended to view current Catholic teaching, apart from matters of faith, as more or less final in its form. They were little ready to see the necessity, for the sake of accuracy, of viewing it in the light of modern discoveries, and thereby correcting its expression. They were little alive to the possibility of such modifications being called for as the discovery of Copernicanism introduced in the current interpretation of *Josué*. If traditional expressions of belief conflicted with modern scientific theories, no doubt could arise but that the science of an evil day was wrong. If individual Catholics had difficulties as to such collisions, it showed a want of faith in them. Openness of intellect and patient candour were perhaps not congenial qualities to this school, which may have looked on such pretensions much as Canning did, and held them to be pretexts for the unreal many-sidedness which "notes with keen discriminating sight, black's not *so* black nor white *so very* white." A strong man, perhaps they felt, must be to some extent narrow. That gift of judging fairly and impartially from all points of view, which the ideal intellect might have, is not bestowed on limited human nature. The best we can hope is to see clearly from one point of view; and for Catholics, whose faith assures

[1] *L'eau bénite du dix-neuvième siècle*, pp. 4-6.

them that theirs is the truest point, exclusiveness and one-sidedness are simply intellectual virtues. Hence the tendency of the school to uncompromising views. Hence M. Gaume's expressed contempt for science, and his love for the most extreme vagaries both of popular devotion and of theological expression; and, on the other hand, M. Veuillot's personal attacks on the free-thinkers of the day. The careful separation of good and bad elements in the character of an enemy of the Church, or the delicate weighing of the certain, the probable, the possible, the impossible, in dogmatic belief, seemed to them often to savour of that plausible and corroding rationalism which attenuates and ends by destroying the deepest and most vital differences of opinion. An infidel was not a man to be analysed by a sympathetic psychology, or to have the pedigree of his infidelity examined, and the unbelief partially excused by the heredity of persons or of circumstance. He was an infidel,—a man to be condemned and avoided,—and there was an end of it.

Such was the new Ultramontanism in its original source and in its most direct current.

But while the peculiarities typified in such writings as I have cited, by Veuillot and Gaume, damaged the school in the eyes of the world, which looked on these men as representatives of modern Ultramontanism, there were in reality many sympathisers in the movement who were comparatively free from such excesses. The tendency to emphasise the papal authority, and to centralise the forces of the Church, existed, apart from such marked extravagances of thought and expression as have been described above, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain. It had ever been characteristic of the Jesuits as a body; and in many places they joined forces with the school of de Maistre. The German Jesuits and the theologians of Mayence were active members of the school. The *Civilta Cattolica*, the organ of the Italian Jesuits, was equally pronounced. In France itself, although the influence of the *Univers* was very great, its spirit was not by any means typical of the whole Ultramontane party. The Jesuits of Lyons, of whom Père Ramière was a distinguished representative, shared Veuillot's sympathy with the centralising tendency, but advocated it in a very different spirit. With all of these the lessening of national peculiarities

in the various churches—the tendency to uniformity with Rome in discipline, in theological and philosophical method, in ritual, in devotion—was a desired object; and the promoters of this object rapidly became the most powerful party in France. The Roman liturgy largely replaced the Gallican; St. Sulpice was remodelled in the same spirit under Archbishop Morlot; the modern devotional writings of Gaume and Ségur in great measure replaced those of Fénelon and Bossuet. But the persons instrumental in these measures were often far from being entire sympathisers in the attitude of M. Gaume, or in the personal abuse employed by M. Veuillot. As so often happens, however, the characteristics of the extremest writers arrested attention, and coloured the popular conception of the whole party. The Catholic *esprit de corps*, the passionate loyalty to the Holy See, the devotion to the Apostolic ideal, the personal piety of these writers were not denied. But none the less their extravagances of thought and language proved an effective weapon in the hands of the enemies of the Church; while the tendency to censoriousness and personal abuse caused much friction among Catholics themselves. It was the voice and the method of Lamennais used for the purpose of anathematising his own friends.

A word must be added as to the Catholic revival in another country, with whose controversies Mr. Ward came later on in contact. Catholicism in Germany in the beginning of this century was at nearly as low an ebb as in France. The suppression of Bishoprics and convents and confiscation of church property, which followed the Napoleonic wars, had thoroughly cowed German Catholics. Even the intellectual productions, specially characteristic of the German divines, ceased. "Scientific and theological works from their pens became daily more rare," writes a German historian, "until finally they ceased almost entirely to appear."

The first symptom of revival was the stream of conversions among eminent men in the beginning of the century. The religious reaction after the Revolution was fostered by dread of the invincible emperor. "The universal sadness," writes Heine, "found consolation in religion . . . and in fact against Napoleon none could help but God Himself." This movement refused for the most part to take the form of Protestantism.

Leopold Frederick, Count Stolberg, the historian, led the van in 1800. He withdrew from the public service on his conversion, and henceforth devoted his energies to writing; many of his works having a directly religious character. His *History of the Religion of Jesus Christ* was mainly instrumental in the conversion of Prince Adolphus of Mecklenberg.

A few years later (1805) came the reception of Frederick Schlegel and his gifted wife. Attracted at first to Catholicism on grounds partly æsthetic, his grasp of Catholic principle deepened, and his *Philosophy of History,* written shortly before his death, is an evidence of the colour which his thought ultimately assumed. Disciples of his in a great measure were many of the Romantic School, which included a number of eminent writers, and the group of artists, of whom Overbeck was the most conspicuous, who joined the Catholic Church about the year 1814. With these men, as with Schlegel, the movement began on æsthetic grounds; but assumed, in the hands of such thinkers as Joseph Görres, a deeper intellectual character, and took its stand on the study of history. Heine noted the whole case with anger, and spoke of it with his usual mixture of insight and scoffing raillery. "The aristocratic Jesuit monster," he says, "at that period raised its unsightly head from amidst the dark forest depths of German literature"; and he thus describes the origin of the movement in the love of mediæval art:—

When the artists of the Middle Ages were recommended as models, and were so highly praised and admired, the only explanation of their superiority that could be given was that these men believed in that which they depicted, and that therefore with their artless conceptions they could accomplish more than the later sceptical artists, notwithstanding that the latter excelled in technical skill. In short, it was claimed that faith worked wonders, and in truth how else could the transcendent merits of a Fra Angelico di Fiesole or the poems of a Brother Ottfried be explained? Hence the artists who were honest in their devotion to art and who sought to imitate the pious distortions of these miraculous pictures and sacred uncouthness of those marvel-abounding poems and the inexplicable mysticisms of those olden works—these artists determined to wander to the same Hippocrene whence the old masters had derived their supernatural inspirations. They made a pilgrimage to Rome, where the Vicar of Christ was to reinvigorate consumptive German art with asses' milk. In brief, they betook themselves to

the lap of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, where alone, according to their doctrine, salvation was to be secured. Many of the adherents of the Romantic School—for instance Joseph Görres and Clemens Brentano—were Catholics by birth, and required no formal ceremony to mark their readhesion to the Catholic faith; they merely renounced their freethinking views. Others, however, such as Frederick Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis, Werner, Schütz, Carové, Adam Müller, etc., were born Protestants, and their conversion to Catholicism required a public ceremony. The above list of names includes only authors; the number of painters who in swarms simultaneously abjured Protestantism and reason was much larger.[1]

The furious attacks of Heinrich Voss on Stolberg for his conversion, which he described as due to a league between Jesuitism and aristocracy, were so personally bitter as to benefit instead of injuring the Catholic cause.

Then came Möhler's *Symbolism* in 1830—a book for which his biographer claims that it created a greater sensation than any theological work of the century. The persecution by the Prussian government of the Archbishop of Cologne in 1837, followed by that of the Archbishop of Gnesen and Posen, for maintaining the Catholic doctrine on mixed marriages,—culminating in the imprisonment of both,—was perhaps the turning point in the German Catholic revival. In the words of the historian already quoted, it "excited the sympathies of the whole Catholic world, and in Germany caused a reaction in favour of the Catholic Church more loyal and outspoken than had been known for many years."[2]

As we have seen, the revival was neither in France nor in Germany a merely theological and devotional revival. It was also the renewal of appreciation of the whole "genius of Christianity," to use the title of Chateaubriand's great work. Chateaubriand in France, Fouqué in Germany, and a little later Manzoni in Italy brought Catholic life into fiction; and we

[1] See Heine's Essay on the "Romantic School," contributed in 1833 to the Review *Europe Littéraire*.

[2] So too said Döllinger. In the notes of a conversation of 1855 with the present Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, he is reported to have said of the imprisonment of the Archbishop of Cologne that it "was the spark that lit the flame of the movement in Germany in favour of Catholicity. The dormant awoke. The lax took up arms, and throughout this portion of the continent the Catholic religion took a new start. Görres wrote a work, *Athanasius*, which in one year went through five editions."

cannot but recall the effect of the *Promessi Sposi* on one so indifferent to theology as Macaulay. "I finished Manzoni's novel not without many tears," he writes. "The scene between the Archbishop and Don Abbondio is one of the noblest that I know. . . . If the Church of Rome were really what Manzoni represents her to be, I should be tempted to follow Newman's example." The Romantic School of Cornelius and Overbeck represented Catholic art in Germany, while their example found equally zealous if less distinguished imitators in France, in the Confrérie de St. Jean originated in 1840 by Lacordaire.

The Catholic Revival in Germany developed gradually so many distinctive lines of thought, that no attempt can be made here to enumerate them. But some of the most important have an immediate bearing on the theme of this work, and must be spoken of. It was natural that the revival should take a critical and intellectual direction in Germany, as in France it bore a more social and political aspect. But there was a certain analogy between the story of the two movements in some of their leading features. In both countries, as we have seen, the revival was in great part a reaction against the Revolution, and against its parents—the philosophies of Rousseau and Voltaire. De Bonald in France and Stolberg and Schlegel in Germany invoked once more the authority of tradition, and turned to the pure streams of the Christian revelation and life, which had been polluted from the Renaissance onwards. Here, indeed, at the outset, was a difference. Bonald was an Absolutist. Schlegel was, to some extent, a Liberal. Bonald's views had a strong political colour. The German revival kept, on the whole, clear of politics. Again, the mystical element, due in part to the influence of Jacobi and Klopstock, was present in Germany, and scarcely at all operative in France. But the initial spring—the return to Christian tradition, the sense that the unbroken continuity of the Catholic Church represented that tradition—was common to both.

Once more devotion to the Holy See—that spirit of loyalty with which de Maistre had fired the whole Catholic world—was at the outset equally characteristic of the German movement. Stolberg, Schlegel, Möhler, and Döllinger himself were markedly Ultramontane. Görres, too, the parent of the

deeper historical spirit among German Catholics, was equally so. Thus in Germany as in France we have the ancestors of very different movements united at starting in their Ultramontanism. As Montalembert represented in early days equally with Veuillot the party most bent on enforcing the papal claims, so Döllinger was, in his youth, almost as Ultramontane as his friend of later years, Windischmann,[1] the Vicar-General at Munich.

Döllinger was opposed both to the principle of Gallicanism and to ecclesiastical absolutism. Both were infringements on the liberties of the Church. As long as Ultramontanism meant, primarily, a protest against State tyranny, Döllinger was Ultramontane. The later change was partly in Döllinger, and partly, as he considered, in the Ultramontane party itself. "It cannot . . . be denied," writes an intimate friend of Döllinger (see *Guardian*, 22nd Jan. 1890, p. 142), "that in those early years Dr. Döllinger leant to the Ultramontane side. . . . As time went on, however, and Ultramontanism grew in strength, and became more and more the representative of the strict Roman system, Döllinger drifted away from it. This does not mean, however, that he moved in the direction of Gallicanism as that system is sometimes understood. The system which prevailed in France, particularly under Louis XV. and Cardinal Fleury, found no favour in his eyes. He regarded it as an instrument by which rulers who deemed themselves irresponsible to all men, extended their power over the Church. He sympathised warmly with the appellants and the re-appellants. He opposed Ultramontanism because he considered it an attempt to introduce the principle of absolutism into the Church itself. Both Ultramontanism and Political Gallicanism were, in his view, endeavours to curtail ecclesiastical liberty and to make the caprice of rulers superior to law." In short, Döllinger's movement was not towards Gallicanism, but towards only those tenets of Gallicanism which were absorbed into the new-born Liberal Catholicism.

[1] This was the Windischmann whom Döllinger described as "an Ultramontane by nature, with a native capacity for organising and ruling"; and as "the only person whom I ever knew who combined the highest qualities of a critical scholar with Ultramontane opinions" (*v. Guardian*, article by H. P. L., 22nd Jan. 1890).

The new antithesis between the Liberal movement and the Ultramontane dated in France, as we have seen, from 1850. In Germany there was no sudden rupture which at all corresponded with the dispute over the Falloux law; but a number of historical and critical students gradually separated themselves more and more from the distinctively Roman school, which had its headquarters in the city of Mayence. With Döllinger himself the attitude of estrangement from Rome began to show itself in the fifties. Henceforward the Mayence school, led by the great Bishop von Ketteler, was in opposition to the tendency of the school of Munich, whose most extreme developments were represented later on by Froschammer in philosophy, and by Döllinger in history and theology. Its chief organ, the *Katholik*, had a prolonged discussion with the quarterly review of Tübingen, which advocated almost as strongly as the school of Döllinger the Liberal developments of critical and historical learning, and the freedom of science in its relation to Church authority.[1] The German Jesuits were in harmony with the school of Mayence, and their organ the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach* was as markedly in accord with the more Roman school as the *Katholik*. Of the spread of intellectual Liberalism in Germany and England under Döllinger's influence, and of Mr. Ward's opposition to it, an opposition seconded and echoed in Germany itself by such writers as Dr. Scheeben of Mayence, and Fathers Schneemen and Schäzler, who avowedly adopted Mr. Ward's analysis of the Ultramontane position in their vindication of the papal prerogatives, I shall have to speak later on.

[1] See *Home and Foreign Review*, vol. iv. p. 214.

CHAPTER VI

LIBERAL CATHOLICISM IN ENGLAND

1858–1863

Mr. Ward, coming upon the controversy between Liberal Catholicism and Ultramontanism in 1858, when the divergence of the parties was acutest, had necessarily to lean to one or other side; and when the extent of papal authority was in question, there could be little doubt as to his choice. But his spirit was far more akin to that of de Maistre and de Bonald, than to the spirit of their later representatives, Veuillot and Gaume. The personal rancour which characterised Veuillot was foreign to Mr. Ward's temper and taste; and how distasteful to him were such views as M. Gaume's on Holy Water will be appreciated by those who remember his disgust at the somewhat similar principles which were advocated by certain writers in reference to the benefits due to the scapular. But the enthusiasm for Rome as the one source of unity, strength, and peace, in Ward as in de Maistre, was a ruling passion; while the hopelessness of attaining practically to the highest truths by mere argument and analysis, had been, as we have elsewhere seen, with Ward as with de Bonald, a deep-set feeling.

There was probably an element of direct influence here, so far as de Maistre was concerned. Ward had been familiar with de Maistre's works at Oxford, and quoted him frequently in his writings. Carlyle's *French Revolution* was also a book which, at the time of its publication, had an influence on him, and helped in some degree to make the nightmare of the French writer an influential force on his English disciple. But on the whole, the spirit and aspirations, which he shared with the French Ultramontane, derived their strength in the Englishman from a different source.

The vision of horror which led de Maistre to look to the Roman Pontiff as the one hope for order and peace, was due to personal experience of a life lived through the Terror of '93. And perhaps nothing short of a personal experience could have given so keen an edge and marked a direction to his views. Mr. Ward had also the personal experience of confusion, of anarchy, of destruction. But the confusion was that of opposite dogmas energising and colliding in the Church of his birth; the anarchy was the free thought of those who replaced impossible contradictions by a spirit of free criticism imported from Germany; the destruction was not the republican baptisms in the Seine, or the September massacres, or the regicide, but the breaking down of the landmarks of traditional Christianity and the ruin of faith. He had looked at individuals, as Clough, who in early youth had dwelt with peaceful certainty on the details of the Gospel story, and could now do so no longer. He had gone through a phase of the same dreariness himself. The depopulated scene of Strauss's *Life of Jesus* was as truly to him a land of waste and dreariness, an outcome of barbarian outrage and destruction, as to de Maistre were the churches pillaged by the Jacobins, and the country robbed by massacre and emigration of nine-tenths of its clergy.

The Christian imagination could no longer rove with confident trust through scenes full of consolation, whose certainty was divinely guaranteed. The consoling power was gone from the shadowy figure which replaced the Son of God. The certainty was gone from all that filled in the meagre outline of the story which criticism allowed to remain. So, too, Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, which he had read so eagerly at Oxford, made a solitude in the metaphysics of religion, as Strauss did in its history. Once more came the temporary victory of destructive forces; once more the yearning for the peace of the *ancien régime;* once more the sense that St. Peter's Rock was the one foundation which could not be shaken, which would support the lesser principles of order and trust, and restore peace and stability. With Mr. Ward the Revolution concerned primarily the world of philosophy, as it did with so many in the land of thought, Germany. Atheism was its outcome rather than regicide. "On both sides of the Rhine," writes Heinrich Heine, "we behold the same

rupture with the past; it is loudly proclaimed that all reverence for tradition is at an end. As in France no privilege, so in Germany no thought is tolerated without proving its right to exist; nothing is taken for granted. And as in France fell the monarchy, the keystone of the old social system, so in Germany fell theism, the keystone of the intellectual *ancien régime*."

With Ward, as with de Maistre, what had been was but a symptom and a forewarning of what was impending. Ever since 1844 he had constantly reasserted what he had said in the *Ideal*, that the movement of the age was towards that negation in religion of which Voltaire and Comte represent, though in very different spirits, successive stages. The religious revivals did not shake this belief. They did not appear to him any more to lessen the fundamental uncertainty which was growing, than the religious revival of Augustus gave back the primitive faith and unquestioning heroism of the Roman kingdom. The destructive movement continued intermittently, but still with persistency, as the Revolution reappeared in 1830, in 1848, in 1870. A great crisis might come at any time and reveal suddenly the really powerful agents, denuded of the light-sitting though all-covering clothes of conventional civilised life. Then would appear the true depth and breadth of the destructive forces, and the meagre residue of deep belief, often covered by so much religious sentiment and profession. Then would appear also the strength, and the absolute necessity, of a real living principle of Authority—existing in fact and not only in theory. He spoke of the war of principles constantly as of an actual battle, with its din and confusion. Energising ideas are described as "clamorously distinct," their collision as the "frightful conflict of opinion raging round us." His anticipation is expressed again and again in passages of which the following is a sample: "An internecine conflict is at hand between the army of Dogma and the united hosts of indifferentism, heresy, atheism; a conflict which will ultimately also (I am persuaded) turn out to be a conflict between Catholic Theism on the one side and Atheism of this or that kind on the other. Looking at things practically, the one solid and inexpugnable fortress of truth is the Catholic Church built on the Rock of Peter." [1]

[1] *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, p. 24.

And the word "fortress," which he makes use of in this passage, is suggestive of further points in his treatment. The German sceptic has called the Catholic Church the Bastille of the soul. Mr. Ward, substituting the idea of a fortress for that of a prison, fully accepts the position. The safety for a Catholic against the evil influences of surrounding free thought lies, in his view, in "intellectual captivity," in shutting the intellect within the sacred influences which the Church supplies, in order to preserve it from error. The freedom which leads to anarchy is the danger; the surrender to restraint and authority is the safeguard. The intellect is no more trustworthy in its independent rovings than the will is. If there is no higher law to give truth to the one and goodness to the other, then a philosophy of pessimism must result; for lawlessness can never lead to happiness. But a Catholic has his fortress ready made, and has but to remain in it. "Independence of intellect," he writes, "just like independence of will is not man's healthy state but his disease and calamity. Independence of will consists in setting at nought every law, human and divine, and following each momentary passion and inclination. This is depravity; this is misery . . . The will's perfection consists neither in independence nor in subjection to tyranny, but in subjection to God who is sanctity. Just so as regards one's intellect. Its perfection consists neither in independence from authority on the one hand nor in subjugation to false oracles on the other hand, but in absolute surrender to God who is Truth. It consists in submission to His expressed voice—whether that voice be heard in the dictates of reason or revelation—and in docility to His discoverable intimations. Not in intellectual independence but in intellectual captivity is true intellectual liberty and perfection."[1]

With this conception of the value,—the necessity,—of authoritative guidance he made no secret of his wish to find and to prove the sphere of infallible papal utterances *to be* large; and here we have another element of marked agreement with the new Ultramontanism as distinguished from the old. The argument from utility has a comparatively minor place in Fénelon; it was the most powerful motive force with de Maistre and with Ward. The Pope was needed by de Maistre to keep

[1] *Dublin Review*, January 1867.

order in times of revolution or of political crisis; by Ward to keep order in times of intellectual anarchy. "The great thing we want," says de Maistre, "is for the Pope to settle things one way or another." Mr. Ward wrote an essay called "Are Infallible Definitions Rare?" with the object of proving them to be very frequent; and maintained that this was a matter of congratulation, as increasing the store of truth infallibly guaranteed.

In the strong conviction, then, of the desirableness and utility of papal interference, the two writers are in accord. And we may concur in this sense with the remark of an acute critic that "Dr. Ward . . . is not so much a theologian as a theopolitician," and his explanation that Mr. Ward is drawn to the "most effective scheme of authority, the best calculated to beat down this wretched wild world into subjection," which "recommends itself to him as the best moral discipline, and as satisfactorily supplying a moral want." This temper in their advocacy gave special force to both writers; if it also gave to the form of their writings the character of what opponents stigmatised as special pleading. Each works directly to prove a case. Neither shrinks from energy of expression or even occasional paradox, in the abundance of their sense of the truth and justice of their principles. The Revolution is "satanic" for de Maistre; he insists that there is "no Christianity without the Pope"; he declares, as we have seen, that "infallibility and supremacy" are "absolutely the same things under different names," and openly avows his utilitarian basis by saying that the great thing is not only to know "if the Pope is, but if he ought to be infallible." Mr. Ward on his side speaks of indifferentist principles as "fitting people for that hell which, unless they repent, they will without doubt for all eternity inhabit." While he does not rhetorically identify infallibility and supremacy, he frequently insists on the fact that the Pope is "ecclesiastically absolute"; he urges the "profound intellectual submission required from a Catholic" to prevent his being "deplorably destitute of loyalty"; and he wrote a pamphlet on the extent of Infallibility of which the form rather than the substance gave it so much the appearance of enlarging a Catholic's obligations of belief, that Bishop Dupanloup had it circulated among the Bishops and priests in Rome

before the Vatican definition was made, as the best argument against it.

Mr. Ward's resemblance to de Maistre was, as I have said, closer than to any of the French developers of his system—Gaume, Veuillot, or their friends. Mr. Oxenham has truly said that the comparison so often made, between Ward and Veuillot, was doubly unjust; for Veuillot was in no sense a philosophical thinker, while his personal rancour had no counterpart in the Englishman. In his higher moods indeed Veuillot rose to de Maistre's broad conceptions, and was related to the English Ultramontane as his master was. The crisis of the Commune was treated by him worthily. The underlying thought of his treatment was, in the words of a contemporary writer, "that material civilisation is, after all, infinitely petty and infinitely sad, because it touches only the crust of things and leaves the heart of man unchanged. The Revolution has . . . brought a new gospel of liberty, equality, and fraternity for the healing of the nations, and has preached the message by the lips of such a John the Baptist as Rousseau, and such a Messiah as Napoleon. But the result is *pétrole.* The Commune is the heaven to which the Revolution has led poor France. She must learn, says Louis Veuillot, that she has been going, not towards heaven but towards hell; she must wearily go back to the old guidance of the Church, if she would escape a destruction worse—infinitely worse—than Sedan or Paris in flames. She must learn once more the simple duty of obedience to an inscrutable will, and of faith in an unseen Redeemer. Her hope lies in the Vatican. . . . It is the gospel of an Ultramontane Carlyle." Substitute for France the human soul, for the Revolution and the Commune the horrors of hopeless doubt and infidelity, and we have here Mr. Ward's attitude. But the very difference of the *terrain* which engaged his attention marks the point at which the resemblance ends. While Veuillot occupied himself with concrete France, and lampooned the existing *libres penseurs,* as well as the existing Liberal Catholics, while his attacks were on persons and parties, Mr. Ward, looking at the individual soul, peopled with passions and principles of thought and action, attacked abstract ideals and tendencies. Violence of language we have in both cases. But while Veuillot satirises and gossips about M. "Champfleury" and M. Renan, or abuses Montalembert and Dupanloup, Mr.

Ward is found to be denouncing Liberalism, or Temporalism, or Indifferentism, or Intellectualism with a fierceness which suggests personal bitterness, and which reminds one how singularly living and real the abstract world was to him. Just as in Oxford days he characterised "that hateful and fearful type of anti-christ," Lutheranism, "in terms not wholly inadequate to its prodigious demerits," so he now sketched the influence of Worldliness on the soul as that of a "circumambient poison," and described the moral degradation of Intellectualism as an "idolatry" more "degrading" than that of "the worshipper of stocks and stones." The *Libres Penseurs* and the *Odeurs de Paris* are chock-full of proper names; the "Essays" in the *Dublin Review* contain scores of pages without any personal reference; and where personal reference is made, the person is generally absolved, and even his subjective meaning is often excused, while his words are treated "solely in their legitimate objective sense."

Turning now to the sequence of events, it must be noted that Mr. Ward's first connection with the continental schools of thought was indirect. His early controversies were with English thinkers, whose Liberalism was due in part to English, in part to French and German influences. The Liberal movement in England was at its height in these years. It was supreme in politics as well as in speculative thought. It continued to be so until well on into the seventies. From 1841 to 1874 there was no large Conservative majority;[1] and the occasional return of Conservatives to power was only the partial suspension of a movement which on the whole represented the English mind. And associated with this political tide was a general sanguineness as to the effects of freedom in all shapes, which showed itself in liberal theology, in the movement for secular education, in the relaxation of the University tests, in the belief in free trade, freedom of contract, freedom of association, in the advocacy, as though of self-evident truths, of the benefits of unrestricted liberty of the press and liberty of conscience, in the pursuit of the freest discussion on Biblical criticism,

[1] The word "large" is relative, but the dominance of Liberalism during these years will not be questioned. Speaking of the year 1874 Mr. Froude says, 'England, it really seemed, had recovered from her revolutionary fever-fit . . . for the first time since 1841 a strong Conservative majority was returned independent of the Irish vote" (*Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 235).

and on those new scientific theories which alarmed the upholders of the traditional theology. Trade was flourishing: scientific discovery moved apace: and there was the intoxication of general success which seemed to confirm the hopes of those who looked on the unchecked development of the Liberal Ideal as an infallible nostrum to cure all evils. Carlyle had struck a discordant note almost at the outset of the movement in the *Latterday Pamphlets*, but he was looked on as simply an eccentricity for writing them. With a wonderful trust in the teleology of the universe, most of the leading spirits in the country echoed Tennyson's words:—

> Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change;

and freedom in all its shapes was regarded as the one condition for the forces of the universe to move without hindrance, and to accomplish the great destiny in store for them.

Mill's book on Liberty was published in 1859. His work on *Representative Government* appeared in the following year, containing in the most persuasive form the modern ideal of a State, in sharp contrast to the Catholic ideal of St. Thomas Aquinas's *De Regimine Principum*. Darwin's *Origin of Species* came out in the same year; and the grave question was forced upon the attention of Christians—"Is modern research going to prove that the Biblical narrative of creation is unscientific?" *Essays and Reviews*, and Colenso's works in the years immediately following, pressed further the question of scriptural inspiration, and the minds of numbers were unsettled. Mr. Frederic Harrison marked the sympathy of a Positivist with the leaders of the Broad Church movement by his comments, in the *Westminster Review*, on their manifesto. The Jews were admitted to Parliament. A free Church and a free State were held up as an ideal, and disestablishment was spoken of as merely a matter of time—as a point to which the progress of things must necessarily lead.

And contemporaneously with the advance of the Liberal movement there was a growing change in the ethical convictions and standards of English public opinion.

Coming fresh upon the world from the absolute seclusion in which he had lived for fourteen years, Mr. Ward was at once struck with what Mr. Mill has called the "mongrel

morality" of the later nineteenth century, and with its intellectual confusion. The growth of the secularist spirit, of which Cardinal Newman has written so eloquently in his discourses on University education, had been marked since Ward's Oxford days. In the Oxford of 1830-45 the conviction that this life was a preparation for the next, that to save one's soul was the great object, that the true standard of virtue was to be found in the Sermon on the Mount, was general, with a large majority, in their serious moments. In 1858 things were very different. It was partly—as Mr. Ward came across it—the difference between a religious university and an irreligious world. But it was also in great measure a change in the spirit of the times. The standard of ethics was less Christian, more purely naturalistic. Mr. Ward associated the change with the Liberal movement. He had no close sympathy with either political party, and had as hearty a dislike for stagnant Conservatism as for the excesses of ultra-Liberals; but the principles and watchwords of Liberalism were, he considered, both in politics and in theology, opposed to those of the old Christian civilisation. They were symbols of the new ideal of the aims and meaning of life. He held with Mr. Morley[1] that, ethically and politically, there was a homogeneous conception of life and society which expressed the modern tendency of the Revolution; and this was all around him still contending with the remains of the old ethical and political ideals of mediæval Christendom. "The maxims and principles of Liberalism," said Frederick Schlegel, ". . . can have no other tendency than to revolution." So wrote the German thinker with reference to Continental Liberalism; and Mr. Ward held it to be true of English as well. He classed the ethical, political, and intellectual movements together, then, as naturally akin. To the modern ethical principles he gave the name "religious Liberalism"; to the Liberal doctrine on the relations of the Church to modern society and modern science he gave the

[1] "Christianity," writes Mr. Morley, "is the name for a great variety of changes which took place during the first centuries of our era, in men's ways of thinking and feeling about their spiritual relations with unseen powers, about their moral relations to one another, about the basis and type of social union. So the Revolution is now the accepted name for a set of changes which began faintly to take a definite practical shape . . . towards the end of the eighteenth century," etc. (*Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 1).

name "ecclesiastical Liberalism";[1] and he treated both at length.

And while Liberal principles in England were spreading, and were assuming the character of the scientific ideal which an enlightened mind must necessarily accept, signs were not wanting, among English Catholics, of a tendency to adopt them, more marked and unreserved than that of Montalembert or Lacordaire.

The *Rambler*, afterwards called the *Home and Foreign Review*, perhaps the most uniformly able Catholic Review of the present century during its later years, was avowedly Liberal. And it appeared to Mr. Ward to worship the modern ideal, both in ethics and in politics, with an unreserve which was quite inconsistent logically with the principles of Christianity.

Its history must be briefly given. The *Rambler* had been started as a weekly paper in 1848. Its object was, in the words of its conductors, "while avoiding as far as possible the domain of technical theology, to provide a medium for the expression of independent opinion on subjects of the day, whether interesting to the general public or specially affecting Catholics." Its success from the first was marked. On the 1st of September 1848 it was enlarged, and thenceforth published monthly. It was attempted at first to keep its scope to matters of purely literary interest, but "the events of the time and the circumstances of English Catholicism" gradually led its conductors "to open their pages to investigations of a deeper and more complex nature." It gained contributors of great and even brilliant literary talent; and it treated philosophical and social problems on markedly Liberal principles. Its general sentiments were expressed in the manifestoes issued from time to time by its conductors, and incidentally in editorial articles; and they became more pronounced as time went on. "Modern society," they wrote, "has developed no security for freedom, no instrument of progress, no means of arriving at truth, which we look upon with indifference or suspicion." And speaking of the scope of the *Review* they added, "not only do we exclude from our range all that concerns the ascetic life and the more intimate relations of religion, but we most

[1] See *e.g.*, *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, p. 88.

willingly devote ourselves to subjects quite remote from all religious bearing." Mr. Ward held that such professions were, under the circumstances, both unsatisfactory and impossible to carry out. And the actual articles in the *Review*, even before some of these explicit avowals, gave evidence of the unsatisfactory nature of its programme. The sweeping advocacy of all modern instruments of progress resulted, he considered, in an almost habitual treatment of Papal teaching as antiquated, and of the modern liberties and modern scientific theories as claiming supreme and unreserved allegiance. And again, the exclusion of all subjects with a religious bearing was, considering the intimate connection between the social and religious life, either an empty profession, or an avowed divorce of sociology from religion which was equally uncatholic. And further, the *Review* appeared to restrict its Catholic principles to the acceptance of the definitions of faith, and to set aside as unimportant and often untrue the whole mass of ethical and doctrinal teaching which makes up the practical life of Catholicism. This amounted, in Mr. Ward's opinion, to the denial of the Catholic ideal,—which had a unity of its own,—the definitions representing only the fixed points and outlines of a large system, and the outcome of a mass of energising principles.[1] The definitions which were admitted became in such a scheme practically a dead letter; and were excluded from the range of active thought, and consequently kept from collision with those Liberal principles which were freely applied.

If the intellectual brilliancy of the *Rambler* meant the spread of these views and this method, it was loss, and not gain, to the cause of the Catholic Revival and of Christianity itself. Such principles must be opposed, however brilliant their advocates—nay, the more because they were brilliant and, therefore, dangerous. "Great is the evil," Mr. Ward wrote, a little later, in reference to this school of thought, "[if the Church possess] no children who can defend her cause with fully adequate intellectual power. But then there is another evil possible and greater still, namely, that her nominal children may *assail* her cause with fully adequate intellectual power." And such must be the result if the modern spirit is allowed unrestricted sway, and no care is taken that Catholics "shall

[1] See Ward's *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, pp. 10-16.

be educated in clear appreciation of the Church's various principles, and in deep harmony with her mind and spirit."[1]

The *Dublin Review* was, during the years 1857-60, at a very low ebb; and the influence of the *Rambler* was in consequence the more unchecked. Cardinal Wiseman, for so many years the most accomplished representative of English Catholicism in literature, was especially alarmed at its developments; and Mr. Ward shared in his alarm. They saw the renewed vigour of intellectual life after the stagnation of penal times, and feared lest under such influences it might take a wholly wrong direction. Ward indeed regarded the mass of English Catholics as still so deficient in literary interests, that a serious Catholic Review was out of place, until improved education should enable them to appreciate it. However, at the Cardinal's request, he, Oakeley, and other fellow-converts consented in 1858 to take an active share in rehabilitating the moribund *Dublin Review*, as an antidote to the *Rambler*. A little later overtures were made to Newman, who was known to value highly the ability of the conductors of the *Rambler*, to undertake its editorship and place it on a new footing.

Ward, understanding—prematurely as it proved—that Newman had already accepted the editorship, wrote to Cardinal Wiseman expressing his satisfaction with the arrangement, and added that he felt his services in connection with the *Dublin* to be no longer necessary. The following letter, written when he found that Newman was still hesitating, tells its own tale:—

NORTHWOOD PARK, COWES, *Shrove Tuesday, 8th March* 1859.

MY DEAR FATHER NEWMAN— . . . All of us, except Oakeley, were occupied *entirely* against the grain: nor (I think) is there *one* who would have dreamt of accepting the *Dublin Review* on the terms we did, except for our detestation of the *Rambler* and our wish to serve the Cardinal in his war against it.

For myself the whole thing (as I plainly told him) was a greater nuisance than could well be supposed. I am occupied with matter which interests me extremely, and for my own part would not care to walk across the room if by merely doing so I could turn out a first-rate Quarterly. My whole wish (putting it roughly) was to try that the Cardinal should feel the converts would *help* him.

We were all *delighted* to have a good excuse for retiring. I

[1] *Dublin Review*, vol. xviii. p. 11.

understood from Burns that your editorship was a fixed thing, and on that I wrote to the Cardinal.

I have the most perfect conviction that at best ours would have been a *wretched failure.* No one has less right to be suspected of *false modesty* than I have; but I am about as competent to direct a *Review* as to dance on the tight rope, and Oakeley is not much better.

I am perfectly sure, and never doubted for a moment, that nothing can make the *Dublin* even tolerable. A. B. is an omnipresent supreme inquisitor into every detail, and even if he were responsible editor, if there is one man on earth more unfit than *me* for such a post, it is *him.* Abounding (as I think) in most admirable *instincts,* but not a *reasonable being* in any shape.

I am writing in a hurry, *currente calamo,* to save the post. I hope I have made myself intelligible.

On public grounds I don't care one button for having a good *Review,* nor do I see who would be the better for one, in our miserable state of intellectual degradation. But I am *perfectly certain* that the *only* chance of our having one, would be that you should throw aside scruples *which are most misplaced,* and simply take the editorship of the *Rambler,* working it into a regular Quarterly. The *Dublin* then must die, and I should with great delight dance at its funeral.

On *personal* grounds it would be the most delightful thing to me in the world to have again a real exhibition of yourself.

All this of course in confidence. But if you wish a quasi-official answer about our "Dublin" negotiations, such as you could quote, let me have the word, and I will send you one.—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

Newman accepted the *Rambler.* A compromise was effected as to its increased size. The *Dublin* continued as a Quarterly; and the new *Rambler* was bi-monthly. Its first number appeared in May 1859. A second appeared in July; and then Newman found the scheme impracticable and retired suddenly from the editorship. He had contributed to it essays on "Northmen and Normans in England and Ireland," and on the "Douay and Rheims Version of Scripture," which bear the record of the character which he wished to impress upon the *Review,*—one marked at once by interest in Catholic tradition, by breadth, and by freedom from such theological technicalities as were unsuited to general readers. He had published also a remarkable paper, "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine." But from the date of his retirement

he washed his hands of all responsibility as to the line taken by the *Review*.

The group of men—some of them of singular brilliancy—into whose hands its conduct then fell, must now be mentioned more particularly. Sir John Acton, now Lord Acton, and Mr. Richard Simpson were the most active spirits. Among other collaborateurs or occasional contributors were Mr. Wetherell, Mr. H. N. Oxenham, Mr. Monsell, Mr. John O'Hagan.

Sir John Acton was the editor, and publicly accepted his responsibility for the line taken by the *Review*. He was connected by ties of family with Germany, and owed to Munich and Döllinger his University training. He came to England straight from the feet of the great Bavarian, and at once devoted himself to literature. He avowed frankly his dislike for the Roman and Scholastic system, and was an eager devotee of Liberal principles and what is called advanced thought. He seems to have believed that he saw in the school of German savants, of whom Döllinger was the chief, the harbingers of a great movement, of which the characteristics should be a thorough independence and frankness in critical and historical and scientific investigation, a broader theology, a union of the progressive creed of the nineteenth century with acceptance of the Church's defined dogma.

Mr. Richard Simpson, his chief collaborateur, was an Oxford man, and a convert from Anglicanism. His career as an Anglican clergyman had not been without its passages of arms with Church authorities; and it was said by some of his friends that disputes with his bishop had become such a necessary part of his daily life, that he could no more do without them than some men can dispense with a daily constitutional. He was a man of subtle intellectual power, with a quick and sensitive apprehension of the dangers to faith which an age of enlightenment might bring. Both scientific researches and a frank pursuit of metaphysical speculation must, he felt, lead to dangers for the many if Christianity were identified in the popular mind with obsolete and false scientific teaching. Mr. Simpson had without doubt a taste for controversy, and was perhaps slower to see the advantages of the *suaviter in modo* than of the *fortiter in re*.

Mr. Henry Oxenham, the graceful writer whose essays

were long familiar to readers of the *Saturday Review*, was also an Oxford convert. His cast of thought was somewhat similar to Sir John Acton's, although he was not credited with the authorship of any articles as comprehensive as the remarkable expositions of the Liberal Catholic position which appeared from time to time from Sir John Acton's pen. Mr. Wetherell was also an Oxford man of considerable literary gifts, who spent on literature the leisure he could spare from the routine work of a clerk in the War Office.

Mr. Monsell, now Lord Emly, and Mr. John O'Hagan were also occasional contributors; though neither of the two had any sympathy with the anti-Roman tendencies of the *Review*. Their articles were on political or literary subjects. Mr. Monsell was the intimate friend of Cardinal Newman. He held office in various Liberal administrations, and was Postmaster-General in Mr. Gladstone's Government. He was intimately associated with Montalembert and his party, and an enthusiastic advocate of Liberal Catholicism in its French and political form, as Lord Acton was in its German and more intellectual manifestation.

Mr. John O'Hagan, afterwards Mr. Justice O'Hagan, was both a poet and an orator. His translation of *La Chanson de Rolande* is a work of great accuracy and beauty.[1]

In the May of 1862 the *Rambler* was turned into a Quarterly, and its title changed. The *Home and Foreign Review*, as it was now called, was carried on on the same lines and under the same editorship as its predecessor.

The *Home and Foreign Review*, during the two years of its brief existence, bore comparison in the range of the subjects treated, and in the ability and thoroughness and scholarship of the writers, with any Review of our own times. It won admiration from the English world of thought, and was much read in literary circles both in London and at Oxford.[2] It naturally held its place as a power, moreover, among that group of German thinkers of whom Döllinger was the most prominent, and whose views it to a great extent reflected.

[1] A volume of his essays, including several articles in the *Rambler* and *Home and Foreign*, will shortly, I understand, be published.

[2] I observe that Mr. Max Müller speaks of it in 1863 as "one of the best-edited of our Quarterlies."

From the date of Newman's retirement onwards the reviewers accentuated their theological Liberalism.[1] They tended to desert the traditional Catholic positions, and to hold that their religion need not affect their views of politics, or of history, or of critical science: and they wrote of current topics as men of the world, according to the current maxims of the day. Mr. Ward engaged himself in unearthing the abstract principles which appeared to him to be involved in such a procedure.

In the first place to treat the political problems of the hour as matters entirely apart from Catholic teaching, was to pass over a large mass of recent papal instruction. Pius IX. had been throughout his pontificate emphasising the traditional Catholic position on matters unquestionably affecting the European politics of the time. The duties of the civil power towards the Church and religion had been urged in an Allocution and a Brief of 1850 and 1851,[2] and the union of Church and State was spoken of as the true ideal in an Allocution of September 1852.[3] As early as 1849 came his first declaration on the Temporal Power.[4] These were the first of a long series of pronouncements, containing condemnations of modern errors on the subjects in question, which were afterwards embodied in the Syllabus and Encyclical of 1864.

The question recently so practical both in France and in Ireland, What is the exact binding authority of such instructions? forced itself on Mr. Ward. On the lowest view they required external obedience and deference; and to claim for the politics advocated in the *Review* complete independence, was to fall below this lowest standard. Again, to claim for criticism and history that they should be treated entirely without reference to religious beliefs, was in Mr. Ward's eyes unreal. History cannot be read with precisely the same eyes by one who believes in a Providence and in the supernatural, and by one

[1] Here is a specimen of the language of the Review which startled the ecclesiastical authorities, on the Index and the Inquisition: "Is it not scandalous to allow congregations like those of the Index and Holy Office to come forth with all the pomp of authority, and to condemn as false and heretical theories which the Church, as teacher of the truth, has not so condemned? As if the only object were to impose on weak minds and to force them to obedience by pretending an infallible authority which really has nothing to do with the matter in hand."

[2] The Allocution *In Consistoriali* and the Brief *Ad Apostolicos*.

[3] The Allocution *Acerbissimum*.

[4] In the Allocution *Quibus quantisque*.

who does not. Gibbon's five causes of the spread of Christianity suffice for a convinced atheist, because he does not believe in the possibility of any supernatural cause. They are the best possible selection from the materials at his disposal. Belief in revelation and in the supernatural affords fresh material, and gives another factor for logic to reckon with. So, too, criticism will lead M. Renan to the belief that a Christ who is not God can be fashioned true to those facts in the Gospel narrative which are unquestioned. Here, again, his fundamental philosophy limits the hypotheses at his disposal. He draws a true conclusion from his own premises. "If the supernatural view is incredible" (and this is his tacit assumption) "my account is the best adapted to explain the facts." But a Christian has an additional hypothesis within his reach—that of a supernatural cause—which squares better with the phenomena. He forms logically a different view of facts from different premises.

But Mr. Ward went farther than this. Holding himself that a thoroughly loyal Catholic should accept, not only the defined authoritative teaching, but the "doctrinal intimations"[1] of the Holy See; believing with de Maistre that a spirit of increased deference to Rome was the great need of the Church in these latter days; he regarded the *Rambler*, not only as failing to appreciate the true logic of the Christian position, but as doing the greatest injury to the Catholic cause. Sympathising with de Maistre's sentiment, "Point du Christianisme sans le pape," he maintained that revealed doctrine could not be securely preserved without extensive guidance from the Holy See itself in matters of Critical Science and Politics.[2] Such guidance was in fact offered, and it must be accepted with docility. In some cases its acceptance was of obligation, in all it was due in loyalty.

Whilst, then, the *Rambler* endeavoured to make little of the necessary differences between a Catholic and an average man of the world, Ward of set purpose made much of them.

[1] See *infra*, p. 273.

[2] Mr. Ward seems to maintain that papal instructions are a positive help to science. "Although," he writes, "the Church does not teach human sciences from their own principles, she can, nevertheless, very importantly advise and assist them." This is written with reference to papal condemnations of scientific tenets as false (*Doctrinal Authority*, p. 446).

He considered that contemporary thought was really moving in a direction contrary to Christianity, and those who refused to face this fact, and surrendered themselves passively to the intellectual influences around them, would wake up some morning and find that they were no longer Christians at all. It was, then, a most necessary work to bring to light the radical opposition between the two sets of principles.

In his earlier controversies on this subject he emphasised the contrast on the ethical side, maintaining that the general Liberalism of the *Rambler* came in great part from neglecting or opposing the Christian ethical standard. Its want of reverence for authority had its springs in a deficient sense of the claim of Christianity to be the one guide—absolutely supreme. The necessary contrast in secular matters between a convinced Christian and a man of the world was only to be understood by a realisation of the vast difference between the natural and supernatural views of life, and the standards which they implied. Much of the enthusiasm for Freedom in the abstract went with deficiency in Christian reverence. Much of the sanguineness of Liberalism arose from the concentration of youthful hopefulness on this world instead of the next; from admiration, in the spirit of a positivist, for achievements on behalf of the prosperity of the human race on earth—an end of surpassing importance to the secularist, of only passing and minor interest in the Christian view. And logically connected with this was the enthusiasm for a great mind rather than a great character, for intellect which deals skilfully with the forces around us, rather than will, whose strength tells ultimately for the world behind the veil.

The first question which arose in this connection was the fundamental one of the best method of education—in the sense of formation of mental and moral habits. The *Rambler* reflected, as Mr. Ward considered, the spirit of the times in this matter. General literature, as acquainting the mind with all varieties of opinions, characters, histories, religions, was the grand instrument. The ideal product was the well-informed man, with wide sympathies and many-sided powers of appreciation, who seems to

> Sit as God holding no form of creed,
> But contemplating all.

Such was the conception first known in Christendom at the Renaissance. It was the ideal of continental indifferentists. It was, Ward maintained, the ideal of the Oxford of Jowett and Pattison.

Christianity, on the other hand, was exclusive. It could not logically deal with all phases of thought as on a level; with all standards of moral judgment as equally valuable studies; with equal appreciation of all elements in this various universe as the best training. Ethics had one standard and one only. Let this standard become rooted, and one with the habitual and fixed springs of action, before you introduce another principle which might well take root if it found congenial soil. Such was the view for which Mr. Ward contested eagerly in the now forgotten "X. Y. Z." controversy in the *Rambler* in 1859 and 1860. The more liberal view was advocated in the *Rambler* by a writer under the pseudonym of "X. Y. Z." Mr. Ward wrote a series of letters in reply under the signature "W. G. W." He opposed the "Liberal" system as a diet consisting only of varied tasting without the essential element of swallowing which is required for nourishment. He stated his views with his own uncompromising and somewhat irritating plainness. "The free and unrestricted study of able writers who imply some standard of praise and blame inconsistent with the Christian, tends in the greatest degree to imbue youths with the same detestable standard," he wrote, "and the more injuriously in proportion as the more unconsciously." He sympathised indeed in some degree with Abbé Gaume's strictures on classical study, which he read with interest. The practical outcome of Ward's views was the advocacy of the extension of theological and patristic reading, the Classics being treated as a mere instrument of rudimentary education in grammar, and general literature primarily as recreation.[1]

[1] I may supplement the account in the text by an analysis of some scrappy private notes on the subject. A distinction is drawn between that serious reading which forms the character and the ideals of life, and the varied reading which gives wide sympathies and literary culture. The first was to come earlier, immediately after the rudimentary education, and was to be treated as the serious formation of the man; the second was to come later, and to be regarded avowedly as recreation, and as the study of something which was to remain external. He applies to Christian education the saying "know everything of something, and something of everything." The Christian literature was to form the mind fully,

His attack on the worship of intellect, contained, for the most part, in an address to the Catholic "Academia," *On the Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's true Perfection*, went on somewhat similar lines.[1] It provoked a good deal of surprise and some amusement as coming from one whose whole life was absorbed and fascinated by intellectual speculation. And yet there is little doubt that this very fact led him to be scrupulously exact in ascribing to a sphere, in which he excelled and delighted, absolutely no place in the true perfection of man. Like his prototype de Maistre, he felt his own moral shortcomings keenly, and echoed the French writer's saying, "Je ne sais pas ce qu'est la vie d'un coquin, je ne l'ai jamais été; mais la vie d'un honnête homme est abominable." "I have the intellect of an archangel, and the habits of an eating, walking, and sleeping rhinoceros," he is reported to have said; and he felt that the intellect would remain, as it remained in Lucifer, even if the life were depraved. The true theory of human perfection must face this fact frankly.

His argument went on clearly defined lines. The days when the only hearty reverence in the world was reserved for

to give it its standard and point of view, to saturate it, and thus to give strength and consistency; and then in order to prevent narrowness a course of general reading was to be allowed. There is a knowledge of ethical principles which only comes by acting on them. We cannot act on contradictory ethical codes. We cannot at once obey a precept of meekness and impatient resentment, of purity and unbridled love of the beautiful, of mortification and unstinted indulgence in all healthy pleasure. We cannot at the same time make national greatness and the cause of God in the world the mainspring of our devotion. Even if the supple and weak intellect can admire inconsistent ideals equally, by a kind of dramatic sympathy, the whole man acting and thinking and expressing his entire self has to choose sides. One who cannot choose sides between contradictory principles of action, cannot act at all, and is a radically weak man. It is the business of education to make a strong man,—a man whose thought and feeling act consistently,—and how much more does this apply to Christian education where the ethical ideal is held to be infallibly revealed, and where the springs of action are ready to hand and constantly kept before the mind. That one who theoretically held that inconsistent ethical ideals might well be each of them suited to human nature under different conditions, and that none was beyond doubt complete or true,—that such a one should fall into the weakness of indecision or of a too many-sided sympathy, was in a manner excusable. But that professed Christians should do so was simply inexcusable, and a deliberate forfeiture of their privileges.

The controversy in the *Rambler* dealt with further questions; but they do not come within the scope I have marked out for this book.

[1] This address was published in 1862 by Cardinal Wiseman's request.

saints were passed; and yet such an attitude was the logical outcome of Christianity. Worship of mere intellectual genius, as such, was inconsistent with Christian belief; and yet it was a strongly operative force in the Liberal movement. He quoted with great indignation and ample italics from an address of Lord Brougham's, which he considered in this respect typical of modern Liberalism, where it was allowed its full fling unchecked by theological influences. "Consider," he wrote, "this amazing burst of Lord Brougham's. 'It is no mean reward of our labour' in scientific studies, says this inveterate man of the world, 'to become acquainted with the prodigious genius of those who have *almost exalted the nature of man above its destined sphere;* and who hold a station apart rising *over all the great teachers of mankind*,'—God Incarnate," Mr. Ward adds, "and His Apostles of course inclusively,—'and *spoken of reverently*, as if *Newton and Laplace were not the names of mortal men.*' No worshipper of stocks and stones," Mr. Ward continued, "ever perpetrated a much more degrading idolatry than this. And the judgment of a consistent Catholic on such insane rant will be understood from the fact that Lord Brougham considers Newton and Laplace to be 'almost exalted above the destined sphere' of humanity, precisely because of their possessing qualities which are possessed in an immeasurably greater degree by Satan and his angels. It is hard on Newton to be so spoken of; for in many ways that eminent astronomer was worthy of great respect. But on the various moral excellences which he seems to have possessed—his humility, simplicity, public virtue—Lord Brougham has not a word to say. It is in consequence of his having approached so much more nearly than most other men towards intellectual equality with the evil spirits, that Lord Brougham speaks of him, just as the Catholic might speak of St. Ignatius or St. Francis of Assisi." Referring to the Catholics who were infected by the ethos of modern Liberalism, he wrote:—

> They exhibited a certain general view of life: a habit of putting in the background man's true end; of preposterously over-estimating intellectual excellence in regard of its supposed dignity and nobleness; of measuring morality by a different standard from the Christian.

If a strong man or a great man were one in whom the

deepest thought was inseparably allied with that unity of conviction which forms character, any tendency to regard mere intellectual acquirement, or cleverness, as inherently admirable must be excluded from Catholic education. Separating sharply that higher contemplation which the schoolmen call "intellectus" from the "intellect," which he regarded in a more limited sense than the word conveys to many, as mere nimbleness or agility of mind, he urged that it formed no true part of man's perfection. Here, as elsewhere, clearing away all the web which complicated the problem in real life, he set himself to point out, in the pamphlet already referred to, that intellect —regarded simply as skill in analysis and dialectic—was as little a part of man's true perfection as skill in "cutting hair" or "making boots." The pamphlet aroused opposition. One opponent said he could hardly make up his mind whether it was the advocacy of a paradox or the statement of a truism. And there is something in the style of the pamphlet, as we shall presently see, which makes this verdict intelligible, however much we may dissent from it. Mr. Ward goes still nearer the root of the ethical contrast between the modern world and primitive Christianity in a characteristic passage which must be quoted:—

The world awards praise or blame to human actions, on such principles as these—

Principle 1. If a man makes the main end of his life to consist in labouring to promote his own interior perfection and growth in God's love,—if he concentrates his chief energy in the performance of this work,—he must have a mean and contemptible spirit. Monasteries are the proper places for such as him: he is fit for nothing better.

Principle 2. Those who are worthy of our honour as high-minded and spirited men have two main motives ever before their mind: a sensitive regard to their honour, and a keen sense of their personal dignity. Good Catholics would express this by saying —they must be actuated by vainglory and pride in an intense degree.

Principle 3. As their springs of action are worldly, so also are the external objects to which their action is directed. Some great temporal end—the exaltation of our country's temporal greatness or the achievement of her liberty—here is a pursuit well worthy of man's high aspirations. He who should regard godlessness and worldliness as immeasurably greater evils to his country

than political weakness or subjection, is a poltroon unworthy the name of patriot.

Principle 4. Physical courage is a far greater virtue, at least in a man, than meekness or humility or forgivingness.

Principle 5. Of all modes of life, the most irrational is that, wherein a man or body of men separate from the world, that they may the more uninterruptedly contemplate their Creator.

I might most easily add to this list; but I have said enough to indicate clearly what I mean. Such as these, I say, are the principles by which the world estimates human conduct; by which Lord Macaulay measures facts of the past, and the *Times* newspaper facts of the present. These principles are not even categorically stated in worldly literature; they are treated as too obvious and undeniable to need explicit statement; and they underlie the whole award of praise and blame, expressed or implied by the mass of men, when contemplating the actions of their fellows.

The Church, on the other hand, has no office more important than that of witnessing to and upholding consistently and prominently a moral standard in the extremest degree contrary to this. Those moral truths indeed to which the Church witnesses belong to the natural order, and are in themselves discoverable by human reason; yet they have also been supernaturally revealed, and form an integral part of the Church's depositum. And the reason commonly given for this fact is, that though reason in the abstract is adequate to their ascertainment and proof, yet in fact, the world around us being such as we see, they would certainly be overlooked or denied, were it not for the Church's prominent and emphatic witness. Suppose then, that through our neglect of interior culture, we have allowed ourselves in such habits of mind as I was lately describing; suppose that in theology proper we have brought down the Church's authority towards its minimum point; of course, in the region of history and politics, we shall neglect that authority altogether. . . . Our one security from infection is to sit ever at the Church's feet, and listen to her voice, and make her utterances our one test and measure of human morality.

Nor is it at all necessary, if we wish to know the Church's voice on such matters, that we should become theologians and study her various definitions. The books which she places in every one's hands for spiritual reading—the *Imitation*, the *Spiritual Combat*, or *Rodriguez*[1]—are all in deepest harmony on fundamental principles. The evil is not that we can possibly be ignorant of the Church's standard, but that we do not choose to apply that standard where it is rightly applicable. We often act as though we held the Church's principles to be true for one half hour, and false for all the rest of the day. We pass our due time in spiritual reading,

[1] The well-known author of *Christian Perfection*.

and accept, without question, the holy lessons placed before us. Then, this special work of piety being over, we plunge into the records of the past, or think and write on the politics of the present, and in doing so we measure the various facts which come before us by a standard directly contradictory to those very lessons of piety which we have received. I wonder that we are not ashamed of this as a mere matter of intellectual inconsistency. If the Church's principles are true in the morning, they are true through the day; if they are true to us, they are true to others; and those who have habitually and deliberately adjusted their conduct by different principles are no fit objects for our admiration, but on the contrary (to say nothing else of them) have been blunderers and fools.

CHAPTER VII

THE "DUBLIN REVIEW"

1863–1865

THE tone of the *Rambler* and *Home and Foreign* became more and more generally distasteful to English Catholics. The protest of its writers, in the name of modern criticism and candour, against the special pleading of Catholic controversial authors, appeared to many to lead them into an opposite extreme, and to make them take pleasure in representing the action of the Church in the course of its history in the most unfavourable light possible. It was the

> Candour which spares its foes and ne'er descends
> With bigot zeal to combat for its friends.

Again, they carried their opposition to the current Catholic teaching in such matters as the relations of Church authority to politics and secular science, and the relations of faith to reason, to a pitch which proved beyond the endurance of the local ecclesiastical authorities. In October 1862 the English bishops, with one exception, issued a formal protest against the *Review;* and this was followed up by two pamphlets from the pen of Bishop Ullathorne of Birmingham, on the methods and views it had advocated. At the same time Cardinal Wiseman, anxious, under the circumstances, to place the *Dublin Review* on a permanent footing, and to ensure its preserving the religious character of its earlier years, which the strong political element among its contributors was endangering, asked Mr. Ward to accept the post of responsible editor. Mr. Ward, after some hesitation, consented. He announced the fact to Newman in the following letter, dated "Freshwater, 16th October":—

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—I am desirous that you should not hear for the first time from any one but myself that I have had the impudence to accept the editorship of the *Dublin*. It is certainly a new phenomenon to have the editor of a quarterly profoundly ignorant of history, politics, and literature . . . But it was really a Quintus Curtius affair, and the only apparent alternative was the Tories seizing it and making it a political organ. I think even my editorship is better than that. I am very desirous to avoid . . . all appearance of *cliquiness*, and my notion is when I go back to town to call on as many different kinds of people as I can . . . My absurd difficulty about riding . . . will prevent my being in Birmingham more than thirty-six hours, but I should be greatly obliged if you would give me some talk for part of that time . . . I wish I could hope there was any chance of persuading you to write. The smallest contribution would be most gratefully received, whether grave or gay, lively or severe. . .—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.[1]

Mr. Ward explained his views further in the correspondence which followed. He designed as far as possible to make the *Dublin* a rallying-point for Catholic writers of various views, and to impress on it the directly religious character of Newman's *British Critic*. The following letter gives the conditions under which Mr. Ward accepted the editorship :—

As to the *Dublin* . . . I am most certainly to be the editor in the *second* of your two senses. As to Richardson, it is quite doubtful whether he will continue. And as to the Cardinal, he earnestly desires to know *nothing about any number before it appears*. All for which he stipulates is that there shall be three theological "assessors" approved by him, to whom I am to show whatever *in my judgment* legitimately falls under theological censorship; the *majority* in each case to decide. The three are to be Manning, Dr. Russell, and (we hope) F. Eyre, S.J.

I most earnestly wish to make the *Review* a means of helping forward the *conspiratio bonorum*, which seems so all important just now. There are many views in politics, *e.g.*, or in philosophy, from which I might importantly differ, and which, nevertheless, extremely good Catholics may hold or wish to advocate. But on this

[1] This letter is endorsed by the Cardinal with an extract from his own reply, "I could not write for the *Dublin* without writing also for the *Home and Foreign*, and I mean to keep myself, if I can, from these public collisions, not that in that way I can escape the evil tongues of men, great and small, but reports die away and acts remain."

and many other matters I am particularly anxious for your advice.[1]

Newman seems to have expressed his doubts as to the *Dublin* imitating with success the old *British Critic*, and Ward replied in his next letter entirely concurring in such doubts :—

I hope you don't think me madman enough to imagine that I could make the *D*[*ublin*] *R*[*eview*] ever so distantly comparable with your *B*[*ritish*] *C*[*ritic*]. I don't think it is generally a fault of mine to be over sanguine about what I undertake ; and least of all about the *Dublin Review*, for which in many respects I am the most unfitted man alive. If I obtain even the most ordinary success, no one will be more surprised than I shall be. To take a thing for a model, don't imply a notion of coming near it ; otherwise J[esus] C[hrist] and the Saints could not be our models.

Still, however, I think that my only chance is to do what I have said. Badly as I shall do *in* my line, surely I should do worse *out* of it. Now in all such matters as literature proper, etc., etc., I am like a man deprived of some sense. I literally can no more get on with it than I can read Hebrew without having learned. I am driven to the play (except that now I am taking up chess) from sheer inability to comprehend anything intermediate between theology or philosophy and the theatre. Consequently, I assume that if it is God's will I should undertake the *D. R.* He must wish me to do it in my own line and not in another. Otherwise in fact I should not be undertaking it at all, but merely giving opportunity for a miscellaneous scrap-book.

The first number of the *Dublin Review* under Mr. Ward's editorship appeared in July 1863. The plan of the *Review* was considerably recast under his auspices ; and one feature of importance was the institution of a supplement to each number, containing a record of Continental events of interest to Catholics. In this supplement were chronicled not only the political or social events which bore upon the fortunes of the Church, but the essays or controversies in leading Continental periodicals, as the *Correspondant*, the *Civilta Cattolica*, the

[1] Ward had an interview with Newman on the 18th of November, and talked over his prospects with the *Dublin*. He had been summoned to Birmingham by the Bishop to discuss the situation, and took this opportunity of seeing Newman. Newman was kind and sympathetic, but he adhered to strict neutrality. He wrote to Lord Emly, however, on the following day, describing Ward's intentions. "Poor fellow," he adds, "I wonder if he will burn his fingers as others, or have better luck."

Katholik. The staff of writers whom Mr. Ward gathered round him included men of known ability. Manning, Dalgairns, and Henry Wilberforce were frequent contributors. Mr. Healy Thomson was sub-editor—succeeded later on by Mr. Cashel Hoey.

The new editor's conciliatory programme was not destined to be carried out. Before the appearance of his second number two events occurred which determined the line adopted by the *Dublin Review* during the eventful years which succeeded—a line primarily defensive of dogmatic principles. The first was the public exposition by Montalembert of his views on Church and State, at the Congress of Catholics at Malines in August 1863; the second was the address of Dr. Döllinger at the Munich Congress in the following month. Each was a significant and influential utterance on behalf of Liberal Catholicism: one was on semi-political questions, the other on the matter of philosophical and theological speculation. "It is with very deep truth," Mr. Ward wrote, "that an able writer in the *Civilta* places in close juxtaposition these two orations. Both tend to disparage the Church's legitimate authority, whether in politics or philosophy."

Some account must be given of the two Congresses. Some thousands of Catholics had responded to the invitation of Baron de Gerlache—the staunch defender of the liberties of the Belgian Church in the days of Dutch persecution, and the Supreme Judge of the Court of Cassation—to a reunion to be held at Malines in August 1863. The Congress was under the presidency of the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines. Our own Cardinal Wiseman also took an active share in its proceedings. The Patriarch of Jerusalem was present, and the Bishops of Gand, Tournay, and Namur in Belgium, and of Adelaide in Australia, and of Beverley in England. The assembly consisted chiefly of Frenchmen and Belgians, and was designed partly to arouse Belgian Catholics to better organisation and corporate action. Their political power was not in proportion to their numbers; and the recent infringements of the liberty of Catholic education by the Liberal Government had not been opposed by them effectively. The subjects discussed during the four days of the Congress (18th to 22nd of August) were of various interest,—Christian education, Catholic

associations, works of charity, Christian art. The state of the Church in different countries was also a subject dealt with; and Cardinal Wiseman delivered an interesting address on "The Condition, Religious and Civil, of Catholics in England." M. L'Abbé (afterwards Cardinal) Mermillod spoke on the "Union of Christian Churches"; M. L'Abbé Soubiran "On the Works of the Oriental Churches and Schools." On Thursday, the 20th of August, at half-past five, Count de Montalembert delivered his celebrated address on "A Free Church in a Free State," which he followed up the next day by another on "Liberty of Conscience." Both addresses were of a rhetorical rather than a scientific character. The first advocated, on lines dangerously resembling the theories of the *Avenir*, the separation of Church and State. The second strongly condemned the principle of religious intolerance advocated by Catholic theologians, and countenanced by the mediæval Church. The speeches made an immense sensation. Cavour, a few years earlier, had taken up the Liberal Catholic formula, "L'Eglise libre en l'état libre," and applied it to justify the spoliation of the Pontifical states; and Montalembert was charged with playing into the hands of the Nationalist party. Veuillot's friends attacked both speeches bitterly. The English press took them up, and Mr. Grant Duff in a speech to his constituents at Elgin hailed Montalembert's advocacy of liberty of conscience as marking a new departure in Ultramontane Catholicism. The speeches, both in their advocacy of the principles of modern Liberalism, and in their disparagement of the past, went too far even for some of Montalembert's own friends. Lacordaire, years earlier, had admitted the union of Church and State to be the normal condition of things. "On est allé trop loin à Malines," wrote Foisset in reference to Montalembert's addresses; and the same writer speaks of his condemnation of mediæval Christendom as "quatre fois trop absolu."

In Mr. Ward's eyes the speeches were an abandonment of the Christian Ideal, on the relation between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, in favour of the Liberal. Montalembert appeared to Mr. Ward to attack the mediæval relations between Church and State, and the principle of an established religion, not only as unsuited to the times but as absolutely wrong. Again, he appeared to advocate general tolerance of all

forms of religious propagandism as an abstract principle of justice. Had he merely advocated separation of Church and State and general toleration as a practical programme for the nineteenth century, Mr. Ward would have had no quarrel with him.[1] But he appeared to represent the modern ideal, based on the indifferentism of governments, as higher and truer than the mediæval, which was based on the Catholic unity of the Holy Roman Empire.

Still, Mr. Ward viewed Montalembert's speech as far less serious than Döllinger's. The debatable questions raised by the Frenchman were not practical. "The evil work of decatholicising civil society," Ward wrote, "has been now so completely wrought out in far the largest portion of Europe, that the question at issue rather concerns our theoretical estimate of the past than our practical provision for the present."

Far more serious were the proposals of Dr. Döllinger. "For ourselves," wrote Ward in the *Dublin*, "we regard the philosophical movement with immeasurably greater alarm and consternation than the political." The memory of Froschammer was still green at Munich, and Froschammer had openly defied papal authority in all matters of philosophical speculation. A speech, then, which might be interpreted as lending Döllinger's sanction to a programme of similar tendency was a serious matter. Let us briefly give the story of the Congress and address. In August 1863 Döllinger and two of his friends, Abbot Haneburg and Dr. Alzog the historian, invited a number of Catholic Scholars and Divines of Germany to a literary conference to be held on the 28th of September. They set forth as the object of the meeting the danger to religion from the spread of infidelity, and the desirableness that German Catholic writers of different schools should understand each other better and act as far as might be in concert,—that a spirit of conciliation should replace the existing antagonisms. Nearly one hundred professors, many of them laymen, authors, and doctors of divinity, responded,—nearly all men of in-

[1] So Mr. Ward implies in many places, *e.g.* "I suppose pretty nearly every Catholic does hold that the "modern liberties" are a necessity under present circumstances. . . . But what Montalembert maintained was that their establishment constituted a true social progress. Indeed he maintained more than this, for he maintained that the earlier state of things was wrong in *principle*" (*Doctrinal Authority*, p. 28).

tellectual mark, and some of them deputed specially by their Bishops. They assembled at the Benedictine monastery of Munich on the appointed day. An address of fidelity to the Holy See was unanimously voted. Four days were occupied in varied discussions. It was resolved that the Conference should be annually repeated. The Pope telegraphed his blessing. The Bishop of Augsburg and Archbishop of Bamberg gave toasts at the final banquet in the Benedictine refectory. The assembly, of which a considerable majority were from the diocese of Munich, included such names as Professor Sepp the disciple of Joseph Görres, Dr. Reinkens of the University of Breslau and Dr. Hagemann of Hildesheim, both historians of reputation, Schulte, Werner and Phillips from Vienna, Professor Mayr from Würzburg, and very many other writers of established position.

The object set forth by the President of the Congress in his opening address, which the *Home and Foreign* noted with satisfaction, was to give a certain direction to the work of Catholic thinkers and writers. A programme was set before the Congress for treating dogmatic questions on lines more and more removed from the traditional scholastic Theology. Dr. Döllinger[1] paid a tribute indeed to the "completeness and comprehensiveness" of the Scholastics, and to their advance in this respect on the early fathers. But their Aristotelian starting point imposed limitations. "Their analytical processes could not construct a system corresponding to the harmony and wealth of revealed truth; and without the elements of Biblical criticism and dogmatic history they possessed only one of the eyes of theology." Since the Reformation a theology had been growing up more suited to modern needs, in various countries. Our own Stapleton was hailed as the most eminent champion against the Reformers. The hope for the future in Germany (the address went on to explain) was religious unity; and that could only be attained by Catholic divines taking a certain line which was definitely indicated. Scholastic theology was to be regarded as a thing of the past. Catholic doctrine must be presented in its organic completeness, and in its connection with the religious life, "rigidly separating that

[1] This account is abridged from the report in the *Home and Foreign Review* of January 1864.

which is permanent and essential from whatever is accidental, transitory, and foreign." Catholics must recognise and claim the distorted truths which the "separated communities" preserve, thus appealing to those outside the Catholic society by what is truest or best in the opinions they already hold. The genuine theologian must reason boldly and thoroughly, and "not take to flight if the process of his reasoning threatens to demolish some truth which he had deemed unassailable." Hypothesis and opinion are constantly being broken down as knowledge advances, but defined dogma must ever remain; though even defined dogma needs intellectual power for its exposition. "Definitions need to be impregnated by the thought of the preacher and divine, and while they may become bright gems in the hands of a true theologian, they may be converted into lustreless pebbles by the manipulations of a rude mechanical mind." Development, expressed both in modification of opinion and in the increased realisation of the true meaning of dogma, is to be the order of the day; and above all things the attempt to give to the opinions of a school the authority of dogma is to be opposed.

Such was the substance of this memorable address. And there was much in it with which all active Catholic thinkers sympathised. It was delivered to an audience including adherents of many schools; and in great part it bore an interpretation which all could accept. Heinrich and Scheeben were there, representing the Ultramontanes of Mayence, and they did not repudiate it. But they did publicly disclaim agreement with the extreme interpretation of it which a section of thinkers adopted; and it was naturally judged in Rome by the known views of its deliverer and supporters. If it contained much which was acceptable to all Catholic thinkers of insight, as to the necessity of vivifying scientific theology, bringing it up to date, uniting it with the exposition of the religious life, separating dogma from opinion, it appeared to some of those present that the element of discipline and the element of authority were ignored. One necessary element of Catholic progress—intellectual life—was advocated; the other, equally indispensable to orderly advance—authority—was reduced to a minimum. The decisions of the Roman Congregations, and the conclusions of the united Theological

School, must be in some sense landmarks, and the intent of the address, as viewed by many, was to emancipate Catholic thought altogether from their control. Again, it might be well to supplement the Scholastics; but Rome could not set aside the writings of the great doctors, portions of which had passed into the very definitions of the Church, and so many of which were indissolubly blended with its undying tradition. Opinion might change; but there were theological opinions which carried the greatest weight, and could not be treated as having no special authority from the universal and prolonged sanction of the Church. Advance and Reform were good, but Revolution was bad. Again, however far individuals might go in modifying received opinions, for the authorised teachers to hazard their own speculations, in opposition to established traditions, was fatal to the discipline of the Church. The current teaching might become gradually modified by the efforts of individuals—this had happened often enough in the history of the Church. But that official Catholic teaching and public writing in Germany should break off avowedly and suddenly from a body of doctrine which, even if not true in every particular, was, as a whole, the outcome of an unbroken growth, whose roots were in the apostolic age, whose branches were among the dogmas of all times, was a proposal which could not be passed over with neutrality.

But this very prospect, that in the hands of the most liberal representatives of the Munich school, Dr. Döllinger's principles would lead to a complete breach with traditional methods, was naturally what rejoiced the hearts of the English liberal thinkers of whom I have spoken.

The *Home and Foreign* looked for great results. It noted the "rare significance" of Döllinger's address, and added that "in conjunction with the circumstances in which it was delivered, it forms an epoch in the ecclesiastical history of Germany." Its influence, if it was unchecked, would not be confined to Germany. "If it comes to bear fruit," the *Review* continued, "[it] will bear it for the whole Catholic world."[1]

The hopes of the *Home and Foreign* were Mr. Ward's fears. He did forbode that the lesson of disregard for Roman decisions and traditions would be widely learnt; and if he had any

[1] *Home and Foreign Review*, January 1864, pp. 209 *seq.*

doubts on the subject they were put an end to, so far as the English Döllingerites were concerned, by the events of the next two months. A Brief from the Pope to the Archbishop of Munich, dated the 21st of December, commended the intentions of the promoters of the Congress, and expressed all hope of a good result; but carefully vindicated the authority of the Roman congregations and of the Scholastic Theology from the depreciation which some might suppose to be implied by Döllinger's address. In short, as the editor of the *Home and Foreign* himself said, the Brief condemned exactly the interpretation of Döllinger's address which that periodical had adopted. The *Home and Foreign* suspended its publication; but instead of expressing submission to the Brief, its conductors appealed to time to justify them, and to show that the Pope was wrong.[1]

This determined Mr. Ward's line. "If," he wrote, "Sir John Acton, without professing any change of opinion, had simply said that in deference to the papal pronouncement he terminated his periodical, we should by no means have been too curious in inquiring whether he really yielded as much deference to that pronouncement as its character demanded."[2] But the condemnation of the Pope by Catholics stood on a different footing. It was an open and extreme manifestation of the principles to which the *Review* had hitherto been visibly approximating. As long as the spirit of de Maistre had in any degree remained among the adherents of the German schools, as long as loyalty was preserved, the principle of unity was *practically* there. If this was going further steps must be taken. The exact limits of Infallibility and the precise weight due to official letters of the Pope was, in Mr. Ward's opinion, a matter to which "theologians had by no means given that degree of methodical and scientific consideration which was due to its importance."[3] If Catholic feeling did not prompt men to deference, let it be clearly shown at what point they fell below their actual obligation by not deferring, and at what point they were in direct rebellion against the Church's infallible teaching.

[1] *Home and Foreign Review*, April 1864, pp. 686 *seq.*

[2] See *Dublin Review*, July 1864, p. 65.

[3] *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, p. 432.

Mr. Ward was quite clear that whatever amount of adaptation or concession to the thought of the day might be desirable, whatever readaptation and modification of Scholasticism might be necessary (and in philosophy he did advocate considerable modification), the Munich school and their English adherents were carrying their liberalism to a point which tended simply to destroy the Catholic movement altogether. Even in philosophy some supervision was necessary as a protection against the vagaries of individual genius, much more in theology. With the deep conviction so often expressed by him that philosophical principles do in due course necessarily lead to their logical consequences, he held the Church's power of safeguarding Catholics from dangerous currents in contemporary thought to be simply essential as a preventative against infidelity. Deny this, and the Catholic movement which proceeds on such a denial is really on the road to ruin. Allow a Psychology to be taught unchecked in the Catholic schools, or advocated by Catholic writers, which is inconsistent with the doctrines of freewill, grace, and sin,[1] or a metaphysic which undermines the arguments for Theism, laugh at the Roman condemnation of such systems, and you have a movement on foot which, however much it may claim to be an enlightened Catholic movement, is really a movement against the Church. "At what pace" an advocate of such principles realises this "will depend," he wrote, "on the degree in which he unites intellectual keenness with spiritual obtuseness"; but ultimately "he will find himself in a direct opposition to the Church's teaching, which no sophistry can gloss over; and will be confronted with the awful alternative of total retractation or undisguised apostasy."[2]

His investigation, then, of the extent of papal Infallibility and of the exact weight due to the decisions of Roman congregations, was intended to check both German and French Liberalism,—the Liberalism of Döllinger and of Montalembert. But it was the attitude of some of Döllinger's followers,—their avowed contempt for the whole method and teaching of Rome,—which made him deem it imperatively necessary to deal with the question thoroughly. "Such men," wrote Mr. Ward, "regard the Church's rulers much as they might regard Balaam's ass.

[1] Essay on "Rome and the Munich Congress," *Dublin Review*, July 1864, p. 87.

[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 95.

They are made the organs of a divine utterance . . . at certain very wide intervals, but are otherwise below the ordinary level of humanity in their apprehension of God's works and ways."

Mr. Ward's treatment of the question occupied many articles in the *Dublin Review*. It is too elaborate and technical to be fully dealt with in the text of a work like the present. His main contention was that all the doctrinal instructions in the Pope's official public letters, which claim to guide Catholic belief, are strictly infallible; although neither the incidental statements (*obiter dicta*), nor the doctrinal statements of letters whose primary purport was disciplinary, are infallible. Papal condemnations were, he held, infallible not only when they declared an opinion or work heretical, but when they branded it with some lesser censure. Papal letters might be *ex Cathedrâ* and infallible, although in form only addressed to a single individual, provided that the Pope designed them for general guidance. Further, he maintained that the Pope did in fact intend very frequently to give infallible instruction in such letters. Once more, although the matter of papal teaching *ex Cathedrâ* is "faith and morals," he maintained that such decisions might be immediately ("in their proximate relations") concerned with philosophy, politics, history, or physics, provided that the ultimate object of the decisions was the safeguarding of revealed truth. As to the decisions of Roman congregations, he claimed for them in many cases a provisional "interior assent," although he admitted that they were, at all events apart from the Pope's confirmation of them, not irreformable.

His treatment was objected to by many theologians as too exacting:—notably his claiming infallibility for what was not in form addressed to the whole Church, met with general criticism, as well as the liberal extent to which he claimed the same attribute for decisions *primâ facie* political or historical rather than doctrinal. But his essays on the subject did in great measure the work he had most at heart—of checking the opposite extreme of the *Home and Foreign* writers. They brought out the fact that even the theologians who least agreed with his analysis, insisted on a deference to papal Encyclicals and Allocutions very different from that which those writers manifested. Father Ryder, now Superior of the Birmingham

Oratory, who wrote a careful adverse criticism on Ward's exposition, thus expresses himself:—

Of course I allow that all Encyclicals and official letters of the Pope, since they go so far to engage the Church to the peculiar line they take, must be in a special manner under the guidance of the Holy Spirit who is pledged to preserve the Church from all errors of faith and morals, and all such errors of discipline as would militate against her life. . . . We cannot doubt but that the general course of his instructions is holy and true in a sense that no other instruction is; nay, it is probable that sometimes he is speaking under the influence of the spirit of truth himself.[1]

Ward's own treatment of the subject was republished in 1866, in a work entitled *The Authority of Doctrinal Decisions.* The spirit in which the work is conceived is best represented by his letter of dedication to Archbishop Manning.

My dear Lord Archbishop—There is nothing which you have more earnestly taught us, than that the interests of "truth" come before those of "peace"; or rather, that all Christian peace, really such, is based on Christian truth. Nor have you been less emphatic in inculcating that there is no security for religious truth, except in the most humble and unreserved submission to the Church, on all matters which are related ever so remotely to faith and morals. Since, therefore, in the following pages I have treated a small portion of this large subject, it is not unnatural that I should have solicited you to accept its dedication. I esteem your compliance with that request as one of those kindnesses which, during late years, you have shown me in such abundance, and for which I shall ever be most grateful.

I trust I may consider that, in according this permission, you have given your blessing both to me and to my little work; and I sincerely hope that you will approve its contents.

That you may be long spared us to exhibit and teach that devoted loyalty to the Holy See, which is our one protection against the misbelief and unbelief of our unhappy age, is the constant prayer, my dear Lord Archbishop, of your Grace's dutiful and affectionate servant, William George Ward.

The emphasis and extreme explicitness of Mr. Ward's work aroused opposition; but it was a necessary consequence of his view of the situation. Looking on deference to Rome not merely as a protection, but as the very foundation of any

[1] *Idealism in Theology.* By the Rev. H. J. D. Ryder (Longmans).

desirable theological activity among Catholics, he had no temptation to reserve, and every reason to speak out. Other thinkers who concurred in his views up to a certain point shrank from emphasising them in their fullest logical expression. Cardinal Newman, who, as we shall presently see, condemned emphatically the Liberalism of the Munich school, felt strongly the intellectual enlargement which, with all its shortcomings, it promised for Catholic education and speculation. He shrank from an abrupt logical challenge, which might simply irritate its members, and might lose their services for the Catholic Revival. Cardinal Manning himself, although almost entirely in harmony with Ward's general views, refused to maintain, as Ward did, that the principles of '89 were condemned.[1] Newman had hopes of the philosophical and historical movement represented by the Munich school, Manning of the movement of Lacordaire and Montalembert, that they might be factors in the Catholic Revival; and they shrunk from pressing logical conclusions which might kill this prospect. Each was a movement full of heterogeneous life; and they hoped that dangerous elements might be discarded, and the life utilised for the Church. In these hopes Ward had no share whatever. He did not believe that either movement could be brought into harmony with the claims of Church authority. Viewing each as primarily the expression of the abstract theories advocated by its promoters, he held that each was based on principles essentially un-Catholic. No modification could make them Catholic, although as in physical diseases a period of apparent health, of religious and moral life, might come after the germ was planted, and before the disease showed its true nature. Thoroughgoing Liberalism was the microbe of religious negation. Let Catholics be touched by it, and you will liberalise Catholicism: you will never Catholicise Liberalism.

In the case of German Liberalism and its English adherents Mr. Ward contented himself almost exclusively with pointing out their refusal to acknowledge the true extent of Church authority. The details of the historical, critical, and scientific questions which they raised were, in part at least, outside the sphere with which Mr. Ward was familiar, and he did

[1] Pastoral on *The Ecumenical Council, and the Infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff*, p. 17 (Longmans 1869).

not deal with them directly. In the case of the French Liberals, however, he acted otherwise. He held that there was much less of disloyal spirit and much more of mere confusion of thought in the adherents of Montalembert than in those of Döllinger. He treated the subject-matter of French Liberalism, the relations between Church and State, at length. The most characteristic of the Essays, that on "Liberty of Conscience," in answer to Montalembert's address, was withdrawn before publication by Archbishop Manning's advice, lest its strictures on Montalembert might give offence. But as it supplies the fullest account of Ward's attitude on the subject, and is an excellent specimen of his controversial style, some extracts must be given from it.

He blames Montalembert for treating rhetorically a matter needing such careful scientific thought as the theory of universal toleration. He distinctly admits that, practically, he is in agreement with Montalembert, that general toleration of the various existing forms of religious creed and worship is expedient in modern Europe. But he attacks him at great length on two points. The first is the *principle* on which toleration should be justified in existing circumstances. The second is the ideal which should be recognised as highest. Toleration must be defended, not on the French orator's ground that it is the absolute right of all men and of all religions, but because, as things are, it is practically expedient for the general welfare. The highest ideal is not a universal liberty to differ, but the union of society in one true religious belief. And it is the duty of the Government to preserve that union so far as it exists. This fundamental principle is stated in the following passage:—

Civil government more adequately performs its highest and most admirable function in proportion as the true moral basis is wider on which the body politic is established. By the moral basis on which a body politic is established, we mean to express the aggregate of moral and spiritual doctrines which are regarded by all citizens as first principles—as truths which are no matter for discussion or argument, but which no right-minded person could dream of questioning—and on which the whole legislative, judicial, and administrative structure, the law of marriage and the law of education, are absolutely built.

Before depicting that highest state of things in which Catholic belief and public sentiment are coextensive, as they were in great measure in the Middle Ages, he gives a sketch of the exact amount of toleration which his principles would demand in the existing state of things in England. He takes the instance of monogamy as a practice sacred both in the English law and in the English public conscience, and defends the legal intolerance of polygamy or of propagandism in its behalf, so long as public opinion remains what it is. If this unity of opinion should be destroyed, toleration of the advocates of polygamy might become necessary on grounds of expediency: but the preservation of the higher moral sentiment which at present exists, is so important an end, as to make the State's intolerance of those who attempt to infringe it a duty.

He gives first the picture of public opinion in Christian Europe united in favour of monogamy. The question is beyond dispute. It secures "an elevation of thought in regard to marriage and family ties" which the Turk, who has not lived in the midst of it, cannot understand. Nay, he may, being as it were without the instinct generated by this higher morality, argue against it, from the prevalence of certain vices which will always be incidental to a stricter moral code. Where more is forbidden transgression is more frequent. The Turk can appreciate his own argument based on this fact; but the state of public opinion in which *he* lives, and the family habits in which he has been educated, prevent him from appreciating the higher nobility and purity of which he has not even enough experience to understand it. The European, who lives faithfully his life of self-restraint and domestic affection, is conscious of his own superiority, and does not care to argue with the Turk, to whom his deepest reasons are inaccessible. The Essay then proceeds to picture the first infringement of this state of things—

> The little rift within the lute
> That by and by will make the music mute.

Such (so far) is our happy condition. Here and there an individual theorist may raise his voice in protest against monogamy; but even if it reach the popular ear at all, it falls on it dull and unheeded. He is unmolested, because he is innocuous. But now

let us suppose that in some part of Europe—say in England—an opposite opinion begins rapidly to gain ground. A sect is formed like the Mormonite, whose characteristic tenet is the lawfulness and expedience of polygamy. For some time the obscure fanatics are treated with indolent contempt; but at length the fact is forced on public attention, that this sect is actually taking root and spreading. They practise polygamy with perfect satisfaction of conscience, and write vigorous controversy in its behalf. David and the patriarchs are quoted in every page; and the terrible moral corruptions which thrive in monogamical regions, and which are visibly the offspring of monogamical institutions, are set forth with unsparing severity. The heart of England, on the whole, indeed, is still sound; but who shall say how long this will continue? Respectable and conscientious fathers of families find that even their own sons are becoming infected; and when rebuked by their parents for their profligacy, amaze them by answering with a Scriptural text and a controversial argument. At once a great cry is raised to the Government and to the Legislature: "Arrest this plague before it has had time to reach our very vitals. The evil with which we are imminently threatened is beyond the power of imagination to realise. Let things only once come to this, that monogamy is an open question among us, that polygamists and monogamists live peacefully side by side, in mutual acquaintance and friendship, that the mass of our people, instead of accepting monogamy as an unquestionable first principle, come to regard it as a matter on which much may be said on both sides—let this once come to pass, and the whole evil is done. We have lost that sense of family sacredness which was an Englishman's highest boast, and we are brought down to the degraded level of Turks and Mormonites." The Government and Legislature, being no less sound at heart on the matter than the great body of the people, promptly listen to the petition, and enact in good earnest stringent measures of repression. The dissemination of polygamical tenets is made penal, and the penal laws are rigorously enforced. Those of the new sect who persist in holding their (ir)religious assemblies, or in propagating their vile tenets, are thrown into prison. The mass of Englishmen warmly sympathise with these energetic proceedings; and indeed the magistrates are obliged to interfere actively, lest the mob take the law into their own hands. At the same time resort is had to every means of argument and persuasion which fervent charity can suggest, in order to inspire true thoughts in these unhappy men, and awaken them to a sense of the appalling calamity with which they are threatening their country. Finally, by the Government's timely and most laudable exertions, the plague is arrested. There is a great deal, indeed, of temporary excitement and temporary misery, the legacy left to their

countrymen by these pestilential heresiarchs. But before long this also dies out, and England remains in possession of this dear and cherished principle. Health is restored to the body politic; and Englishmen unite their voice as one man in returning thanks to God for having enabled them, by wholesome and well-timed coercion, to expel that malignant disease which threatened to take up a permanent position in the system.

In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, we say, such wholesome coercion would be effectual. But let us contemplate the hundredth case. From whatever cause — whether the remedy has been applied too late, or that the coercion has been insufficient, or, on the other hand, has been injudicious—at all events the miserable fact is accomplished. The sect occupies a permanent position in England, and a generation arises of hereditary polygamists. The evil, alas! is done. England is degraded: never again (unless a counter revolution were worked) can England be what she was. Even those (the great majority, perhaps) who retain monogamical principles, have come to think that at last it is a matter for "argument." They have lost in great degree their old practical conviction that monogamical doctrines are most certainly and indisputably true; and they have lost in that very degree their old instinctive appreciation of the foulness and odiousness inherent in the practice of polygamy. Under these circumstances, any further attempt to enforce the penal laws simply adds, and adds indeed most grievously, to the existing evils. They are the constant cause of heart-burning and discontent; they actually enlist public sympathy in behalf of those against whom they are directed; they are fatal to national union and consolidation. The undeniable truth of this forces itself more and more on the most zealous monogamists; and at length, *communi omnium plausu*, after being long disused, they are for ever erased from the statute book.

And here two things deserve our attention. Firstly, at the beginning of this wretched era of declension, the penal laws were most right and admirable; at the end of it they were mistaken and mischievous. There was one certain intervening period,—but who can lay his finger precisely on that period?—when their evils began to outbalance their benefits. And, secondly, it is those who are most commendably zealous in the holy cause, those who most unreservedly claim our admiration and sympathy—it is those men who will probably be latest in seeing the uselessness of further severity. No one thinks that in war a general shows a cruel and bloodthirsty temperament because he is slow in believing himself overcome; and because he continues, therefore, the sacrifice of human life after resistance has become hopeless.

However, the time has come at which the abrogation of

the penal laws is desirable—not on Liberal but on Conservative principles.

The Prime Minister of the day is, perhaps, a zealous but judicious monogamist. We may suppose him to address a deputation of polygamists, on the bill which he is about to introduce for their relief from civil penalties and disabilities, in the following terms: "I do not conceal from you, gentlemen, my own conviction that the existence of your sect in England is a most heavy public calamity, and that England has in consequence fallen to a level of degradation, from which (while you remain among us) she can never recover. Still I cannot close my eyes to the circumstance that your hereditary existence here is now an accomplished fact, and to that fact I bow. The bill which I shall have the honour of introducing, and to which I expect the unanimous consent of both Houses, will provide effectually for your full toleration. You will have liberty to assemble without molestation for your peculiar form of worship; to educate your children in polygamical tenets, to found endowments, which the law shall respect, in promotion of polygamical interests. If the State places any of your body in an exceptional position—in army or navy, in workhouse or prison—it will provide for them the attendance of their own Ministers. The Established Church will, indeed, continue to teach monogamy; nay, further, I tell you frankly that all my own political measures will have for their predominant aim the promotion of Englishmen's spiritual interests; and that among those interests an abhorrence of polygamy holds, in my mind, a somewhat prominent place. I cannot quarrel with you if you, in your turn, pursue a similar course—if you, in your legislation, aim at England's spiritual good, according to your apprehension of what that good involves. Miserably unsatisfactory as such an arrangement must be, it is the best which remains to us under that unhappy condition to which your fathers, gentlemen, have reduced our dear old country. And now that I have made these concessions, you may rely on my fulfilling them to the very letter. When that good old monogamist, George III., first received the American Minister, he said, 'I was the last to acknowledge your country's independence, and (depend upon me) I will be the last to violate it.' So I was the last to concede your toleration, and I will be the last to infringe it. If any monogamists, in their mistaken zeal, endeavour practically to thwart what the Legislature has conceded, I will be the first to give you speedy and complete redress. And let me end my address with words more peaceful and conciliatory than any which I have yet used. I look upon you, gentlemen, if you will allow me frankly to say so, as holding a most different position from your fathers. They, living under the full light of universal monogamy, and

having received a corresponding education, introduced a new and (as I must think) a most pestilential and degrading error; their whole attitude was one of rebellion against established truth; and (though God alone knows the heart) there was the strongest presumption that in each instance the error was caused by personal wickedness and corruption of mind, whether in the way of pride or of sensuality. You differ from them in all these respects; you do but hold what you have always been taught; and you have listened to the teachings of those whom God Himself has entrusted with the charge of your education. Moreover, I fully believe that now you are admitted to political privileges, you will eagerly join with us monogamists in opposition to the still graver and deeper errors which are now beginning to menace us. There are portents arising above the horizon, which even you regard with antipathy and horror. Views are being secretly advocated about the family relation, which are as far below yours as yours (excuse me) are below ours. I sincerely hope and expect that by our full and free incorporation of you into our political system, we shall obtain your cordial help in the tremendous struggle which is now before us. As far as you and we are concerned, we shall try to make converts from your body, and you from ours; but converts in either direction will be visited with no civil penalty or disability. Civil penalties will be reserved for that body of still more extreme and abominable misbelievers, to whom I have adverted; and I trust you will unite with us in inflicting on them those penalties when the necessary occasion arises."

Mr. Ward follows this up with another illustration of the same principle, which in some sense goes farther, as supposing a case where views characterised not by laxity, but by high though misguided morality, must be forcibly repressed if the national life would suffer from their prevalence:—

We suppose, then, that England is engaged in an anxious and critical war, on whose event her whole future is thought to depend. The coalition of nations against her is truly formidable, and Englishmen of all classes make surprising sacrifices for that idol of their heart and imagination—national independence and pre-eminence. At this very juncture a sect arises, holding the same principles with some obscure fanatics of the sixteenth century, but developing them with much greater power and success. That principle is the intrinsic and absolute unlawfulness of war, and, by consequence, of the military profession. Their arguments are far from contemptible, and we will give a brief specimen of their character: "It is to the military spirit among us," they say, "that we mainly owe that anti-scriptural standard of morality which

disgraces our nation. The Scripture lays its whole stress on meekness, unresistingness, and humility; it exhorts us to seek not man's approbation, but God's; and when smitten on one cheek, to turn the other. The code of military morality, from first to last, is violently opposed to all this; it lays its whole stress, not on 'poorness of spirit,' but on high spirit; not on a readiness to forgive, but on a readiness to resent insult. It avows that the soldier's chief consolation is his countrymen's applause, and his chief excellence to aim at no other end than his country's greatness."

The sect grows and the danger becomes serious:—

We may, easily indeed, proceed to suppose that a very powerful effect is actually produced; and that at this most critical period the sect is advancing with rapid and bewildering strides among the very class from whom soldiers are principally derived. Enlistment, in fact, has become so difficult, that the Government is obliged to resort to conscription; and even then the sectarians refuse to serve when impressed, enduring by preference the law's utmost severity. Desertions from the army are more and more frequent, and there is reason to believe that secret preparations have been made for a joint and corporate desertion on a vast scale. Still the great mass of the people (as before in our "monogamy" illustration) remain faithful to the Englishman's gospel, that national greatness is the nation's true end, and that nothing necessary for that greatness can be really immoral. They know not how widely this sect may spread, and feel that England is menaced with a most imminent danger, to which no parallel has occurred in history. They clamour for severer measures. "All milder punishments," they say, "have been tried in vain. Are our ministers and legislators themselves members of this new sect; have they also turned fanatics and traitors, that they shrink from exercising at once the only available remedy?" The leading journal embodies and expresses the popular sentiment: "We solemnly warn our rulers against that pedantic adhesion to old-fashioned and effete formulæ which we fear is standing between them and the country's preservation. We are sick of the cuckoo cry that these traitors are sincere. So were the Jacobites, no doubt, sincere; but their sincerity did not save them from the axe and the gallows. The simple question is, Shall England be for ever erased from the map of independent nations, and be condemned to base and inglorious subjection; or shall she at once assert her sovereign power in hanging the ringleaders at least of these fanatical traitors, who seek to plunge her into the abyss of ruin? The remedy will be sharp, but most certain. A few months will elapse and England will be herself again."

So much for the principle of self-protective intolerance in

itself, and as applied to ideally conceivable contingencies in modern Europe. But its full and perfect exhibition is, as I have said, only possible under the union of Church and State in a Catholic country. The ideal state of things is, in Mr. Ward's own words, "that the pure and high Catholic temper may pervade the whole atmosphere, influencing for good each individual citizen." And this has been shadowed forth, though not realised, in the Christendom which was built up from the ruins of the Roman Empire.

"This civilisation," he writes, "differs unspeakably from every other (putting aside the ancient Jewish) which the world has seen, in this one critical circumstance—that it proceeded, in all its earlier stages at least, on a moral basis, which was not only wide but infallibly true. The Roman Empire had been built on principles so entirely contrary, that the attempt to Christianise it, even under the most pious emperors, was but adding new cloth to an old garment. These emperors, no doubt, performed most important incidental services to God's cause; but, looking politically at the result, such efforts were unavailing to retard the Empire's rapid decline. It tottered and fell, and a new social order had to be raised on its ruins. It happened, through an inestimable benefit from Almighty God, that those various elements of a future world, which were then just emerging from chaos, amidst all their differences, possessed in common one great and most precious quality of union and assimilation; they were mostly united by a simple and undoubting faith in the new religion. The Church, therefore, which was the divinely appointed guardian of this religion, assumed spontaneously the office of guide and foster-mother to the new civilisation."

And speaking of that lofty morality of Christian public opinion, which was embodied in the code of chivalry, and in the intense faith and devotion which were the recognised ideal in spite of practical corruptions he says:—

She breathed into the mass an elevation of thought and sentiment, to which in earlier times there had never been the most distant parallel, and which in later times has never been approached. We are speaking, be it observed, not of individual but of national and corporate elevation of character. Those violent and brutal usages and habits which so grievously abounded in the mediæval period are not accounted by any candid thinker, Catholic or non-Catholic, as any kind of argument against the Church's civilising tendency; but, on the contrary, as memorials and measures to subsequent generations of the tremendous obstacles which crossed her

path. Both classes of phenomena coexisted: the barbarian violence and the Christian elevation of thought which was in process of subduing that violence.

Further, he regards the co-operation of the Christian Ruler with the Church, realised most fully in the Holy Roman Empire, as an essential condition to preserving and spreading this Christian public opinion.

Now it is not too much to say that the one key of this normal state was civil intolerance of heresy. It was the civil ruler's highest function to co-operate with the Church in preserving unshaken the firm conviction of Catholic truth, and in preserving unsullied the purity and unearthliness of Catholic sentiment.

This state of things, never adequately realised, but effectively approached in the Middle Ages, has gone. The result is, not that the Catholic spirit is gone, but that it becomes the property of individual persons and small communities. It returns to the catacombs. It ceases to have the force of an elevating and sustaining public opinion. Faith becomes again, in a sense, more personal and less corporate. The surrounding atmosphere is unhealthy. The bracing oxygen of the mediæval Church is supplanted by a climate not even neutral but poisonous. And this change is, he explains, the destruction of that state of things which Catholics recognise as "normal."

The Church in later ages has done marvels, by her seminaries and other similar institutions, in fostering the ecclesiastical spirit, and preserving union of practical aim and practical principle among her ministers; but precisely through the great change of relations between her and the civil power, she has been obliged to loose her hold on the convictions, imagination, and affections of society at large. True, there are laymen living in the world who have reached the height of sanctity, and there are multitudes of such men who have a firm, prevalent resolve against the commission of mortal sin. But there can be no doubt that the whole of this latter class, as distinct from the former, suffer grievous spiritual detriment from the unchristian tone of thought and sentiment, the miserably false standard of human action and morality, which prevails around them. They give far more of their obedience to the Church than of their loyalty and affection; they give to her, and to God whose representative she is, but a divided allegiance. The spiritual blessings, then, of mediæval organisation were not less signal in degree, and, of course, immeasurably more valuable in kind than the social. And this is what Catholic thinkers mean

when they characterise this organisation as "normal." The Church professes to be infallible in her teaching of morals no less than of faith. If, then, Catholicism be true, and if Catholics have fullest ground for knowing it to be true, the one healthy, desirable, and legitimate state of civil society is, that the Church's doctrines, principles, and laws should be recognised without question as its one basis of legislation and administration; and that the civil ruler, in all his highest and most admirable functions should be profoundly submissive to the Church's authority. This was far enough, no doubt, from being practically the case, even in mediæval times; for human self-will, pride, and frailty were far from being extinguished, whether in laymen or in ecclesiastics; nay (as we have already observed), sins of brutality and violence were abnormally prevalent. But what existed then, and has ceased to exist since, is that such as we have described was the ideal recognised by the public mind, and in public institutions. We really find it difficult to imagine how any "*cordatus Catholicus*" who will honestly give his mind to the question, can doubt that such are the normal relations between Church and State; and that (in this respect, though by no means in others) the days of Innocent III. are a kind of golden age, on which our eyes may reasonably look back with admiration and deep regret.

One last consideration Mr. Ward urges, which, however little it will commend itself to the acceptance of general readers, certainly offers food for reflection. The cruelty of the Inquisition has been a byword. In barbarous times persecution was in fact synonymous with, not mere repression, but bloodshed and torture. And yet—always with the assumption that the preservation of Catholic belief for a nation is knowably a priceless boon—what is to be said of the horrors of war, incurred for objects which are often a boon of very moderate value? We have not civilised up beyond war. We have got beyond the barbarous application of the principle of repression. Consequently we judge one lightly, the other severely. But may not a time come at which the following passage would be read by many with relative agreement—agreement, that is, in its estimate of the disproportion between the horrors and the benefits incidental to many a war, if not in its implied approbation of the principle of intolerance?—

It is objected, indeed, that our doctrine (on persecution) has fearfully added to the amount of human suffering. God forbid we should speak lightly of human suffering! It is one of the most

awful thoughts in the whole world, to consider the amount of suffering which God has made indispensable for the attainment of every highest end. He might, *Salvis Attributis Suis*, have pardoned us without any Atonement being made; but He chose in preference that this great end should be obtained through Christ's bitter cross. And in all human affairs suffering is the one road to really great results. We may reason, indeed, on this very ground, according to the well-known principle of Butler's *Analogy*, against any *a priori* objection to the tremendous doctrine of eternal punishment as revealed in the Gospel. But as regards the case before us, we really think no other instance can be cited in which so inestimable an end has been purchased at so small a price. Consider the sufferings of war: numbers of men lying untended for hours, perhaps days, on the battlefield, till in helpless and sharpest agony they expire from the very excess of pain; others receiving wounds which make their whole future existence a prolonged misery; relatives and friends kept for months and years in the most exquisite torments of suspense; the horrors of a besieged and of a captured town; the miseries inflicted at the seat of war. It may safely be said that the sufferings caused by all the executions for heresy which ever took place, do not, taken together, approach to those caused by one single bloody war. And for what end is a war undertaken? To preserve the balance of power, or to resent some public insult; nay, some thinkers hail it for its own sake with lively satisfaction, because of a certain elevation which, in their judgment, it imparts to the national character.

From the outlines of Mr. Ward's refutation of modern Liberalism few Catholics materially dissented, when the heat of incidental controversy had passed, and temporary misunderstanding had been dispelled. Cardinal Newman, whose attitude was, as we shall presently see, strongly opposed to Ward's in matters of ecclesiastical expediency, said in letter after letter, "the differences between us are unimportant," "I always agree with you in principle." It was otherwise, however, as to the opportuneness of the line Mr. Ward adopted at this time, in his Essays in the *Dublin Review* and other writings. It was otherwise in many cases as to their tone, their form, and as to his practical application of principles. Mr. Ward, writing afterwards of the earlier days of his editorship, frankly faced the fact that opposition on one ground or another had been common. He had, indeed, the support of the two great Cardinals who presided over the Church in England. "My labours," he wrote, "as a whole were cordially approved by my two

ecclesiastical superiors, Cardinal Wiseman and his successor"; and undoubtedly a considerable number, probably the majority of English Catholics, from the first considered that the *Dublin Review* took the most consistently orthodox line. Still, even among sympathisers, there was irritation at the tone of the articles. Cardinal Manning, in recalling those days, quoted to me a saying of an influential English layman: "I am dreadfully afraid Ward is right." And still more opposition was aroused among those who considered that the details of his exposition were exaggerated and ill-timed, and that his practical application of theory was inexact. Cardinal Newman once referred to the *Dublin Review* as "stretching principles till they were close upon snapping," and as "stating truths in the most paradoxical form"; and in saying so he was expressing the feeling of a considerable number.[1]

The exact nature of Ward's influence—both his success and his non-success—can only be understood by considering in some detail the source and nature of the opposition he aroused.

One source of opposition was no doubt the startling *form* in which conclusions were expressed, even when his general principle was most irresistibly given. Take, for example, his treatment, already referred to, of Intellectual Power in its relation to human perfection. The general principle is stated with such clearness that it seems a truism once it is read. On the other hand, the final deductions, the comparison of the intellectual faculty which is so intimately connected with man's distinctive greatness as a rational being, which is at all events the condition of moral judgment and therefore of moral action, to proficiency in skating and making clocks, even if explanatory definitions could logically justify it, had all the effect of a paradox on the imagination.

The following passage, for example, even to those who agreed with it, seemed to require that the points of contrast between intellectual speculation and clock-making should be noted as well as their points of agreement:—

(1) Just as various men are called to other modes of life, to be poets, or lawyers, or merchants, or clockmakers, or professional

[1] These phrases in the letter to the Duke of Norfolk applied to certain unnamed persons partly referred, as the Cardinal admitted in a private letter to Ward, to the line taken by him on several occasions in the *Dublin Review*.

singers, so some of us are called to the occupation of intellectual activity in one or other branch of knowledge: in theology, or philosophy, or history, or physical and mathematical science, as the case may be. (2) Just as all other men act more perfectly and become more perfect in proportion as they make their external work an instrument of interior perfection, so those of us who have *this* vocation act more perfectly and become more perfect in proportion as we make our *intellectual* exercises an instrument of interior perfection. (3) One man is more perfect than another, in precise proportion as he is more spiritually perfect. No one ever thought of saying that A tends to be more perfect than B, because he sings better, or makes better clocks, nor yet because he has more muscular power, or has worked more assiduously at its development; so neither does A tend to be more perfect than B because he has greater *intellectual* power, or because he has worked more assiduously at its development. True, indeed, A may sing, or make clocks, or practise gymnastics, from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, in which case these exercises do so far increase his real perfection; and in like manner (neither more nor less) *intellectual* exercises, if practised from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, increase his true perfection. But this is not because he possesses musical, or clock-making, or muscular, or intellectual power, nor yet precisely because he exercises that power, but, exclusively, because he makes such exercise his instrument for advance in piety.

A somewhat similar result ensued when he advocated in his treatise *De obduratorum peccatis mortalibus* that habitual vice could not cease to be a vice just at the moment when you had become so vicious that you no longer asked the question, "Is it right or wrong?" His Thesis was in itself at least a persuasive one—that an action of which the latent spring was a love of pleasure so inordinate, that the question, "Is it lawful or vicious," has simply no weight, was all the worse for such indifference. But when a friend said, "Suppose Lord Palmerston had such a love of pleasure, and suppose he took his cup of coffee in such a spirit, would it be a mortal sin?" and Ward with prompt logic answered, *ex hypothesi* "yes"; the report went about that Ward had said Lord Palmerston committed a mortal sin after dinner every evening in drinking his coffee. And this was not calculated to recommend his theory. In a like spirit, when insisting on the dangers of intellectualism, he chose for his address the startling title, "On the Mortal Sins of Men of Genius."

Somewhat similarly, when inveighing against what has since been called "Jingoism" as no true patriotism, he proceeded to expound the unwelcome theory, that a man who was a real patriot and really loved his country, would often desire her humiliation as a salutary medicine. Such language was the more provoking because while it failed entirely to convince, the underlying fallacy was hard to detect. A man who loves his mother knows that in fact his love would not make him desire that she should be publicly humiliated in punishment for her faults. In point of fact human nature does not act in this way; and the logical hypothesis that it would be entirely for the good of mother or country is not sufficiently verifiable to make logic triumph over the strong instincts of mankind. Consequently the following passage tended to make readers revolt against even the amount of true criticism it contained of that kind of patriotism which tends to undisciplined love of boasting:—

Some Englishman so dearly loves his country that he feels most keenly her national sins. He well knows indeed the national sins of France, of Germany, of Italy. Still they do not grieve him as do English sins, though he may think them equally heinous, because he does not love France, Germany, or Italy as he loves England. He fancies that he sees one special root of these sins in England's *temporal greatness*. We are not endorsing such an opinion, any more than we are assailing it; but it is a very intelligible one. The Englishman then, whom we are supposing, is led by his keen love of his country to desire her temporal humiliation. He expresses accordingly his wish that she may be unsuccessful in some war which she is waging; that she may descend to a secondary place among nations. All this, we say, arises from his love of his country; for if he loved her not, it would be a matter of comparative indifference to him, how much she multiplied her sins. Yet the very charge brought against him would be that he is "unpatriotic." By "patriotism" then, in the world's parlance, is not meant "love of our country's highest interest," but "love of her temporal greatness." Nay, it precisely means a *preference* for her temporal greatness over her spiritual good. For our Englishman will be dubbed "unpatriotic" on no other ground than that conversely he prefers her spiritual good to her temporal greatness.

So much for considerations which weighed even with those who agreed with Mr. Ward in the main. But there were

others which affected the school commonly designated Liberal Catholics.

Mr. Ward himself in his interesting retrospect gives probably the key to the situation so far as they were concerned. "On reflection," he writes, "I quite admit that I ought sometimes to have explained more clearly *who* those were against whom I intended to speak." His argument was directed against the Liberal Ideal. It was often expressed as against "Liberal Catholics" in the mass. In point of fact in England, France, and Germany, the term Liberal Catholic has been applied to groups of men differing vitally from each other. "The name was, in my belief, very badly chosen," writes the Comte de Richemont in a letter from which he kindly allows me to quote, "and must be made responsible for the manner in which they were often so much abused and mistaken. So many groups, absolutely different from each other, were known under the name of Liberal, that errors were very easy to commit." Mr. Ward indeed fully recognised this later on; but in the heat of the struggle it was often forgotten. The epithets, "unsound Catholics," "disloyal Catholics," "enemies of the Church," were freely used in describing a large number of men. In Ward's mind, indeed, they applied to ideal embodiments of abstract principles. But they were printed in real and concrete pages. And they were read by living individuals. "It was, I fear," he wrote shortly before his death, "by no means unnatural that the reader should sometimes think I was directing my invectives against persons who were in fact most loyal of intention towards the Church. There were various persons against whom I had really nothing to say except that I did not think them sufficiently clear-sighted in discovering the disastrous tendency of certain tenets. I greatly regret that I occasionally used language which might naturally be thought . . . to comment on such persons with harshness or severity." And again he wrote with express reference to Montalembert, "It was said of me that I was wanting in due respect for that excellent man and his friends, but I consider this a severe imputation and deny the fact entirely."

Had the danger of such misunderstanding been more constantly before his eyes, no doubt much painful feeling would have been avoided. As it was, men whose devotion to Rome

was the ruling passion of their lives, or was at least deep and sincere, appeared to be bracketed with Froschammer and Döllinger, and the extremest writers in the *Home and Foreign*.

But, even apart from such misunderstandings, Mr. Ward did at times offend by his expositions of the papal teaching in avowed reference even to Montalembert and Lacordaire, and their friends. Instances of his strictures will appear in the sequel. While respecting the men themselves, he characterised some of their utterances as acts of rebellion against Rome, though he admitted it to be "unintentional"; and it was an accusation they could not brook. When the idea of uniting Catholicism with modern Liberalism was first broached, and the conductors of the *Avenir* went to Rome, their language breathed passionate devotion and loyalty. "O Father," they addressed the Pope, "vouchsafe to cast your eye on some of the lowest of your children who are accused of being rebellious against your infallible and mild authority. Behold them before you; read in their soul; there is nothing there they wish to hide. If one of their thoughts, only one, differs from yours, they disown, they abjure it. You are the rule of their doctrines. Never, no, never, have they known others. O Father, pronounce over them that word which gives life because it gives light."

Such were the professions, and such proved to be the dispositions of Lacordaire and eventually of Montalembert. The papal Encyclical condemned them and they submitted. They made no merely external submission, but they owned their doctrines to be wrong. But it was a very different question to accept Ward's interpretation of the force of the Encyclical, and of the doctrines it called on them to accept. There was a medium between accepting its general drift as the Pontiff's teaching from the Chair of Peter, and regarding as binding a strong interpretation of what was obviously rhetorical and not reduced to the shape of defined propositions. It is quite true that Mr. Ward, if carefully read, allowed incidentally the force of this objection in general terms; but as a representative critic expressed it, "having relieved his conscience by an aside, he was able to fling himself without further scruple into the current of his choice." If his logic was more moderate than his rhetoric, it was his rhetoric which gave the tone to his works and decided their effect. He urged with emphasis his own

exposition of what an encyclical did infallibly teach; and the general challenge to accept this under pain of disloyalty irritated men of a different cast of mind extremely.[1] Lacordaire himself had seen in the Encyclical of 1832 a warning not to convert enthusiasm for liberty into a fanatical creed. He spoke *ex animo* on this subject:—

"Es-tu bien persuadé," he wrote to Montalembert in December 1833, "que la liberté de la presse n'est pas l'oppression des intelligences faibles par les intelligences fortes, et que Dieu en courbant les esprits sous l'autorité de l'Église, n'a plus fait pour la liberté réelle de l'humanité que les écrits de Luther, de Calvin, de Hobbes, de Voltaire, que le *Constitutionnel* ou la *Tribune de Mouvement*? Ne vois-tu pas le peu de libéralisme vrai qu'il y a dans notre pays après quarante ans de révolutions? . . . sais-tu si de ce libéralisme, qui te plaît tant, il ne doit pas sortir le plus épouvantable esclavage qui ait jamais pesé sur la race humaine? Sais-tu si la servitude antique ne sera pas rétabli par lui, si tes fils ne gémiront pas sous le fouet impie du républicain victorieux?"

But it was one thing for these Liberal Catholics to accept the papal condemnations of unrestricted Liberalism, and another, they considered, to have to cast themselves in the mould of a subtle mind, with marked peculiarities which others did not share. The challenge was too abrupt and too precise. Mr. Ward disclaimed enforcing his own interpretation, but it was thought by others that his statements of papal teaching were in reality statements of his own explanations of it; and his language, which shall be quoted in the sequel, explains this impression. Men who believed themselves to be second to none in loyalty of intention were angry at what seemed to them unwarrantable dogmatism, and an attempt to expel views which they believed to be true (though their exaggerations had been condemned) by a sort of theological *argumentum baculi*.[2]

[1] Mr. Ward's article in 1864 on the "Mirari Vos" is one instance of this. Another is his constant statement that the Church has infallibly condemned the principles of '89, a statement in which, as we have seen, Manning himself did not concur. It may also be noted that Manning appears (in the letter cited at the end of this chapter) to have been alive to the danger of pressing on others any special *interpretation* of the Pontifical documents.

[2] It must be noted in fairness (*Dublin Review*, vol. x. p. 98) that Mr. Ward allows in the abstract that there may be "very wide divergence" as to the true interpretation of doctrinal determinations, among perfectly loyal theologians.

On the other hand the men whom Ward really felt to be most dangerous, and whose influence he was endeavouring to destroy, had no such explanations to give as those by which Lacordaire or Dupanloup or Foisset could and did defend their thorough orthodoxy. Many of the *Home and Foreign* School looked on the whole action of Rome as obstructive, and treated the *Syllabus* and Encyclical of 1864, as they had treated the Munich Brief, as having no claim on their allegiance. If there was a danger in the confusion of thought on these problems, lest all those called Liberals should drift towards this extreme, there can be little doubt that the *Dublin Review* by its definite account of the dogmatic force of the Encyclical helped to check it. It brought home to those whose loyalty was real that there *was* a danger in Liberalism; and while they were angered at their orthodoxy being suspected, the clear exposition of the matter at issue helped to separate them from those whose want of thorough loyalty to the Holy See was not only admitted but emphasised. The final judgment of Mr. Ward's Catholic critics as to the work done by him at this time will probably depend on the estimate formed of the dangers of the situation. If the danger was great that the "extreme left" of theology would ultimately obtain the lead among all Catholics whose sympathies were in any degree Liberal, undoubtedly a calamity was averted out of all proportion more serious than any incidental drawback from the faults of detail of which Mr. Ward later on accused himself. And it was by this test that he himself claimed in later years to have his labours judged.

Neither Mr. Ward himself nor Provost Manning, who worked with him constantly at that time, had any doubt as to the danger. It seemed to them that the extreme left were gradually, from their ability and energy, influencing more and more the heterogeneous party roughly classed together as "Liberal," to distinguish them from the party popularly known as "Ultramontane." In England especially the spirit of Froschammer seemed more likely to prevail among them than the spirit of Lacordaire. Illness is catching, but health is not. Later on, indeed, representative leaders energetically repudiated the position of the extreme section, but this was not so at first. Mr. Monsell, one of the most devotedly loyal of those who were

called Liberals, made a speech in the House of Commons on the subject of intolerance in Spain,[1] which seemed to Mr. Ward entirely to tally with the Malines programme. Another member of the party—again not one of the most extreme section—delivered a public address on the Roman question which Ward considered in the last degree disloyal. The protest against being more Roman than the Pope, which professed to be only a protest against the exaggerations of the Veuillot school, appeared to Mr. Ward to take, in many even of the more moderate Liberals, a colour of disaffection at variance with the habit of loyal and prompt obedience which was essential to the discipline of the Catholic body. And all this went to show that the party was drifting, not in the direction in which most of them ultimately turned, but in the direction of the extreme Liberalism of which the *Home and Foreign* had been the English embodiment. And with regard to the ringleaders who were responsible for this tendency, Mr. Ward had in later life no regret to express—as he had with regard to Montalembert and Lacordaire. "They were traitors in the camp," he wrote, "I cannot feel any kind of regret, on the contrary I feel great gratitude to Almighty God when I remember the fact that I never uttered one word concerning them which would suffer the reader to forget how vehement was my aversion to their writings." [2]

The exposition, then, in the *Dublin* of the Church's opposition to Liberalism took the form, as Ultramontanism had already done on the Continent, of a movement. By its promoters it was considered a painful necessity and a defensive campaign. The opponents of the action of the *Dublin Review* stigmatised it as wanton and aggressive: and it is obvious that it was defensive or aggressive according to the view we take of the dangers of the situation. That it had a defensive side cannot be doubted by those who bear in mind the attitude of some of the men whom Mr. Ward continually named as his chief objects of animadversion, when the events of 1870 directly challenged them to submit to the Church's definition. That it had

[1] We shall see later on that Mr. Ward ascribed to Mr. Monsell a principle which he did not in point of fact maintain, although Mr. Ward argued that it followed logically from the words he used.

[2] See *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, p. 17.

an aggressive aspect to some even of those who sympathised with its general current, we have already seen.

Direct intercourse was begun with leaders of continental Ultramontanism. Ward corresponded with the conductors of the *Civilta Cattolica*, and with such representative writers as Père Ramière of Lyons and Father Perrone. Some of his own essays were translated into French and Italian, and the *Dublin Review* reproduced articles by Ramière and the Italian Ultramontanes. Archbishop Manning, from the first, took almost as active a part in the movement as Mr. Ward. After the article on the "Mirari Vos," the first of the series on papal decisions, Manning, not yet Archbishop—then on his way to Rome—wrote a letter which gives some picture of the situation :—

DOVER, 12*th January* 1865.

MY DEAR WARD — Here I am weather-bound by a furious gale, but enjoying a day of perfect rest. I have just read your article on the "Mirari Vos." It is one of the best you have done, and I hope you will follow up the subjects dropped at the end of it.

I have not studied the text as you have, but my belief is that your interpretation is right. And your statement of what Catholics would do, if they had power, is very well done. I will take care to have this well examined in Rome, for it is one of the points on which sectarians, both Protestant and Catholic, think they have an advantage against us.

Now I have been thinking over our position; it seems to me that we ought at once to communicate with as many *lay* Catholics as we can, with converts to keep them from the mischief which is spreading, and with old Catholics because they do not know us, and therefore only half trust us.

I think you ought to do this personally and through A. and B. . . . If you have not seen the letters of an "English Catholic," in the *Standard*, get them without fail. If we are silent, these men will mislead public opinion. The mischief already done by the Catholics and Unionists is very great. Poor Mr. X. is a simple scandal.

Now there is no course for us but equal explicitness, and the enunciation of the highest truths. I am convinced that boldness is prudence, and that half truth is our danger.

It seems to me that we can do nothing surer nor more practical than to pursue the line you have begun and to keep to it almost exclusively; I mean the exposition of the Pontifical Acts.

But to do this we must disclaim to be their interpreters and

derive our interpretation, as far as we can, from Rome, or interpret them avowedly as private writers, and with submission.

I have with me your paper, which F. Dalgairns sent me, and I will get it examined in Rome.

I heartily agree in it.

The more I look at our position *ab extra*, as I now do sitting by the sea, the more I seem to see that nine men in ten are going wrong from some of these causes :

1. Half-conversion to the Church.
2. Half-instruction in the Catechism.
3. Want of all Philosophy.
4. Anti-Catholic Philosophy of Germany and Scotland.
5. The *reliquiæ* of Anglicanism, religious, ethical, and social.
6. Mistrust of high truths and of those who teach them, because of the cry of bigotry, etc.
7. Disloyalty, *pericula ex falsis fratribus.*
8. Fear, shame, and shrinking from the truth and the Cross in the face of the English world.

Now I feel sure that unless some few men are willing to suffer for truth, it will be corrupted and trampled upon. And to do this we have only to speak out. But it must be so clearly and precisely that men must hear whether they will or no.

In that you have not failed. Nor I hope, I, ever since I knew what to believe and what to say. Now do try and get as many laymen as you can about you, and get others to do the same.

With very kind regards to Mrs. Ward,
Believe me,
Always affectionately yours,
H. E. MANNING.

A letter will find me in Paris till Monday morning :
Hotel Windsor,
Rue de Rivoli.

Let me have a line at Hotel Windsor, and tell me the writers of the articles. "The Belgian Constitution" is very good.

CHAPTER VIII

WARD, NEWMAN, AND LIBERAL CATHOLICISM

1862–1865

THE plot thickened. The school of thought represented by the *Home and Foreign Review* were active advocates of the education of Catholics at the national Universities. Newman, without entirely sharing such views, felt strongly the need of religious influences in the Oxford of that time. In 1864 had come the proposal that he should found an Oratory at Oxford, and Ward believed that this would largely increase the number of Catholic undergraduates. The plan came to naught; but the agitation in favour of sending Catholics to Oxford continued and increased. Oxford in the sixties was, in Mr. Ward's opinion, penetrated by the spirit of indifferentism. The indifferentist temper acquired in youth would never be shaken off. Here, then, was a prospect worse than the influence of the *Home and Foreign* on contemporary thought —the inauguration from youth upwards of a temper which was, in its fullest exhibition, inconsistent with any definite faith. "The thoughts of youth are long thoughts," and it would be hard indeed to engraft the dogmatic character on an indifferentist training.

Mr. Ward used his best endeavours to thwart the Oxford scheme under its various forms, and dealt in his writings at this period with the whole question of the importance of forming the mental character in early years by exclusively Catholic influences. The infallibility of definite decrees was important; but still more vital was the question which he expressed thus: "How far are Catholics to live, as it were, in the atmosphere of Infallibility?" The tone of thought and the bent of character among the rising

generation must depend, he considered, on their regarding this atmosphere as a matter of supreme moment. "A great intellectual movement is beginning," he wrote, "among English Catholics, of which, indeed, the excitement about University education is one characteristic sign. This intellectual movement will take a totally divergent direction at its very outset, according as the body of leisured Catholics are animated by the orthodox or the minimising spirit."

Regarding the Church as a vast instrument for fashioning and forming the whole character, intellectual and moral, he vindicated, in his Essays in the *Dublin Review*, the necessity of complete surrender to her guidance as well as to her doctrine. The acquisition of the Catholic ethical standard, of which his earlier writings had treated, was part of this; but that indefinable though so real and recognisable ethos called the *Catholic Spirit* went further. There was a temper of mind which made a Catholic utterly unlike a Calvinist or a Lutheran on the one hand, or an indifferentist on the other. It was gained by a surrender to the influences of the living Church, and these influences were infallibly salutary. All that mass of ideas and practices ascetical, liturgical, devotional, mystical, which find their highest development in a St. Theresa rather than a John Bunyan, were an essential part of Catholic training. "Catholics throughout the world," he wrote, "are instructed in certain *doctrines*, are exhorted to certain *practices*, are encouraged and trained in certain *tempers and dispositions*. The Church's office in providing for this is no other than her 'Magisterium,' whereby, as Father Perrone expresses it, 'she leads them by the hand, as it were, along the path of eternal salvation.'"

It is by following this lead that the Catholic *spirit* is gained —that those elements in the Catholic ideal are assimilated which are too subtle for intellectual analysis. The individual becomes gradually a part of the organism of the Church: his life is part of its life; his temper of its temper. "We all know," he writes, "the subtle but most efficacious influences communicated through the various waves (as it were) of some organised society. We know in how inexplicable and yet intense a degree feelings and prepossessions, which are acted on as first principles, and which are ordinarily unassailable by argument,

are implanted by the various associations, habits, usages, in one word by the general *tone* of such a body. We know what a mysterious sympathy spreads through the mass, and conveys into the very heart of each individual a share in the characteristic life and character of the whole." Such a process was the communication of the life of the Christian Church to each of its various members.

That this process should be efficiently performed, it was necessary that a man should be surrounded in youth by living Catholic influences; and this at Oxford was practically impossible. Ward advocated the influencing of contemporary thought by Catholic thinkers. Unlike M. Gaume he preached no doctrine of aloofness from controversy or from the world. He himself read freely the works of Mill, Bain, Spencer. He associated with Huxley and Tyndall at the Metaphysical Society. But the necessary preliminary to all this was a thorough mastery of Catholic principles uninfected by modern Liberalism. There was a kind of inoculation which, when it was successfully administered, would preserve from infection. Go heedlessly into the modern world of thought, and you unconsciously assimilate its principles. Fortify yourself beforehand with an antidote to each false principle and you are safe. The mediæval Catholic was surrounded with the Catholic ethos and beliefs. They were the oxygen he breathed. They kept his apprehension of the supernatural order vigorous and healthy. In a diseased age this oxygen had to be artificially supplied. In the normal state of things, de Maistre says, a Christian does not argue and analyse; he believes. But in time of controversy he has to work out argumentatively the principles which in better days supported him naturally. Ward applied this statement to the position of English Catholics who came in contact with modern thought. That set of first principles which made up the Christian Ideal of the Middle Ages had to be fully worked out and guarded by each one for himself. Point for point they were the true antidote to the principles of modern indifferentism. Men who were armed with this antidote, and fortified by the ethical and religious spirit which were its correlatives, could and should—each according to his capacity—deal with the world at large. Thus the fundamental principle of the Catholic intellectual

movement must be to analyse intellectually this Catholic Ideal, and to form such a system of education as would ensure its influence on the rising generation.

The following passage, from an Essay written in 1865, will illustrate Mr. Ward's application of these principles to the question of the education of Catholics at Oxford:—

By unreservedly surrendering themselves to the Church's influence . . . all may imbibe the true Catholic spirit. All may imbibe that spirit which places them in real sympathy with the Church's mind, gives them the instinctive habit of obedience to ecclesiastical authority, and constitutes them the Church's trustworthy defenders.

Since the season of childhood and youth is immeasurably the most impressible of all, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of preserving the purity of a Catholic atmosphere throughout the whole of Catholic education. . . . Even intellectually speaking, no result can well be more deplorable than that which tends to ensue from mixed education. There is no surer mark of an uncultivated mind, than that a man's practical judgment on facts as they occur, shall be at variance with the theoretical principles which he speculatively accepts. Suppose, *e.g.*, a politician who is busy in forwarding measures condemned by that theory in political economy which he professes to accept. What would happen? We should all cry out against his shallowness, and lament that he had received no better intellectual training. Now this is the natural result of mixed education. The unhappy Catholic who is so disadvantageously circumstanced tends to become the very embodiment of inconsistency. Catholic in his speculative convictions, non-Catholic in his practical judgments; holding one doctrine as a universal truth, and a doctrine precisely contradictory in almost every particular which that universal truth embraces.

Further, we can thus discern (see prop. lxxix. of the *Syllabus*) the deplorable nature of that calamity which overspread Europe when unhappy circumstances necessitated in so many countries the civil toleration of religious error. The Catholic atmosphere, instead of pervading the nation, is withdrawn as it were within the more purely ecclesiastical sphere. A wide and ever-increasing gulf opens between the clergy on the one hand and the great body of the laity on the other. Religious indifferentism eats like a cancer into the very vitals of society; a disease, perhaps by the very reason of its subtlety, more perilous than almost any other by which the body politic can be affected.[1]

Closely connected with the principles maintained by

[1] *Dublin Review*, July 1865.

the chief advocates of mixed education, were the principles of many of those who met sympathetically Dr. Pusey's *Eirenicon*, and indulged in hopes of corporate reunion between England and Rome. In each case there was a desire to make little of the importance of preserving, among Catholics, habits of mind marking them off from non-Catholics, and to "minimise" the distinctive tenets and spirit of Rome. If compromise was conceivable on a basis of the positive definitions of the Church, interpreted in the most liberal sense, such a union, like mixed education, involved the surrender of much of that atmosphere of Catholic life which made up the unwritten law and the informing spirit of the Church. The two questions are treated in great part together by Mr. Ward. In each case to reduce the guidance of Rome, devotional and doctrinal, to a minimum, is to surrender the true principle both of unity and of stability. "Unity can be found only in subjection to Rome," he wrote; "hearty and profound unity only in hearty and profound subjection." The spirit of mutual concession, on the other hand, of the promoters of union involved "minimism" on both sides as a necessary condition; and "minimism" was essentially a dissolvent force.[1]

What, it will be asked, was the attitude of Cardinal Newman in these controversies? Did his advocacy of the Oxford scheme imply substantial agreement with the representatives of the *Home and Foreign Review*? Materials are available for a tolerably accurate answer to this question.

With Liberalism as such he never had any sympathy. He detested the democratic principle[2] in politics: and the principle of Liberalism in religion—of viewing all forms of religious opinion as on an equal footing—was to him, as to Ward, the

[1] The questions of mixed education and of Dr. Pusey's proposals—especially the latter—continued to occupy his attention for some time. They are dealt with in the following articles: "University Education for English Catholics" (October 1864), "The University Question" (January 1865), "Roman Unionism and Indifferentism" (July 1865), "Historical Argument for the Church's Claims" (January 1866), "Projects of Corporate Union" (April 1866), "The Council of Florence" (April 1866), "Historical Argument for Ecclesiastical Unity" (June 1867), "Historical Argument for the Pope's Prerogatives" (July 1867).

[2] See *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 268: "No one can dislike the democratic principle more than I do."

denial of the dogmatic principle.[1] But when it came to the world not of principle but of practice, he parted company in great measure with Ward, both on the question of Catholic education and on the ideal of Catholic thought. While utterly condemning the undisciplined Liberalism of the extreme left, he sympathised warmly with the general policy and sentiments of Lacordaire, and Montalembert, and still more of Dupanloup.[2] He criticised the *Univers* with severity. He refused to write either for the *Dublin* or for the *Home and Foreign*, thereby marking his inability to concur in the line taken by either.

It will be sufficient for the present to remind ourselves of the line taken by him on three questions, (1) The question of University education for Catholics; (2) the relations between scientific inquiry and theological and ecclesiastical authority; (3) the question raised in Döllinger's address as to the true method of theological advance.

On the first two questions he spoke at length in his lectures at the Catholic University of Ireland; on the last in the *Apologia*. In the education question, while concurring with Ward as to the dangers of Liberalism and the necessity for a religious training which should be a safeguard against it, he opposed Ward's proposal that the Classics should be in great measure superseded, and that one chief instrument of a layman's education should be theological and patristic reading. He spoke of the advocates of this opinion as "serious and earnest," but expressed his inability to concur in it.[3] He opposed the study by average secular students of the more full and technical theological works. "I would exclude," he wrote, "the teaching *in extenso* of pure dogma from the secular schools, and content myself with requiring such a broad knowledge of doctrinal subjects as is contained in the Catechisms of the Church or the actual writings of her laity. I would have students apply their minds to such religious topics as laymen actually do treat and are thought praiseworthy in treating." And correlatively, instead of regarding the whole of education as directly and

[1] See *Apologia*, p. 288 *seq.*; also his speech on Liberalism delivered after his elevation to the Cardinalate.

[2] See *Apologia*, p. 285, and *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 288.

[3] *Idea of a University*, p. 372.

logically ministering to the inculcation of Christian principles, he treated intellectual cultivation in his *Idea of a University* as an end in itself, and to be pursued as such in University training.

Similarly, as to the relations between secular science and theology, while preaching submission to the Church's condemnation of theories which might be dangerous to faith, he refused to hold with Mr. Ward that the man of science should constantly test his conclusions by their agreement with prevalent theological opinion. The harmony between secular science and theology is not always at once apparent. Each has its own methods and principles which are reliable in themselves; and to be over ready to condemn a line of opinion in science, because its harmony with theological conclusions is not yet explained, is to destroy the possibility of scientific advance. There may even be incidental and temporary error in scientific opinion at a given stage, but this may be the indispensable road to truth. "In scientific researches," he wrote, "error may be said without a paradox to be in some instances the way to truth and the only way." Let the investigation proceed, and it works its way out of error into truth. Balk it by over-rigid theological censorship, and you may kill the error, but you lose the truth to which the inquiry was leading. At the same time when from circumstances scientific error or even scientific truth may upset the faith of the multitude, the interference of ecclesiastical authority is required for the sake of protecting the weak. Bishop Ullathorne, whose indebtedness to Newman in his views on these matters is well known, has emphasised the fact that while Copernicanism as a scientific hypothesis was approved by ecclesiastical authority in the days of Copernicus himself, Galileo was condemned when he applied it to the interpretation of Scripture, and consequently tended to unsettle the faith of the multitude; and Newman indicates a somewhat similar view in his introduction to the last edition of the *Via Media.*

As to the third and last question—the province of authority in the progress of theology—Newman held with Lacordaire that authority and liberty were equally necessary. While Ward proposed to build theological science mainly on the decisions of authority as a positive foundation, Newman

regarded the action of Rome as primarily negative. With the writers of the *Home and Foreign* he eloquently vindicated the importance of originality and of scientific methods, and with Ward he vindicated the claims of authority; but adhering still to a *via media* he considered that each party had neglected a necessary element. His own words on this subject shall be cited shortly.

The following extracts from contemporary correspondence and incidental writings, in the course of the events dealt with in the last three chapters, will illustrate the relative positions of the persons chiefly concerned.

In February 1861 Ward heard that the whole question of the best method of Catholic education was to be reopened in a letter to the *Rambler*, and that the editor would refuse to publish any rejoinder. Ward appears to have written at length to Newman on the whole matter in a letter, the notes of which I subjoin :—

To J. H. N.

15th February 1861.

(1) If you agree with me on the extreme danger of classics under 3rd head, why speak so little about that danger in your works, and give so little prominence to any plan for remedy?

(2) If I were an infidel I should say that education can't be liberal without a study of Christian thought, and consequently of Christian doctrine. On what principle is Xenophon's *Memorabilia* "liberal" and Suarez not so?

(3) But as we are Christians, Christianity should be the one animating element, everything else subordinate and illustrative.

(4) How is there any other moral safeguard than this? Half an hour's daily meditation would do much, but this is often omitted. Mere general supervision worthless.

In another letter of the 18th of February Mr. Ward described the proposal of the editor of the *Rambler*, giving Mr. Simpson as his authority, and then continued :—

I don't in the least know on what terms you now stand with the *Rambler*. But you may make any use you think desirable of this letter. Cordially disliking and distrusting the *Rambler* as I do, I still fancy it is better for the peace and welfare of the Church that it should go on without a row, and (if possible) gradually adopt (what I should think) better principles. But if Sir John Acton attempts anything like what Simpson suggests, some sort of further *row* is not improbable.

Newman's reply ran as follows :—

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM, 19*th February* 1861.

MY DEAR WARD—By this post I send your letter of this morning to Sir John Acton, scratching out one passage. You say "you may make any use you think desirable of this letter."

As to your former letter, I don't think I said I agreed with you in practice ; for I was pretty sure I did not.

I said that I agreed in opinion, thought, and principle, and I think I do, except that I cannot always follow your *words*, as "immense," etc. etc.

. . . I should say that you most inequitably overlook the great principles in all of which we agree, and dwell upon points of detail (*e.g.*, questions of method, means to an end, etc.) on which we may differ, *e.g.*, whether theological knowledge *in extenso* is the best remedy against the dangers of Liberalism.

I think you forget many things that I have insisted on in my books (though I have cause to be very grateful to you in your formal treatise and elsewhere for the many things which you recollect of mine, and record).

I think you have read with only one eye the two last University Discourses, the first University Sermon and IV. 4 of University Lectures.—However, ever yours affectionately,

JOHN H. NEWMAN
Of the Oratory.

On the question, so closely connected with that of Catholic education, which Ward had raised in his pamphlet on "The relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection," Newman also wrote, and we find in his letter—which has an interest of its own quite apart from contemporary controversy—the same agreement with Ward's principles, and the same sense that in ethos and practice they were divided.

THE ORATORY, 15*th March* 1862.

MY DEAR WARD—Thank you for your two essays and for the continued kindness with which you keep what I have written before the world. I hold to every word of those passages you quote from me, and I always agree with you in principles. I am not certain that I should agree with all your deductions, but it would require more time than I have at command to put my finger on the points at which we diverge from each other, and to defend the direction which I should take myself. This I am sure of that even though some persons should think you had exaggerated what is substantially true, all Catholics must be grateful to you for what

you have written at a time when warnings are so necessary against intellectualism.

I suspect your psychological facts, *e.g.* you speak at p. 26 of the "keen and constant pleasure which intellectual processes afford." I am far from denying that there is a pleasure and one providentially assigned, as pleasant flavour to food; but if you mean that "keen and constant pleasure" ordinarily attends on "intellectual processes," well, let them say so who feel it. My own personal experience is the other way. It is one of my sayings (so continually do I feel it) that the composition of a volume is like gestation or childbirth. I do not think that I ever thought out a question or wrote my thoughts without great pain, pain reaching to the body as well as the mind. It has made me practically feel that labour *in sudore vultus ejus* is the lot of man; and that ignorance is truly one of his four wounds. It has been emphatically a *penance.* And in consequence I have hardly written anything unless I was *called* to do so. I had to furnish a sermon weekly for the pulpit, etc. I recollect a friend asked me soon after writing my volume on Justification, whether it was not interesting to write, and my answer was that it was "the painful relieving of irritation," as a man might go to a dentist, not for "keen and constant pleasure," but with the mingled satisfaction and distress of being rid of pain *by* pain. When I wrote the *Arians* six years earlier I was so exhausted at length that for some days as it approached finishing I could scarcely keep from fainting.

The exercises which most nearly have approached to pleasure have been finding parallel passages to passages in St. Athanasius, or writing verses; processes which have not much of active intellect in them. I might say a great deal more on this subject but I have said enough as giving the testimony of at least one person. What I feel others may feel; others again may feel neither your pleasure *nor* my pain. At all events, I think you must not take for granted what all men do not recognise as true. What has been my own motive cause in writing may be that of others—the sight of a truth and the desire to show it to others. Juvenal says "facit indignatio versus." I do not feel this in the case of verse; I do in the case of prose.

I am far from denying of course that if one thinks one has done a thing well, one may be tempted to be pleased at it. But here it is the work, not the process, that pleases. "When the shore is won at last, who will count the billows past?" Our Lord says, "When she is delivered of the child she remembereth not the anguish *because*" etc. Of course she may idolise her child for the very reason that it has cost her pain, but the pain never can be "keen and constant pleasure"; and she never would bear a child for the sake of the childbirth.

Not at all denying then that there is a class of minds such as your own, Sir W. Hamilton's, Lord Brougham's and the academics,' to whom exercises of intellect are simply keen and constant pleasure, I don't think it is more than one class.

I am not sure that this assumption, that all feel as some feel, has not exerted an influence on your whole view of the subject you discuss, and has coloured it. As to your conclusions I will but add that I am not convinced by what you say that what I call (*University Discourses*, p. 185) Wisdom is not the Donum Sapientiæ.

However, as I began I conclude by thanking you much for your work, and for the "pleasure" as well as instruction which I have gained from its perusal.—Yours affectionately,

JOHN H. NEWMAN.

On the appearance of Bishop Ullathorne's censure of the *Rambler*, already referred to, Newman at once wrote expressing his own acceptance of and concurrence in the condemnation.

"I hope I need not assure your lordship," he wrote to Bishop Ullathorne on 24th October 1862, "that I concur with all my heart in your condemnation of the doctrines you find in these publications and of the articles containing them. It follows that I must consider it as I do the simple duty of the writers of them and of all concerned in them, first to repudiate the doctrines in question, and secondly to withdraw the statements in which they are conveyed."

Newman wrote to Ward also at length, enclosing his letter of concurrence and submission to the Bishop, and apparently expressing in detail his disapproval of certain passages in the censured periodicals. The two following letters which Cardinal Newman sent me, show how, in the matter of the *Rambler* and *Home and Foreign* as in other cases, much of the occasional acuteness of feeling had been due, in part, to misunderstanding. Newman's sanction had been claimed where it had not been given, and it was evidently a surprise as well as an intense relief to Ward to know this. The first letter is dated 28th of October 1862.

I must begin with the latter part of your letter, and say how immensely I was "consoled" by it, as the old Catholics say. I observe, however, that all your instances are taken from Simpson's articles on Faith and Reason. I venture to think that the remarks in the last number about the independence of politics on Theology, on which the Bishop also comments, are almost equally uncatholic, and they are certainly much more characteristic of the *Review's*

general tone. . . . However, your present view on the *Home and Foreign* is to me the happiest tidings I have had for many a long day.[1]

The subject is continued in the next letter, written by Ward in the following month :—

As to your relations with the conductors of the *Home and Foreign*, I am most interested by what you say. I can only add that A. B.'s way of talking had given me a most different impression: and if to me, who see but little of him, probably much more to others who see a great deal of him. It would not surprise me if far the greater part of that floating opinion which mixes you up in one solidarity with the *Rambler* originated with him. Observe I don't speak of *definite statements* made by him; but of implications, probably not intended by himself, but conveyed in his way of speaking. I have mentioned wherever I could and shown bodily also your letter on occasion of your Bishop's censure of the *Rambler*.

The complexity of Newman's many-sided relations continued. He found that his letter of submission to the Bishop had been taken as a more absolute condemnation on his own part of Mr. Simpson's essays than he had intended. He felt strongly for that writer's difficulties, and considered that allowance should be made for his point of view. His full realisation of many of the problems raised by modern thought was an important fact, and the attempt sincerely to grapple with them was a laudable and valuable one. If the tone of the Essays had been unfortunate, and if they had conveyed to the Bishop a meaning that was censurable, he must submit to censure and withdraw his writings. But that did not undo the good elements which Newman recognised in his original design. Sympathy with his intentions, Newman said, had added to regret at his performances. He wrote to Ward, stating this plainly, and enclosing a draft of a proposed supplementary letter to the Bishop, which was designed to set things in their true light.

Ward appreciated as ever Newman's absolute conscientiousness, although he regretted the over-subtlety, as he thought it, of

[1] It is evidently in reference to Newman's letter, to which this was a reply, that Bishop Ullathorne wrote to a friend (*Ullathorne's Letters*, p. 122), "Newman has written to Dr. Ward that unless the conductors of the *Review* repudiate such doctrines, they cannot be considered as good Catholics or deserve that any interest be taken in them."

his view on the whole subject. He desiderated fuller and plainer speaking in the proposed letter. From the following extracts it appears that Newman did change his language in consequence of Ward's suggestions. The play on both sides of feeling and thought is visible in their correspondence. In Ward's view the really important issue was a very broad one, and called for very plain speaking. There was in the *Home and Foreign* a marked disregard of Catholic tradition and teaching, which should not be tolerated in a Catholic Review. He admitted the ability of the writers, but he could not allow that any treatment, however able, of the problems of the day by Catholics who ignored the Church's full teaching was valuable.[1] It neglected the distinctive strength of the Catholic position. He was not indeed disposed to condemn individuals whose education and circumstances accounted in great measure for their views. But a public organ which helped to form Catholic opinion was on a different footing. It was a public duty to oppose its general line. His love for Newman, his appreciation of the ability of the *Home and Foreign* staff, and of the great need in Catholic literature of able and candid writers, his wish if possible to work in harmony with Newman, were influential forces, but they were all subordinate to his sense of this duty. A Catholic writer was not, he said, the physician of individual consciences; he was bound to oppose false principles even if individuals who advocated them were from circumstances inculpable. And in this respect, especially, he was out of sympathy with Newman's line of action. Newman's tenderness for the individual leaders of the extreme liberal school made him, Ward thought, not sensitive enough to the necessity of avowing plainly and unequivocally the principles which they both held in common. The following extracts illustrate this state of mind.

Writing *apropos* of his approaching editorship of the *Dublin*, in November 1862, and of his intention to make the devotional and theological element prominent, Ward speaks as follows:—

[1] "I never thought of doubting," he wrote to Newman, "the great literary merits of the *Home and Foreign*; on the contrary, those merits are my gravamen. A stupid attack on good principles would do no harm."

If I may merely, for explanation, state my own opinion, I think far the most deadly evil perpetrated by the *Rambler* and *Home and Foreign* is the systematic attempt at expelling God from His own creation. And I think, therefore, nothing is so much wanted just now as an exhibition in practice of the connection of all things with theology.

Then surely the Catholics are a most unliterary body; this may be a good, or an evil, but anyhow it is a fact. It is most difficult to interest them in any writings; but I really think they are more likely to be interested in a devotional drift than in a literary. Look at the wonderful sale of Faber's books, which (I believe) mainly represents the interest felt by Catholics in talk about piety as such.

However, I really expect nothing but failure, though I will do my best to avoid it.—Ever affectionately yours,

W. G. WARD.

The next letter (dated 29th of December) was written after Newman had sent the draft of his proposed second letter to Bishop Ullathorne, of which mention has already been made:—

I am struck with your (I may say) heroism in taking the chance of losing so good a friend as your bishop rather than be a party to what you feel as detraction. But in real truth I am more struck than I can express at all times with your wonderful disinterestedness and straightforwardness.

One word for myself. Neither you nor Simpson can possibly go beyond me in recognising the shallowness of the polemic with which we ordinarily meet the infidel difficulties of the day. It was only yesterday I said to a priest that three-fourths of the arguments in ordinary (text) books seem to me fictitious, *i.e.* that the writer never asks himself the question whether they are valid arguments, but merely whether they will pass muster and impose upon ingenuous youth. I used to tell my pupils that A. B.'s reasoning [naming a text-book much in vogue at the time] would disgrace a boy of ten years old.

Pray excuse all my impudence. I have written off *currente calamo* and domestically in a certain state of distraction.—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

We should be all deeply indebted for any prayers or masses you could give in behalf of our baby (Joseph Herbert) whose case is somewhat dangerous.

The next letter, pressing Newman to be more explicit in his explanations to Bishop Ullathorne, is evidently a continuation of remarks in a previous letter which is not

included in the collection which the Cardinal sent to me. The scarlet fever, to which reference was made in the letter just cited, had meantime spread in his household with fatal consequences :—

23 GLOUCESTER SQUARE, W., 31*st Dec.* 1862.

MY DEAR FATHER NEWMAN—Our domestic trouble has grown into such dimensions that I am very unable to collect my thoughts. Our baby has gone to God, and *all our children except one* (*i.e.* seven survivors) are ill of the complaint. It is beginning also to spread among the servants, so that we enjoy emphatically a merry Christmas and a happy New Year. Thank God, however, I believe all the survivors have it in a very mild form; unless indeed there be one other exception, our third son Bernard. . . .

You misunderstand what I say about *hints*. I am not referring to cases where it is even possible that you have not formed your own views. In so many cases you leave people to draw inferences, and take for granted that (if they have proper delicacy of perception, and if in fact they are worth dealing with at all) they will draw them. Rogers [Sir F. Rogers] (who spoke of you with the very warmest affection) said that had always been your practice, under the view that if those whom you address are *real* men they will certainly see what you mean. So in the present case you say you can't "preach" to your bishop; well—I think that unless you do (what you invidiously call) "preach" to him, you will altogether fail of conveying to him your meaning. And I don't think such authorities . . . mind (comparatively) being preached to. What they least of all understand, in my humble opinion, and least of all like, is being dealt with in the way of *hint* and *innuendo*.

It would very greatly interest me if you thought it well to send me your amended draft, but do as you think best.—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

The letter was sent, and the Bishop replied disclaiming any such misunderstanding of Newman's position as had been supposed. He had not, he said, supposed Newman's original letter to imply any "judgment of his own," and had taken him as writing "without examining the articles commented on." "But," he added, "I did take your letter as evidence that you had no solidarity with the *Rambler* or *Review* of recent years. I knew that from other sources, but I was much rejoiced to have that evidence in my hands." Newman forwarded the whole correspondence to Ward, who replied as follows :—

Thank you very much indeed for the enclosures. Thank you also very much for your masses, and please thank Father Bittlestone sincerely for his. We are going on quite smoothly after the storm.

The correspondence must be very agreeable to you. I mean it shows you did not at all mislead the bishop either by your October letter or by your recent conversation. If you will allow me to say so, I much prefer the letter as you sent it to the original draft.

On the 15th of January 1863 Ward writes again, hoping against hope for some better understanding with the *Home and Foreign* party, if he and they could find some "common denominator" in Newman's partial sympathy with each side.

If at any time when Acton is staying with you you think that any kind of better understanding could be come to between the two reviews, I should be most happy to come down for the day and meet him with you and talk the thing over most explicitly. And I must also add in fairness that I think the article on Irish University Education is in an excellent spirit, and that there is little or nothing to complain of in that on . . . St. Francis Xavier. I believe Simpson is far fonder of theologising than of theology. . . . "Do come and have a walk with me," he once wrote to me, "that I may make your hair stand on end," which, to do him justice, he usually contrives to do.—Ever affectionately yours,

W. G. WARD.

In truth Newman's position at this time, as in the old days of Tract 90, was necessarily more complex than Ward's. There was no one over-mastering feeling to absorb smaller ones. His sense of the need of comprehensive discussion was quite as strong as his regret at the tone of the *Home and Foreign* writers. His belief in the necessity of submission to authority had always been strong; but so had his belief in the necessity of a boldness and freedom of thought, which seemed represented nowhere among English Catholics but in that *Review.* His agreement with Ward in principles, which from time to time he emphasised, was matched by his strong dislike of Ward's uncompromising and emphatic assertions of principle at moments which he considered inopportune, and of his relentless application of one set of principles without consideration of another set equally essential to a just conclusion.

His conviction, which was growing, that the *Home and*

Foreign was on the whole censurable, went along with the feeling that he had no authoritative standing, and was not called upon to give a full opinion on a difficult subject. Personal feelings were playing on all sides. "A man who has been mixed up with two such different people as Ward and Simpson, cannot explain himself without writing a volume," he said. Again the *Home and Foreign* writers had looked up to him and had asked his counsel; and his tenderness in such cases was not less than it had been in the days of the "Parting of Friends" at Oxford. He shrunk, as we have seen, from accentuating his differences from them. The consequence was that, from those who did not understand him, he incurred, as in the days of Tract 90, the charge of over-subtlety, and of a reserve incompatible with the plain speaking which the situation demanded.

All this comes out vividly in his correspondence with Lord Emly at this time, which I have been allowed to peruse. Letters were written at one moment with one feeling uppermost, at another with another. We find him in January 1863 once more hopeful about the *Home and Foreign*, which, as he trusts, has dissociated itself from the obnoxious articles. But at the end of that month there is a clear and final change. The extraordinary paradox of the exposition in one of the articles in a Catholic review of the "contrast" between "Catholic and Christian morality," coupled with the plain statements of an editorial letter, was more than he could stand. He saw with regret that the *Home and Foreign* was now taking a line which would simply serve, as he said, "to write up the *Dublin*." [1]

[1] The following letter to myself from Lord Emly, who was at that time greatly in Dr. Newman's intimacy, gives further particulars of his attitude:—

MY DEAR WARD—You ask me what was the attitude of Cardinal Newman towards the *Home and Foreign Review*.

The two words—interest and disappointment—describe it.

He was in hearty sympathy with the principles put forward in its prospectus; but he disapproved of many of the articles which appeared in it, and especially of what he called their tone. In a letter to me he wrote, "It was a smack of something or other, what I should call a tone, which ruined the *Rambler*, and a Protestant smack will be fatal to the *Home and Foreign*."

In the beginning of January 1863 he told me that it was in a better position than it was when he last wrote to me. "X. has taken on himself nearly all the obnoxious matter, as little as possible remains, except that unlucky article in October on Genesis." Later on in the month, when a new number had appeared with an article I thought very objectionable, I asked the Cardinal whether he thought I ought to continue to write for the *Review*. His reply was that he heartily agreed with my objections to the article in question, and that if I did continue to contribute articles,

There remains the most important question at issue—the province of authority in Catholic theology, and the claims of the scholastic method—the question which Döllinger's address at Munich had brought into such prominence.

In the very year, 1864, in which the *Home and Foreign* spoke its last word, and took its stand on a programme directly opposed to the Munich Brief of the Pope, and in which Mr. Ward began his enforcement of the claims of Rome on Catholic thought, Newman had an opportunity of speaking on the subject in debate. With the wonderful insight which never deserted him, he recognised, as we have seen, the valuable elements in the speculations of the Liberal thinkers, in spite of their exaggerations. He introduced these elements into his sketch of a truly scientific Catholic method suitable for our own time, and yet included in it that reverence for Catholic tradition, the theology of the schools, the authority of the papal decisions and Roman congregations, the absence of which was fatal to the programme of Döllinger's address.

His treatment will be found in the last chapter of the *Apologia.* Vindicating eloquently the province of individuality, originality, research, and learning in the progress of Catholic thought and in the formation of Catholic opinion, he insists on tradition and authority as an equally integral portion of its motive force. The *Home and Foreign* writers disparaged the condemnations of Rome which lay outside the sphere of defined dogma. Newman not only stated the duty of submission, but maintained that history proves ecclesiastical authority to have been mainly in the right. The advocate of what even turns out eventually to be true, if indiscreet or premature in his action, is rightly checked. "He may seem to the world," he wrote, "to be nothing else than a bold champion for the truth and a martyr to free opinion, when he is just one of those persons whom competent authority ought to silence. . . . Yet its act will go down to posterity as an

"I ought, and had a right, to bargain that there should not be a smack of Protestantism in the *Review.*"

Again, about the same time, referring to a letter from the editor, he wrote to me, "For myself I feel this the more, because, in ignorance of these intentions, I have lately been zealous in his defence. I was not prepared for them by his prospectus"; and, in another letter, "I can but grieve over the state of the case."

I have many long letters on this subject of the Cardinal's, but think that what I have written is a sufficient answer to your question.—I am ever sincerely yours,

EMLY.

instance of tyrannical interference with private judgment, and of the silencing of a reformer."[1] Again, the Munich school spoke of the scholastic method as *passé*, and advocated the adoption of a new mode of treating theology which should in great measure break with the old. Newman, on the other hand, expressly stated his intention of introducing what was new in such a way as to be consistent with what is old. "Catholic inquiry," he wrote, "has taken certain definite shapes, and has thrown itself into the form of a science, with a method and phraseology of its own, under the intellectual handling of great minds, such as St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, and I feel no temptation at all to break in pieces the great legacy of thought thus committed to us for these latter days."[2]

Once more, in contradistinction to the disregard on the part of the Munich school for such parts of current Catholic teaching as are not definitions of faith, Newman notes that Catholic traditions are the very material out of which definitions are framed, and that it is in the acceptance of them on the whole that the Catholic has his security that no intellectual violence will be done to him by his promise to accept future definitions.

"I submit," he says, " . . . to the universally received traditions of the Church in which lies the matter of those new dogmatic definitions which are from time to time made, and which in all times are the clothing and illustration of the Catholic dogma as already defined. . . . Nothing can be imposed upon me (in time to come) different in kind from what I hold already, much less contrary to it."[3]

In these passages are contained the three essential points of Catholic discipline and doctrine, the implicit denial of which, in Döllinger's address, was censured in the Pope's Brief. Had the Munich programme been equally explicit in its recognition of them it might have borne more fruit.

But in truth the difference was a deep one. In Newman's eyes the province of authority not only as a discipline for individuals, but as an actual security for prudent action, and general wellbeing, and sound thinking in the long run, was of

[1] *Apologia*, p. 258. [2] *Ibid.* p. 251.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 251, 253.

the highest importance; while the leaders of the Munich school, as subsequent events showed still more clearly, did not recognise this subtler aspect of it, although they allowed in some measure the individual's duty of submission. Authority as defining dogmas of faith, or as maintaining discipline, was understood by them. But its complex action in giving breathing time, checking precipitation, protecting weak minds, occasionally enforcing the superior importance of other interests over the intellectual, acting at times justly as a ruling power by condemnations which were not philosophically exact, and might be ultimately cancelled—such manifestations of authority were not understood or valued by so exclusively intellectual a school. "The Pope is a ruler, not a philosopher," Newman said; and he held that this truth was one which both the Munich school and the *Dublin Review* were apt, for opposite reasons, to forget. The former grudged intellectual submission to what made no pretence of exhaustive scientific treatment, the latter tended to build Catholic thought on preventive decrees.

The combination of recognition of the full value of authority with appreciation of the importance of intellectual independence and elasticity was perhaps at that time uncommon. Newman had noted that combination emphatically in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, so far as the circumstances of mediæval speculation made it possible. Second to none in his reverence for Catholic tradition that great thinker and saint had broken with the modes of thinking and speaking of the fathers, and had the chief hand in fashioning a theology based on the Aristotelian method of the rationalistic and Pantheistic schools of his time.[1] He had cast the old truths in the intellectual mould of a new era, and treated Christian thought in the light of contemporary philosophy. It had been a work equally characterised by originality of construction and tenacity to tradition. What had been in the past might well be again. Let the two elements be insisted on equally—independent and real thought and reverence for authority and tradition—and time would bring about their rightful application to our own circumstances.[2]

[1] Newman's eloquent account of the transformation will be found in his *Idea of a University*, p. 469.

[2] As will appear in the sequel, in philosophy proper, Ward entirely shared Newman's views on this subject.

Let me set down the eloquent passages in which Cardinal Newman indicates the province of each of these factors:—

Every exercise of Infallibility is brought out into act by an intense and varied operation of the reason, both as its ally and as its opponent, and provokes again, when it has done its work, a reaction of reason against it; and, as in a civil polity, the State exists and endures by means of the rivalry and collision, the encroachments and defeats of its constituent parts, so in like manner Catholic Christendom is no simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but presents a continuous picture of authority and private judgment alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of the tide; it is a vast assemblage of human beings, with wilful intellects and wild passions, brought together into one by the beauty and the majesty of a superhuman power, into what may be called a large reformatory or training-school, not as if into a hospital or into a prison, not in order to be sent to bed, not to be buried alive, but (if I may change my metaphor) brought together as if into some moral factory, for the melting, refining, and moulding by an incessant, noisy process, of the raw material of human nature, so excellent, so dangerous, so capable of divine purposes.

St. Paul says in one place that his Apostolical power is given him to edification and not to destruction. There can be no better account of the Infallibility of the Church. It is a supply for a need, and it does not go beyond that need. Its object is, and its effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in religious speculation, but to resist and control its extravagance. . .

It is individuals, and not the Holy See, that have taken the initiative, and given the lead to the Catholic mind in theological inquiry. Indeed, it is one of the reproaches urged against the Roman Church that it has originated nothing, and has only served as a sort of *remora* or break in the development of doctrine. And it is an objection which I really embrace as a truth; for such I conceive to be the main purpose of its extraordinary gift. It is said, and truly, that the Church of Rome possessed no great mind in the whole period of persecution. Afterwards, for a long while, it has not a single doctor to show; St. Leo, its first, is the teacher of one point of doctrine; St. Gregory, who stands at the very extremity of the first age of the Church, has no place in dogma or philosophy. The great luminary of the western world is, as we know, St. Augustine; he, no infallible teacher, has formed the intellect of Christian Europe; indeed, to the African Church generally we must look for the best early exposition of Latin ideas. Moreover, of the African divines, the first in order of time, and not the least influential, is the strong-minded and heterodox Tertullian. Nor is the Eastern intellect, as such, without its share

in the formation of the Latin teaching. The free thought of Origen is visible in the writings of the Western Doctors, Hilary and Ambrose; and the independent mind of Jerome has enriched his own vigorous commentaries on Scripture from the stores of the scarcely orthodox Eusebius. Heretical questionings have been transmuted by the living power of the Church into salutary truths. The case is the same as regards the Ecumenical Councils. Authority in its most imposing exhibition, grave bishops, laden with the traditions and rivalries of particular nations or places, have been guided in their decisions by the commanding genius of individuals, sometimes young and of inferior rank. Not that uninspired intellect overruled the superhuman gift which was committed to the Council, which would be a self-contradictory assertion, but that in that process of inquiry and deliberation which ended in an infallible enunciation, individual reason was paramount. Thus Malchion, a mere presbyter, was the instrument of the great Council of Antioch in the third century in meeting and refuting, for the assembled Fathers, the heretical Patriarch of that See. Parallel to this instance is the influence, so well known, of a young deacon, St. Athanasius, with the 318 Fathers at Nicæa. In mediæval times we read of St. Anselm at Bari, as the champion of the Council there held against the Greeks. At Trent, the writings of St. Bonaventura, and what is more to the point, the address of a priest and theologian Salmeron, had a critical effect on some of the definitions of dogma. In some of these cases the influence might be partly moral, but in others it was that of a discursive knowledge of Ecclesiastical writers, a scientific acquaintance with theology, and a force of thought in the treatment of doctrine.[1]

[1] See *Apologia*, pp. 252, 265.

Note.—Further correspondence of considerable importance, between Mr. Ward and Cardinal Newman, bearing on matters dealt with in this chapter, came into my possession too late for inclusion in the text of my work. It will be found in the last Appendix (Appendix C.)

CHAPTER IX

PRIVATE LIFE

1858–69

THE main features of Mr. Ward's private life during these years must now be recorded. In 1858 he went to live at Northwood, his family place near Cowes in the Isle of Wight. He went there as a stern matter of duty. He was not only too unworldly to wish, as many men do, to take up the position which is open to a large landlord, but he had not even the slightest natural inclination for it. It is possible that a parliamentary career might have appealed to the unusually small share of ambition which he had. But local interests and local importance were utterly uncongenial to him. The prospective life, as he came to consider it, was very unattractive. He could not conceive of himself as a country gentleman. He was no sportsman. He had no knowledge of or interest in agriculture. He had no acquaintance with business. He did not feel enough confidence in his knowledge of human nature to trust himself to do much in the way of personal investigation or arbitration in grievances and disputes among his tenants. Years afterwards, he gave, as an ideal illustration of heroic effort against the grain, in proof of the freedom of the will, and of his doctrine of "Anti-impulsive effort," an account (founded on fact) of his bringing himself to look into a serious matter connected with the welfare of some farmers on his property. The passage is characteristic, and deserves quoting:—

I am a large landed proprietor, and I rejoice in my thereby assured income as a means of securely prosecuting my physical or

literary or philosophical studies. Otherwise I am profoundly uninterested in my estate. I cannot distinguish wheat from barley; I am quite indifferent to field sports. I have no value whatever for my social position. I have no tendency whatever towards personal relation with my agricultural dependants. Information reaches me that my agent has been acting with gross injustice to various of my tenants, and is endeavouring to stifle their complaint. What is my spontaneous impulse? Probably to invent some salve for my conscience as regards the tenants, and to plunge myself afresh in my favourite studies. I have no particular affection for my tenants any more than I have for any other farmers who may happen to live in my neighbourhood, and pursue their (to me utterly unintelligible) avocations. I can easily persuade myself, if I choose, that I may conscientiously ignore the information I have received, and continue without further inquiry to repose trust in my agent. On the other hand, if I am really conscientious I am able by means of due thought to see clearly where my duty lies. Accordingly I put forth anti-impulsive effort. With sighing and weariness of heart I bid adieu to my studies for the necessary interval of painful and laborious inquiry. I resolve to exercise herculean labour; to interview the complaining tenants; to apprehend (1) the meaning and (2) the merits of the accusation they bring, and finally to take such practical steps as I may judge necessary.

And while the occupations of a landlord's life were distasteful to him, he had a very exalted conception of its duties in the abstract. The bad landlord of Irish history, or the man who used his position as a mere stepping-stone to self-indulgence, or to selfish ambition, or to advancing his family interests, had been from early Oxford days his *bête noire*. He had been disposed to criticise his uncle for not seeing more of his tenants. Life at Northwood, as he had known it in the last years of Mr. George H. Ward's life, had been little to his taste. His uncle had been invited to contest the county as Conservative candidate in 1835. It was a year in which the memory of the Reform Bill was still green, and a Conservative in the Island as in many other places stood little chance. His father, who had been twice elected, lost his seat in that year, and his uncle failed, by a small minority, to get in. From thenceforth failing health had more or less enforced on him a life of idleness and ease. He took hardly any personal interest in the management of the property or the concerns of

the town. His chief care was given to extensive additions to Northwood, which he in great part rebuilt, very elaborately, after the model of an Italian palazzo, adding to the pictures and statues already there a fine collection of his own.[1] Over this and over the collection of rare and choice plants much time and money were expended; and in the summer months that section of the London world which went to Cowes for yachting purposes was invited to admire the house and grounds or to appreciate the skill of his French cook.

To W. G. Ward valuable paintings and classical statuary were as uninteresting and unintelligible as the "minutiæ of botany." He could not look forward with any satisfaction either to enjoying the fruits of his uncle's knowledge and taste, or to the performance of the active duties from which he had been debarred; while the ideal amusements with which Cowes was associated were the most wearisome and laborious elements of existence there. A summer among the yachting *habitués* of Cowes was an even more terrible prospect than a winter of inspecting farms and interviewing farmers. The pleasures of the life were worse than its duties.

However, the experiment was now to be tried, and Mr. Ward finally took up his abode at Northwood in 1858, and attempted to find a *modus vivendi* with his new surroundings. He avoided the yachting season after one experiment of it. He set aside a portion of his time religiously for business connected with his property, and got some amusement from the sense of his "profound incompetence" really to understand it. His agent primed him with the facts of each case which arose, and coached him in the arguments to be used in any discussion with farmers or deputations from the town; and Mr. Ward used the facility which he had acquired at Oxford and Old Hall, in political speeches at the Union and in theological lectures, to discuss the advantages of a new building scheme or to justify his resistance to some proposal of the townspeople. On one occasion, to his infinite delight, a speech which he made at his agent's suggestion on behalf of some scheme, the nature of which he had not succeeded in understanding at all, completely convinced

[1] The statue of Antinous, now in the Queen's collection at Osborne, was one of the statues brought by Mr. G. Ward from Italy to Northwood.

one of the chief opponents of the plan. "I did not in the least know what I had been advocating," he told us; "a great deal of my argument had reference to a 'butt,' and I have not the most distant conception what a 'butt' is. But A. B. at the end said that, after my masterly speech, and especially after my lucid treatment of the 'butt' question, he had no alternative but to withdraw all opposition."

He somewhat astonished the people of Cowes by the large number of "popish Ecclesiastics" who visited him. Cardinal Wiseman, Father Faber, Father (afterwards Cardinal) Vaughan, and Monsignor (afterwards Cardinal) Howard were among his guests within six months of his arrival at Northwood. He found his way as often as he could to the other end of the island, with its breezy downs and lovely scenery. He often stayed for weeks in Freshwater. Here he not unfrequently met some of his old pupils, and enjoyed the confusion which arose between his theological capacity and his capacity of landlord. The island was, in those days, primitive in habits, and his designation as Squire Ward—or, in the island dialect, *Werd*—was as universal as though it had been a military or civil title. I remember his telling me of one former "Divine" of Old Hall memory, who asked at the hotel for "Dr. Ward," and was sent away with the assurance that no such person was staying there. "Doctor, me no doctor, sir," Ward said to him when they met; "my foot is on my native heath, and my name is 'Squire *Werd*.'"[1]

His favourite walk to the Needles' Point was disfigured about this time by a fort which the Government erected; and he went to law for compensation. The fact is worth recording, because it was the occasion of a characteristic speech by his old friend Coleridge, the present Chief Justice, who was retained on his behalf. The ground for compensation was that the view was spoilt, and the value of his property consequently injured. Ward often quoted with zest the peroration of Coleridge's speech: "In brief, gentlemen of the jury, suppose a man had a beautiful picture by Titian, or by Raphael, or by Reubens; and that for his country's defence he sacrificed it. Would you not honour his patriotism? Would

[1] "Campbell, me no Campbell, sir; my foot is on my native heath, and my name is Macgregor!"—*Rob Roy*.

not his grateful countrymen make good his loss? My client had a picture. He has, for the defence of his country, suffered it to be destroyed. It was a picture not by Raphael, not by Reubens, not by Titian, but by the Artificer of Nature Himself!"

During his residence at Cowes, Mr. Ward had naturally much to say to the various plans for doing good which the local Catholic priest entertained. The excellent understanding to which they afterwards came makes it allowable to recall a characteristic passage in their early intercourse. The priest had a very definite conception of the position of a lay Catholic country gentleman, whose interest ought to be in his estate and in field sports, who was to endow the mission but to leave all particulars of its management simply to ecclesiastical care.

Mr. Ward, on the other hand, whose interests were by no means those of the English fox-hunter, took a lively interest in all details, liturgical, devotional, and practical, of the mission. A Catholic layman in his eyes might well share the interests of Sir Thomas More, or of Comte de Maistre in our own century. The result was at first a friction which made it impossible for them to work together. Mr. Ward feared that harm would be done, and wished to place the matter before the Bishop, who would, he thought, probably prefer to instal some one who would share his own general views as to the direction which Catholic work in the place should take. He did not like, however, to do this without giving the priest full and fair warning. "He asked me to come and see him," the priest said, in describing the event. "He told me that he did not like to say of me behind my back what he did not say to my face. He told me that he could not get on with me. 'I have no doubt,' he said to me, 'that you are an excellent man, but I can't stand you; we shall never be able to work together.' I could not feel angry, for he had no malice in him. He was very kind to me. He asked after my health. He walked with me to the gate of the park, and said good-bye very kindly. But he told me all the same—that he could not bear me."

His correspondence with Cardinal Newman continued during these years; but, in accordance with his habit, Ward destroyed by far the larger number of the letters. From the

character of those which remain, it must have been constant up to 1864, after which it was only occasional. Early symptoms of differences of view, which increased later on, appear in the letters which passed at this time, in spite of the affection and reverence for his Oxford teacher which is visible in Ward's attitude.

"How singular," wrote Newman, shortly before Ward left Old Hall for the Isle of Wight, "that you should disapprove of my work at Dublin and that I should think you in a false position at St. Edmund's, and that while you are thinking of moving from St. Edmund's to the Isle of Wight I should be returning from Dublin to Birmingham! My letters of resignation have gone to the Bishops, and have been accepted as far as my answers hitherto go; and I doubt not, as far as residence goes, my connection with the University is drawing to a close (*though I don't wish this known*). However, you, I suppose, don't change in your views about St. Edmund's, nor can I in mine about the University. Mrs. Ward does not say anything about your health. I take no news to be good news."

The lectures on *Nature and Grace*, based on the philosophical course at St. Edmund's, were, as we have seen, revised and printed while Mr. Ward was at Northwood, and formed the theme of further correspondence with Newman. Ward sent the volume to Newman before it was published, for suggestions and criticisms. One point—of interest in its connection with Mr. Ward's later controversies with Mill—was the analysis of the apprehension of the Moral Law in Conscience. Mr. Ward strenuously protested against those thinkers who found in God's command the final analysis of Right and Wrong, and he was at the outset disposed to attribute to Newman some sympathy in this view. Newman's letter on the subject is instructive, and it is endorsed in my father's handwriting with the words—"I have been converted to this." It will be seen that Newman accepts Mr. Ward's central contention that morality depends not on the Will but on the Nature of God; while Ward, in his final analysis, given later on, adopts Newman's further position, that conscience involves the recognition of a personal Obliger.

Newman's letter is dated 26th of November 1859:—

"I have not written to you," he writes, "to express my pleasure at the prospect of your coming here till such time as ought to have advanced me some way in your book; but, to tell the truth, it has set me writing and thinking, and thus I have made the slowest possible progress in it, or rather have fallen back and begun again.

"If I gather from it rightly what you take to be my own views of moral obligation, I do not think I have conveyed them to you, and I never thought I had—perhaps without my fault, for it is so difficult to explain oneself without almost a treatise. I believe that conscience involves the revelation of a God commanding; this does not oblige me to say that moral obligation depends simply on that command. I believe it to depend not solely on the command but on the nature of God. This is not inconsistent, I am sure, with anything I have meant to say to you, which has all gone to this, viz., that conscience in the sense of moral obligation in my mind is such as distinctly to carry with it the sense of an Obliger; or that the *immediate* shape with which it comes to me is not that of a divine truth but of a divine command as well. The immediate form need not be the ultimate basis.

"I have only said that my conscience is to me a proof of a God just as a shadow is a proof of a substance. The shadow does not depend on the mere arbitrary *will* of the substance for its shape, but on the *nature* of the substance.

"No illustration is exactly parallel. As the Word is from the Father's will, yet exists in consequence of the Father's eternal nature, so His word in our hearts is from His eternal nature, yet is also an act of His will, and is imposed by His authority. This is what I hold and would express. I had meant to suggest this parallel so long ago as 1834 in my sermon for Whitsunday (*Parochial Sermons*, vol. ii.) I was led to suggest it in consequence of a conversation with my friend Bowden. The Son, I say, is the living and eternal law of truth and perfection, the Image of God's unapproachable attributes, which we have ever seen by glimpses on the face of the world, felt that it was imaged, but knew not *whether* to say it was a fundamental rule and self-existing Destiny *or* the offspring and mirror of the Divine *Will*. Such has He been from the beginning . . . *distinct* from Him while mysteriously *one* with Him."

Ward's lectures were published in the course of the year 1860, and modified in consequence of Newman's suggestions, as the following letter to one of the Oratorian fathers of Birmingham indicates:[1]—

[1] Father Stanislaus Flanagan is the well-known parish priest of Adare, County Limerick, whither he went from Birmingham.

NORTHWOOD PARK, COWES,
Maundy Thursday.

MY DEAR FATHER FLANAGAN—I am preparing my volume for publication. Will you kindly tell me whether I am *now* in accordance with the facts, as you have discovered them.

Will you tell your Father Superior, with my love, that I have entirely rewritten the three first sections and (I hope) made their meaning much clearer. I will send him down a copy as soon as ever it is out; which will (I suppose) be in three or four weeks. I should have got it done earlier, but have had a bad attack of illness (caused in part, I really think, by the intolerable dulness of secular life at Cowes) which quite incapacitated me for more than six weeks. I am now fast recovering, having spent a month at Old Hall for the purpose of recruiting.—Believe me, ever most sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.[1]

The year of the publication of *Nature and Grace* brought a beautiful letter from Newman on the birth of Ward's youngest daughter, who was born on the Feast of the Transfiguration 1860:—

THE ORATORY, 10*th August* 1860.

MY DEAR WARD—I waited to answer the announcement contained in your kind letter till I could tell you that I had said mass for your and Mrs. Ward's intention about the little child. This I have done this morning. I offer you and her my best congratulations, and I earnestly pray that the festival on which she was born may overshadow her all through her life, and that she may find it "good to be here" till that time of blessed transfiguration when she will find from experience that it is better to be in heaven. Give me your good prayers in return that I may spend the rest of my life to God's glory, and believe me to be, my dear Ward, affectionately yours in Christ, JOHN H. NEWMAN
(Of the Oratory).

[1] With the main current of Newman's views, both on the philosophy of faith and on the testimony of Ethics to Theism, Ward heartily concurred. He looked to the *Grammar of Assent*, when it appeared later on, as the foundation of the Religious Philosophy of the future, although he did not concur with incidental statements in it, notably with its treatment of the argument from causation. Ward wrote on its appearance to express his delight at the scope and drift of the book. The exchange of letters was a lull in the storm, for it came out in 1870, at the acutest time of their divergence. Newman wrote as follows:—

MY DEAR WARD—It is a very great pleasure to me to receive your letter, both as expressing a favourable opinion of my book and as recording a point of agreement between us on an important subject. It would be strange indeed if I were not quite aware, as I am, that there are portions of my theory which require finishing or revising. I expect it to be my last work, meaning by work labour and toil.—Yours affectionately in Christ, JOHN H. NEWMAN.

The uncongenial life and the ill effects of the Cowes air on his health made Mr. Ward's sojourn at Northwood a brief one. Three years saw him back at Old Hall. The life there, for some ten years, was quite secluded, and it was his wish that his daughters should be nuns and his sons priests. His two eldest daughters both became nuns—one in 1863 and the other a little later. His eldest daughter Mary had been his constant companion, as we have seen, and he felt the separation keenly. He saw very little of any of the rest of his children at that time, and was quite puzzled when his second daughter Agnes said that she felt, as her sister had felt, that she owed her "vocation" in great measure to him. He wrote to her, on the eve of her "profession" as a member of the community of Benedictines at Oulton in Staffordshire, the following letter:—

I received with very great interest your most undeservedly kind letter, and am most grateful to you for it. I wish I could think I had ever anything to do with your present happy position, but it seems to me that I do nothing whatever for my children and that they do everything for me. That your mother's training has been of inestimable value, I thoroughly agree with you.

However, if ever I had done you any service there is no imaginable requital which would have been so acceptable as of seeing you happily installed as a religious. You seem, indeed, to have found a home at Oulton, and the more I hear of the convent the more I like it.

I am not at all surprised at your happiness; my difficulty always is in understanding how we poor creatures who have no vocations can endure life. At the same time, of course, this life is for crosses, and you know far better than I do that you must not be surprised if some day or other you were very sharply tried. F. Faber always said that those were the most favoured who were most visited by interior trials.

I always think a great deal about you, for a convent life is of all things the most worth thinking about. But I shall most especially remember you on Wednesday, and give you the best of my exceedingly worthless prayers, that God will accomplish in you most thoroughly and perfectly the noble work He has begun.

So here is a letter without a single joke in it, as you wished. And pray believe, my dearest Agnes, that I do not think the less but rather the more of you because I do not see you, and that I shall ever be, most affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

An event of importance to him, both private and public, in the year 1865, was Cardinal Wiseman's death. Mr.

Ward's great fear of the Liberal movement, which was still so active, made him extremely anxious as to the Cardinal's successor. Ward held that the most uncompromising opposition to the movement was imperative; and there were many possible successors to Wiseman who would not be in this respect satisfactory. The one man whom he looked to as really desirable was Dr. Manning, and there seemed little or no chance of his appointment. He was not sufficiently popular with the Canons of the Chapter of Westminster to be a likely nominee; and it was not to be looked for that the Pope should take the very exceptional course of setting their recommendation aside. Ward, however, did his best in Rome. He was in frequent communication with the Vatican and Castel Gadolfo, through Monsignor Talbot, the Pope's constant attendant and intimate friend; and he urged Manning's fitness in the strongest terms. A few extracts from letters will sketch the sequence of events.

On the 15th of February he writes to Mrs. Ward that Wiseman's death is hourly expected: "I will leave this open," he adds, "for the last news about the Cardinal. This morning he was reported as rapidly sinking." Comments follow as to possible successors, but Manning is not named; and a *P.S.* says, "the Cardinal died at eight o'clock this morning. Requiescat in pace." A few weeks later: "I have seen Manning this morning, who has written me a beautiful article for the *Dublin* on the Cardinal. He is a good deal out of spirits. Dr. Clifford has been telegraphed to Rome." Later again: "I had a long talk with Manning last night and received from him the Pope's gift." [Pius IX. had sent Ward through Dr. Manning a medal and framed photograph of himself with the Papal Arms engraved beneath.] "On the photograph is written in the Pope's own handwriting, *Benedicat vos deus benedictione perpetua*, addressed (as he told Manning) to you, to the children, and to myself. You will be much interested with it. The things he told me are of course most *strictly private*, but they are to my mind far from satisfactory. The decree about Oxford is of course on the right side, but it is feebly worded, to my mind, falling far short of what is required. It is the same congregation (Propaganda) that decides on the Archbishopric. I have, therefore, given up almost all hopes of

Manning's appointment. He says himself that there is not the remotest chance of it nor again of Clifford. He says it will entirely lie between A. B. and C. D. The Cardinal was not sensible after his arrival, so that the latter did not in fact see him. But he must necessarily have returned, he says, to act as Provost, and also it is most important that there should be no idea about his intriguing in Rome. He will not, therefore, return. . . . I have a small dinner party next Tuesday to meet Manning, who comes in the evening."

The appointment, however, did come. Owing to circumstances which are sufficiently well known, the Pope felt called on to set aside the names recommended by the Chapter, and Dr. Manning was nominated.

Monsignor Talbot wrote to Ward from the Vatican on the 12th of May 1865, as follows:—

VATICAN, 12*th May* 1865.

MY DEAR DR. WARD—I write a few lines to say that I daresay you are very glad to hear of the nomination of Dr. Manning to the See of Westminster. A concatenation of circumstances, guided no doubt by Providence, have led to his promotion. In consequence of the opposition of the Episcopate, Clergy, and the majority of the laity of England, I never thought it possible that he should ever be Archbishop. Almighty God, however, has overruled all our anticipations in a most wonderful manner; and the Holy Father, inspired by the Holy Ghost, has named him. I am afraid that he will meet with much opposition at first, but I have so great confidence in him that I think in a few years his enemies will exclaim, "The Pope was right and we were wrong."

He may depend upon my support, as I have always given it him for fourteen years, but I think that all his friends ought to rally round him at this trying moment.

He will have some bitter moments at first, but I think he has virtue enough to weather the storm.—Believe me, very sincerely yours, GEO. TALBOT.

P.S.—If you have been photographed I should like very much to have your photograph and that of Mrs. Ward, which I wish you would send me by post. G. T.

Another letter to Mrs. Ward, written from the Pope's country house at Castel Gadolfo, may be given:—

CASTEL GADOLFO, 11*th August*, 1865

MY DEAR MRS. WARD—A thousand thanks for the photograph of Mr. Ward, which I shall treasure up, especially as you tell me

they are so scarce. Mr. Ward's article on the end of Civil Government has been translated into Italian by a good Bologna gentleman, who has sent several copies of it to the Holy Father, one of which has been given to me. He told me that he had read some of it, and has liked what he has read.

I am glad to hear that your new Archbishop is going on so well. Mr. Ward was one of the few persons who wrote to me to recommend him for that position to the Holy Father. Of course I told his Holiness all Mr. Ward said, but at that time I saw no prospect of his appointment. I may say that the Bishops and the bulk of the clergy and laity were all opposed to him, and it is not the practice of the Holy See to name a Bishop in direct opposition to the general wish of the Bishops, Clergy, and Laity. A concatenation of circumstances led to his appointment, therefore I cannot look upon his nomination otherwise than as a special interposition of Providence.

I am glad to hear that since his appointment he is going on so well; but his difficulties are to come, when he will be obliged to perform acts which will not be pleasing to all parties. As yet it is the interest of all to stand well with him. I hope to see him here in September, when there will be a Consistory, and he will receive the Pallium from the hands of the Pope himself.

When he comes I shall be able to give him many hints which will be of great use to him in the administration of his diocese. I am glad to hear that Father Vaughan is returned to England, and has brought a good deal of money with him. It was a bold act of his to go to America, and he seems to have been very successful everywhere. I should not be surprised if he accompanied Dr. Manning to Rome. Vaughan some day will make a good Bishop. He has a great deal of zeal, and he takes the right view of most subjects, but I am afraid that he is not the kind of man the Chapter are likely to recommend.

I am glad that Mr. Ward took the line he took about the Isle of Wight election.[1] Remember me kindly to Mr. Ward, and believe me, very sincerely yours, GEO. TALBOT.

Ward's delight at Manning's appointment is a thing which those who lived with him will not easily forget. I remember his rushing into the room at Hamilton Terrace, where we were living at the time, with a telegram in his hand, and jumping over a chair which was in his way, as he called out, "Henry Edward, by the grace of God, Archbishop of Westminster," and we went down to the room we used as a chapel

[1] Mr. Ward had voted against Sir J. Simeon on the ground of his Liberal Catholic views, see p. 228.

and sang the *Te Deum.* His satisfaction is incidentally and characteristically expressed in a letter to Mrs. Ward written a little later. He had been suffering from sleeplessness, and some cows in the neighbourhood by their lowing had effectually kept him awake for some nights. Renewed health, however, put this right.

"I am immensely better," he writes, "for my drives. This morning I woke while my natural enemies were bellowing their utmost with all the strength of their horrid lungs just before sunrise, and without either shutting my window or [applying your remedy] I got off to sleep again almost directly. Te Deum Laudamus! Good sleep at night and a good Archbishop by day (and a good opera in the evening) are adequate for human felicity. I am to go to the Archbishop to-morrow evening."

It was about this time that Mr. Cashel Hoey was asked to accept the post of sub-editor of the *Dublin Review.* Ward explained to him, in the course of the interview in which the appointment was decided, that his own editorial work would be almost confined to subjects bearing on the controversies of which so much has already been said. The literary and political side of the *Review* was to be entirely in the hands of the sub-editor. "You will find me," he said to Mr. Hoey, "narrow and strong—*very* narrow and *very* strong." It was a critical moment, and the *Syllabus* was just out. The Italian aggression on the Papal Sovereignty was moving onwards. A year later the Vatican Council was determined on. The *Dublin* did not draw back from the struggle, the particulars of which during the succeeding five years must be given in the next chapter. From this time to the Vatican Council warfare never relaxed.

In 1866 the Council was known to be approaching, and Ward was naturally eager that the matter which he had been so keenly debating in the *Dublin Review*—the extent of Papal Infallibility—should be considered at that assembly. He was in constant communication with the Archbishop, and when Cardinal Reisach, one of the "commission" of five cardinals appointed in 1865 to discuss the projected Council, came to England, he and Archbishop Manning paid Mr. Ward a visit at Old Hall. The visit, in the July of that year, was one of great interest. Reisach had much to tell Ward of the feeling in Rome, and of the various schools of opinion there.

It was not without its more amusing side, which impressed itself on the minds of the youthful observers of their intercourse. The customs of the Roman Curia were not those of the Oxford student-life in which Mr. Ward had formed his own habits. The daily constitutional—two hours' fast walking, essential for health and comfort—was very different from the Cardinal's habitual stroll on the Pincian Hill, where he "took the air" after his siesta. A walk was proposed, and the picture remains in the memory of those who saw them, as of two horses of utterly dissimilar size and pace in double harness. The Cardinal's three steps and then the halt of half a minute, while with much gesture he described the Holy Father's rebuke of Passaglia, or his approval of an article in the *Univers*, entirely disconcerted Mr. Ward, who soon saw that no real walking would be possible. Dismayed at the prospect of the miseries consequent on the loss of his constitutional, after a quarter of an hour had only taken them about 100 yards, he affected not to observe the Cardinal's halt hoping that if he walked on, his companion would do so likewise. But Roman diplomacy was equal to the occasion, and the Cardinal ran forward a few paces, halting this time face to face with the Englishman, completely blocking up the onward path, and thus, master of the situation, finished his argument at leisure. He tried before he left Old Hall to induce Ward to return with him to Rome, but Ward, mindful of his one attempt to go abroad in Oxford days, refused. "But you love Rome so deeply," said the Cardinal. "Yes," replied Ward, "my heart is very Roman, but my stomach is very English."

The year 1866 brought a visit from Bishop Moriarty of Kerry, the intimate friend of Mr. Monsell and of Cardinal Newman. The visit had some effect in softening the asperities of the controversy between Ward and his opponents. Mr. Ward and the Bishop had often corresponded, but their meeting did more to make them understand each other; and conversation qualified some of the absolute logical statements which had aroused strong feeling on all sides. Neither the previous nor the subsequent interchange of letters throws any materially new light on the subjects discussed; but it deserves attention that in a letter of the following year

Bishop Moriarty had evidently brought before Ward for the first time the fact that many members of the "Liberal school" respected and accepted papal teaching beyond the limits in which they were prepared to admit its absolute infallibility. Ward expresses incredulity in his answer. He doubts if there are "ten men" who maintain such an attitude. "What A. and B. and others wish," he writes, "is to detest tenets which the Pope authoritatively inculcates, and to think his teaching behind the age, etc."

The correspondence gradually ceased, greatly because the Bishop found himself less and less able to decipher Ward's writing, which in spite of his efforts to improve it only got worse as time went on. "I am really very concerned," Ward writes in another letter of the same year, "that the deciphering of my letters gives you so much trouble, and I will try and improve my bad writing. I have sometimes thought of taking six lessons." The pleasant impression left by the visit, however, remained. "Thank you very much," Ward writes on the 9th of July 1866, "(1) for your sermon, (2) for your praise of my article, (3) for your kind remembrance of your visit to us. We all unite in eagerly hoping that the latter may be soon repeated." And a letter of 1867 opens thus: "Our children were extremely interested to know that I had heard from you. They have a most lively and delightful recollection of your visit here last year."

The ten years of this second residence at Old Hall coincided with the most acute portion of Ward's controversial career. And while the subjects on which he wrote were still, as at St. Edmund's, most fascinating to him, and his enjoyment of the abstract argument was keen, the element of personal controversy was trying to him beyond words. The downrightness, plain speaking, and hard hitting of his style gave in this respect a most false impression. He conceived it to be an absolute duty, especially after the *Dublin Review* had been entrusted to him, to speak out against any neglect or disparagement, wherever he detected it, of the papal official teaching. Pius IX. was so constant and urgent in his pronouncements that occasions were constantly arising; and nearly every controversy gave him the greatest pain or even made him ill. His feeling, both of repugnance for a process in

which he was so much at home as theological controversy, and of pain at the utterances which led him to write, was quite peculiar. He often said: "Many people look on me as a kind of theological gladiator who delights in fighting, or a theological Red Indian who is only at home in the war paint. They little know what a coward I am, and how I hate fighting. If it wasn't for the infinite harm which Liberalism is doing I could never bring myself to write against it."

The feeling of pain in controversy concerned especially such men as Newman, Monsell, and others, whom he personally liked and respected, and yet felt bound to oppose. He explained again and again how intensely he appreciated their goodness and highmindedness; but they would not commit themselves to the line which he considered indispensable as a check to the extreme Liberalism, which they disliked in reality almost as much as he did; and so with relentless logic he spoke of them as enemies to the cause he had at heart. Much of his opposition, indeed, was, as we shall see, based on a misconception of their views. He could not bring himself to see in any of their statements less than the embodiment of an abstract principle, pregnant with consequences. Even, however, before this misconception had become manifest, his personal feeling was entirely friendly. But he could not bring the *suaviter in modo*, which never failed him in conversation, into his writing; and he could not resist his inclination to express contrasts of opinion in the most startling and extreme form; and thus opposition became accentuated. Private intercourse and correspondence did, nevertheless, from time to time show how much kindly and even tender feeling remained, and how painful were the combats which seemed so congenial and were so uncompromising. Moreover, as we have already seen in the case of Bishop Moriarty, these private communications brought to light points of agreement with his opponents which his public writing would leave little room for suspecting.

Noteworthy instances of this were his communications with Mr. Monsell at the time of the address from the Catholic laity to Dr. Newman, his private relations with Sir John Simeon in 1865, and his correspondence with Father Ryder after their public controversy of 1867.

Ward had, on grounds already indicated, opposed the

scheme of Newman's going to Oxford. His opposition in Rome had been strenuous, and he well knew that Newman was deeply pained at it. The proposed address to Newman, promoted by Lord Castlerosse, Mr. Monsell, and others, contained a sentence to the effect that every blow at Newman was a blow at the Catholic Church in this country. Mr. Ward believed that this sentence really referred to the opposition to the Oxford scheme. Consequently he felt unable, after the line he had taken, to sign the address. The pain the whole thing cost him is remembered by many; and it is visible in the following letter to Mr. Monsell which accompanied the letter in which Ward explained his position on the subject, and asked for any suggestion as to his expressions.

"I am sorry," he writes, "to give you so much trouble as is implied in the accompanying letter, but in these serious times it is necessary to weigh one's words carefully. I will add one further matter. Hoey mentioned to me a conversation he had with you about my feelings towards Father Newman. I entreat you to believe that you have not yourself a warmer personal regard for him than I have, or a keener sense of indebtedness to him. And I am quite certain no one ever heard me speak in a different sense. At the same time, I feel with bitter grief that in matters which seem to me vital there is a wide gulf between him and me. It would be a real relief to me if you could make him understand how unalterable is my feeling of affection and gratitude towards him. He has naturally much difficulty in believing this."[1]

That Newman did, in fact, in some measure, appreciate this singular mixture of feelings appears in a letter to a friend, in the year 1871, in which he asserts that Ward had "much to do with keeping him from Oxford"; but he adds:—

> I have not a word to say against him. He has ever in feeling been kinder to me than I to him. . . . He is thoroughly honest and above board. . . . He says out all that he thinks; and in the mildest most affectionate manner would call me an unmistakable heretic.

Towards Monsell himself Ward also had a mixture of opposite feelings, although their friendship had never been so

[1] The date of the address was 1867.

intimate. He was quite unable to make little of the contrasts between their principles, which he viewed as having the diametrical opposition which abstract Liberalism has to abstract anti-Liberalism. And yet the two men were full of *bonhomie* and friendliness to each other. A letter from Ward abounding in kind expressions, written in 1867, winds up as follows:—

> I write this at A. B.'s desire, but quite without hope of result. I believe you are as firmly fixed in your view as I in mine; and that you abhor mine as heartily as I abhor yours.

Another letter, at the time when Ward looked on Newman and Monsell's attitude as opening the door to the extreme Liberal Catholics, winds up as follows:—

> I heartily wish that we all on both sides wrote with the admirable kindness and Christian tone which distinguish your letter. Pray believe how sincerely I respect you and many others whom I regard as grievous enemies to the Church most unintentionally; and in particular how undying are my gratitude and affection towards the illustrious leader of your formidable and dangerous band. —With great respect, very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

An indication of a somewhat similar contrast of public and private feeling appears in his relations to Sir John Simeon in 1865. In that year Ward took, for the first time, an active share in the Isle of Wight election. It was at the very crisis of his dread of Liberal Catholicism; and Sir John Simeon, old friend though he was, was the last man in his opinion to represent Catholicism in the House of Commons. Accordingly he gave his active support to Sir Charles Locock, the Conservative candidate. The contest began and ended without interrupting personal friendliness. Mr. Ward's share in the election aroused considerable interest, and was not unnaturally misunderstood in some quarters. The *Standard* congratulated him upon being faithful to the Conservative traditions of his family, and not allowing considerations of religious creed to prevail against them. Mr. Ward's indignation may be imagined; and he wrote to the editor that he did not care twopence for Conservative traditions in comparison with religious interests, which interests were the very ground of his opposition to Sir John Simeon.

Many Catholics held that he should have taken no

share in the election. The *Tablet,* on the other hand,—in those days a strongly Tory journal,—warmly congratulated him in the name of English Catholicism. "By far the most interesting," wrote the editor, "of the English elections now pending, to Catholics at least, is that of the Isle of Wight. Sir John Simeon, a Roman Catholic baronet, of large property and good private character, is the Liberal candidate; and as he is of the most advanced school of Liberals in all questions, domestic and foreign, Lord Palmerston has no more cordial partisan of the whole platform of his policy. Sir Charles Locock, on the other hand, is the Conservative candidate, and, as we read his address, a very ordinary Conservative of the old hum-drum Protestant Tory school. His opposition to Sir John Simeon is, indeed, in great measure carried on in a way offensive to Catholic feeling. Now, Mr. W. G. Ward, of Northwood Park, whose name and writings are well known to all English Catholics, is one of the principal landed proprietors of the island; and if he should only choose to support Sir John Simeon, there is very little doubt that Sir John Simeon would be elected. But Mr. Ward, on the contrary (to his honour be it said), has elected to oppose Sir John Simeon, to the full measure of his legitimate influence; and if, as we sincerely hope, Sir John Simeon be defeated, it will under Providence be, in all probability, due to this decision."

Sir John Simeon had married again since Ward had left Northwood, and Lady Simeon wrote to him a month before the election assuring him how entirely in good part both she and her husband took his line of action, and regretting that Ward's absence from the Island had prevented more frequent intercourse between them. Ward wrote her the following reply:—

21 Hamilton Terrace, N.W., 19*th June* 1865.

My dear Lady Simeon—If I feel grateful to your husband, who has known me long, for his kind opinion, much more must I feel grateful to you.

The whole state of things in the English Catholic world is to me full of bitterness. Here is a matter bubbling up to the surface which indicates the commotion below. I am actually driven to vote with men whose views I probably detest even more than he does, and who certainly abominate me immeasurably more than they

abominate him. I don't speak here of all Sir Charles Locock's supporters, but of the anti-Catholic fanatics.

It will give me very much pleasure if at some future time I have the opportunity of making your better acquaintance; and meanwhile thank you most cordially for your letter.—Very faithfully yours, W. G. WARD.

Indeed Ward's personal feeling for Sir John Simeon had ever been kindly. Sir John's daughter[1] writes to me: "Mr. Ward and my father, though always entertaining a sincere respect and, I may say, affection for one another, had moved on different lines. It is a great matter of regret to me that they were not thrown more forcibly together, for I cannot but believe that their differences would have been merged in the recognition of their mutual love for truth."

As the election drew nearer, Mr. Ward found that his position was a little too complicated to be generally intelligible. The no-popery cry was raised against Sir John Simeon, and was found to be the most effective weapon against him. Under these circumstances Mr. Ward wrote to the President of Sir Charles Locock's committee, withdrawing his name, though still promising his support. His letter, characteristic in its keen recognition of all that made the position startling and paradoxical, ran as follows:—

21 HAMILTON TERRACE, N.W., LONDON,
26th June 1865.

DEAR SIR—I beg you to withdraw my name from the committee over which you preside, and as my position is somewhat peculiar, perhaps you will allow me to take the opportunity of making public a personal explanation.

I was never engaged in any political contest which interested me at all so keenly as the present movement against Sir John Simeon's election. My motives, however, for opposing it are not chiefly political; though I do cordially dislike and disapprove his whole political creed. Still less are they personal; on the contrary, I have the warmest regard for him, and on this very occasion he has treated me with a generosity which I shall never forget. But my reasons for being shocked at the thought of his appearing in Parliament as a representative of Catholicism are very far more influential with me than any merely political or personal reason could possibly be.

When I was asked to join Sir Charles Locock's committee, I not

[1] Mrs. Richard Ward.

unnaturally inferred (though nothing of the kind was stated or hinted) that his canvass would be mainly conducted on those Conservative principles which I hold in common with the other members of the committee. Such, however, has not been the case: the appeal has been almost exclusively to that unhappy animosity, so prevalent among Englishmen, against that Church of which it is my highest earthly privilege to be a member. Certainly it will be a very singular (and to my mind providential) circumstance, if this hatred of Catholicism should become the instrument for averting what I regard as the most serious danger with which the Catholic cause is threatened during the next election. But still the fact remains, that your method of forwarding Sir Charles Locock's interest has been one which I most profoundly disapprove; while your reasons for opposing his antagonist stand out in extreme and most curious contrast to my own. I could not, therefore, without incurring misconstruction, allow my name to remain on his committee.

I shall none the less vote for Sir Charles Locock as the only means in my power of promoting Sir John Simeon's exclusion from Parliament. And I will venture to say that no member of your committee desires that end more earnestly than I do, or will more heartily rejoice if God in His mercy grants its accomplishment.

I will take this opportunity of repeating what I have said at former elections. I cannot but think each elector personally responsible for his own exercise of the suffrage, and it would, therefore, be very painful to me if any one was induced, directly or indirectly, by my influence to vote against his conscientious convictions. I would take every lawful step to injure Sir John Simeon's electioneering prospects; but I cannot regard such exercise of influence as a lawful step.—I remain, dear Sir, faithfully yours, W. G. WARD.

In the case of Father Ryder, what may be in some sort termed a friendship was brought about by the private correspondence which arose from a public controversy. Father Ryder was unprepared for what he has styled in print the "chivalrous good-humour" of Ward's private letters; and their epistolary intercourse became frequent and intimate. The two following specimens of it tell their own tale. The first brings to light Ward's recognition of elements of truth in some of the contentions of the *Home and Foreign*, and at the same time points the contrast between his feelings towards the Liberalism of that Review and the merely theological "minimism" which he attributed to Father Ryder. It should be observed that Ward's dislike,

which appears in the first extract, to the self-complacent optimism and special pleading of many modern Catholic writers, was deep and lasting, and had only been kept in the background by the exaggerations of the *Home and Foreign* in an opposite sense.

"I quite agree with you," he writes to Father Ryder in 1868, "that immense harm has been done by the bombast and swagger of certain Catholic controversialists. But on the other side I think (though you won't agree with me) that even more harm was done by [the editors of the *Home and Foreign.*] What I feel so agreeably in your pamphlet is, that here is a good Catholic working to meet a common danger threatening us all. Those others always seemed to have their heart on the other side; and to have far greater antipathy to ecclesiastical authority than to free-thinking scholars. I think that this has with great reason prejudiced pious Catholics against even the truths which the said [editors] had to deliver, and think they are greatly responsible for our existing evils. If, on the one hand, we ought to be honest, surely, on the other hand, we ought to deal most tenderly with 'babes.' I say this in praise of you, not otherwise. But those fellows seemed to have a real pleasure in making pious people shudder."

The following letter to the same correspondent, though of later date, belongs to a similar line of controversy. It was written after the appearance in 1874 of Newman's letter to the Duke of Norfolk, in which he alluded to the action of the "extreme" party as injurious to souls, inconsiderate to weaker brethren, and virtually "trampling on the little ones for whom Christ died." Ward's pain at such words from Newman may well be imagined.

"As by this time," he writes, "you will have read J. H. N.'s pamphlet, you will not be surprised to hear that I required a double dose of chloral to get a tolerable night. It is endless of course to speak of it; but I wish you would kindly explain one passage. Who are those who (p. 4) 'leave to others the task of putting out the flame,' which they have themselves kindled? God grant that we may all do rightly amid the perplexities which surround us. I sometimes feel as if I should get out of further perplexity myself by the simple process of habitation in Bedlam. Was there ever before in the history of thought such a simultaneous din of wildly discordant voices? Do you remember Warren Hastings saying that when he heard Burke's speech he for the

moment thought himself a monster. Apply the parable and remember how enormously J. H. N. has always influenced my mind."

What happened after this letter is told elsewhere. Newman was evidently touched by it, and wrote a friendly and kind note which I refer to in a different connection.

In these years, as earlier, Ward's chief escape from the trials of life was the opera; and it was an understood thing that no reference to public matters or trying controversies was allowed within the "sacred precincts," as he styled Covent Garden Theatre. I recollect his indignation once, about the year 1869, when he had been anxiously expecting the issue of one of his controversies in Rome, and the editor of the *Tablet*[1] told him the result in the opera-house between the acts of the *Barbière*; and matters were made still worse by his introduction, by the same man and on the same occasion, to a well-known partisan of Döllinger in his war against the Vatican decrees. Ward, imagining himself in the streets of Seville, gossiping with Figaro, laughing at Bartolo, drinking in the music from the voices of Almaviva and Rosina, forgetting that there was such a thing as a Liberal Catholic party and an approaching Council, was roughly awakened to the realities and pains of life. The opera was spoilt; the illusion could not be restored, the "discordant din" of theological controversy drowned Rossini's melodies, and he rose with a heavy heart and left before the second act was half over. With an assumption of humour, but with very real feeling, he said when he next met the editor of the *Tablet*: "If you ever meet me at the opera again, I have two requests to make —1st, That you will not talk about theology; 2nd, That you will not introduce me to Döllingerites."

[1] Mr. J. Wallis, afterwards British Consul at Cairo.

CHAPTER X

THE SYLLABUS AND THE VATICAN DEFINITION

1864–1870

SOME account must now be given of Mr. Ward's share in the general movement of centralisation which preceded the Vatican Council. In France that movement was at its height from 1860 to 1870. From the time, indeed, when Montalembert, in 1853, made a last and futile attempt to regain the leadership of the Catholic party, it encountered no strong element of opposition. The devotion to Rome, the centralising tendency which killed Gallicanism, came more and more to combine with its nobler elements a tendency to make Rome a direct court of appeal, and a direct pattern, in matters in which local authorities and local customs were still felt by many to have a strong claim. Friends and foes to the movement alike recognised its strength. It was already well advanced on its course when Abbé Gerbet wrote, in 1858, "no French Bishop dare venture, without instantly being annihilated by the public opinion of the clergy, to defend himself . . . Rome can do anything now"; it was at its height when Montalembert, stung by the censures of the men for whom he had fought so long, made common cause with Dupanloup and his followers, and avowed himself to be opposed to the definition of papal infallibility, which he feared would mean in France the triumph of men whose attitude had become little less than fanatical.

Two phenomena here deserve attention. The eagerness of the *Univers* for centralisation and direct relations with Rome led from the first to a disparagement of episcopal authority. Here we trace again Lamennais's influence. But the warfare against Bishops had meant with the *Avenir* warfare against

Gallicanism: it waxed hotter in the *Univers*, although the old reason for it no longer existed. Veuillot and his friends had persistently advocated and practised appeals to the Pope over the heads of local authorities, which led Archbishop Sibour to say, "the bishops and priests are being insulted under pretence of avenging the Holy See"; and when the Bishops found the *Univers* more than they could control, Veuillot (in 1853) succeeded in getting a papal letter which expressed a wish that the French episcopate should take the Catholic press under their protection. The meaning of the letter was plain, and the *Univers* successfully defied the Bishops. Its course continued, with an intermission of six years (1861-67), during which it was suppressed by the Government. During these years, however, its writers were not less vigorous and active. The *Monde* replaced the *Univers*, and the influence of its conductors was perhaps most pronounced from the time of the *Syllabus* of 1864 to the Council of 1870. "I have no influence with my clergy," Cardinal Mathieu is reported to have said. "The *Univers* is all-powerful with them." The *Univers* professed to echo the voice of Rome even in its whispers, and claimed attention in the name of Catholic loyalty.

This marked increase of centralisation was, of course, promoted by the rapidity of communication and locomotion which the present century has brought. And it went hand in hand with a second phenomenon.

The wide circulation of the *Univers* enabled it to interpret papal pronouncements after its own fashion for all the Catholics of France. People read for the first time, with a strong interpretation in the *Univers*, documents addressed by the Pope to the Bishops, and which needed for the average layman explanations and reservations which Bishops and Professors of theology should in the ordinary course have given in their exposition.

It was here that Mr. Ward, utterly opposed as he was in intention to the slightest infringement of Episcopal authority, took his share in the movement. Urging in the *Dublin Review*, on the lines already indicated, a generous acceptance of each papal document as it appeared, he termed less ample concessions than he considered to be due as to which of such documents was infallible, or as to the amount of infallible teaching they

contained, "minimising."[1] He reduced to a *minimum* the necessity of guidance at the hands of theological experts, whether in determining the authority of a document or its obligatory interpretation. He preached, as we have seen, docility not only to the pronouncements but to the "intimations" of the Holy See. The results of this policy, both in the *Dublin Review* and in the *Univers*, became manifest in the important course of events beginning with the appearance of the *Syllabus* in December 1864, and ending with the Vatican Council in 1870. Of these events some account must now be given.

True to their accustomed *rôle* the French Ultramontanes in 1861 urged the Pope for some stringent condemnation of the errors current in modern society; and when their endeavours bore fruit in 1864, Mr. Ward set himself to urge the authority of the document, and the duty of accepting it in its largest interpretation. This document was the celebrated *Syllabus*.

The story of its composition must be recalled. The Bishop of Perpignan—as Abbé Gerbet had now been created—had written a pastoral on modern forms of irreligion, and he and his friends had hoped that its main propositions would be embodied in a Pontifical pronouncement. Sixty-three propositions were actually drafted by the Roman authorities, and submitted to the episcopate. Such dispensing, however, with the usual machinery of the theological faculty found little favour with some of the Bishops to whom Pio Nono submitted the proposal—among others with Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans.[2] It was abandoned in 1862, and two years were allowed to pass before, with the advice of the board of theologians which had continued to sit since the Definition of 1854, a *résumé* of the numerous condemnations made in the reign of Pio Nono was published, under the title of *Syllabus errorum*.

That this document was brewing was an open secret for some time before its appearance. Statesmen like Montalembert, Falloux, the Duc de Broglie, Albert Dechamps dreaded it. Pius IX. had already made more public authoritative pro-

[1] This is the final analysis of his use of the word which he accepted.

[2] See *Vie de Dupanloup*, vol. ii. p. 455.

nouncements than any previous Pope. Public feeling was exasperated at the attitude of the Ultramontane school. The French and Belgian Liberal Catholics feared that the *Syllabus* would only increase the tension. They signed a petition to the Pope begging him to refrain from the publication of the document which was preparing. It had no effect, however, and on the 8th of December, the feast of the Immaculate Conception, 1864, the Encyclical *Quanta cura*, and the accompanying *Syllabus* made their appearance.

The Encyclical went mainly over old ground, and reiterated the condemnation of unrestricted Liberalism as an ideal. Its keynote is struck early in the document, where the Pope refers with reprobation to those who teach "that the best state of public society and civil progress absolutely require that human society should be constituted and ruled without any more regard to religion than if it did not exist, or at least with no distinction between true and false religions." The Pope went on to derive from this conception the "erroneous opinion" that "liberty of conscience and of worship is the inherent right of every man which should be proclaimed by law and asserted in every rightly-constituted society; and that citizens have a right to entire liberty, which must be restrained by no authority ecclesiastical or civil, to manifest openly and publicly declare every opinion whether in speaking or writing or otherwise."

This false ideal of society, while rejecting the restraint of lawful authority, sets up in its place "the will of the people, manifested by public opinion (as it is called) or otherwise," as "the supreme law, freed from all divine or human legislation."

The *Syllabus* covered very wide ground, consisting of eighty condemned propositions, classified under nine heads—the chief of which concerned Rationalism, Pantheism, Indifferentism, Errors on the rights of the Church, Errors on natural and Christian Ethics, Errors on Christian Matrimony, Errors on the Pope's Civil Princedom, Errors referred to contemporary Liberalism.

The *Syllabus* was drawn up in the careful and technical phraseology of official Rome. It is not too much to say that the great bulk of condemnations in its propositions were merely statements of those principles without which the Catholic or even the Christian position would be an absurdity. Such are

all seven of the propositions under the first head—some of which are, from the Christian standpoint, mere truisms. Thus the sixth proposition condemns the assertion that "the faith of Christ is opposed to human reason, and divine revelation not only does not profit but injures the perfection of man." Again the opinion is condemned in the seventh proposition that "Jesus Christ himself is a mythical invention." Again the third section on Indifferentism for the most part only states the Church's claim to be the one true Church, and not on a level with other religious institutions. So too in the fifth section such a condemnation as the following is the statement of a truism for Catholics. Those are condemned who deny that "the Church has the power of defining dogmatically that the Catholic religion only is the true religion" (prop. 21). Again those are condemned (prop. 37) who advocate the institution of "national Churches removed and plainly divided from the control of the Roman Pontiff."

The errors in Ethics again in the 7th section are generally such as all Christians and most Theists must condemn. One proposition condemns rebellion against lawful princes. Another denies that "might is right" ("authority is nothing else but the sum of number and material force") and such instances might be further multiplied.

The world, however, is ruled, as Lord Beaconsfield has said, by imagination and not reason; at all events it is so ruled for the time even in matters in which reason ultimately prevails. The publication of the Encyclical and the *Syllabus* was promoted and their appearance hailed by men who did not disguise their thoroughgoing opposition to modern civilisation and modern science. These men interpreted them in their own way. The condemnations of Liberalism were hailed as the deathblow to the *Correspondant* and to the school of Montalembert. They were claimed by the party of Louis Veuillot as a triumph for their own views, and to the world at large, who did not read the documents with care and had not that acquaintance with theological tradition which was required to understand their drift, they appeared to be simply a declaration of war on modern society. It was useless that Foisset, theologian and lawyer, noted at once that the *Syllabus* "contains nothing whatever that is new" (Letter to M.

Douhaire, 4th of January 1865), or that M. de Falloux, with a statesman's calm, saw that the Encyclical's condemnation of extreme Liberalism "imposes nothing which was not already imposed on the exercise of our rights as citizens" (Letter to Foisset, January 1865). Such statements were remembered and understood when the storm had passed. But at the moment all that was seen was that the party of Veuillot and Gaume, men who were known as the embodiment of the aggressive attitude of the extreme Ultramontanes, had persuaded the Pope to fulminate eighty propositions against the "errors" of the age, that was of course against the commonplaces of modern life. The *Syllabus* condemned modern science and civilisation; each proposition was more preposterous than its predecessor.

The irreligious press in France had, as M. Boissard, the biographer of Foisset, notes, condemned both documents before their appearance as "a declaration of war against society"; and when they appeared it at once claimed the fulfilment of its prophecy. "La presse irréligieuse," he writes, "en fait grand bruit, le representant comme le divorce définitive du catholicisme avec le monde moderne, comme l'acte de décès de l'église." This view was widely accepted without question.

The English press for the most part echoed the sentiments of the French indifferentists. In England, moreover, where circumstances made it hard to realise that a vindication of the rights of the Holy See meant to a great extent the vindication of the claims of Christianity against a rising generation of uncompromising opponents, the vehemence of the Pope's attitude and the frequency and elaboration of his censures—emphasised in this *résumé*—were attributed to pure fanaticism. What other account was to be given of such elaborate condemnations of modern "errors," at a time when scientific truth was achieving its greatest triumphs, and civilisation had reached a perfection hitherto unknown? Years later acceptance of the *Syllabus* was spoken of in a public controversy, by a man of literary eminence, as placing his opponent outside the pale of rational discussion. The world enjoyed an ignorant guffaw, and it was probably not until the publication, ten years later, of Cardinal Newman's letter in answer to Mr. Gladstone's expostulation, that it was understood that much both of the *Syllabus* and of

the Encyclical was merely a protest against the extreme of religious indifferentism so prevalent on the Continent, and against the principles of the Revolution.[1]

Some of the Pope's strictures, which were received at the time with the most intense scorn, have since been in great measure accepted by the civilised world. Note the language, a few months since, of a French Republican premier, which was endorsed by many of our generation in England. "Liberty of speech and of the pen," said M. Loubet, "has prostituted the cause of liberty . . . we are to-day suffering for the faults of our predecessors, who for a long succession of years allowed everything to be done and said." To the same effect was the prophecy of Pius IX. in the sixties, and it was received with scorn as the language of an antiquated reactionary. The theory of universal toleration, which Johnson had treated a hundred years earlier as an absurdity, was regarded as an axiom by the world at large at that time. It was stigmatised as a *deliramentum* by the Pope, and the English and continental press laughed at him. The more careful logic of our own day sees that Dr. Johnson and the Pope had something to say for themselves. There are now many thinkers who agree with Mr. Balfour[2] that as an absolute and unrestricted theory the claim for "liberty of conscience" cannot possibly be maintained. Pio Nono was going in the teeth of a very strong current of opinion, which was too sanguine and enthusiastic to be exact, and which mistook itself for a newly-found science of the laws of progress and civilisation.

An additional cause of the excitement produced by these documents was the fact that while Veuillot's friends were ready with their extreme interpretations, the party which was looked on as the more reasonable Catholic party — the school of Montalembert — had to support the consequences of that orator's hasty statements at Malines, and were not able in an instant to unite in such a view of the bearing of the documents

[1] It was characteristic of the determination to construe the papal condemnations of abstract principles as denunciations of modern civilisation itself, that a French journal rendered one of the headings of the *Syllabus* which, in the original Latin was "Errors concerning civil society" (de societate civili), as "Errors of civil society."

[2] See Address on "Progress."

on their position as could make itself intelligible in a moment of excitement. The most immediately practical condemnation was that of the modern liberties, and these were the very subject of Montalembert's speech. We have already seen that the conductors of the *Correspondant* did not accept Montalembert's statements, and the division necessarily caused confusion and hesitation.

Dupanloup did, however, within a few days speak on this point; and the position of his friends was vindicated for those who took the trouble to read what he said. He explained in a commentary on the Encyclical that the Church ever preserved a certain ideal, and that the condemnation of modern Liberalism, as an ideal opposed to the Catholic, was in no way inconsistent with the permission to Catholic citizens to adapt themselves to modern conditions as a practical necessity and as the most desirable policy. This commentary was approved in Rome,[1] and though prejudice on all sides was too active to ensure its acceptance by public opinion at the time, when the storm had subsided its common sense was understood. Indeed here, as in the controversies on classical education and on the Falloux law, official Rome abstained most carefully, as M. Boissard has pointed out, from giving any judgment against the school of Montalembert, or from identifying itself with Veuillot's personal quarrels.

A few facts will illustrate the state of things—the attitude of the school of Veuillot on the one hand, and of the Pope on the other—towards the representative Liberal Catholics of France.

The *Univers*, and its successor the *Monde*, in order to leave Montalembert and his friends no loophole for escape, systematically identified political with religious Liberalism. As early as 1852 Veuillot had written, "It has been said that the parliamentary system rests on an heretical principle; whatever desire we have to avoid all exaggeration we think that this is not to say enough." And now when Dupanloup and Foisset were endeavouring by careful theological explanations to show that

[1] Mr. Ward pointed out, however, that although the Pope endorsed Dupanloup's correction of the false interpretations of the Encyclical and *Syllabus*, he evidently wished him to emphasise more positively the unchristian principles against which they were designed as a protest.

to condemn the indifferentist ideal was not to forbid Catholics to adopt the institutions of the modern world, or to sympathise with true liberty, the *Monde* used its best endeavours to cut off this avenue of escape. Using language which seems strange indeed in days when the Holy See is exhorting Catholic France to put aside its monarchical prejudices and to co-operate heartily with the Republican system, the *Monde* wrote in January 1865, "Every Liberal being a partisan of Liberalism falls necessarily under the reprobation of the Encyclical. In vain will equivocation be attempted, by distinguishing the *true* Liberal and the *false* Liberal. . . . Let it not be said that there are many ways of understanding this word 'Liberalism.'" And again, "The Church condemns Protestantism and it condemns Liberalism; that is enough." And a month later, "There would be danger in making a distinction between good and bad Liberalism. It is as if one wished to distinguish between good and bad Protestantism."[1]

It was with unanswerable force that Dupanloup, in recalling these passages, contrasted them with Pius IX.'s own language on the subject. He cited the celebrated Allocution *Jamdudum cernimus*, in which the Pope referred to his own attempt to found a Liberal administration in Rome, and in which he declared that the Church was now as ever the friend of true liberty and civilisation. "Vera restituantur rerum nomina" the Pope wrote; and as in his later Encyclical he condemned "liberty of conscience" not in the sense of true liberty, but as embodying the indifferentist principles of godless governments, so he carefully indicates in this Allocution the difference between the irreligious Liberalism and civilisation which he condemns, and the sympathy with freedom which is at once compatible with Catholic tradition, and had been sanctioned by his own example.

And while Veuillot and the *Monde*, neglecting the Pope's own explanations, persisted in attributing to him an indiscriminate condemnation of every kind of Liberal and Liberalism, Abbé Gaume used even stronger language in a pamphlet which he published a little later called *Le Catéchisme du Syllabus.*

This pamphlet was sold at a low price with the avowed object of circulation among all the faithful. While professing

[1] *Monde*, 10th January and 7th February 1865.

to give the teaching of the *Syllabus*, its author introduced a chapter on Liberal Catholicism,—a subject not mentioned in the *Syllabus* at all,—and cited the very title of Montalembert's speech, "L'église libre dans l'état libre," as embodying a favourite principle of the men whom the Catechism declared to have been condemned in that pronouncement. Montalembert, who had done more than any man living for Catholicism in France, and whose loyalty to the Holy See was proverbial, was in this handbook classed among "hypocrites who wish, like the Jansenists, to remain in the bosom of the Church without belonging to it,"[1] and "persons whom one cannot absolve any more than one can absolve the plague."

On the other hand, Pio Nono expressly denied that his condemnation of the modern liberties was aimed at Montalembert's speech. No doubt the enemies of that orator had their share in pressing for a pronouncement on the subject; but the Pope stated, some months after the appearance of the Encyclical, that he had not read the speech. "Here it is," he remarked to Mr. Monsell, pointing to a presentation copy which he had received from Montalembert himself, "it cannot have been condemned if I have not read it; for I am the Captain of the Ship." Pius IX.'s anger at Montalembert's attitude in 1870 is well known, and it is the more necessary to call attention to M. Gaume's invention with reference to their earlier relations.

However, neither the Pope's approbation of Foisset and Dupanloup, nor his refusal to admit that Montalembert was condemned, prevailed for the moment over the outcry of the two extreme parties which for opposite reasons wished to emphasise the same opinion. "When the Encyclical appeared," wrote Dupanloup, "have we not had in fact the sorrow of seeing the former conductors of the *Univers* . . . agree with the *Siècle* and its friends in inflicting on the Holy Father and the Church the injury of the same interpretation of it?" The irreligious world and the *Monde* alike would have it that Rome had condemned the only Catholics who were tolerable to modern society, and had declared war to the death on all that was congenial to the modern world. And public opinion, which could more readily understand such wholesale and indis-

[1] *Catéchisme du Syllabus*, p. 86.

criminate assertions than the subtler distinctions of Dupanloup or Foisset, adopted this view.

And now began in earnest the struggle of opinion which culminated in the Vatican decree of 1870. Apart altogether from the extreme Liberals whose leaders ultimately refused to accept the definition, there were, in France, Germany, and England, large numbers of representative Catholics who looked with great regret on the interpretations of the *Syllabus* and Encyclical which gave them the colour of a declaration of war against modern civilisation. These men represented various shades of opinion, ranging from the six hundred and thirty bishops who gave in writing their adhesion to Dupanloup's pamphlet on the Encyclical,[1] to the comparatively small number who, when the Vatican definition was officially proposed, declared themselves to be Inopportunists. In England, as elsewhere, this temper of mind did not at first show itself in an attitude of aversion to the definition. Its most distinguished representative, Cardinal Newman, said, shortly before the Council, "The thing we have to be anxious about is not that there should be no definition, but what the definition will be."[2] The doctrine in question was received already with practical unanimity by nearly all of Catholic Christendom. "Scarcely any one appeared to be a Gallican," wrote M. Albert Dechamps, "before the controversy was raised on occasion of the Council." The effect of the definition on Catholics themselves, if it merely condemned Gallicanism, would be practically the introduction of nothing new.[3] Its effect on the outside world was a matter which subsequent events made a more anxious consideration.

The real contest, then, among those who were on either side true and loyal Catholics, was, at starting, between the men like Veuillot, who seemed to fear no extreme so long as it was in the direction of emphasising the papal prerogatives and amplifying papal condemnations, and those who felt strongly,

[1] See *Vie de Dupanloup*, par L'abbé Lagrange, vol. ii. p. 473 (troisième édition).

[2] Both Mr. Aubrey de Vere and Lord Emly testify to the Cardinal's language to this effect; and the fact that he used it to each on separate occasions, and that in speaking to the present writer each referred to the subject, without knowledge of the other's testimony, seems to place the Cardinal's attitude beyond question.

[3] So also remarks Cardinal Newman. See Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 342.

with Cardinal Newman, the danger of exaggerations, and dreaded the insuperable barrier which they might erect between the Church and the modern world. In the sphere of theological opinion the main difference in its final analysis was between those who emphasised the "means of assistance" of which the Vatican decree speaks—the theological advice, the consulting the church, the convention of councils, with the aid of which the Pontiff defines.—and those who emphasised the prerogative manifested in the final definition. The latter class dwelt on the papal claims. The former class dwelt on the machinery of the *Schola Theologorum*, and the influence of the Episcopate, as the natural protection against the absolutism which Protestants ascribe to the papacy in the exercise of its functions, and the visible contradiction of such exaggerations of its powers as those of the *Univers*. It was not at first a controversy between Liberals and Ultramontanes, nor between Inopportunists and Definitionists.[1] It was only when the definition appeared for a time (humanly speaking) to portend the triumph of the "extreme" advocates of the papal claims, that a considerable section of the more moderate party became "Inopportunists," and that Ward on the other hand was an "Opportunist." Many, like Newman, who had no sympathy with the democratic tendency which was often ascribed to the French Liberal Catholics, and who were known to have even been defenders of papal Infallibility, united with the Liberals in opposing the friends of M. Veuillot.

M. Veuillot, who was in no sense a trained theologian, had used language in the *Univers* which must be recalled, as it is otherwise quite impossible to understand either the strenuous opposition of men like Newman and Dupanloup, or the extraordinary exaggerations still current among men of the world as to the meaning of the dogma of Infallibility. In defiance of the commonplace of theology that the protection of the Pope from error in formal definitions is not "inspiration" but only Providential "assistance," and that the ordinary means made use of by the Pope in ascertaining the truth are, correlatively, the regular scientific processes of theological investigation,

[1] We may remind ourselves that those who thought the definition opportune or the reverse were known as "definitionists" (or "opportunists)," and "inopportunists."

or consulting the Episcopate whether in Council or otherwise, he boldly used the following words in a pamphlet called *L'illusion Liberale:* "We all know certainly only one thing, that is that no man knows anything except the Man with whom God is for ever, the Man who carries the thought of God. We must . . . unswervingly follow his *inspired* directions" (*ses directions inspirés*). Following out this same line the *Univers* laughed at the *Correspondant* for dwelling on the careful and prolonged discussions which were in point of fact so marked a feature in the Council. "The *Correspondant* wants them to discuss," wrote Veuillot, "and wishes the Holy Ghost to take time in forming an opinion. It has a hundred arguments to prove how much time for reflection is indispensable to the Holy Ghost."

Carrying out the spirit of this conception, of which Dupanloup said that it had the same relation to sound theology that the nostrums of a quack have to medicine, the *Univers* indulged in language about the Holy Father which seemed to many Catholics positively profane. In October 1869 it applied to him the words of the Apostle in which our Lord is spoken of as "much higher than the heavens." In the same month it printed in a hymn, addressed to Pius IX., words almost identical with those addressed by the Church to the Holy Ghost on Whitsunday—

Pater pauperum,
Dator munerum,
Lumen cordium,
Emitte cœlitus
Lucis tuæ radium.

In the following month came a version of the hymn beginning—

Rerum Deus tenax vigor

with the word "Pius" substituted for "Deus" (*Univers*, 21st and 28th October and 8th November).

Such was the language which led to Cardinal Newman's famous letter to Bishop Ullathorne, in which he spoke of the injury done by Veuillot to the Catholic cause. Dupanloup concentrated the grievances of many years into the *Avertissement* which he addressed to Veuillot himself, in which pain and indignation speak audibly. "The moment has come," he wrote,

"to defend ourselves against you. I raise then, in my turn, my voice . . . I charge you with usurpations on the Episcopate, with perpetual intrusion in the most delicate matters, I charge you above all with your excesses in doctrine, your deplorable taste for irritating questions, and for violent and dangerous solutions. I charge you with accusing, insulting, and calumniating your brethren in the faith. None have merited more than you that severe word of the Sacred Books 'Accusator fratrum.' Above all I reproach you with making the Church participate in your violences, by giving as its doctrines, with rare audacity (*par une rare audace*), your most personal ideas."

There can be no question that Mr. Ward and other Ultramontanes suffered in popular estimation from association with the general line of the *Univers;* and it is necessary to mark off clearly his position from Veuillot's. While agreed with him in pressing the ethos of de Maistre, and the spirit of unreserved loyalty to Rome, his logic was throughout far more cautious. From the beginning of the contest both the *Dublin Review* and the *Civilta Cattolica* had been careful to draw the distinction between the practical advocacy of the modern liberties and the extremes of theoretical Liberalism,—a distinction which, as we have seen, M. Veuillot treated with scorn; and Ward's eulogies of Montalembert had been as frequent as Veuillot's sneers. And when the question of Infallibility came on the *tapis* it need not be said that the theological training of many years kept Mr. Ward clear of the language on papal inspiration which Dupanloup criticised with such severity in Veuillot; while rhetorical adulation was foreign to his tastes and habits. Most of all did he differ from the *Univers* in his attitude towards the Bishops which was one of unmixed loyalty. In point of fact he came across the *Univers* too seldom to be aware of its extravagances, and was consequently unfamiliar with one chief cause of irritation against the school to which in some sense he belonged.

He did, however, in opposition both to Dupanloup and to Newman, press to its consequences de Maistre's temper of unreserved sympathy with Rome, by a full and in some degree aggressive interpretation of its teaching. And he acted with those who emphasised the papal prerogative itself rather than

the scientific means which the Pope is accustomed to use for his assistance. When the *Syllabus* appeared, he urged that it was beyond doubt infallible, and rejoiced in the wide field to which he held that its teaching extended. "Friend and foe," he wrote, "have been alike struck with the extent of ground which it covers." And when it was evident that theologians would, as Dupanloup had done, limit carefully the extent of its claim to determine Catholic belief, he appealed to the example of Rome itself as justifying a more stringent view. "Our one model as to the suitable manner of accepting the *Syllabus*," he wrote, "is most assuredly the way in which it was accepted in Rome under the very eye of the sovereign pontiff."[1] He describes, in a remarkable passage, the principle in which he embodies unmistakably the ethos of de Maistre —a principle which he truly says "lies to so great an extent at the root" of the differences between his own views and those of the more moderate Divines.

> In practice, he is the best Christian who is not content with obeying a direct command; but carefully considers what God may wish and desire at his hands. In like manner I would submit he is in doctrine the best Catholic who is not content with believing what the Church directly requires, but labours to bring his intellect into increasing harmony with her mind and spirit. The Apostles deposited a vast and multifarious tradition within the Church's bosom, which has been developed and matured under her fostering care. *By God's unfailing promise this tradition is ever preserved in unsullied purity by the local Church of Rome, to which Church, because of her* potentior principalitas, *all others are to look for doctrinal guidance.* He is in doctrine the best Catholic who, by surrendering himself unreservedly to the Church's moral and spiritual atmosphere, by watching every indication of her mind, *by studying the exhibition of Christian truth at the feet of the Sovereign Pontiff in Rome, its fountain head*—embraces and appropriates the largest portion of genuine Apostolical tradition.[2]

Carrying out this principle Mr. Ward pointed out that Pius IX. had often criticised interpretations of his teaching, on the ground that they minimised its import, but never on the ground that they exaggerated it. The fullest interpretation

[1] A second Letter to Father Ryder (Burns and Oates), p. 69.
[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 27.

of papal utterances, then, and the closest attention to the spirit of the local Church of Rome, were the marks of true Catholic loyalty.

Again the guidance of the Pope may be sought by the average layman directly, and not through the medium of the Theological School. "It has been implied before now," he wrote, "that the faithful can never hear their Pastor's voice except through the medium of theologians": and he opposes such a view by his own statement that "it will happen again and again that those who may have received no theological education, but who look with humility and simplicity to the Holy See for guidance, will apprehend the teaching of that See far more accurately than many a theologian who is twisted by an unconscious bias in his dealing with Pontifical acts" (*Dublin Review*, vol. xxv. pp. 285 *seq.*) He cited a letter of the Holy Father to some Belgian laymen, in which he congratulated them on their "explaining" the papal decisions "in the purity of their original sense" against Catholics who explained them away, as a proof that the Pope did not look on such decisions as matters for theologians only to interpret. And he maintained that, far from the principle being true that the Pope should be interpreted by theologians, it was rather theologians who should be interpreted by the Pope.[1] He thus worked out to its limit that conception of the directness of the relations between the ordinary Christian and the central authority, which de Maistre and Lamennais had begun early in the century to inculcate on Gallican France, and which took Lamennais and Lacordaire to Rome in 1831.

Cardinal Newman, on the other hand, while enforcing strenuously the duty of loyalty to papal authority, and of studying the mind of the Church as well as the letter of her doctrine, differed markedly from Mr. Ward as to the manner in which that mind was to be ascertained. While Ward bid Catholics accept the *Syllabus* in the spirit in which it was accepted in Rome, Newman noted emphatically the contrast between the "pure and serene atmosphere" of the rock of Peter at its summit, and the "malaria" of imprudence which, human nature being what it is, might be found in Rome itself;

[1] See Letter from Father Ryder (Longmans), p. 21.

and warned his readers against accepting the interpretation put on the *Syllabus* by "light-minded men" even though these men were Romans.[1] Again, while Ward treated the authoritative utterances of Rome as simply so much addition to positive scientific theology, and as the basis for copious deductive reasoning, Newman appears, as we have seen, to have viewed the action of the Roman Church as in great measure negative —the curbing of excess, the pruning of incidental error—and urged the necessity of a careful scientific interpretation of papal utterances before their exact force could be determined.[2]

The working of individual minds throughout the Church in forming Catholic thought appeared to him to be insufficiently realised by Mr. Ward. The theological analysis of revealed truth was ultimately defined by Rome, but it did not therefore necessarily originate there. Rome had constantly adopted thoughts which were first formulated by Greeks or Africans. To view the local Roman Church, then, as embodying necessarily the best theological thought at a given time, was to claim for her more than she claimed for herself.

So, too, to interpret papal teaching in the fullest sense of which the words admitted would be to go beyond the intention of Rome. The condemnation of some propositions is expressly the condemnation of exaggerations, and to interpret such condemnation in its most extensive sense is to condemn the truths of which they are exaggerations. Again, propositions may be condemned in the special sense in which they are used in a certain book, and yet may be in an obvious sense quite harmless and true. To use such condemnations as the inculcation of principles, to be applied without reserve and freely reasoned

[1] Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 297.

[2] On the first point, let us recall what has already been cited from the *Apologia*. It has been said, Newman tells us, that the "Roman Church . . . has originated nothing, and has only served as a sort of *remora* or break in the development of doctrine. And it is an objection which I really embrace as a truth; for such I conceive to be the main purpose of its extraordinary gift . . . The great luminary of the western world is, as we know, St. Augustine; he, no infallible teacher, has formed the intellect of Christian Europe; indeed, to the African Church generally we must look for the best early exposition of Latin ideas." On the necessity of scientific interpretation, some of the strongest passages are to be found in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, see pp. 176, 279, 280, 296, 307, 321, 332, 333, 334, 338.

on in their strongest interpretation, would be, therefore, inexact and misleading.[1] Again, in the *Syllabus* there was a further reason against a full or a popular interpretation, namely, that the propositions had reference to condemnations made in special circumstances by the Pope.[2] Those circumstances had to be taken into account before the force of the condemnations could be determined. On these principles Newman advocated "a wise and gentle minimism,"[3] in interpreting Roman teaching, as the duty of those who are determining what is of obligation in belief, as distinguished from those opinions which are prompted by piety.

But, in truth, the fundamental question in the controversy had relation to the function of trained theologians in the economy of the Church. This, with the moderate party, was very important, with Mr. Ward comparatively unimportant. Mr. Ward held that the exact claim of a Pontifical utterance, and its import, were easily ascertainable by a man of fair ability from the Pope's own words. And we do not find in his writings much emphasis laid on the elaborate preparation of the official utterances of Rome by the Pope's theological advisers. Papal infallibility meant that the Pope taught, and the faithful believed. The Pope and the faithful were the two important factors in the whole theory of a teaching Church. Newman, on the other hand, never forgetting the human aids used by the Pope in determining *what* was the teaching of the Church, and the human media whereby the faithful ascertained *what* was taught, looked at Ward's analysis as incomplete and unpractical. And this view was urged, in one shape or another, by such writers as Father Ryder, Dupanloup, Père Daniel the Jesuit, and Bishop Fessler, Secretary-General to the Vatican Council.

The ultimate judgment of a theological discussion rested of course with the Pope, as the Crown and Parliament are supreme, not only over the nation, but inclusively over the legal profession. But it was for theologians to supply materials for a decision, and to interpret decrees of the supreme authority when framed, both as to their meaning and as to their binding force; as it is for specialists and lawyers to supply the

[1] Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 295.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 28. [3] *Ibid.* p. 339.

help necessary both in framing and in interpreting Acts of Parliament. "It is for theologians to discuss," Father Ryder wrote to Ward, "and for the Pope to decide. But when you go on to tell me that I must interpret theologians by the Pope I am simply aghast. I had always imagined the very object of the *Schola* to be that it should interpret the positive theology; the matter of which latter is Scripture, and the decrees of Councils and Popes. You might as well find fault with me for interpreting Scripture by the Fathers instead of the Fathers by Scripture."

In a similar spirit wrote Cardinal Newman. "None but the *Schola Theologorum* is competent to determine the force of papal and synodal utterances"; and again, "[The Church] only speaks when it is necessary to speak; but hardly has she spoken out magisterially some general principle when she sets her theologians to work to explain her meaning in the concrete, by strict interpretation of its wording, by the illustration of circumstances, by the recognition of exceptions," etc. So, too, the learned Jesuit, Père Daniel, protested against using the Encyclical and *Syllabus* as popular documents to be read by the average layman, when in fact they needed the interpretation of experts. "L'Encyclique," he wrote, "n'est pas un enseignement populaire: elle s'adresse principalement à l'épiscopat, aux membres du clergé, auxquels il appartient d'en pénétrer le sens à l'aide de leurs connoissances spéciales, et de l'enseigner aux fidèles" (*Etudes Réligieuses*, October 1868).

It must be borne in mind that Ward repeatedly explained his constant enforcement of the necessity of attending to the Pontifical Acts themselves, as being for the sake of men who were actually disloyal. He considered the appeal to theologians to be a common form of subterfuge parallel to O'Connell's boast that he could "drive a coach and four through any Act of Parliament." A clever specialist could evade any decree. He represented the appeal as implying that "in the days of Jansenism, *e.g.*, ordinary laymen had no means of knowing that their assent was required to the dogmatic fact about Jansenius until theologians had said their last word on the subject." Again, men bent on a lax view might take advantage of the eccentricity of some one theologian, and give on his authority an

unnatural interpretation to a decree whose sense was clear enough. It was obvious that the appeal to theologians was capable of being travestied and abused. Ward was vividly impressed by the dangers incidental to neglecting or opposing papal guidance, and pressed the Pope's own words as a landmark, which, if kept in sight, would be a standing rebuke to uncandid evasion. They should act, he held, as a warning to any loyal-minded man against subterfuge and biassed interpretations to which those might have recourse who disliked the decisions of Rome, and really wished only for an excuse to oppose them.

Newman, who did not deny that men might seek to evade their duty by an uncandid use of theological opinion, as an unscrupulous man can abuse and exaggerate any truth, sought the remedy in a direction different from Ward's theory. The remedy must lie, not in ignoring or making little of what was in its place so necessary as the guidance of the members of the theological school, but in urging in addition a spirit of loyalty to the Holy See. "To be a true Catholic," he wrote, "a man must have a generous loyalty towards ecclesiastical authority, and accept what is taught him with what is called the *pietas fidei;* and only such a tone of mind has a claim, and it certainly has a claim, to be met and handled with a wise and gentle minimism." The constitutional provisions in the Church—which included the varieties of theological interpretation—were essential as a protection against the unwarrantable dogmatism of individuals, just as a scientific moral theology is required to prevent tyranny in the Confessional. A Confessor, we know, on the principles of "probabilism," is not allowed to impose as of obligation anything which theologians of weight deny to be obligatory. But, none the less, as probabilism may be made a cloak for laxity, so minimism in dogma may be an excuse for rebellion. The remedy in each case is not to make little of the value of theological authority, but to preach against the use of it in an uncandid or disloyal spirit; not to lay down as of strict obligation what grave theologians called in question, but to warn people against confining themselves to what is of strict obligation, and against evading the meaning of the Holy See on the strength of a theological opinion which really does not carry sufficient weight.

Coming then to the actual question of the enforcement by the *Dublin Review* of a stringent view as to the obligations imposed by papal decrees, Newman criticised it as tyrannical. He urged upon a Catholic theological writer an attitude in some sense similar to that of the Confessor. He bade him not urge as obligatory what grave theologians questioned, though he should exhort to the spirit of loyal obedience. Mr. Ward, on the other hand, taking the view that the Pope himself desired a full and not a minimistic interpretation, and looking on a Catholic writer as bound in loyalty to second the Pope's wishes, maintained that if a writer thought it clear that a decree did in the Pope's intention impose a certain obligation, he was right in saying so, even although grave theologians thought otherwise. Thus the ultimate point at which such different lines of policy began to diverge was that Newman said, "Say if you like 'I think this is the true interpretation,' but do not impose it on others as obligatory, if grave theologians think differently"; while Ward replied, "If I think it is infallibly true, and part of the Church's teaching, I think it is obligatory; and I say so, as the Pope wishes me to. I do not impose it on my own *ipse dixit*, or assuming any authority, but I give the reasons which convince me."

And these two attitudes were in reality almost inseparable from their respective modes of approaching the decrees. If the average layman is competent to go straight to the Pope's words, he will probably be able to weigh the Dublin Reviewer's reasons for this or that interpretation; and reasoning which he can understand cannot well be tyrannous. But if the theological knowledge necessary for an exact interpretation and determination of their binding force, is only the property of a few, the vehement inculcations of an opinion as obligatory under sin have the effect, as Newman says, of tyranny. The average layman, being unequal to weighing the argument, is told by an expert in the chief Catholic *Review* what he must believe; and the theological expert is to him a natural exponent of the Church's voice in dogma as the Confessor is in morals. This being so it became practically, in Newman's view, unjust and intolerant in Mr. Ward to urge his interpretation in such a way as to lead others to suppose it to be an undoubted expression of the Church's teaching, and

without letting it be fully apparent that persons of equal authority thought otherwise.

Ward's views on the extent of infallibility, expounded first in the English essays already named, were summed up in a pamphlet called *De infallibilitatis extensione*, published in Latin in March 1869, shortly before the Vatican Council. In this pamphlet he developed the consequences of his special method of finding in the Pope's own words a sufficient criterion of the precise degree of authority with which he speaks, a method which enabled him to dismiss for the most part the formal tests advocated by many theologians for the determining whether the Pope was in this or that case speaking *ex Cathedrâ* or infallibly. He maintained that if the Pope intimated in any way that he was guiding the belief of all the faithful and not simply inculcating a precept of discipline, his teaching was infallible.[1] He then explained that there were many papal utterances — some addressed only to private individuals — in which this condition was fulfilled, and maintained that their infallibility was *ipso facto* decisively proved. Both the infallible teaching and the proof that it was infallible teaching were thus to be looked for in the Pope's own words.[2]

This pamphlet giving, as it did, theological form to views of the same tendency as Veuillot's, with something of Veuillot's rhetoric, although far more moderate in their logic, and being, moreover, accessible to all as written

[1] The exact degree to which he pressed this opinion varied. In his English controversies he maintained without reserve that when "the Pope teaches all the faithful in a doctrinal exposition what is to be held by them as certain, he is by that very fact to be held to speak *ex Cathedrâ*." He found, however, that Perrone and other Roman theologians denied this when he wrote for their opinion. They maintained that the Pope might be speaking not as universal Doctor, but as universal Ruler (*Gubernator*). Ultimately Mr. Ward limited his proposition to cases where the Pope exacted "entirely absolute interior assent." (Cf. *De infallibilitatis extensione*, p. 38, and *Doctrinal Authority*, pp. 433 and 435.)

[2] Mr. Ward lays down the following among the "fundamental principles" assumed in his pamphlet. "If we desire to know the extent of the Pope's infallibility we have only to inquire what extent of infallibility the Pope claims for himself in practice. In whatever decrees the Pope binds the faithful to yield interior and entirely absolute assent, of these decrees he practically teaches and professes the infallibility." It will be noted that although this is a less stringent view than his earlier one, it still finds the great test of infallibility in a form of the Pope's own words, which his critics considered not sufficiently significant to constitute a practical test in very many cases.

in the official language of the Church, was taken up by Dupanloup in conjunction with some of Archbishop Manning's pastorals, and vehemently attacked by him. Dupanloup, as is well known, was in frequent communication with Newman and other eminent representatives of the "moderate" party, and he brought out clearly the central matters on which the difference turned.

He published in November 1869 a letter to his clergy on the approaching Council. Echoing the complaint of the Jesuit Père Daniel in France, and of Father Ryder in England, he deprecated the fact that "intemperate journalists" insisted on "opening debates on one of the most delicate theological subjects, and answering beforehand in what sense the Council would decide and should decide." The public mind thus became filled with an extravagant and untheological idea of what papal infallibility meant; and the definition was inopportune because it would be utterly misunderstood. Statesmen would be alarmed, and would not have the theological knowledge to satisfy them in questions which would arise with very practical bearing on the safety of governments.

On se demandera sur quels objets s'exercera cette infaillibilité personnelle. Quand il n'y aurait que les matières mixtes où les conflits furent toujours si fréquents, quelles sont ici les limites? Qui les determinera? Le spirituel ne touche-t-il pas au temporel de tous côtés? Qui persuadera aux gouvernements que le pape ne passera plus, jamais, dans aucun entraînement du spirituel au temporel? Dès lors la proclamation du nouveau dogme, ne paraîtra-t-elle pas, non aux théologiens habiles, mais aux gouvernements, qui ne sont pas théologiens, consacrer dans le pape sur les matières peu définies et parfois non définissables une puissance illimitée, souveraine sur tous leurs sujets catholiques, et pour eux gouvernements, d'autant plus sujette aux ombrages, que l'abus leur paraitra toujours possible!

The fact that such impressions were due in part to the strong interpretations of the *Univers*, showed that the pretence of appealing to the Pope's words rather than to the explanations of theologians, was really the substitution of the explanations of Veuillot for those of theological experts. Interpretation and application of general decisions there must be, and Dupan-

loup held that they should be given by experts and not by writers without theological training.

Coming to Mr. Ward's special share in the controversy, the Bishop singled out primarily his contention that utterances not addressed to the whole Church might be infallible:—

Faut-il dans l'acte ex Cathedrâ que le Pape s'adresse à toute l'église? Oui, disent la plupart. Non, dit un anglais professeur laïque de Théologie . . . quand il ne parlerait qu'à un seul évêque ou même à un simple laïque il peut avoir voulu enseigner *ex Cathedrâ*. Et c'est assez. . . . M. Ward est un ancien ministre Anglican, converti, zélé catholique aujourd'hui, et qui a été, quoique laïque, professeur de théologie au grand séminaire de l'archevêché de Westminster. . . . Eh bien, alors faut-il au moins comme plusieurs le réclament pour qu'il n'y ait aucun doute sur son intention que le Pape définе la doctrine sous la sanction d'un anathème contre l'erreur? Ou suffit-il, comme d'autres le prétendent, qu'il exprime, d'une manière quelconque, son intention de faire un dogme?

And this last contention which was Mr. Ward's, the Bishop uncompromisingly condemns.

His language on another feature in Ward's pamphlet has an important bearing on the controversy. Ward had ascribed infallibility to a number of documents on the ground that they contained condemnations reproduced by the *Syllabus*, and he maintained that all Catholics were bound to believe this. Afterwards, in deference to the opinion of Roman theologians, he retracted the assertion that such a belief was of obligation.[1] Dupanloup at once seized on the retractation. If even a theological expert like Ward could make such a mistake how much more would others. What an argument for leaving so subtle a question to time, and to the safer process of discussion among theologians, whose ultimate decision would have the advantage of the fullest consideration of pros and cons! What a proof that a true view of papal infallibility was inseparable from the constitutional methods habitually employed! The Pope was indeed infallible; but the exact knowledge of what he taught infallibly, and when he taught infallibly, came to the faithful in the cases which his own words might well leave doubtful not through the rapid private judgment of an individual, however able, or of a public writer for his

[1] See *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority*, p. 462, note.

readers, but through the learning and knowledge of the great teaching Church as a whole. This important passage from the letter must be extracted in full:—

Qui décidera en fait que telle décision du Pape remplit toutes les conditions d'un décret ex Cathedrâ? Ce discernement sera-t-il facile? Non. C'est ce que reconnaissent de bonne foi les partisans les plus avancés de l'infaillibilité pontificale. Le théologien anglais Ward, par exemple, dit expressement "Puisque toutes les allocutions pontificales, toutes les lettres Apostoliques, même toutes les encycliques, ne contiennent pas des définitions *ex Cathedrâ, il faut regarder de près pour discerner d'une façon* suffisante quels sont ceux de ces actes où le souverain Pontife doit être censé parler *ex Cathedrâ*, et il faut y regarder dans les actes même *ex Cathedrâ*, c'est à dire dans les actes même infaillibles, pour bien discerner ce qu'il enseigne *ex Cathedrâ*, c'est à dire infailliblement."

Et ce discernement est si difficile parfois aux théologiens eux-mêmes, que M. Ward reconnaît avec une modestie qui l'honore avoir commis et opiniâtrement soutenu une grave mépris touchant la nature des actes pontificaux de diverses sortes, où avaient été flétries les propositions signalées plus tard dans une pièce récente émanée de Rome. Il avait cru et il affirmait que chacun des actes qui a fourni des propositions au recueil appelé *Syllabus*, devait être regardé par cela seul comme ayant le caractère d'un acte *ex Cathedrâ*: ce qu'il confesse maintenant avec franchise avoir été une grosse erreur. L'histoire ecclésiastique, du reste, est pleine de faits semblables. Qu'on se rappelle certains actes considérables des papes dans les temps passés, sur lesquels les théologiens ont tant disputé et disputent encore pour savoir s'ils sont, oui ou non, *ex Cathedrâ*. Quand le pape Etienne condamna saint Cyprien dans la question du baptême des hérétiques, a-t-il parlé *ex Cathedrâ?* Les uns affirment, les autres nient. . . . Qui décidera donc? L'Eglise. Il faudra donc souvent en revenir, de fait, à une décision de l'Eglise.

Here, then, Dupanloup indicated that important fact which Cardinal Newman has so constantly pointed out, and which was at the very root of the differences between the tendencies of these two schools. The function of the Church, as represented by the bishops and the theological school, in determining the force and interpreting the meaning of papal declarations, as well as in assisting the Pope in the deliberations previous to definitions, was, as we have seen, the point most insisted on by Newman and his friends. It was minimised and almost

denied by the *Univers*. Without it infallibility seemed to many indistinguishable from inspiration or revelation.[1]

What then was the issue of the Council in its relation to these differences? The materials for an answer have only been before the public a comparatively short time, although Cardinal Newman, with the intuition of genius, had in great measure given it by anticipation in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk in 1874. The full acts of the Council —an enormous Latin tome published as the 7th volume of the Jesuit Collectio Lacensis in 1890—give for the first time the record of the lengthy and involved deliberations on the definition, which occupied the committee for upwards of fifty sessions. I have, moreover, had access to an important private diary of one of the bishops belonging to the commission which framed the definition, parts of which only are embodied in the official record, and which adds details of great interest. It would repay us to go far into the whole question, but the scope of this work warns me to keep strictly to the matters in which Mr. Ward was concerned.

These were, as we have seen, primarily two:—(1) the opportuneness of the definition, and (2) the sphere to which

[1] This distinction was the turning point in the submission, three years later, of a chief opponent of the dogma. Père Gratry notes the moderation of the Vatican definition itself; and in describing the dogma as he had resisted it, and as it was represented beforehand by its extreme advocates, says: "Writers of a school which I thought excessive were undesirous of limitation to infallibility *ex Cathedrâ* as being too narrow"; he explains that a "personal" and "inspired" infallibility were represented as the objects of the definition. "I almost feared," he says, "a scientific infallibility, a political and governmental infallibility." Such a view of the case has been amply accounted for by the words already cited from the *Univers* and published on the eve of the Council. It was encouraged in the course of the Council itself, when M. Veuillot exhorted the Fathers to hasten on to the definition remarking that once this was achieved affairs could proceed much faster, as Pontifical bulls could take the place of conciliar deliberation. (*Univers*, 1870, 20th Feb.) So again a more distinguished organ of the extreme party was quoted by Bishop Dupanloup as saying, "When [the Pope] thinks it *is God who meditates in him.*" It was probably such language as this, joined to Veuillot's personal scurrility, which was the cause of Montalembert's opposition. "When I examine thoroughly," wrote his intimate friend, Madame Augustus Craven, "what made me cling so strongly to those who opposed [the definition], I find it was principally because of the manner, the odious and unchristian manner, in which it was defended by those who upheld it." And she mentions Veuillot and his friends as among the number.

infallibility extended, as well as the manner in which this should be ascertained by individual Catholics.

As to the first question no doubt is left by the records that an overwhelming majority were from the first in favour of the opportuneness of the definition. The doctrine itself was regarded as a matter practically decided; and it was denied by scarcely any Catholics in the years preceding the acrimonious controversies which dated from the appearance of the *Syllabus.* At the date of the Council itself only a small group questioned its opportuneness. This fact, sufficiently notorious before the publication of the acts of the Council, is in no way modified by them; and Mr. Ward claimed, in the attitude of the Fathers, a sanction for an important principle which he had urged—that the interests of truth were in such a case more important than the interests of peace.[1]

Next as to the second question on which Cardinal Newman laid so much stress—the extent of Pontifical infallibility, with the correlative question of the normal means whereby the faithful might ascertain what was taught as of obligation:—Did the decree involve a new estimate of the papal prerogative for any except Gallicans themselves? Did it give any countenance to the attitude of Veuillot, as represented in the citations I have given from the *Univers?* Did it make light of the share of the episcopate and of the *Schola Theologorum,* either in the deliberations which precede a definition or in the subsequent ascertainment of its scope? Did it imply that the Pope in his decisions acted apart from the Church? Did it tend to emancipate papal decisions from the control of precedent and tradition? Did it admit of the interpretation that God inspired the Pope, or revealed doctrine to the Pope, or did it on the contrary limit the divine assistance to the infallible security that he would never define *ex Cathedrâ* what was not the teaching of the Church?

Some of these questions, indeed, are such as no instructed Catholic would ask, but they are all put by educated men of the present time; and in many cases an answer is taken for granted which travesties the acts of the Council. Even for Catholics themselves some of the questions have an interest. The tendency towards centralisation has an attraction for many as

[1] See *Doctrinal Authority,* p. 38.

the opposite tendency has for others; and it will be instructive to note the bearing on these tendencies of parts of the deliberations and of the definition.

On some of these points the definition itself is very express; but its impressiveness is added to by a perusal of the preceding deliberations in the documents to which I have referred. The proposed definition having been discussed and weighed for the space of two months by the commission of bishops and theologians appointed for the purpose,[1] had actually been drafted and approved by the Pope, when Cardinal Bilio, the President of the commission, who avowed his wish to conciliate the party of Dupanloup,[2] on the 5th of May, unexpectedly opposed the formula as too strong. He urged that as the extent of the Church's infallibility had not yet been discussed, papal infallibility should only be defined as extending to definitions of "divine faith." He explained that of course he did not deny that the Pope was infallible in canonising saints, and in dogmatic facts; but he opposed extending the definition to these points. It was argued on the other hand by the supporters of the original formula that such a limitation as he proposed would appear to deny papal infallibility in dogmatic facts, which would open the door to great confusion. The session broke up in a tumult (*tumultuarie*).

Next day the eminent theologians, Perrone and Franzelin, were summoned, and a formula, limiting the scope of the definition as proposed, was passed with only two dissentients—Archbishop Manning and the Bishop of Ratisbonne.[3] On the 7th of May, after a conference between the Bishop of Ratisbonne and Franzelin, the difficulty in the matter of dogmatic facts[4] was allowed by the latter to have weight, and it was agreed by those present that the question of the extent of papal infallibility should simply be left with the statement that it was the same as that of the Church. Thus both a stricter and a laxer view of its extent

[1] This commission was officially styled "Deputatio pro rebus fidei."

[2] The diary already mentioned quotes a remark made by Cardinal Bilio when the inopportunists finally refused to accept any definition, "My hope of conciliating the opposing Fathers is disappointed."

[3] The diary adds that certain of the other Fathers, while voting for it in substance, wished for some modifications.

[4] Cardinal Manning told me that this was the chief difficulty they urged.

would be allowable. After much further discussion a formula by Kleutgen and Franzelin was submitted to the committee dealing with the extent of infallibility in the negative manner described, but with a most important addition of a "historical introduction," avowedly designed to prevent extreme interpretations of the decree. It was to show "in what manner the Roman Pontiffs had ever been accustomed to exercise the *magisterium* of faith in the Church"; and to prevent the fear lest "the Roman Pontiff could proceed (*procedere possit*) in judging of matters of faith without counsel, deliberation, and the use of scientific means." This introduction formed the basis of what was ultimately voted on at the public session of the Fathers on July the 18th, although the text of Franzelin and Kleutgen was not entirely approved.

The point was emphasised still further in one of the Annotations to the first draft of the new *formula*, proposed on the 8th of June, which formed the basis of further modifications. "It seemed useful," we read in this Annotation, "to insert in the Chapter some things adapted to the right understanding of the dogma, namely that the Supreme Pontiff does not perform his duty as teacher without intercourse and union (*sine commercio et unione*) with the Church."[1]

In the historical introduction, as finally published, the safeguard urged in this connection as necessary, was thus expressed: "The Roman Pontiffs, as the state of things and times has made advisable, at one time calling ecumenical councils or finding out the opinion of the Church dispersed throughout the world, at another by means of particular synods, at another using other means of assistance which Divine Providence supplied, have defined those things to be held which by God's aid they had known to be in agreement with sacred Scripture and the Apostolic traditions. For the Holy Ghost was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but that by His *assistentia* they might preserve inviolate, and expound

[1] It was evidently to these additions to the decree originally proposed that Bishop Ullathorne, the friend and Ordinary of Dr. Newman, refers in the following passage in his *Autobiography*, which follows his statement that he had intended to speak in favour of some change in the decree as originally proposed: "In fact the lines of explanation added to the decree before its promulgation accomplished all that I desired," p. 46.

faithfully the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles."

The deliberations of the Council were not published in Mr. Ward's lifetime, and he was far too careful a theologian to have at any time ignored the considerations set forth in the decree itself; and when they were urged as proofs that the Council had rejected his views on the extent of infallibility he was able to point to the fact that nothing had been ruled inconsistent with his teaching. Whatever his rhetoric had appeared to others to imply, his logic had gone no further than could be reconciled with the terms of the definition. The question, indeed, as to the extent of infallibility, as we have seen, was designedly left open. But the immense elaboration of the previous deliberations, as well as the text of the decree, were an impressive contradiction to the exaggerations of the school of the *Univers;* and they brought into relief the important *rôle* which the Church had played in those deliberations which issued in the definition, and must play in its interpretation. If it needed so much discussion among theologians to decide upon wording which was free from objection, how clear that what was worded so carefully and scientifically must be carefully and scientifically interpreted! While the decree condemned the Gallican view that the consent of the Church is the test of the validity of a definition, the Fathers enforced the share of the Church as represented by bishops, synods, and scientific theologians, in its framing, and, by consequence, the practical necessity of their aid in its interpretation, and in determining what was infallibly and irreformably decreed and what was not. That share Mr. Ward had never denied, but it was thought by many that his attitude tended to reduce to a minimum what both the theory and practice of the Council had recognised as so important.

Scarcely less important in the same direction was Bishop Fessler's pamphlet on *True and False Infallibility,* published soon after the Council. Bishop Fessler's work was welcomed by Newman as in sympathy with his own views; and in one point of importance the Bishop directly opposed Mr. Ward's line in the *Dublin Review.* He cited the opinion of "grave theologians" that the *Syllabus* was not issued *ex Cathedrâ.* Fessler was Secretary-General to the Vatican Council, and his

work was approved by the Pope. Mr. Ward pointed out that there was no proof that the Pope had examined it in detail; but the fact that while Fessler's official position lent so much authority to his words, they remained then and afterwards uncensured, seemed to many proof conclusive that Rome itself at the very least did not think it desirable to enforce a more stringent view.

Mr. Ward himself in later years, while retaining in the main his own views, considered that he had been in some respects too exacting. He has placed on record the fact that even before the Vatican Council eminent Roman theologians refused to endorse his theory in several particulars; and during the last years of his life he more than once reverted to the subject, and qualified his earlier teaching. "I have now no doubt," he wrote a year before his death, "that in various parts of my pamphlets I pressed one or two of my points much too far. . . . This was due in part, I take for granted, to the heat of polemics; but it is due still more (I think) to a certain hankering after premature logical completeness which I quite recognise as prominent among my intellectual faults." One noteworthy point on which he abandoned his original position was the assertion that the fact of the Pope's teaching all the faithful a doctrine as certain, was positive proof that he taught *ex Cathedrâ*. This position, which had been criticised as untenable by certain theologians of weight in the year of the Vatican Council, he definitely abandoned in 1881. He came to hold with Perrone that the Pope might be only expounding current Catholic teaching, and not exercising his prerogative of Universal Doctor. But if Ward had enforced his lesson of loyalty by means of a machinery which could not in all respects have stood the test of time after it had done its work, he had, nevertheless, in great measure gained his object. The party charged with disloyalty, against whom he was really writing, either accepted the decree with Gratry, or ceased to foster an anti-papal feeling among Catholics by excluding themselves from the Church with Döllinger. If his treatment had had, as he implies, some of the exaggeration, and over-stringent insistence on each detail of his scheme which the apostle of any movement is apt to fall into, he had some of the success of

an apostle. It was to the Ultramontane movement that, humanly speaking, the Council was due; and if that assembly did not ratify the technical details of his treatment, it brought about that spirit of deference to the Holy See, which he sought to obtain by means of a theory which he himself considered later on as too exacting. Unlike Veuillot, he had no love for the controversy, and he was only too glad to retire from it. He recognised that his main point was won; that the disloyal Liberals had lost their influence; and he ceased from pressing his views as he had done in earlier years. "The Council," he wrote, "taken in connection with some of its attendant circumstances, was (I think) the deathblow of that organised party in England which had been represented successively by the *Rambler*, the *Home and Foreign*, and the *North British*"; and consequently, "since the year 1870 I have written much less constantly and urgently than before on the extent of the Church's doctrinal authority. Circumstances of the moment have sometimes rendered it in some sense necessary to do so; but where there was no special pressure of circumstances I have commonly left the theme alone."

His services were appreciated in the quarter in which recognition was to him a reward unlike in kind to recognition from any one else. The Holy Father addressed a special brief to him on 4th July 1870, which was couched in the following terms:—

PIUS P.P. IX.

Beloved Son, health and Apostolic Benediction.

We congratulate thee, beloved son, that having been called into the light of God's sons, thou labourest to diffuse the same light over the minds of others; and that, having been received into the bosom of Holy Mother Church, thou studiest to exhibit and illustrate her holiness, and to assert the divine authority of her supreme Pastor, to vindicate his Prerogatives, to defend all his Rights. In this we see the nobleness of a mind which, having been drawn forcibly to the truth by mature examination, burns for it with more inflamed love, in proportion as it has gained it with greater labour; and occupies itself with extending further the received blessing with more intense effort, in proportion as (taught by its own experience) it accounts the condition of those in error more miserable. The unwearied labour with which, for many years past, thou hast applied all the gifts of ability, knowledge, erudition, eloquence, given thee by the Lord, to supporting the cause of our

most holy religion and of this Apostolic See, plainly shows the faith inherent in thy mind and the charity diffused in thy heart, whereby thou art pressed to redeem the past time, and to atone for any controversy formerly perhaps undertaken in behalf of error, by alacrity and strenuousness in defending truth. But since a sure reward is prepared for him who sows justice, and those who train many thereto shall shine like stars for ever and ever,—while we rejoice that thou thus wreathest for thyself a garland,—we exhort thee at the same time that thou pursue thy design, and continue to fight valiantly the Lord's battles; in order that thou mayest ever lead forward more into the way of truth, and mayest obtain for thyself a more splendid crown of eternal glory. We wish thee, therefore, the necessary strength for this, and supplicate copious helps of divine grace and all blessings; and as the foretaste of these and as a pledge of our paternal good-will, we very lovingly impart to thee the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's on the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, being the twenty-fifth of our Pontificate.

PIUS P.P. IX.

I subjoin some passages from private correspondence of these years illustrative of the attitude of Ward on the one hand, and of Newman and his immediate friends on the other, in reference to the questions raised by the Encyclical and *Syllabus* of 1864 and the Council of 1870. It will be observed that they tend to show that Newman's analysis of the controversy in the first letter which I cite was in great measure true. The differences in theological opinion appeared smaller and smaller as each side found opportunities for explaining itself fully, but the difference in ethos, and, as Mr. Ward himself expressed it later, in their views on "Ecclesiastical prudence," remained. From the first letter to the last, Newman's main grievance is Ward's identifying his own explanations, both of the force and of the meaning of Pontifical acts, with the acts themselves, and treating those who denied his statements as disloyal to the Pope.

The following letter gives the key to the situation. It was written immediately after the appearance of Father Ryder's criticism of Ward's views on infallibility:—

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM,
9th May 1867.

MY DEAR WARD—Father Ryder has shown me your letter, in which you speak of me; and though I know that to remark

on what you say will be as ineffectual now in making you understand me as so many times in the last fifteen years, yet, at least as a protest in memoriam, I will, on occasion of this letter and of your letter to myself, make a fresh attempt to explain myself. Let me observe then that in former years, *and now*, I have considered the theological differences between us as unimportant in themselves; that is, such as to be simply compatible with a reception both by you and by me of the whole theological teaching of the Church in the widest sense of the word teaching; and again now, and in former years too, I have considered one phenomenon in you to be "momentous," nay, portentous, that you will persist in calling the said unimportant, allowable, inevitable differences, which must occur between mind and mind, not unimportant, but of great moment. In this utterly uncatholic, not so much opinion as feeling and sentiment, you have grown in the course of years, whereas I consider that I remain myself in the same temper of forbearance and sobriety which I have ever wished to cultivate. Years ago you wrote me a letter, in answer to one of mine, in which you made so much of such natural difference of opinion as exists, that I endorsed it with the words, "See how this man seeketh a quarrel against me." . . .

Pardon me if I say that you are making a Church within a Church, as the Novatians of old did within the Catholic pale, and as, outside the Catholic pale, the Evangelicals of the Establishment. As they talk of "vital religion" and "vital doctrines," and will not allow that their brethren "know the Gospel," or are Gospel preachers, unless they profess the small shibboleths of their own sect, so you are doing your best to make a party in the Catholic Church, and in St. Paul's words are dividing Christ by exalting your opinions into dogmas. . . . I protest then again, not against your tenets, but against what I must call your schismatical spirit. I disown your intended praise of me, viz., that I hold your theological opinions in "the greatest aversion," and I pray God that I may never denounce, as you do, what the Church has not denounced.—Bear with me, yours affectionately in Christ,

J. H. Newman.

Both the comparative smallness of the differences, and Ward's emphatic insistence on the questions in debate, are apparent in the correspondence on a matter raised by the Encyclical of 1864. Ward pressed its condemnation of "liberty of conscience." Men, closely identified with Newman, as Mr. Monsell, were known to be advocates of "liberty of conscience." But in reality the old saying of Dr. Brown as to Hume and Reid was curiously illustrated. "Hume and Reid are really

agreed," he said. "One cries out, 'You can't help believing in an external world,' and then whispers, 'But you can give no good reason for your belief'; the other cries out, 'You can give no sufficient reason for believing in an external world,' and then whispers, 'But you can't help the belief.'" Yet Hume and Reid fought at the time as though the shout were everything, and the whisper nothing. So in the controversy on religious liberty many who took exception to Ward's line, and who regretted his rhetoric, were often by no means prepared to advocate a *principle* opposed to his. Where they differed was in their war cry. Men like Mr. Monsell, or M. Foisset, or Dupanloup, felt the necessity of emphasising the practical importance of liberty and toleration; while Ward emphasised, as we have already seen, the truth of an abstract principle of intolerance. But Ward did not deny the expedience of toleration under "our deplorable circumstances," any more than Monsell denied—when the ground of debate had been made quite clear—that an ideal state of things would include a Catholic state, protecting the conscience of its subjects from the influence of teaching which would destroy religious unity. Newman, with whose views Mr. Monsell absolutely identified himself, was most explicit against any principle of universal toleration as the State's duty. Dupanloup wrote to Monsell asking him to obtain from Newman Theological authorities against persecution. In Newman's answer to Monsell dated 6th of February 1864, he asks the question whether the civil power may (*i.e.* "has the right to") inflict punishment for religion as religion, and replies "My notion is that you must hold the affirmative here, in spite of St. Athanasius's attacks on the persecuting Arian Emperors." He adds that "The great question is expedience or inexpedience."

He urges on the advocates of toleration the importance of showing from history that it is expedient; leaving alone the question of abstract justice. But so far as the Church itself is concerned he maintains that "gentleness is its own duty." Ward "whispers" each point which Newman "shouts." In every article (I have found no exception) in which he deals with the question, he has a saving clause to the effect that religious toleration is generally expedient at the present time; and in a letter to Bishop Moriarty, dated 1864, he expressly

acquiesces in the application of the maxim "Ecclesia a sanguine abhorret" to the Church's own duty of gentleness.

However, in each case, as with Hume and Reid, the whisper was for a time unnoticed. Ward spoke of his opponents as though they maintained a principle opposed to the recognised Catholic teaching; and they in turn regarded him as a practical advocate of religious persecution. Such a letter as the following may be given as a sample of many, and indicates generally the state of things—a state which fortunately issued ultimately in mutual explanations.

Mr. Monsell, to whom it was written, had, it may be remembered, spoken strongly in the House of Commons in 1863 against the religious intolerance of the Spanish Government. He had characterised it as "opposed to the first principles of religious liberty," and had intimated his belief that the "prejudices of the Spanish people" were responsible for it. The question came up in his correspondence with Ward on the whole subject more than a year after the appearance of the Encyclical; and Ward wrote as follows:—

My dear Monsell—You don't wish to enter into the theological question; and if you did, you could read what I have printed.

I only write, therefore, because I don't wish you to suppose that I concede that you are not directly contradicting what the Church teaches; because I do not concede this. Indeed, if an Encyclical and *Syllabus*, coming from Pope and accepted by the Bishops, are not the Church's teaching, I don't see how the *Council of Trent* is the Church's teaching. . . .

I feel so strongly with you the tremendous responsibility of such opinions as those advocated in the *Dublin Review*, that nothing would induce me to advocate them except the Church's plain voice. If you really wish to shut me up, do please bring me before some Roman tribunal. It seems to me very hard that those on your side will not adopt this straightforward course. When Ryder's pamphlet came out I wrote at once both to Newman and to him that that most simple course was open to them; and that I would give every possible facility to any such procedure.

If any individual is to judge in the matter, surely it should not be Dupanloup but the Pope.

As to Morel's book, I did not cite it as agreeing with all its opinions for I don't; and particularly I think him very unjust to Ketteler. But I cited it for the amount of papal teaching which it textually contained. I can't fancy any one reading it and doubting

that there is in the Church a chain of traditionary teaching condemnatory of what I must call Montalembert's heterodox notions about religious liberty.

I hope you will not think I am writing in a violent and headstrong temper. I am not conscious of the least approach to such a temper. But I really think that those on your side do not face the question.—I remain, my dear Monsell, with great respect, sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

It was perhaps the result of correspondence between two men so different in intellectual tendency, and in the work of life—the one a statesman who had constantly to think of the practical effect of his words, the other a philosopher and an abstract thinker, to whom practical effect was a secondary question, and theory was all in all—that it took a long time before they understood each other's position. To Mr. Monsell the abstract principle was of minor importance, and the exact doctrinal weight of the *Syllabus* and Encyclical was a matter which he naturally left to professed theologians. But these two points were everything to Ward; and he seems to have persevered in the impression that his correspondent, with Newman's sanction, both set at naught the teaching of the Encyclical, and denied the dogmatic authority of the condemnation it recorded.

It is instructive to note how comparatively inconsiderable the theological difference between the two parties was proved to be once both sides had spoken out fully. Third persons made mischief; sayings on either side were exaggerated or misquoted. Feeling was too strong on every side during the years of acute controversy for the necessary explanations. These earlier contests are often remembered; the later arrival of a truer understanding is, perhaps, not so well known. "We should never," Ward wrote in the *Dublin Review*, with reference to Newman's answer to Gladstone in 1874, "have dreamed of giving the name 'minimistic' to such a treatise as F. Newman's. Nothing can be more alien from its spirit than any tendency to deal grudgingly with the question whether this or that Pontifical act be *ex Cathedrâ*. On one or two particulars, indeed, of comparatively small practical importance, we venture to be at issue with F. Newman on

this head; but we have hardly ever read a work with which we felt generally more sympathy on the points to which we here refer." The following letter of the same period touches on the special question of the *Syllabus*:—

My dear Father Newman—I have to thank you very much for forwarding me a copy of your appendix, which I have read with great interest of course.

If it be not impertinent in me to say so, your own view of the *Syllabus* has seemed to me, from the time I first read it, a thoroughly intelligible, loyal, and Catholic view, and I have said so in our forthcoming number. I meant to have said so in January, but I have given reasons why your arguments do not convince me.

I think that you have done good service by your change of wording in page 22. Several considerable persons thought you had intended to say that there were no *ex Cathedrâ* Acts as early as the seventh century. I had already written half a page to interpret your present words by other passages of yours which distinctly state the contrary; now I shall merely have to note your change of expression.

I really think Gladstone has done much good in teaching Catholics to understand each other better. In what I have written for our forthcoming number I express various subordinate differences of opinion from you, but I trust and expect you will find nothing in the slightest degree tending to the excitement of divisions.

With deepest sincerity I wish you Paschal joys and all others, . . . and remain ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

So much as to the clearing up of some of the misunderstandings of the past. A divergence remained, and though we are still anticipating in point of time; I think that the last full statement on Ward's part, in their private correspondence, of the nature of that divergence, with its pathetic peroration, should be given here, as completing the view of this curious controversy. Its argument is hardly more than a restatement of what has so often appeared. Ward imported a chivalrous devotion to the intimations of the Holy See into the essence of a Catholic writer's career. He trusted to the Holy Ghost for the Pope's prudence; and filled with a deep sense of the impotence of the individual to judge, threw himself throughout into the policy of Rome. Newman not

less ready to obey absolutely where obedience was due, drew a sharper distinction between matters of policy and of doctrine. He could not forget the human elements which affected policy, though they could not touch the essence of doctrine. Saints have been called on to rebuke Popes, though Popes can define doctrine infallibly and saints cannot. Ward's sanguine trust appeared to be based on an ideal of guidance from on high, which, however desirable, had not been in fact vouchsafed.

Newman had written immediately after publishing his pamphlet, and the purport of his letter I well remember though it was destroyed on the spot by my father—according to his general habit. He asked my father to "bear with him" in reading certain portions of his pamphlet which censured the line generally taken by the *Dublin Review*. If he was to write at all (he said) he must speak out; and he added that he had always admired Ward amid all differences for his own absolute straightforwardness. He expressed the sense he had always had, and always should have, while life lasted, of Ward's unfairness in stigmatising those who took a less stringent view of the papal prerogatives and infallibility than himself, as "minimisers," and making his own belief the measure of the belief of all Catholics. This feeling, he said, he must, if he wrote at all, give expression to.

The letter was signed "with much affection, yours most sincerely,"—a signature which seemed to me under the circumstances warm, but which my father complained of as being less warm than the "yours affectionately" of their old intercourse.

My father's reply—one of the last letters sent to me by Cardinal Newman before his death—was as follows:—

20th January 1875.

My dear Father Newman—I was so engaged yesterday in business connected with our forthcoming number that I could not give your letter my attention. But I was extremely glad to see your handwriting again after some interval, and am grateful also for your various kind expressions. I rather infer that you would wish me rather to answer said letter than merely acknowledge its receipt, so I will try to answer what you say point by point. I have taken up my best pen, so as to minimise (not indeed doctrine but) your trouble in deciphering me. At last you can throw it unread into the fire if it bores you.

I see most clearly and admit most readily that you had no legitimate alternative between either not writing at all, or including in your pamphlet what you consider a just rebuke of our exorbitances. My grief is not that you say what you say, but that you think it.

I feel sensibly your kind eulogy of my straightforwardness. . . .

Your chief charge against me is that I "make my own belief the measure of the belief of others." As these words stand, they do not convey to me any definite idea. But it seems to me that the difference between you and me (I do not wish at all to underrate it) may be understood by some such explanation as this.

It has always appeared to me that a Catholic thinker or writer ought to aim at this: viz., so to think and write, as he judges that the Holy See (interpreted by her official Acts, and due regard being had to individual circumstances) would wish him to think and write. I have often said in the *Dublin Review* that peace and truth are in some sense necessarily antagonistic; that every proclamation of a truth is a disturbance of peace. I have then gone on to say that whether or no in some given case the interest of souls would suffer most by the proclamation or the withholding of some given truth—that this question is one which ordinary men (I mean not specially helped by God) cannot even *approximate* to deciding; that, consequently, it is one of the very chief gifts bestowed upon the Pope, that in his authoritative teaching he can so decide.

By a further consequence, I have thought it might very often be a duty to persuade Catholics (if one can) that certain beliefs are obligatory on them which as yet they do not recognise. I have thought that this was one's duty, whenever it should seem to one (after due deliberation) that the Holy See is desiring to enforce this obligation; and on the other hand I have always said that truths, which one might think to have been infallibly declared, ought not on that account to be brought forward, unless there are signs that the Holy See wishes them to be now brought forward (I refer to truths other than the dogmata of the faith, though connected intimately with them). And I have thought that the "peace and unity," which as you so truly say are the "privilege and duty of Catholics," are to be sought in one way and no other viz., in increasing among us all an *ex animo deference*, not only to the definitions but to the doctrinal intimations of the Holy See.

I have written on at dreadful length but I did not see how otherwise to explain myself. Now I am daily more and more convinced that my aim has been the true one; but I am also daily more and more convinced that I have fallen into grievous mistakes of judgment from time to time, whether as regards what I have said, or (much more) my way of saying it. I may say with the greatest sincerity that the one main cause of this has always appeared to me

to be my breach with you. Never was a man more unfit than I to play any kind of first fiddle. You supplied exactly what I needed; corrected extravagances, corrected crudities, suggested opposite considerations, pointed out exaggerations of language, etc. etc. When I found that you and I (as I thought) proceeded on fundamentally different principles, this invaluable help was lost; and I have never been able even approximately to replace you. If you will not laugh at the expression, I will say that I have felt myself a kind of intellectual orphan. I may say in my own praise that my censors have complimented me on my submissiveness; but I have always wished to submit myself much more could I have found a guide whom I trusted.

Excuse this tremendous prolixity of egotism. It will at least show how very desirous I am that you should think less ill than you do of my intellectual attitude, and that your rebukes therefore should be less severe. *The whole colour of my life has changed*, I assure you, from the loss of your sympathy. But my gratitude for the past will ever remain intact.—Affectionately yours,

W. G. WARD.

I hope I am not dreadfully illegible.

They never met again, and the opposition of so many years could not be as though it had never been. Advanced age on one side and increasing infirmity on the other made travelling a difficult matter; and so the experiment of a meeting could scarcely have been tried. But certainly the early love for Newman, which had never passed away, remained more undisturbed during the last seven years of my father's life than it had been since the divisions of the years following 1860. I remember well the strong feeling he showed when I unearthed (about 1879) some old letters of the Cardinal's, written with warmth of expression, and his constant wish that I should come, in some personal way, under his influence; and it is a relief to turn to the last mention of my father in Cardinal Newman's later correspondence with myself. "It pleases me to find," he wrote in March 1885, "that you take so kindly the real affection I have for you, which has come to me as if naturally from the love which I had for your father."

Note.—Some of the documents relating to the modifications made in the definition of papal Infallibility, as originally proposed, are given in Appendix A, p. 435.

CHAPTER XI

W. G. WARD AND J. S. MILL

THE year of the Vatican Council brought about a complete change in Mr. Ward's life. He had a severe attack of rheumatic gout from which at one time fatal effects were feared. During his long convalescence he used to speak of it as the "inauguration of old age"; and after his recovery he was in many ways a changed man. Much of the inclination to combative discussion, which had co-existed with his sensitiveness in controversy, passed away never to return. He held aloof henceforth in great measure from party strife. He was glad to turn to the comparative calm of philosophical debate. The heated controversies with Liberal Catholics gave place to the earnest but friendly tournaments with Mill and Bain. He never renewed the habits of violent bodily exercise which in earlier days were a necessity to him. Mentally and physically alike there was a change in the direction of greater repose.

Henceforth, then, while still working for the Catholic cause, he took part in the Catholic Revival on its philosophical side. A great movement had set in, for the revival of the philosophy of the mediaeval schools—a movement associated with such well-known names as Liberatore, Sanseverino, Palmieri, Caretti, and, later on, Cardinal Zigliara. Father Kleutgen's able work on the Scholastic Philosophy was perhaps the most remarkable outcome of this movement.

Mr. Ward, while admiring profoundly Kleutgen's great work, and while adopting with the utmost sympathy in his philosophical writing the scholastic method so long familiar to him in theology, and congenial to him for its orderly clearness, was never a thorough Aristotelian; and this fact

qualified the part he took in the movement. Further, he had a very strong feeling as to the necessity in philosophy of elbow-room for free intellectual thought; and the tendency which he saw in some of the modern scholastics to exclude original thought, and to treat the words of the older schoolmen as authoritative texts, was a severe trial to him. Fortunately Father Kleutgen himself was far more moderate in his demands; and Ward was able in some degree, through his interpretation of the movement, to find a *modus vivendi* with the Neo-Scholastics. But it was to the end a process which required considerable effort.

The result of this difficulty, however, was that the story of Ward's philosophical work, unlike that of his theological, is not closely associated with the writings of any Catholic school. His share in the revival of the Scholastic method in philosophy had relation, primarily, to the controversies in England and Scotland which were external to distinctively Catholic thought. In his view of the requirements of Catholic philosophy he returned to the method of his great patron, St. Thomas Aquinas, from whom he learnt a different lesson from that learnt by many of the Neo-Scholastics. While these men adopted bodily the old formulæ of the mediæval systems, with little regard to their connection with the thought of the present hour, Mr. Ward preferred to treat contemporary philosophy as St. Thomas himself had treated it six hundred years earlier. That great thinker had had the chief share in working a far-reaching change in the relations between Catholic and non-Catholic thought. He was the chief representative of that school which, deserting the old patristic antagonism to Aristotle, and the policy of holding aloof from the rationalism of the day, addressed itself to the task of showing how the peripatetic philosophy could be reconciled with Christianity, and to dealing closely and candidly with such non-Christian thinkers as the Arabians, Averroës and Avicenna, and the Jew, Maimonides. From the last named St. Thomas learnt much which he has incorporated in his great philosophical work. Indeed, the amount which both St. Thomas and Albertus Magnus owe to this great Jewish thinker is a remarkable fact to which German writers have recently called attention.

All this was entirely in harmony with Mr. Ward's philosophical temper. With St. Thomas he sharply divided the truths of faith from those of reason; and in the latter sphere he returned to the debates from first principles which he had loved in the early days of his Liberalism, treating all Theists as allies, all Agnostics as foes. His work was, in its very form, what St. Thomas's chief philosophical effort had been. The Dominican saint wrote, not a complete treatise on philosophy, but a *Summa Contra Gentiles*, a work expressly directed against the philosophical systems which in his own day were impugning belief in Christian Theism; and Ward wrote a defence of Theism in the shape of an attack on contemporary Antitheists. Pantheism was the danger in 1270; Phenomenism in 1870; and St. Thomas was best imitated, not by a useless *résumé* of arguments against a system of Pantheism which had ceased to exist, but by dealing in St. Thomas's spirit with the errors which had taken its place.

One further characteristic of Mr. Ward's adaptation of the Scholastic method also had its prototype in the days of mediæval Scholasticism. Not only did he with St. Thomas enter into frank controversy, in his writings, with non-Christian thinkers on the truths of reason, prescinding entirely from revelation; but he held personal intercourse with them as well, both in his correspondence with Mill and Bain, and in his share in the debates of the Metaphysical Society. A French writer has described the impressions of a visitor in the days of Charlemagne at one of the meetings of the Mahometan rationalists of Bagdad—the *Motekallemin* or "teachers of the word" as they were called. "There were present," he writes, "not only Mussulmans of every kind, orthodox and heterodox, but also misbelievers, materialists, atheists, Jews, Christians; in short there were unbelievers of every kind. Each sect had its chief, charged with the defence of the opinions it professed, and every time one of the chiefs entered the room all arose as a mark of respect, and no one sat down again until the chief was seated. The hall was soon filled, and when it was seen to be full, one of the unbelievers spoke. 'We have met together to reason,' he said. 'You know all the conditions. Mussulmans, you will not bring forward reasons taken from your book or founded on the authority of your prophet, for we

do not believe in the one or the other. Each must limit himself to arguments taken from reason.' " Such were the conditions accepted by the Christian disputants in the city of Haroun al Raschid. And they were accepted by Mr. Ward in his intercourse with Mill and Martineau, Bain and Huxley.

The first step in this direction was his resumption—in the years immediately preceding the Vatican Council—of his correspondence with J. S. Mill.

Early in 1865 Mill sent Ward a copy of his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.* In it he conceded in part the justice of Ward's contention, explained later on in this volume, as to the immediate evidence of the reliableness of Memory. He conceded that Memory must be allowed to be intuitive, but he denied that this proved any general power of intuition. There was this one intuition and no more. He referred his readers to Ward's work on *Nature and Grace,* in which he first developed his position on the subject, and expressed his concurrence with Ward's reasoning, and his sense of the ability and "practical worth" of the volume.[1] Mill's concession on the question of Memory, made on his unwavering principle of absolute candour, was a shock to some of his followers, who recognised all it involved. To Ward it appeared to be a renunciation of his whole opposition to the intuitional philosophy as such, and he was not slow to say this. Dr. Bain, later on, expressed emphatic dissent from Mill's position; but of this we shall have to speak shortly. Ward wrote to Mill on receipt of the volume as follows:—

28th April 1865.

My dear Sir—I have to thank you for a present of your work on Sir William Hamilton, and also for a kind notice of me therein, which I only reached this morning, having read your book steadily through up to that point. I could not express in few words the various impressions made by what I have read of your book, nor (of course) would you particularly care to hear them. I will only say that I recognise your usual candour (usual in you, most unusual in others), when I find you admitting that "our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate," a concession which, I think, you would have been unwilling to make did not your candour and desire of truth so characteristically preponderate over attachment to your own system.

[1] This tribute of Mill, with further additions, will be found at p. 209 of the edition of 1872.

I fear that since we last corresponded our divergence is even greater than it was before. I am now editor of the *Dublin Review*, and if you ever happen to cast your eye on it I cannot doubt that you will think it as simply mischievous (except for its ineffectiveness) as any production can possibly be. In it my position as editor has obliged me to attend (which I had never done before) to various politico-religious questions, and I have a clear conviction that the Catholic Church is really committed to principles opposed in the greatest degree to your own. Your work on liberty specially exhibits such contrariety. Yet if you happen to look at our April number you will find an article on America with which you will thoroughly sympathise, and which (I think) you will consider able. It is by a son of W. Wilberforce, and I believe he has obtained some of his facts by communication with Miss Martineau.

The article on the Encyclical and *Syllabus* is by me. If you care to open it at p. 469 and again at p. 493, you will admit (I think) that the *statement* is clear of principles which you will regard as detestable.

May truth prevail! Sincerely yours,

W. G. WARD.

Mill, who was not accustomed to Ward's superlatives, wrote back: "It is very unlikely that anything you write, however much I may disagree with it, could appear to me either 'detestable' or 'simply mischievous.' I have never read anything of yours in which I have not found much more to sympathise with than to dislike. . . . [again] the only opposition which I deem injurious to truth is uncandid opposition, and that I have never found yours to be, nor do I believe I ever shall."

Mill's candidature for Westminster was on the *tapis* when Mr. Ward next wrote to him. The line he took is in the memory of many. While consenting to represent the constituency if elected, he refused to canvass or in any way to work for his return. His success under the circumstances was remarkable and interesting. Mr. Ward wrote to him as follows in July:—

OLD HALL, WARE, 17*th July* 1865.

MY DEAR SIR—I was much obliged by your last letter, but thought I would not trouble you with my reply while you were so busy in election matters. At this moment I have no time to write on what I intended, but wish to ask you a question on a totally different matter. Meanwhile I must say how warmly I sympathised

with your whole attitude at your election. If such an example should spread—if many places were found in which a majority would vote for a candidate who plainly tells them they are doing *him* no favour in electing him—one great difficulty would be removed from the mind (I think) of many who now dread the influx of the popular tide. Even had you failed, the very attempt (it seems to me) was an epoch in English history. I say this, tho' I detested even the old bill of '31, and cannot help regarding our present constitution as "democracy tempered by bribery and intimidation," one bad thing neutralised greatly by another. But you at least *have ever been* free from mob-worship.

The question I wish to ask concerns the Copernican system. I am writing an article on the case of Galileo. De Morgan certainly says that in *his* time the heliocentric theory was more probably *false* than *true* so far as regards its *scientific* proof. I think there is something on the subject in your *Logic*, but I cannot lay my hand on it. Could you kindly refer me? I have your 4th edition.

At all events, could you tell me your own judgment on the matter, as no doubt you have formed one? An eminent Catholic mathematician thinks that even in Newton's time the theory was far from *proved*, and that the first really decisive event was *Bradley's* proof that the earth moves from one place to another. Unfortunately (though I studied pure mathematics at Oxford with much interest) I never got on with the applied, and am therefore, alas! profoundly ignorant of astronomy.

Many thanks for your kind expressions of agreement; they pleased me the more from their rarity. I find that many Protestants will tolerate a "Liberal" Catholic; but for myself, who look on Ultramontanism as the only genuine article, the most "Liberal" of Protestants have no toleration. Even my very old friend the Dean of Westminster looks at me quite askance; and yet I really believe, if I may speak in my own favour, that no one takes more pains than I do to do justice to an opponent, though I admit that, from a certain narrowness, I have often great difficulty in understanding opposite views. That I am not simply a "bigot," in the ordinary sense, I persuade myself, were it only from my great interest in everything you write. I may take the opportunity of saying how *heartily I agree* with the drift of that passage about God which has so excited the bitterness of many Christians. To me it seems simply axiomatic, and I am quite confident no Catholic doctor has held that a malignant Creator could have any claims except to resistance and detestation.[1]

[1] "If," wrote Mill in answer to a criticism of Dean Mansel, "instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed

I really wish, whenever you have perfect leisure, you would run your eye over my article in the *Dublin Review* for April, pp. 469-481 and 492-498. The rest of the article would not interest you at all, I imagine; but you kindly spoke of reading this and also H. Wilberforce's article in the same number on America.

When I have time I wish to write on one point of your work on Hamilton in connection with my philosophical volume. I am most grieved to tease people by my deplorable handwriting, which I fear is worse even than it was.—I remain, my dear sir, very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

Mill again gravely remonstrated with Mr. Ward, insisting that he considered him no "bigot." "It gives me much pleasure," he wrote, "that you sympathise so completely with me on the subject of the Westminster election. That you were sure to feel with me as to the passage of my book for which I have been attacked, I could not doubt after reading your book on *Nature and Grace.* Let me add that (whatever may be my opinion of Ultramontanism) I know far too much both of your writings and of yourself to be in any danger of mistaking you for a 'bigot.' Few people have proved more fully than you not only their endeavour but their ability to do ample justice to an opponent." Mill wrote also at considerable length on the Galileo case, and the essay was partially recast in deference to his criticisms. It appeared in October 1865.

A year later a question arose in which for once Mr. Ward and Mill heartily and unreservedly sympathised—the negro question. The events will be in the memory of many readers. An insurrection had broken out in Jamaica. Governor Eyre put down the insurrection with promptitude. But it soon transpired that his treatment of the negroes had been characterised by unnecessary and even wanton cruelty. Four hundred

that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, or what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them—convince me of it and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do—he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to Hell for not so calling him, to Hell I will go."—*On Hamilton*, pp. 123, 124.

and thirty-nine persons had been put to death; over six hundred of both sexes had been flogged. Gordon, the leader of the insurrection, was executed upon evidence which Lord Chief Justice Cockburn characterised as not only utterly insufficient for conviction, but insufficient to justify even a trial. "No competent judge," he said, "could have received that evidence." A Royal Commission went out to Jamaica. Eyre was deposed; and a large section of the English people applauded.

Then came a reaction. There was, we may remember, another party, of which Tennyson, Carlyle, and Kingsley were representative members, who strongly opposed the action of Mill and of the "Jamaica committee," which he organised under Mr. Charles Buxton's presidency; and this party rapidly gained adherents. They held that Eyre had acted promptly and saved the island. It was intolerable, they considered, that the hands of a man of action should be tied at such a crisis, and that his career should be checked, and perhaps ruined, because of faulty excess in the right direction. Mr. Ward's sympathies were, as I have said, with Mill, far more than with his opponents, though he was alive to the dangers of the humanitarian and the sentimentalist movement, against which they entered their protest. The "damned nigger" outcry, which Carlyle promoted, seemed to him, however, simply unchristian. The *Dublin Review* took its place among Mill's defenders.

Henry Wilberforce wrote an article for it on Jamaica, which was published in October 1866, and Mr. Ward sent the article to Mill. Mr. Ward had at the time just completed an essay of some importance on "Science, Prayer, Freewill, and Miracles." Of the purport and occasion of this essay, which aroused considerable attention, I shall speak directly. It is referred to in the following letter to Mill, which accompanied the gift of Wilberforce's article.

W. G. Ward to J. S. Mill

Old Hall, Nr. Ware,
7th February 1867.

My dear Sir—I hope the October number of the *Dublin Review* reached you, otherwise I will send you another. The article on

Jamaica is written by Mr. H. Wilberforce, who has since joined your committee. *Mr. Buxton* writes to say he considers it decidedly the best article he has seen on the subject. I shall be very glad of your opinion on it. . . . I am delighted to see you have begun your campaign, and in such an excellent spirit. I most sincerely wish you success in its prosecution. The anti-negro fanaticism which (by a curious reaction from the opposite extreme) seems now dominant in England, appears to me unspeakably shocking.

I have spent a most agreeable hour to-day in reading your inaugural address. I wish we agreed as much in matters we both regard of supremest importance, as in many others.—Sincerely yours,

W. G. WARD.

I have written an article for April against you on Freewill.

The St. Andrews' address—delivered by Mill as Lord Rector of the University—has been described by Mr. Bain as in one sense a failure, owing to Mill's want of acquaintance with practical academic life. But its ability and interest are acknowledged; and its theoretical attitude towards mental discipline and intellectual work was identical with Ward's. He often quoted from it the statement that the "ultimate end" from which such things take their "chief value" is "that of making men more effective combatants in the fight which never ceases to rage between good and evil."

Mill was much pleased with Wilberforce's paper. "The article on Jamaica," he wrote, "is excellent. I am very happy that you feel with me so strongly on that subject. I am glad too that you like the St. Andrews' address. I wish I had seen your article on Freewill while I was revising my book on Hamilton for a new edition, and replying to other critics. You would have been a much worthier adversary than most of those I have had."

The article being actually in type, Mr. Ward took advantage of Mill's interest in it, and proposed to send him a proof with a view to modifying it, so as to meet his criticisms. "There is one page in particular," he wrote, "on which I very specially desire your opinion, being myself so ignorant of physical facts. If you would only read that page (or two pages) I should esteem it a real favour." At the same time he adds, "I hope you will at once refuse if at all too much pressed for time." Mr. Ward seems to have felt conscious of something curious and difficult to explain in the instinct which

prompted him to single out, as the one critic whose judgment he asked for, one who was so totally opposed to all his deepest convictions. The singleness of Mill's purpose, however, was a magnet whose power was unfailing; and he adds as if in explanation, "You see I treat you, as you have a right to be treated, as the fairest, most truth-loving, most generous of opponents." Mill undertook to read and criticise the essay, which was duly forwarded, together with the following letter:—

21 HAMILTON TERRACE, N.W.,
February 1867.

MY DEAR SIR—I forward you my article, as you have been so kind as to permit it. The discussion on Freewill begins close to the top of slip 14, and continues about half-way down slip 18. I shall be grateful of course for any criticism you will make on my remarks; and will give it my best attention. It would certainly have been a great advantage, if it had been possible, for you to notice them in your next edition; but (so far from being surprised at your inability to do so) my own wonder is that you are able to get through such an infinitude of work. You will not be surprised, considering the line you take on Reform and similar questions, that I, for my humble part, could have wished a larger proportion of your time given to speculation and a smaller to politics. But you will, I am sure, pardon this expression of opinion from a strong Conservative; and indeed take it as a compliment. . . . The part, however, of my article on which I very particularly desire your judgment, and in which I have written with very far greater diffidence than on Freewill, extends from slip 6 at the middle to the middle of slip 12. . . .

My statement about eclipses and comets was taken from what was told me at Oxford by a very accomplished scientific professor. The other day another scientific friend here said that the sphere of *astronomical* prediction is far wider than I had been told. You will see, however, that this rather forwards than impedes my argument, if it be really true (as he also seems to think) that scientific prediction has not materially advanced in other sciences. Read, please, on this head, Mansel's letter, quoted in my final slip.

This is the particular question on which I should be so grateful to you for an answer. I am so deplorably ignorant of physics (which I feel to be a very serious misfortune) that I may have made some serious bungle. In *view* of course you will totally differ from me, but I much wish to know how far you can endorse my *facts*.—I remain, my dear sir, sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

The essay on "Science, Prayer, Freewill, and Miracles,"

which ultimately appeared in the *Dublin Review* in April 1867, is a typical specimen of Mr. Ward's controversial writing. It was called forth by the appearance of a work by the Duke of Argyll entitled *The Reign of Law*, and an essay by Mr. Malcolm M'Coll called "Science and Prayer." The question it dealt with was the difficulty, in the face of the ever-growing proofs of the uniformity of nature, of preserving the Christian conception of a God who is behind the veil, working always. The Mediævalist saw the hand of God in everything. God sent the rain, sent the sunshine, sent an earthquake, sent the plague or pestilence, punished with paralysis or illness, cured disease in answer to prayer. The more the details of physical science revealed the constant chains of uniform sequence in the course of nature, the harder it seemed to conceive of God as directly effecting its changes. To pray for rain was easy as long as God was supposed to "open the heavens"; but when the necessary preliminary conditions of a shower were understood, it seemed as unreal as to pray that the sun might set at six o'clock in June. The barometer was no prophet of the future; it recorded a present state of things, from which rain must follow by necessary law. This was one of the points raised, and there were other parallel ones.

Mr. Ward begins his argument by stating the sceptical philosopher's view, in a passage which may be quoted as a specimen of his habit of entering fully into an opponent's case, when that case proceeded on lines which appealed to him as forcible. He writes as follows:—

There are not a few scientific men, then, we fear, who, if they spoke out their full mind, would argue as follows:—

The one principle implied in every scientific investigation of every kind is the principle of *phenomenal uniformity*; or, in other words, the principle that, in every case without exception, where there are the same phenomenal antecedents, the same phenomenal consequents will result. Let me suppose for a moment the contradictory of this; let me suppose, *e.g.*, that some deity had the power and the will to affect the fixed laws of nature, science would be an impossibility. I compose a substance to-day of certain materials and find it by experiment to be combustible. I compose another to-morrow of the very same materials, united in the very same way and in the very same proportions, and I find the composition *in*combustible. If such a case were possible, the whole

foundation of science would be taken from under my feet. Science from the first has assumed this phenomenal uniformity as its first principle; nor could it have advanced one single step without that assumption. Those achievements, then, of physical science, which the most religious men cannot attempt to question, afford an absolutely irrefragable demonstration of that first principle which science has from the first assumed. No investigations, proceeding throughout on a false basis, could by possibility have issued in an innumerable multitude of unexperienced yet experimentally true conclusions. But now answer me candidly: how is this principle of phenomenal uniformity reconcilable, I will not say with Christianity, but with any practical system whatever of religion? I will begin with my weakest point of attack, and rise by degrees to my strongest. I will begin with the doctrine that prayer for temporal blessings is reasonable and may be efficacious. Your country is visited with famine or pestilence, and you supplicate your God for relief. Your only child lies sick of a dangerous fever, and, as a matter of course, you are frequent in prayer. You are diligent, indeed, in giving her all the external help you can; but your chief trust is avowedly in God. You entreat Him that He will arrest the malady and spare her precious life. What can be more irrational than this? Would you pray, then, for a long day in December? Would you pray that in June the sun shall set at six o'clock? Yet surely the laws of fever are no less absolutely fixed than those of sunset; and were the case otherwise no science of medicine could by possibility have been called into existence. The only difference between the two cases is that the laws of sunset have been thoroughly mastered, whereas our knowledge as to the laws of fever, though very considerable, is as yet but partial and incomplete. The "abstract power of prediction," as Mr. Stuart Mill calls it—this is the one assumption in every nook and corner of science. All scientific men take for granted—when they cease to do so they will cease to *be* scientific men—that a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should know accurately and fully all the various combinations and properties of matter which now exist, could predict infallibly the whole series of future phenomena. He could predict the future course of weather or of disease with the same assurance with which men now predict the date of a coming eclipse. Pray God all day long; add fasting to your prayer if you like, and let all your fellow Christians add *their* prayer and fasting to yours in order that the said eclipse shall come a week earlier. Do you suppose you will be heard?

Yet the precise date of an eclipse is not more peremptorily fixed by the laws of nature than is the precise issue of your daughter's fever. You do not venture to doubt speculatively this fundamental doctrine of science; in our various scientific conversa-

tions, my friend, you have always admitted it. But, like a true Englishman, you take refuge in an illogical compromise. You assume one doctrine when you study science; and another, its direct contradictory, when your child falls ill. And yet I am paying you too high a compliment, for you do not *profess* that this latter doctrine is *true;* you do not *profess* that your prayer to God is *reasonable*, or can possibly be *efficacious:* your only defence is that your reason is mastered and overborne by the combined effect of your religious and your parental emotion. As though you could please God—if, indeed, there be a Personal God at all—by acting in a manner which your reason condemns.

Well, you tell me you see your mistake; you will henceforth pray for *spiritual* blessings, and for them alone. Why, you are still as unreasonable as you were before. Is not psychology, then, as truly a science as medicine? You never doubted that it was when you used to take such interest in the study of Reid and Hamilton. But if psychology *be* a science, if the conclusions, whether of Hartley and Mill or of Hamilton and M'Cosh, have more value than the inventions of a fortune-teller or the dreams of a madman, *mental* phenomena proceed on fixed laws no less inflexibly than *physical*. What, then, can possibly be your meaning when you pray for what you call grace? when you supplicate for help against what you call temptation? for growth in what you call virtue? All these prayers imply in their very notion that your God is constantly interfering with the course of mental phenomena. To talk as you do, or, at least, to pray as you do, is equivalent to saying in so many words, not that this or that school of psychologians is in error, but that there is no science of psychology at all; that there are no fixed laws of mind to be discovered by any one whatever; that the real agency at work, in causing our various thoughts, volitions, and emotions, is the unceasing and arbitrary intervention of a Personal Creator and Sanctifier. Take your choice. Believe in science, or believe in the efficacy of prayer. But at least do not assume an intellectual position so obviously contemptible as that of seeking to combine the two.

At least, you reply, you may exercise your *Freewill* for good or for evil, however powerless your God may be to assist you in the combat. On the contrary, I rejoin, this figment of Freewill is even more directly unscientific than the superstition of prayer. The very foundation of all science, as every one well knows, is this great truth that the same phenomenal antecedents are invariably succeeded by the same phenomenal consequents. Now, the notion of Freewill directly, and, as it were, unblushingly contradicts this fundamental truth. When you say your will is free, your very meaning is that—the very same phenomenal antecedents being supposed, both physical and mental—you possess a real power of

choosing *what* mental *consequent* shall ensue. How amazing, not that a priest-ridden Ultramontane or an ignorant rustic, but that you, an educated and scientific gentleman, can have been blind to so extravagant an inconsistency!

After this, it is hardly worth while to make one more remark, which I will not, however, omit. The Christian religion, in particular, is grounded on an allegation of *miracles*. But miracles, it is plain, constitute the same anti-scientific absurdity in the material world which Freewill constitutes in the mental. To believe the existence of miracles is, *ipso facto*, to disbelieve phenomenal uniformity, and to disbelieve phenomenal uniformity, is to reject the very possibility of science.

We cannot follow Mr. Ward through all the details of his answer to this line of reasoning, but two characteristic extracts shall be made, which give its drift, and explain the correspondence with Mill which followed. The first has reference to prayers for rain or for health; the second to the "free-will" doctrine. He maintained that the advance of science in no way tended to prove that prayer was unreasonable for such things as health and fine weather. The advance of science, great as it has been, has gone on definite and limited lines. In "cosmic" phenomena, as he calls such phenomena as eclipses, or the relative motion of the planets, science has gone far towards establishing laws of periodic recurrence. Further discoveries will then presumably carry further our knowledge of such laws; and prayer that the sun should set at noon, or that the planets should stand still for ten minutes, would have all the unreality of asking for interference in an absolutely fixed system.

But in "earthly" phenomena—those concerning our own planet especially—the case is otherwise. In these the ascertained laws of periodicity are very limited in the past, and will be so equally, it may be presumed, in the future. Optics give a law of refraction, chemistry of the proportions in which elements combine; but neither say *when* refraction or combination will take place. There is nothing to show that any very long chain of regular succession will ever be established in such cases; nay, considering how small a proportion the power of prediction bears to the accessibility of the forces at work, there is a positive argument against any such lengthened chain of uniform causation, uninterfered with by forces external to the fixed system. Darwin, in the *Botanic Garden* (Canto iv.

l. 320), suggests that changes of wind may be due to some minute chemical cause, which might be governed by human agency. If then man could constantly affect the sequence of "earthly" phenomena without violating the laws of nature, why cannot God do so?[1]

Mr. Ward could not then see that the discovery of a considerable number of uniform successions, in such phenomena as those concerning the weather, in the least degree interfered with the ordinary Christian conception of a God who is behind the veil, working always. He quotes Mill as allowing that the great test of scientifically ascertained regularity in physical phenomena is their capability of prediction; and so far as "earthly" phenomena go this capability is very limited. Prayers for rain and health, if their validity is on other grounds acknowledged, are in no way discredited by such limited regularity as has been observed in the course of the weather or of human disease.

He proceeds to explain his meaning by the following illustration:—

We begin, then, with imagining two mice, endowed, however, with quasi-human or semi-human intelligence, enclosed within a grand pianoforte, but prevented in some way or other from interfering with the free play of its machinery. From time to time they are delighted with the strains of choice music. One of the two considers these to result from some agency external to the instrument; but the other, having a more philosophical mind, rises to the conception of fixed laws and phenomenal uniformity. "Science as yet," he says, "is but in its infancy, but I have already made one or two important discoveries. Every sound which reaches us is preceded by a certain vibration of these strings. The same string invariably produces the same sound, and that louder or more gentle according as the vibration may be more or less intense. Sounds of a more composite character result when two or more of the strings vibrate together; and here, again, the sound produced, as far as I am able to discover, is precisely a compound of those sounds which would have resulted from the various component strings vibrating separately. Then there is a further sequence which I have observed; for each vibration is preceded by a stroke from a corresponding hammer, and the string vibrates more intensely in proportion as the hammer's stroke is more forcible.

[1] This suggestion of Darwin's is given by Dean Mansel in a letter to Dr. Pusey cited by Ward.

Thus far I have already prosecuted my researches. And so much at least is evident even now, viz., that the sounds proceed not from any external and arbitrary agency—from the intervention, *e.g.*, of any higher will—but from the uniform operation of fixed laws. These laws may be explored by intelligent mice, and to their exploration I shall devote my life." Even from this inadequate illustration you see the general conclusion which we wish to enforce. A sound has been produced through a certain intermediate chain of fixed laws, but this fact does not tend ever so distantly to establish the conclusion that there is no human premovement acting continuously at one end of that chain.

Imagination, however, has no limits. We may very easily suppose, therefore, that some instrument is discovered producing music immeasurably more heavenly and transporting than that of the pianoforte, but for that very reason immeasurably more vast in size and more complex in machinery. We will call this imaginary instrument a "polychordon," as we are not aware that there is any existing claimant of that name. In this polychordon the intermediate links, between the player's premovement on the one hand and the resulting sound on the other, are no longer two, but two hundred. We further suppose, imagination, as before said, being boundless, that some human being or other is unintermittently playing on this polychordon, but playing on it just what airs may strike his fancy at the moment. Well, successive generations of philosophical mice have actually traced one hundred and fifty of the two hundred phenomenal sequences, through whose fixed and invariable laws the sound is produced. The colony of mice, shut up within, are in the highest spirits at the success which has crowned the scientific labour of their leading thinkers, and the most eminent of these addresses an assembly: "We have long known that the laws of our musical universe are immutably fixed, but we have now discovered a far larger number of those laws than our ancestors could have imagined *capable* of discovery. Let us redouble our efforts. I fully expect that our grandchildren will be able to predict as accurately for an indefinitely preceding period the succession of melodies with which we are to be delighted as we now predict the hours of sunrise and sunset.[1] One thing, at all events, is now absolutely incontrovertible. As to the notion of there being some agency external to the polychordon—intervening with arbitrary and capricious will to produce the sounds we experience—this is a long-exploded superstition, a mere dream and dotage of the past. The progress of science has put it on one side, and never again can it return to disturb our philosophical progress."

[1] "The polychordon, if the reader pleases, may be supposed to have a glass cover, through which the light penetrates."

And then he draws his moral from the parallel :—

Two hundred absolutely fixed laws intervene between the player's premovement and the resulting sound; but this fact does not tend ever so remotely to show that there is not an intelligent player or that his premovement is not absolutely unremitting; and in like manner though phenomenal laws the most strictly and rigorously uniform existed throughout the realm of nature . . . it would not tend ever so remotely to show that these laws are not at each moment directed to this purpose or to that by an immediate and uncontrolled Divine Premovement. God's ends cannot be more inscrutable to us . . . than would be the end of a human performer to the mice. . . . And as a player on the polychordon may be readily induced at the smallest request of a little child to produce this particular musical result rather than some other, so the heartfelt prayer of the humblest Christian may powerfully affect God's premovement of the physical world.

In treating of the Freewill question, he formulated for the first time the distinction, which has since been generally accepted as valid, between the will's spontaneous impulse, in forming which it is *not* free, and a man's power of effort in opposition to that impulse.

"We will here, then," he writes, "lay down a proposition which, beyond all possible question, is fully consistent with the doctrine of Freewill, and which, for our part, we confidently embrace as true. My soul at some given moment possesses certain qualities, intrinsic and inherent, certain faculties, tendencies, habits, and the like. It is solicited, moreover, by certain motives having their own special character, intensity, and direction. Our proposition is this: Under such circumstances science, considered in its abstract perfection, may calculate infallibly the 'spontaneous resultant' of those motives, or, in other words, my will's 'spontaneous impulse.' Now, this proposition is indubitably consistent with Freewill, because I have the fullest power of *opposing* my will's spontaneous impulse. My thoughts are at this moment, perhaps, predominantly influenced by worldly or sensual motives. I may turn them, however, by an effort towards what is heavenly and divine, but if I do *not* put forth some exertion, I follow, as a matter of course, my will's spontaneous impulse. How far I may *choose* to put forth such exertion—*this* is not abstractedly matter of calculation at all. I acquit myself more laudably under my probation, precisely in proportion as I more frequently and more energetically put forth effort in a good direction. At the same time, it should be observed

that in all ordinary cases the act of will which results *in fact* is found in *close vicinity* to the will's spontaneous impulse. It is only in the rarest and most exceptional cases—or rather, we may say, it never happens at all—that a man of ordinary piety will be found putting forth an act of heroic saintliness. In 999 cases out of 1000 a man's probation is carried to a successful issue by this more than by anything else, viz., by putting forward on repeated occasions a number of acts which are *a little* higher than his spontaneous impulse. Nor does any exception to this general remark strike us at the moment except those cases in which there is a violent temptation to mortal sin. We maintain, then, that so far as regards, not the will's *actual movement*, but its *spontaneous impulse*, there is a theory of motives as strictly scientific, as abstractedly capable of scientific calculation, as any theory of mechanics or chemistry. But we further maintain that, in applying that theory to practice, allowance must always be made for the fact that in every instance the will has a real power of acting above the level of such spontaneous impulse. How far the will may *choose* to do so is a matter incapable of calculation, and external to science altogether. And this circumstance precisely, neither more nor less, constitutes that one particular in which the doctrine of Freewill interferes with the strictly scientific character of psychology."

Mill's careful and candid criticism on these two lines of argument, in a letter dated 14th of February 1867, written from Blackheath Park, deserves being reproduced in full :—

J. S. MILL to W. G. WARD

DEAR SIR—I have read your article with very great interest. You are the clearest thinker I have met for a long time who has written on your side of these great questions. I quite admit that your theory of divine premovement is not on the face of it inadmissible.

The illustration of the mice inside the piano is excellent. The uniform sequences which the mice might discover between the sounds and the phenomena inside, would not negative the player without. But you only put back the collision between the two theories for a certain distance. It comes at last. At whatever point in the upward series the unforseeable will of the divine musician comes in, there the uniformity of physical sequence fails; the chain has been traced to its beginning; a physical phenomenon has taken place without any antecedent physical conditions. Now, what would be asserted on the other side of the question is that the facts always admit of and render highly probable the supposition that there were such antecedent physical conditions, and that there

has been no ultimate beginning to that series of effects short of whatever beginning there was to the whole history of the universe.

We do not pretend that we can disprove Divine interference in events and direct guidance of them; all our evidence is only negative. We say that, so far as known to mankind, everything takes place as it would do if there were no such direct guidance. We think that every event is abstractedly capable of being predicted, because mankind are, in each case, as near to being able actually to predict what happens as could be expected, regard being had to the degree of accessibility of the *data*, and the complexity of the conditions of the problem.

I cannot perceive in your article any errors in physics. But I am not a safe authority in matters of physical science. Astronomers now think that they can predict much more than eclipses and the return of comets. Their predictions reach even to the dissipation of the sun's heat, and the heaping up of the solar system in one dead mass of conglution. But I hold all this to be at present nothing more than scientific conjecture. All that is required by your argument is that the possibility of absolute and categorical prediction should be as yet confined to cosmic phenomena. This I believe all men of science admit; and I indorse everything on that subject which is said by Mansel in your note. Scientific prediction in other physical sciences is not absolute but conditional. We know certainly that oxygen and hydrogen brought together in a particular way will produce water; but we cannot predict with certainty that oxygen and hydrogen will come together in that way unless brought together by human agency. The human power of prediction at present extends only to effects which depend on a very small number of causes, and consequently can be predicted. Most other physical phenomena can be predicted with the same certainty, provided we are able to limit the causes in question to a very small number. *This* power of prediction you have not I think allowed for in your essay. Yet it surely is all-important. For if the effect of any single cause, or if any pair or triad of causes can be calculated, the joint effect of a myriad of such causes is *abstractedly* capable of calculation. That we are unable practically to calculate it, is no more than might be expected, at least in the present state of our knowledge, however calculable it may in itself be.

With regard to Freewill, you have not said much that affects my argument. I am not aware of having ever said that foreknowledge is inconsistent with Freewill. That knotty metaphysical question I have avoided entering into, and in my *Logic* I have even built upon the admission of the Freewill philosophers that our freedom be real though God foreknows our actions. You simplify the main question very much by your luminous distinction between the spontaneous impulse of the will, which you regard as strictly

dependent on pre-existing mental dispositions and external solicitations, and what the man may himself do to oppose or alter that spontaneous impulse. The distinction has important practical consequences, but I see no philosophical bearing that it has on Free-will; for it seems to me that the same degree of knowledge of a person's character which will enable us to judge with tolerable assurance what his spontaneous impulse will be, will also enable us to judge with about an equal assurance whether he will make any effort and, in a general way, how *much* effort he is likely to make to control that impulse. Our foresight in this matter cannot be certain because we never can be really in possession of sufficient data. But it is not more uncertain than the insufficiency and uncertainty of the data suffice to account for.

Thanking you very much for giving me the opportunity of reading your very able and interesting speculation.—I am, dear sir, very truly yours, J. S. MILL.

Mr. Ward dealt with the Freewill question in later essays at great length. In the matter of his theory of premovement, he did not consider that Mill's criticism had destroyed the force of his own argument, even allowing that the complexity of the causes of earthly phenomena was as comparatively great as Mill supposed. He held that God's premovement might naturally enough be hidden within a numerous and complex chain of causation. It was not in the order of Providence that such direct influences should be visible on the surface. That causes artificially isolated acted uniformly, and in a manner susceptible of prediction, did not prevent God's frequent interference in the complex combinations in which they are actually found in nature. The fact that fire and wood left apart did not affect each other, and that their non-combustion could be predicted if they were left to themselves, did not prevent their being *in fact* brought in contact with one another by human agency, and combustion ensuing which was thus due to an agency outside the sphere of prediction: and God's supposed premovement was on a similar footing. Prescinding from such incalculable and independent agency, prediction was in each case possible. And it was natural enough that Providence should abstain from special premovement in cases in which it would be so visible as to be an unmistakable miracle. "Let it be assumed," he wrote, "that God does premove earthly phenomena, and . . . that He does

not want this premovement to be a visible palpable fact. On this supposition He would act just as we maintain He *has* acted. He would make earthly phenomena to proceed on so complex a chain of causation that His assiduous premovement of them eludes direct observation."

The controversy with Mill was renewed in 1871 in a more thorough and systematic shape. Mill's own public rejoinder appeared in 1872, and he died in 1873. Mr. Ward spoke of his death as a "severe controversial disappointment,"[1] adding that he had "far more hope of coming to an understanding with him" than with other members of his school, "because he was in the habit of apprehending and expressing his own thoughts so much more definitely and perspicuously than they." Ward continued, however, his examination of Mill's philosophy, of which a full account shall be given in a subsequent chapter.

[1] See *Dublin Review*, July 1873.

CHAPTER XII

THE METAPHYSICAL SOCIETY

1869–1878

In 1869 came an event which brought Mr. Ward suddenly into personal relations with a large number of the most eminent English thinkers of the day—the formation of the Metaphysical Society.

The Metaphysical Society was a remarkable and typical product of modern conditions of intellectual life. Its aim was to bring together in friendly and free debate on the fundamental problems of man's life and destiny, representatives of all the various schools of opinion which made up the world of thought at the time of its foundation. It aimed, in short, at being a living microcosm of the great intellectual world in England. Its original promoters were men who keenly realised the decline of definite faith in the supernatural, among thinking men. They considered, too, that the rising school of scientific agnosticism was assuming an arrogance of tone, and gaining an influence from its self-confidence, which made it all the more dangerous. The movement towards religious negation was then at its height; and the opposition between the opinions current among men of science and theologians had not yet been sensibly diminished by the mutual explanations of the more comprehensive thinkers on either side. Darwin's "monkey" and the Adam of Genesis contested the honourable position of founder of the human race, before the popular imagination: and every argument for evolution was held to support the former and discredit the latter. There were, moreover, few signs as yet of the religious reaction of our own time. Such attempts as had been made in

the English Church at facing frankly the criticism and science of the day evinced rather the impatient and liberalising temper of *Essays and Reviews*, than the greater caution, reverence, and thoroughness of *Lux Mundi*. The scorn of the "lights of science" for the intellectual position of an orthodox Christian, showed at times a onesidedness and slight acquaintance with Christian thought at its best, which could not but be in some degree modified, it was thought, by a personal *rapprochement* with Christian thinkers.

Again, in all the deep problems of religious belief, the personal equation goes for so much that it was considered —and the opinion was justified by the event—that a far truer understanding of an opponent's real mind must ensue from such a *rapprochement*, than from any amount of controversial literature. The necessary conditions of success in the attempt were absolute freedom of speech,—which could safely be admitted among highly-cultivated intellectual men,—and privacy in the debates of the Society. And these conditions were from the first observed. There could be no protest against an opinion on the ground that it shocked religious prepossessions; and the details of the discussions must be, consequently, reserved for those who pledged themselves to conform to this rule. From this very circumstance the proceedings of the Society cannot be even now publicly recorded; but the external facts connected with its foundation, and its general features and results have an interest of their own: and they have been described to me by some of its most distinguished members. Many of the papers themselves were subsequently published. Enough therefore of interest is available to illustrate the social side of *réunions* which gave Mr. Ward an opportunity for marked and characteristic influence.

The first idea of forming such a Society was conceived by Mr. James Knowles, now editor of the *Nineteenth Century*, in the course of a conversation with Mr. (afterwards Lord) Tennyson and Mr. Pritchard, some time Savilian Professor of Astronomy. Archbishop Manning and Mr. Ward were among the first before whom the proposal to co-operate in its formation was laid, and they readily undertook to do so. The original programme of the Society—that it should be a rallying point for Theists of various denominations in their struggle against

the advance of Agnosticism—was soon abandoned; and it speedily took the comprehensive character I have described. Archbishop Manning, Mr. Ward, and Mr. Tennyson met at Mr. Knowles's house, and discussed the claims of the various thinkers of the day to be invited to join, and forthwith arranged among themselves who should communicate with whom. Mr. John Stuart Mill was a personage of importance for such an object, both from his unique eminence at that time as a thinker, and from his interest in religious metaphysics. Mr. Ward undertook to invite him to join, and wrote to him in the following terms:—

8 Upper Hamilton Terrace, London, N.W.,
24*th March* 1869.

My dear Sir—Certain Theists, who feel very strongly what they consider the evils more and more impending from such views as you, Mr. Bain, and others so ably advocate, are extremely desirous of promoting direct and personal discussion on the subject. They are of opinion, rightly or wrongly, that those on your side do not duly weigh what is said on ours, and that good of various kinds would ensue from a closer personal *rapprochement*. They are, therefore, desirous of establishing a "Metaphysical Society," in which metaphysical questions shall be discussed in the manner and with the machinery of the learned and scientific societies. They have been so kind as to ask various Catholics, including myself, to join them; and the Archbishop and I (I don't know about others) have put down our names.

The following gentlemen have also already joined the Society, Rev. Mr. Martineau, Rev. Mr. Maurice, Dean Stanley, Mr. Tennyson, Mr. Hutton of the *Spectator*, Rev. Mr. Pritchard (late President of Astronomical Society), Mr. Robert Browning, Mr. Bagehot, Sir John Lubbock. They are further going to ask either Professor Huxley or Mr. Tyndall (I forget which . . .), Archbishop Thomson, Dr. Carpenter, Mr. James Hinton, Dean Mansel, Professor De Morgan, Mr. Herbert Spencer. They are very anxious to have Mr. Bain, but they fear he is a fixture in Scotland. And they are especially desirous of *you*. For some reason or other, others seemed to have difficulty in writing to you; so I was impudent enough to volunteer, as you have so kindly received various communications with which I have troubled you. And perhaps we can be the better friends from being such *very* pronounced enemies. They are going to ask the Duke of Argyll to be President. They suggest such subjects as these—

The immateriality of the soul and its personal identity.

The nature of miracles.

The reasonableness of prayer.

The personality of God.

Conscience—its true character.

The originator is Mr. Knowles, living at Clapham, who says *you* do not know him; he is a great friend of Dean Stanley's. Will you kindly consider the proposition, and let me have an answer?—I remain, my dear sir, sincerely yours,

W. G. WARD.

Mr. Mill, though sympathising with the object of the Society, felt that at his time of life the day was past for entering into the arena of verbal discussion, and declined to join; as also did Mr. Herbert Spencer, who was invited to become a member. Mill's general view of the prospects of the Society—expressed in his reply to Ward—is interesting, as corresponding in great measure with the view of its actual achievements given later on by Dr. Martineau, namely that the most thorough results could only be attained by means of debates in which the hand-to-hand conflict of the Socratic method is possible. He wrote as follows:—

29*th March* 1869.

The purpose of those who have projected the Society mentioned in your letter is a laudable one, but it is very doubtful whether it will be realised in practice. Oral discussion on matters dependent on reasoning may be much more thorough than when carried on by written discourse, but only I think if undertaken in the manner of the Socratic dialogue, between one and one. None of the same advantages are obtained when the discussion is shared by a mixed assemblage. Even, however, as a kind of debating society on these great questions the Society may be useful, especially to its younger members. But my time is all pre-engaged to other occupations, and I do not expect any such benefit, either to others or to myself, from my taking part in the proceedings of the Society, as would justify me in putting aside other duties in order to join it.

It is very natural that those who are strongly convinced of the truth of their opinions should think that those who differ from them do not duly weigh their arguments. I can only say that I sincerely endeavour to do the amplest justice to any argument which is urged, and to all I can think of even when not urged, in defence of any opinions which I controvert.

The Society rapidly gained members, and came to include a very motley assemblage of men of different opinions and different callings; direct opponents of Theism and Christianity such as W. K. Clifford; statesmen who were also

Churchmen as Mr. Gladstone, Lord Selborne and the Duke of Argyll; Churchmen who were also Church dignitaries as the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol; members of the broad Church School as Dean Stanley and Frederick Denison Maurice; Unitarians as Dr. James Martineau; Catholics as Archbishop Manning, Father Dalgairns, and Dr. Ward; Agnostics who were men of science as Professor Huxley and Professor Tyndall; Agnostics who were men of letters as Mr. John Morley and Mr. Leslie Stephen; Positivists as Mr. Frederic Harrison. Among other members were Mr. Tennyson, Mr. Ruskin, Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen, Mr. R. H. Hutton, Dean Church, Mr. J. A. Froude, Mr. W. R. Greg, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Dr. Carpenter, Mr. Mark Pattison, Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir Alexander Grant, Lord Sherbrooke (then Mr. Lowe), Sir M. E. Grant Duff, Lord Arthur Russell, Sir William Gull, and Dr. Andrew Clark. Mr. Knowles acted as honorary secretary.

It was originally proposed to call it the "Theological" Society, but the name "Metaphysical" was ultimately determined on. It met once a month. A paper was written and privately distributed to the members, and afterwards read and discussed at the meeting. The subjects for discussion seldom departed far from the sphere of Religious Philosophy; and though occasionally such headings are found to the Essays read before the Society as "Matter and Force," "the Relation of Will to Thought," "What is Matter?" far more frequently the titles bear direct relation to the "world behind the veil" as "What is death?" "The Ethics of Belief," "Is God unknowable?" "The Theory of a Soul," "The Personality of God," "The Nature of the Moral Principle." The first meeting took place at Willis's rooms on 21st April 1869; but subsequently the Grosvenor Hotel was chosen as the habitual field of encounter. A good deal of anxiety was felt at first lest some of the most startling subjects of debate might, through the medium of the hotel waiters, find their way to the zealots of Exeter Hall. This fear was, however, allayed when a member on arriving at the hotel was thus greeted by the porter, "A member of the *Madrigal* Society, sir, I suppose?"

The discussion of the evening was always preceded by a dinner which many of the members attended. This pre-

liminary gathering, of a purely social character, was an important feature in the meetings. My father always considered that some of the most characteristic results of the Society were obtained in the friendly conversations at the dinner-table; and it was much to his taste to find himself next to a Huxley or a Tyndall, and to sharpen his weapons for the deadly combat which was to ensue by a most animated and genial conversation on neutral topics. He followed with alacrity the advice given by Tranio in *The Taming of the Shrew*,

> Do as adversaries do in law,
> Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends!

Notes of the members actually present at particular meetings, given to me by Sir Mountstuart E. Grant Duff, help to preserve the picture of the intercourse of the remarkable men who made up the Society:—

"I was elected," he writes, "in the beginning of December 1870, and dined for the first time with the Society on the 13th of that month. Your father was in the chair; next him sat Dr. Ellicott the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol; next him was Mr. Bagehot, then myself, Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Mr. (later Lord) Tennyson, and Mr. R. H. Hutton. On your father's left was Mr. Knowles the secretary, then in order, Dean Alford, Father Dalgairns, Mr. Frederic Harrison and Mr. Froude. The paper was by Mr. Bagehot 'On the Emotion of Conviction.'

"My second visit was on the 11th of January 1871, when there was a large party, consisting of your father, Mr. G. Grove, Dr. Carpenter, Mr. Froude, the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Knowles, Dean Stanley, Mr. James Martineau, Mr. R. H. Hutton, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Mr. Ruskin, Sir John Lubbock, Professor Huxley, Archbishop Manning, Professor Sidgwick, Lord Arthur Russell, and Mr. Frederic Harrison. I sat, I remember, between the future Cardinal and Professor Huxley."[1]

[1] "With a great many of the members of the Society," Sir Mountstuart adds, "I was, of course, well acquainted before I joined it; but some I met there for the first time. Your father, for example, I had never seen before. He did not represent the side of the Oxford Movement which had most interest for me, but he was a notable historical figure; and, moreover, he had been the hero of the hour when I first made acquaintance with Oxford as a boy of sixteen, in 1845.

"I do not remember that the Laureate took any part in the discussion, but his mere presence added dignity to a dignified assemblage. Dean Alford, I think, and Father Dalgairns, I am sure, I had never met till I met them at the Metaphysical. The second I had long wished to see on account of his close connection

The general impression produced by a typical meeting has been sketched[1] by a constant attendant, Mr. R. H. Hutton; and will be specially in place as Mr. Ward was the writer and reader of the Essay of the evening:—

"At the meeting of the Metaphysical Society which was held on the 10th of December 1872," he writes, "Dr. Ward was to read a paper on the question 'Can experience prove the uniformity of Nature?' *Middlemarch* had been completed and published a few days previously. On the day following the meeting the Convocation of Oxford was to vote upon the question raised by Mr. Burgon and Dean Goulburn, whether the Dean of Westminster (then Dr. Stanley) should be excluded for his heresies from the List of Select Preachers at Oxford or not. The 'Claimant' was still starring it in the provinces in the interval between his first trial and his second. Thus the dinner itself was lively, though several of the more distinguished members did not enter till the hour for reading the paper had arrived. One might have heard Professor Huxley flashing out a sceptical defence of the use of the Bible in Board Schools at one end of the table; Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's deep bass remarks on the Claimant's adroit use of his committal for perjury, at another; and an eager discussion of the various merits of Lydgate and Rosamond at a third. 'Ideal Ward,' as he used to be called,

with Newman before he made his great plunge; and the other on account of his poem 'Lady Mary' which ought to be a great deal better known than it is, and makes a very good second, in its own line, to the 'St. Agnes' of the great writer who sat opposite him.

"I remember, after the dissolution of the Society, the late Archbishop of York told me that he was more struck by the metaphysical ability of Father Dalgairns and of Mr. James Martineau than by that of any other of the disputants.

"I think the paper which interested me most of all that were ever read at our meetings was one by Mr. W. R. Greg on 'Wherein consists the special beauty of imperfection and decay?' in which he propounded the questions 'Are not ruins recognised and felt to be more beautiful than perfect structures? Why are they so? Ought they to be so?'

"Another very close friend of mine I connect much more with the Metaphysical, for we used to go thither from time to time from the House of Commons together. This was Lord Arthur Russell. He, as you probably know, amongst his many interests, which embraced almost everything that deserved to be the subject of *la grande curiosité*, had a very strong interest in Metaphysics, and it is a pity that this side of his mind has not been painted, for the many who cherish his memory, by some one able to do it justice. He wrote at least three papers for the Society, one of which, on 'The Absolute,' was read in March 1871, another on 'The Persistence of the Religious Feeling' in May 1876, and another on 'Ideas as a Force' in 1877."

[1] The passage cited is from an Essay by Mr. Hutton published in the *Nineteenth Century*.

from the work on the *Ideal of a Christian Church* for which he had lost his degree nearly thirty years earlier at Oxford, was chuckling with a little malicious satisfaction over the floundering of the orthodox clergy, in their attempts to express safely their dislike of Dean Stanley's latitudinarianism, without bringing the Establishment about their ears. He thought we might as well expect the uniformity of nature to be disproved by the efforts of spiritualists to turn a table, as the flood of latitudinarian thought to be arrested by Mr. Burgon's and Dean Goulburn's attempt to exclude the Dean of Westminster from the List of Select Preachers at Oxford. Father Dalgairns, one of Dr. Newman's immediate followers, who left the English Church and entered the Oratory of St. Philip Neri with him, a man of singular sweetness and openness of character, with something of a French type of playfulness in his expression, discoursed to me eloquently on the noble ethical character of George Eliot's novels, and the penetrating disbelief in all but human excellence by which they are pervaded. Implicitly he intended to convey to me, I thought, that nowhere but in the Roman Church could you find any real breakwater against an incredulity which could survive even the aspirations of so noble a nature as hers. And as I listened to this eloquent exposition with one ear, the sound of Professor Tyndall's eloquent Irish voice, descanting on the proposal for a 'prayer-gauge,' which had lately been made in the *Contemporary Review*, by testing the efficacy of prayer on a selected hospital ward, captivated the other. Everything alike spoke of the extraordinary fermentation of opinion in the society around us. Moral and intellectual 'yeast' was as hard at work multiplying its fungoid forms in the men who met at that table, as even in the period of the Renaissance itself.

"I was very much struck then, and frequently afterwards, by the marked difference between the expression of the Roman Catholic members of our Society and all the others. No men could be more different among themselves than Dr. Ward and Father Dalgairns and Archbishop Manning, all of them converts to the Roman Church. But nevertheless, all had upon them that curious stamp of definite spiritual authority, which I have never noticed on any faces but those of Roman Catholics, and of Roman Catholics who have passed through a pretty long period of subjection to the authority they acknowledge. In the Metaphysical Society itself there was every type of spiritual and moral expression. The wistful and sanguine, I had almost said hectic, idealism of James Hinton struck me much more than anything he contrived to convey by his remarks. The noble and steadfast, but somewhat melancholy faith, which seemed to be sculptured on Dr. Martineau's massive brow, shaded off into wistfulness in the glance of his eyes. Professor Huxley, who always had a definite standard for every ques-

tion which he regarded as discussable at all, yet made you feel that his slender definite creed in no respect represented the cravings of his large nature. Professor Tyndall's eloquent addresses frequently culminated with some pathetic indication of the mystery which to him surrounded the moral life. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's gigantic force, expended generally in some work of iconoclasm, always gave me the impression that he was revenging himself on what he could not believe, for the disappointment he had felt in not being able to retain the beliefs of his youth.

"But in the countenances of our Roman Catholic members there was no wistfulness, rather an expression which I might almost describe as a blending of grateful humility with involuntary satiety —genuine humility, genuine thankfulness for the authority on which they anchored themselves; but something also of a feeling of the redundance of that authority, and of the redundance of those provisions for their spiritual life of which almost all our other members seemed to feel that they had but a bare and scanty pasturage.

"Dr. Ward, who was to read the paper of the evening, struck me as one of our most unique members. His mind was, to his own apprehension at least, all strong lights and dark shadows. Either he was absolutely, indefeasibly, 'superabundantly' certain, or he knew no more 'than a baby,' to use his favourite *simile*, about the subjects I conversed with him upon. On the criticism of the New Testament, for instance, he always maintained that he knew no more than a baby, though really he knew a good deal about it. On the questions arising out of Papal Bulls he would often say that he was as absolutely and superabundantly certain as he was of his own existence. Then he was a very decided humorist. He looked like a country squire, and in the Isle of Wight was, I believe, generally called 'Squeer Ward'; but if you talked to him about horses or land, he would look at you as if you were talking in an unknown language; and would describe, in most extravagant and humorous terms, his many rides in search of health, and the profound fear with which, whenever the animal showed the least sign of spirit, he would cry out 'Take me off! take me off!' He was one of the very best and most active members of our Society as long as his health lasted; most friendly to everybody, though full of amazement at the depth to which scepticism had undermined the creed of many amongst us. A more candid man I never knew. He never ignored a difficulty, and never attempted to express an indistinct idea. His metaphysics were as sharp cut as crystals. He never seemed to see the half lights of a question at all. There was no penumbra in his mind, or at least, what he could not grasp clearly, he treated as if he could not apprehend at all.

"When dinner was over and the cloth removed, a waiter entered

with sheets of foolscap and pens for each of the members, of which very little use was made. The ascetic Archbishop of Westminster, every nerve in his face expressive of some vivid feeling, entered, and was quickly followed by Dr. Martineau. Then came Mr. Hinton glancing round the room with a modest half-humorous furtiveness, as he seated himself amongst us. Then Dr. Ward began his paper. He asked how mere experience could prove a universal truth without examining in detail every plausibly asserted exception to that truth, and disproving the reality of the exception. He asked whether those who believe most fervently in the uniformity of Nature ever show the slightest anxiety to examine asserted exceptions. He imagined, he said, that what impresses physicists is the fruitfulness of inductive science with the reasonable inference that inductive science could not be the fruitful field of discovery it is, unless it rested on a legitimate basis, which basis could be no other than a principle of uniformity. Dr. Ward answered that the belief in genuine exceptions to the law of uniform phenomenal antecedents and consequents, does not in the least degree invalidate this assumption of the general uniformity of nature, if these exceptions are announced, as in the case of miracles they always must be, as demonstrating the interposition of some spiritual power which is not phenomenal between the antecedent and its natural consequent, which interposition it is that alone interrupts the order of phenomenal antecedence and consequence. 'Suppose,' he said, 'that every Englishman, by invoking St. Thomas of Canterbury, could put his hand into the fire without injury. Why, the very fact that in order to avoid injury he must invoke the saint's name, would ever keep fresh and firm in his mind the conviction that fire does naturally burn. He would, therefore, as unquestioningly in all his physical researches, assume this to be the natural property of fire, as though God had never wrought a miracle at all. In fact, from the very circumstances of the case, it is always one of the most indubitable laws of nature which a miracle overrides, and those who wish most to magnify miracles are led by that very fact to dwell with special urgency on the otherwise universal prevalence of the law.' There was a short pause when Dr. Ward had concluded his paper, which was soon ended by Professor Huxley, who broke off short in a very graphic sketch he had been making on his sheet of foolscap as he listened."

The debates which used to follow the reading of the paper of the evening are described as full of character. Sir M. E. Grant Duff gives one or two characteristic touches of description:—

"I recall," he writes, "Mr. Mark Pattison refusing to be 'drawn'

by the questions of his adversaries till he thought the proper time had come to speak, and looking, for all the world, like a wild animal watching its opportunity at the mouth of its den. I seem to see again the massive forehead and august presence of Bishop Thirlwall whom I do not think I ever met elsewhere. I daresay you know the story of his refusing to ask under his roof a German savant who had defended the execution of Socrates. Perhaps that was half in jest; if it were not, the Metaphysical Society was the very best place to learn patience with all opinions. Your father, Manning, Dalgairns and the other Catholics had certainly advanced a long way beyond that Spanish doctor to whom I called your attention lately, and who was so shocked by the prototype of the Metaphysical Society which met in Bagdad more than a thousand years ago. The courtesy of its members to each other was indeed exemplary and phenomenal. I remember Arthur Russell saying one day at the Breakfast Club, 'The members of the Metaphysical Society are always very polite to each other. I can recall only one occasion on which they made the slightest approach to anything the least different. The Cardinal was speaking of some miracle which had been described to him, and observed, "I said to the person who gave me the account of it, 'Now I should like to ask you one or two questions, you know I am a person of a rather sceptical disposition.'" At these words the Society exhibited some signs of amusement in which the illustrious speaker heartily joined.'"

Both the general characteristics of the debates and Ward's own share in them have been described for me by three members who represent, perhaps in the extreme degree, its typical modes of thought. No Theism could be more profoundly or philosophically elaborated than that of Dr. Martineau, whose later eagerness in the advocacy of destructive Biblical criticism was at that time little looked for. No Agnosticism was more openly avowed than that of Professor Huxley, the first inventor of the word "Agnostic." No man in England holds the balance between opposite opinions more habitually or more justly than Mr. Henry Sidgwick. The accounts of all three amply illustrate the unexpected amount of sympathy which disclosed itself among persons holding views which had seemed in the abstract to be without any common measure.

It is hard to say which was more distasteful to Mr. Ward, the acquiescence in intellectual indecision so characteristic of the Cambridge Professor, or the attitude of the scientific iconoclast

who taught that God was unknowable and Christianity a superstition; while Ward's own standpoint—that of Ultramontane Catholicism—was utterly opposed to the first principles of Mr. Huxley's reasoning. Mr. Huxley has, indeed, never been slow to recognise the trained and disciplined intellectual organisation among Catholic theologians; but their ultimate beliefs are to him a tissue of fables; and their method reveals to him "the great gulf fixed between the ecclesiastical and scientific mind."[1] Indeed, his preference for thoroughgoing Catholicism over less definite forms of Christianity, seems to be partly due to the impression that it candidly avows that opposition to all rational science which every defender of the "orthodox" position, if he is but frank and logical, should confess to. The Ultramontane's supposed *credo quia impossibile* is to the Professor a satisfaction, because it acknowledges the position he most wishes to assail. The Ultramontane does not hide in ambush but comes forth into the open. Mr. Huxley prefers him as the hungry lion welcomes the unwary and adventurous antelope.

Again the measured sentences and complex refinements of Mr. Sidgwick, with their passionless outcome of purely intellectual judgment, were to the apostles on all sides—positive and negative—as tantalising as their own enthusiasms and broad principles were to him exaggerated or onesided. Of Martineau Mr. Sidgwick is reported to have said, "he always preaches"; and Martineau would perhaps have retorted, "Sidgwick never makes up his mind."

Another consideration which did not promise well for the good understanding, which was nevertheless attained, was the extreme conservatism in those days of the typical theologians. Objections to the then current theories of Biblical inspiration and to other traditional beliefs which are now recognised to have real force, and which the most orthodox have in some measure admitted and deferred to, were often treated simply as part and parcel of an impious revolt against religion; and such want of exact judgment gave to the scientific school some of the asperity which naturally attends on unfair proscription. Most of us remember the time when theories as to the days of creation and as to the

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, June 1889.

inerrancy secured by inspiration, which are now generally received among Christians, were treated in many quarters as a part of the insolence of geological and critical science. The "advanced" thinkers felt themselves to be wronged, and revenged themselves for the moral strictures of their opponents, which were unfair because they were indiscriminate, by an intellectual contempt which was certainly neither less indiscriminate nor less unfair. While the narrow Theologian was disposed to condemn all the conclusions of science which clashed with theological traditions as inexcusable infidelity, the more combative members of the scientific school accepted the situation, and argued "since this is Christianity how can Christianity be a religion for rational men?" This attitude was marked in the writings of the late Professor W. K. Clifford as well as in Mr. Tyndall's occasional utterances; and both of these writers were members of the Metaphysical Society. It still survives to a certain extent in some of Mr. Huxley's Essays on "controverted questions."

A more generally sympathetic mental habit is typical of our own day. Scientific dogmatism is now as little regarded as an ultimate solution of these great problems as religious dogmatism. But Mr. Huxley's uncompromising condemnations were then representative of an influential section of critics. It was natural therefore that collision should be looked for; and it was remarkable that the opposite forces, instead of clashing abruptly or destructively, were tempered unexpectedly by a third force, hitherto latent—the strong elements of human sympathy which discovered themselves. "We all thought it would be a case of Kilkenny cats," said Professor Huxley to the present writer. "Hats and coats would be left in the hall; but there would be no owners left to put them on again." The following sketches certainly show that the case proved far otherwise, and that respect and something like affection developed themselves where they had been least expected. "Charity, brotherly love," testifies the eminent member just alluded to, "were the chief traits of the Society. We all expended so much charity, that, had it been money, we should every one have been bankrupt." Such indeed was its character from first to last. It was expected to die of irreconcilable dissensions; it eventually came to an end because members

thought that mutual understanding had reached its highest point. Personal friendliness was established, and difference of standpoint was allowed for. Its sources, so far as they were intellectual, were traced; and by mutual consent the elements which were not intellectual were banished from discussion. What remained, after years of constant explanation, still unfathomed, was seen to be beyond the reach of the debates of the Society. Mutual approximation could advance no farther, and as there was no force to make it recede, stagnation became at last the inevitable tendency. "The Society died of too much love," as Professor Huxley expressed it.

The conditions which from the first tended to produce this result are indicated in Dr. Martineau's reminiscences. The absolute mutual toleration among the members, for which he stipulated at the outset, no doubt had its share. It came upon the men who opposed orthodoxy in the name of science as an agreeable contrast to the wholesale hostility of the outside world. They found in the Metaphysical Society strenuous opposition to their views, as a whole, combined with open-minded consideration of the reasons they had to allege; and it was no doubt partly this hearty acceptance on the part of theologians, publicly reputed to be intolerant, of the conditions of mutual respect and equal discussion, which won from their opponents both intellectual appreciation for their candour and ability, and a recognition, the more thorough because it was due to what was unexpected, of their friendliness and fairness. And on the side of the theologians the toleration which began as a practical necessity often passed into real personal regard. "We have not converted each other," Father Dalgairns remarked, "but we certainly think better of each other."

The earlier attitude of mutual disapproval is dramatically indicated by an incident related to me by Mr. Froude. A speaker at one of the first meetings laid down emphatically as a necessary condition to success, that no element of moral reprobation must appear in the debates. There was a pause, and then Mr. Ward said, "While acquiescing in this condition as a general rule, I think it cannot be expected that Christian thinkers shall give no sign of the horror with which they would view the spread of such extreme opinions as those advocated by Mr. Huxley." Another pause ensued, and Mr.

Huxley said, "As Dr. Ward has spoken I must in fairness say that it will be very difficult for me to conceal my feeling as to the intellectual degradation which would come of the general acceptance of such views as Dr. Ward holds." No answer was given; but the single speech on either side brought home then and there to all, including the speakers themselves, that if such a tone were admitted the Society could not last a day. From that time onwards, says Mr. Froude, no word of the kind was ever heard.

Dr. Martineau writes as follows of his own recollection of the formation of the Society, and of the good understanding to which its members attained:—

The invitation to aid in constituting it originally came before me in this form: "A few persons, eminent in genius and character, observing with anxiety the spread of Agnostic opinions, propose to organise an intellectual resistance, in the shape of a Society conspicuously competent to deal with the ultimate problems of philosophy and morals. Will you join?"

My answer was to this effect: "I feel the deepest interest in these problems, and, for the equal chance of gaining and of giving light, would gladly join in discussing them with gnostics and agnostics alike; but a society of gnostics to put down the agnostics I cannot approve and could not join."

It was feared at first that the modified project thus suggested would be unacceptable to the two or three professional theologians who had already been consulted; but they readily acceded to the proposal. The invitations to the institutive dinner were, therefore, addressed impartially to some best representatives of the several schools, positive or negative, of philosophical or religious opinion; and at that first meeting it was distinctly settled that the members, crediting each other with a pure quest of truth, would confer together on terms of respectful fellowship, and never visit with reproach the most unreserved statement of reasoned belief or unbelief.

This initial understanding, so far as I can remember, was honourably observed throughout the history of the Society. And this is the one clear moral gain which may be claimed for our meetings. They divested even extreme contrasts of opinion of every vestige of personal antipathy, and not infrequently opened the way to friendships and admirations which before would have been deemed impossible. For myself I can say that if I had gained nothing from the Metaphysical Society but the impression of Father Dalgairns's personality, I should have been for ever grateful to it.

That such affinities should go so far as to lead to absolute agreement, or to diminution of difference so noteworthy as to be openly avowed, was not to be expected. The sympathies aroused implied rather a psychological than a logical approach. They consisted rather in a truer estimate of an opponent's way of thinking, of the associations, habits, intellectual training which explained his state of mind, than in anything deeper. The difference was generally in first principles; and while width of mind was necessarily gained all round from an intelligent apprehension of such varied mental history, principles themselves did not change as a whole. Still Dr. Martineau seems to think that there may have been some modification of view, in the light of so much that had been hitherto unsuspected, which was not unimportant. He continues thus:—

Whether the growth of such sympathetic affinities carried with it any intellectual approximation I cannot judge. That during the existence of the Society, no member migrated from one school of thought to another, by no means proves that we all remained stationary. It is the rarest result of a debate, that *pros* and *cons* change places; but, short of this, the state of mind in both may be very materially affected; each may be surprised by some unexpected merit in the other's case, or some latent fallacy in an argument for his own; and having entered the discussion as an advocate, he will vote on it as a judge. To me at least, and I should think to others, the evenings of the Society laid bare not a few spurious semblances of disagreement, in the unconscious assumption, at the outset, of inconsistent postulates, in the indistinct conception of the thesis under examination, and in the ambiguous use of terms introduced as media of proof.

The constitution of the Society—as including public men of most various interests—was no doubt opposed to the obtaining of results as complete and scientific as might have been looked for from professed metaphysicians alone. The concessions on either side would have been more carefully registered and would have formed fresh points of departure, had the meetings been always attended by the same members, and had all the members had the logical habits of trained abstract thinkers. Such conditions must, one would think, have ultimately brought the intellectual positions of the members somewhat nearer to each other. But as it was, the attendance varied; and there was not enough of concentration or con-

secutiveness of thought from one meeting to another, to bring about generally such important modifications of view as individual debates seemed occasionally to promise.

"Experiences of this kind," continues Dr. Martineau, "would have led to more sensible abatement of differences, had the Society kept more faithfully to the promise of its name as *Metaphysical.* Being, however, at one time sought or accepted by many persons variously distinguished,—statesmen, judges, prelates, poets, men of science and of letters,—it came to have even a preponderance of members whose genius was at home in other fields that ours, and several who had no faith in Metaphysics and could not be expected to give patient and helpful attention to our appropriate discussions. Hence, at the larger meetings, the debates, or rather *conversations*, were apt to become desultory, and even to run off into total irrelevance. But now and then, when from six to ten members of congenial culture, raised on the same logical base, were gathered round the table, it became evident as we came to close quarters, how slight and innocent was the incipient divergency which looked so large when measured by its scope in life."

Turning to Ward's share in the discussions, Dr. Martineau holds it to have been especially effective in the smaller and closer debates.

It was especially on such occasions that Dr. Ward's singular metaphysical acuteness played its happiest part, being protected by his social sympathies from all temptation to a keen punitive use against nonsense, and enlisted with evident joy in the service of reconciliation. The smaller meetings, too, instead of being surrendered to a single speaker at a time, succeeded by another and yet another, delivering notes prepared beforehand on the paper read, all waiting for a summary answer at the end, were allowed to slip into easy Socratic dialogue, dealing with each point as it arose. And this freedom, while favouring the chances of mutual understanding, was especially advantageous to the function of a skilled logical detective of fallacies like Dr. Ward. If an argument, after his dissection, were allowed to hang together till the end of the evening instead of visibly falling to pieces at once, it had no small chance of escaping after all with some repute of life.

I am not, however, quite an impartial judge of your father's part in the discussions of our Society; for I found myself, almost invariably, on the same bench with him and helped out of lingering self-distrusts by his tone of quicker confidence.

Mr. Henry Sidgwick in his "Recollections" confirms Dr. Martineau's estimate of the special quality in Ward's

debating which made him help in the analysis of the points at issue, and in the diminution of mutual misunderstanding. His sketch includes also some account of the general impression produced on him by Ward's personality and manner of debate.

I remember well the first time that I saw your father—it was, I *think*, at the second or third meeting of the Society. He came into the room along with Manning, and the marked contrast between them added to the impressiveness. I remember thinking that I had never seen a face that seemed so clearly to indicate a strongly-developed sensuous nature, and yet was at the same time so intellectual as your father's. I do not mean merely that it expressed intellectual *faculty* . . . I mean rather the predominance of the intellectual life, of concern (as Matthew Arnold says) for the "things of the mind." I did not then know your father's writings at all; and though from what I had heard of him I expected to find him an effective defender of the Catholic position, I certainly did not anticipate that I should come—as after two or three meetings I did come—to place him in the very first rank of our members, as judged from the point of view of the Society in respect of their aptitudes for furthering its aim. The aim of the Society was, by frank and close debate and unreserved communication of dissent and objection, to attain—not agreement, which was of course beyond hope—but a diminution of mutual misunderstanding. For this kind of discussion your father's gifts were very remarkable. The only other member of the Society who in my recollection rivals him is—curiously enough—Huxley. Huxley was perhaps unsurpassed in the quickness with which he could see and express with perfect clearness and precision the best answer that could be made, from his point of view, to any argument urged against him. But your father's dialectic interested me more, apart of course from any question of agreement with principles or conclusions, not only from its subtlety, but from the strong and unexpected impression it made on me of complete sincerity and self-abandonment to the train of thought that was being pursued at the time. When Tennyson's lines on him came out afterwards I thought that two of them—

> How subtle at tierce and quart of mind with mind,
> How loyal in the following of thy Lord!

were very apt and representative; but the first line does not convey what I am now trying to express—the feeling one had that he gave himself up to the λόγος like an interlocutor in a Platonic dialogue, and was prepared to follow it to any conclusions to which it might lead. This is a characteristic more commonly found in the discussions of youth than in those of middle age; and I do not know that

I can better describe the impression of this feature of your father's manner of debate than by saying that he often reminded me of old undergraduate days more than any other of the disputants. And of course this was all the more impressive in a man who so unreservedly at the same time put forward his complete adhesion to an elaborate dogmatic system.

I remember that once—on one of the rare occasions on which I had the privilege of sitting next him at our dinners—I asked him to tell me exactly the Catholic doctrine on some point of conduct, the nature of which I cannot now recall. He answered, "opinions are divided; there are two views, of which I, as usual, take the more bigoted." Of course I understood the word to mean "bigoted as *you would call* it": but the choice of the word seemed to me illustrative of the mixture of serious frankness and genial provocativeness which characterised his share of our debates.

Professor Huxley's notes on the subject have a special interest of their own as illustrating Mr. Ward's habitual readiness to "agree to differ" from him. Reasoning in different planes, and starting from different first principles, their conclusions were diametrically opposed; but the utmost friendliness was soon attained in private intercourse. Their encounters, even when most deadly, had that purely dispassionate and argumentative character which we see in St. Thomas Aquinas's refutations of the mediæval pantheists.

"It was at one of the early meetings of the Metaphysical Society," writes Mr. Huxley, "that I first saw Dr. Ward. I forget whether he or I was the late comer; at any rate we were not introduced. I well recollect wondering what chance had led the unknown member who looked so like a jovial country squire to embark in our galley—that singular rudderless ship, the stalwart oarsmen of which were mostly engaged in pulling as hard as they could against one another; and which consequently performed only circular voyages all the years it was in commission.

"But when a few remarks on the subject under discussion fell from the lips of that beaming countenance, it dawned upon my mind that a physiognomy quite as gentle of aspect as that of Thomas Aquinas (if the bust on the Pincian Hill is any authority) might possibly be the façade of a head of like quality. As time went on, and Dr. Ward took a leading part in our deliberations, my suspicions were fully confirmed. As a quick-witted dialectician, thoroughly acquainted with all the weak points of his antagonist's case, I have not met with Dr. Ward's match. And it all seemed to come so easily to him; searching questions, incisive, not to say

pungent, replies, and trains of subtle argumentation, were poured forth, which, while sometimes passing into earnest and serious exposition, would also, when lighter topics came to the front, be accompanied by an air of genial good-humour, as if the whole business were rather a good joke. But it was no joke to reply, efficiently.

"Although my personal intercourse with Dr. Ward was as limited as it might be expected to be, between two men who were poles asunder, not only in their occupations and circumstances, but in their ways of regarding life and the proper ends of action, yet I am glad to remember that we soon became the friendliest of foes. It was not long after we had reached this stage that, in the course of some truce in our internecine dialectic warfare (I think at the end of one of the meetings of the Metaphysical Society), Dr. Ward took me aside and opened his mind thus: 'You and I are on such friendly terms that I do not think it is right to let you remain ignorant of something I wish to tell you.' Rather alarmed at what this might portend I begged him to say on. 'Well, we Catholics hold that so and so, and so and so (naming certain of our colleagues whose heresies were of a less deep hue than mine) are not guilty of absolutely unpardonable error; but your case is different, and I feel it is unfair not to tell you so.' Greatly relieved I replied, without a moment's delay, perhaps too impulsively, 'My dear Dr. Ward, if you don't mind, I don't,' whereupon we parted with a hearty hand shake; and intermitted neither friendship nor fighting thenceforth.

"I have often told the story, and, not unfrequently, I have regretted to observe that my hearer conceived the point of it to lie in my answer. But to my mind the worth of the anecdote consists in the evidence it affords of the character of Dr. Ward. He was before all things a chivalrous English gentleman; I would say a philosophical and theological Quixote, if it were not that our associations with the name of the knight of La Mancha are mainly derived from his adventures, and not from the noble directness and simplicity of mind which led to those misfortunes."

The few lines which Cardinal Manning sent me shortly before his death, though recording only a general impression made by scenes of which the details had passed from his memory, suggest traits in Ward's manner of debating which explain the appreciation he won from other camps than his own. "It is strange," wrote the Cardinal, "how a whole world of memories eludes one's grasp like the shades in the fields of Asphodel. . . . When I look back on your father in the Metaphysical Society I can make a *compositio loci* and fill it

with faces, and his in the midst of them. But then it is only imaginary, though made up of realities. I cannot recall any special night or discussion . . . but I have a clear and lively recollection of his singular ability and gentleness in debate. He was always evidently reserving his strength. In writing he always let it all out; but in discussion he was singularly respectful to antagonists, and when in extreme contradiction was always playful and kindly, so as to make collision impossible. His intellectual power was fully felt [but so also were] his great courtesy and kindness of heart and temper."

Mr. James Knowles, the secretary and never-failing attendant at the meetings, tells much the same story. He describes Ward as "acute and relentless as a debater to the extreme," and yet "in every capacity as a member of the Society most genial." He goes on to speak of the emphasis with which Ward insisted on the necessity of a candidate for election being a "good fellow" as well as an able man. Ward set the highest value on this as securing "the atmosphere necessary for such discussions." He hit hard and fought hard in the abstract, but his personal relations with all the members were specially characterised by *bonhomie*. "This was the more remarkable," adds Mr. Knowles, "because many of us used to say that were the inquisition re-established, we heretics would rather take our chance of escape from Manning than from Ward. We felt that Ward's relentless logic would stick at nothing, not even at the protests of his own most amiable and gentle nature. I recollect Huxley going with me to dine at your father's house one day. The first thing he did was to go and peer out of the window. Dr. Ward asked him what he was doing, on which he said, 'I was looking in your garden for the *stake*, Dr. Ward, which I suppose you have got ready for us after dinner.'"

The presence of a considerable number of members who were not professed metaphysicians, if it occasionally handicapped the more technical discussions, undoubtedly added very much indeed to the human interest of the Society. Abstract thinkers were reminded of the necessity of being definite and practical; while statesmen, lawyers, and men of science were aroused from the groove of routine work, and led to bring into play the purely intellectual faculties, which so often become stiff and

unwieldy in the course of a technical career. Again the element of poetry and prose literature represented gave quite as much picturesqueness and imaginativeness to the debates as they lost in logical form. It was a sign of life and health in the Society that Mr. Gladstone was said to have treated the Liberal Whip, impatient for instructions about a coming division, to a dissertation on the immortality of the soul. Mr. Huxley's paper, which dealt with that subject, probably gained in actuality from its anatomical and physiological illustrations, even though metaphysicians might consider them irrelevant; and it was in all likelihood more fascinating and stimulating to hear Mr. Ruskin explain that he was always expecting the sun *not* to rise, than to have listened to a reasoned proof of the uniformity of nature. Again, sparks were struck by the flint and steel of contrast. I do not ever remember my father's breaking in upon his regular hours at night except on occasion of one talk with Huxley, when each returned home alternately with the other some five or six times, ending in a final parting very near cock-crow.

Ward was chairman of the Society during the year 1870, and often officiated (Mr. Knowles tells me) as occasional chairman. Most of the members who have conversed with me on the subject note especially his success in this capacity—his absolute impartiality, his quick sense of the true issues of the debate, his good-humour on occasions on which his interference was called for, his success in keeping the discussion to the point — in avoiding both digression and mistiness. One member recalls a proposal which was made by the Society to appoint Ward and Huxley—the Catholic and the Agnostic —perpetual chairmen in alternate years, a proposal which Mr. Ward's uncertain health made him unable to entertain.

Mr. Ward read three papers before the Society in the course of his membership—one on 15th December 1869, on "Memory as an Intuitive Faculty," one on 10th December 1872 (already described), and one on 14th July 1874, on "Necessary Truth." In the first of these he drew out an argument (elsewhere fully analysed) in reply to Mill and the "Experience" School. He had undoubtedly hit a weak point in their system, when he argued against basing on experience that trust in memory which is the very condition of experimental knowledge itself.

In a passage which one of the members has described as "falling like a bombshell" among his opponents, he illustrated the impossibility of all knowledge unless memory be from the first intuitively known to be trustworthy. The argument was especially *ad hominem* against the men of science who maintain the "experience" philosophy. Every truth of science rests ultimately on remembered facts. "Unless such a man assumes that his own and other men's memory of the past can be trusted," he wrote, "he has no more means of even guessing that the earth moves round the sun or that wheat helps to make bread, than he has of guessing that whist is being unintermittently played in the planet of Jupiter; . . . unless you assume that memory is to be trusted you cannot understand the very meaning of a single sentence which is uttered; you cannot so much as apprehend its external bodily sound."

Mr. Ward continued his membership of the Metaphysical Society until in 1878 his health obliged him to resign it. The Society lasted nearly two years longer; but Mr. Knowles resigned the secretaryship in 1879, and the attendance began to fall off. Its last meeting was on 11th May 1880.

Mr. Ward owed to the Metaphysical Society not only the most interesting intellectual *réunions* of his later life, but also friendly meetings outside the debates themselves. Such men as Martineau or R. H. Hutton or Huxley would dine with him, and talk of topics of the day, and listen to him as he sang *Non più andrai* or *Deh vieni alla finestra.* The genial nature of his intercourse with them is shown by the fact that while his Catholic controversies made him ill, his meetings and arguments with his metaphysical friends and enemies were among the most effective of tonics when he was ill or depressed. The difference of his feeling in the two lines of controversy finds expression in a saying of Mr. Simpson's related by Sir M. E. Grant Duff, which, due allowance being made for Mr. Simpson's love of a startling exaggeration, contains undoubtedly a germ of truth.

"The conversation with your father, which I best remember," writes Sir Mountstuart, "turned chiefly upon Clough, about whom he spoke most kindly—so kindly that I afterwards, in talking of it to Mr. Simpson, an Oxford convert, who was not a member of our Society, but a considerable metaphysician, expressed some little

surprise, considering that your father's views and those of Clough, in his later years, were so widely different. 'Oh!' answered Simpson, 'there is nothing to surprise you in that; you may depend upon it he would speak very kindly of you, but he would call me an Atheist."'

Indeed, acute as the feeling about Clough had been while they were being torn asunder, it was like the amputation of a limb. Once the separation was accomplished healing became possible and pain eventually ceased.

Men who differed from Mr. Ward in the very first principles of thought were, similarly, something apart from the sensitive sphere of his own most intimate religious life, and he regarded them with the interest which remarkable thought and character ever had for him. It was a genuine regret to him when ill-health compelled him to resign his membership of the club; and some of the friendships begun at its meetings —notably that with Mr. R. H. Hutton—became more and more to him to the end of his life.

CHAPTER XIII

THE AGNOSTIC CONTROVERSY

In the beginning of 1871, — the year succeeding the Vatican Council,—immediately after his recovery from his illness, Mr. Ward began the systematic work in behalf of Theism, which, although never completed, must be accounted the *magnum opus* of his life. Mr. Mill was at that time at the height of his influence, and Mr. Ward threw his argument into the form of a polemic against that writer's fundamental philosophy. The attack was begun in an article published in the *Dublin Review* in July 1871 on "The Rule and Motive of Certitude," which was succeeded in October by another on "Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truths," and in the following January by an article called "Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality." Before the series had advanced further Mill died, having first published a reply to some of the questions raised by Mr. Ward, in the third edition of the *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy.* In his reply Mill recognised the importance of the objections Ward had raised. "In answering them," he wrote, "I believe I am answering the best that is likely to be said by any future champion."

Mr. Ward continued the series at intervals, still treating Mill as the protagonist of the "Anti-theistic" philosophy, but exchanging passages of controversy with living exponents of some of his doctrines. His polemic with Mr. Bain and Mr. Shadworth Hodgson on "Freewill," in particular, involved incidental skirmishes which delayed the advance of his systematic argument for Theism. The questions of Causation and Freewill were dealt with, the former slightly, the latter exhaustively. The last article published before his death,

reviewing the general line of his argument so far as it had yet gone, and touching on its practical results, was called the "Philosophy of the Theistic Controversy."

Some account must here be given of the general drift of his work. And first of all certain natural anticipations of its scope must be set aside as inexact. Though the essays deal, as Mr. Ward explains, with the "Philosophy of the Theistic Controversy," they do not form a work on Theism. Viewed as a treatise on the foundations of Theism his work is obviously very incomplete. Viewed again as a psychological analysis of the Theist's mind it does not carry us far. A reader approaching the essays with either of these preconceptions will not only be disappointed, but will find closely and elaborately reasoned disquisitions on points which seem far indeed away from the great Object of religious imagination and religious worship. The true analysis of arithmetical and geometrical knowledge, the rationale of our trust in memory, the basis of our trust in nature's uniformity, are interesting questions in the abstract; but they may seem at first sight to belong to the first elements of mental science, which have often been treated adequately. They may appear trivial and disappointing to those who approach the subject anxious to realise the full groundwork of religious knowledge, in days of doubt and unbelief.

But the fact is that Mr. Ward approached the question from a special point of view. The complete analysis of the basis of Theism needed, indeed, as he plainly indicated, a very delicate investigation of the ethical element in conviction, and of the principles warranted by man's moral nature. It needed also a careful investigation into the tests of informal proof, on the lines of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, with the main principles of which he heartily concurred. That all this was of the utmost importance he felt indeed; but the way to it was blocked by a previous question. These investigations could not be effectively undertaken without the previous destruction of certain theories which paralysed the mind of many inquirers. At the time when he began to write, J. S. Mill's philosophy had, as I have said, great influence. Mill had been for years applying and developing Hume's position that all our knowledge is derived from sensitive experience.

Moral and mathematical knowledge alike were the outcome of a network of past experiences, welded together and fused into inseparable associations. Goodness was utility, conscience fear of the father or ruler. Knowledge, deemed absolute and objective by the *a priori* schools, was explained as relative and subjective. All we could know was our own impression. And this passed by an inference *a fortiori* to the theory which has been most definitely expressed by Mr. Tyndall, that we have not even the "rudiment of a faculty" wherewith to apprehend the infinite God. All that subtler investigation to which I have referred was by this philosophy beforehand discredited as waste of time. The ultimate cause must necessarily be unknown and unknowable by beings with faculties so limited in their scope; and sensible men, who realised their necessary limitations, must therefore be—as it came to be termed—agnostics.

This philosophy, I say, blocked the way. Until it was shown to be false, further investigation was without motive or hope of success. It must be shown that the mind *can* be immediately acquainted with something beyond its subjective impressions; that morals and mathematics cannot be reduced to the association of such impressions; that the element "ought" and the element "must" in consciousness are not relative and passive feelings, but involve a perception of objective necessity, conscious of its own power and truthfulness. Mill had frankly recognised the battleground. Disprove the Experience Philosophy and his organised system must fall. Establish the mind's power to perceive objective truth, to acquire knowledge of objective facts by intuition (to use the technical phrase), and the one coherent philosophy which at that time was paralysing the very idea of religious inquiry, must halt and fail of effect. The criticism of Theistic philosophy as *defective* would no doubt remain. But from its negative character this was much less formidable; or at least it admitted a common basis of reasoning with the *a priori* thinkers, which the Experience Philosophy professed to have destroyed. Not a step could be won in answering the negative criticism until these previous questions had been dealt with.

Mr. Ward held that nothing but constant concentration on a few critical points was required to show that the root-

doctrines of the Experience School could not stand philosophically. Whewell and others had introduced confusion into the controversy. For example, in endeavouring to prove against the Experience School that the mind can perceive the intrinsic necessity of certain truths, they had treated the relative necessity of natural law as on a similar footing with the absolute necessity of mathematical truth. Mill had been victorious in his criticism of such loose thinking, and his theory was daily accepted by a larger number as conclusively established. Ward's object was to narrow the ground of controversy, to seize upon his root-doctrines and confront them with instances which, beyond question, disproved them; to stand over him till he confessed that they could not be logically defended. Hence the narrowness of the ground taken up. Hence the insistency. The merit he would have claimed was the reverse of that which the temper of mind typical of our own generation looks for. Discursiveness and suggestiveness and the psychological analysis of mental attitudes, apart from questions of truth or falsehood, are characteristic of our time. So too is the assumption that a confident decision on these subtle questions is not to be looked for; the sense that "yes" or "no" are the last words to be pressed for among cultivated men. Concentration rather on modes of thinking than on valid thought is in fashion; and the foregone conclusion that no absolute knowledge is possible enters tacitly into the premises and vitiates the method. I speak not of course of physical or mathematical science, but of metaphysico-religious speculation.

Ward on the other hand pressed home a few questions, in answering which there was no other alternative than the unqualified negative or affirmative. He banished the concrete, in which all is complex, and all truth is qualified. He isolated principles, refusing for the moment even to look at their application to religious thought itself,—for religious thought would be complicated and prejudiced by religious feeling. With surgical skill he separated in turn each single abstract truth, to be examined and operated on, from the rest of the living mind of thought and feeling; and then he turned the limelight on it, and patiently continued examination and dissection until its true nature was patently apparent. If he did not this he

did nothing. Some of his answers had been touched before by other thinkers. More have been adopted since by writers who, in Dean Church's words, "have not scrupled to plough with Dr. Ward's heifer." But it was his especial work (1) to single out beyond question those points which were at once essential to the Experience Philosophy, and were yet, if candidly examined, demonstrably untenable; (2) to make this examination without ever allowing himself to be confused by adjacent concrete matter, or to desist until it was practically allowed that on these special points his opponents would have to reconsider their position. No controversy ever ends in opponents simply acquiescing; and in this case the sudden rise into prominence of Herbert Spencer's new version of the Experience Philosophy, and his union of that philosophy with the doctrine of evolution, gave the school new ground; but that the old ground was felt by the original school of Mill not to have cleared itself from the difficulties raised by Mr. Ward appears, I think, in their own admissions, which I shall cite later on in the course of my analysis of the controversy.

The first question concerned the general principle, Can the mind perceive immediately something beyond its own subjective impression? Is intuition a valid mental act? This is the question raised in the essay on "The Rule and Motive of Certitude." Mr. Ward treats it doubly. First he shows that the very conclusions of Mill and Bain themselves need as connecting links the principle of intuition; that the successful work which they appeal to as testimony to their principles, rests on that very power which they theoretically deny; and then he isolates one single instance of the mind's power of intuition,—the power of memory,—shows that it is something distinct from a subjective impression or experience, though at first sight so like it; and insists that it must in certain cases carry with it its own evidence of truthfulness as an immediate informant.

I have elsewhere given an account of the former and more general line of argument, which I may here reproduce:

Mill's carefully disciplined and naturally candid and thoughtful mind had done much for the superstructure of psychology and logic, although the basis he adopted, which was substantially that of his father, and in part an inheritance from Hume, was most

unsatisfactory, or rather was no basis at all. What Mr. Ward did attempt was to show that the root-doctrines of the Experience School are devoid of all scientific foundation, and incapable of defence; while the representatives of that school have in all the useful work they have done for philosophy been in reality acting upon those very principles of intuition which they deride as superstitious and unscientific in their opponents. If we note the consequences of this (supposing the charge to be true), we at once see the peculiar importance of the work which he undertook. If it be granted that Mill's *Logic* is in many respects an advance upon previous works of the same description, and that the experimental method of psychology attains to valuable and new results—is, in fact, a distinct step forward in that science—there seems at first sight no escape from admitting that the methods and principles of inquiry adopted by these philosophers are really an improvement upon those which they have replaced. The writers themselves acquire all the authority which attends on success, and public opinion declares in their favour. They appeal to results as a positive proof that the first principles whence they started were sound. And the consequence is that people do not look closely at the real connection between their success and their avowed principles. The world sees their success, and takes them at their word as to the way in which it was gained. Mr. Ward's central aim, we may say, was by a concentrated attack upon their first principles, to draw attention to them, and to their absolute incompatibility with the mode of philosophising of those who professed them. He singled out a few of their fundamental axioms, and insisted on holding them up to the light and examining them.

"These men are conjurors," he said in effect. A conjuror, who is performing feats of sleight of hand before an audience of simple villagers, passes a shilling, apparently, through the table. He gives them plenty of time to examine the shilling and to mark it. They see it and touch it, and know unmistakably that there it is on one side of the table. And when it comes out on the other side, they examine it again, and recognise their own mark. But at the really critical part of the performance, he diverts their attention, and, while bidding them watch closely something unconnected with the real secret of the trick, imperceptibly passes the coin from the right hand to the left, so that when a few moments later he is pressing his right hand on the top of the table and holding a plate in his left underneath to catch the coin, as he says, when it passes through, the whole work is already done; there is no coin in the right hand; it is really under the table. He then explains to them that his method is simple enough. He scratches the table three times in one spot, and says "Presto, open," and the table opens and allows the coin to pass. The villagers listen with open mouths.

They have no doubt this is the true explanation. See there, he is doing it again, to show them that this is really the secret of the matter. He scratches, pronounces the words, and they hear the coin drop into the plate beneath the table. He can do it, and so they do not doubt that he himself gives the true account as to how he does it. So also it is with Mill and Bain. They have done a work for philosophy. They have shown up a good deal of inaccurate thinking in their predecessors, and added considerably to the analysis of mental operations. This they make clear, and take care that the world should recognise. And all the time they profess to have been philosophising on the principles of the Experience School, and to reject the power of the mind to know immediately anything beyond its own consciousness. Here is the trick. Their readers read these principles as they state them, and study the results; but the sleight of hand whereby the results are reached, the imperceptible insertion of intuitions into the process when nobody was looking, escapes notice. And the impossible account which they themselves give of this part of the performance is accepted, not after close scrutiny, but in virtue of the authority naturally possessed by those who have been successful in a particular department of study.

Mr. Ward's work, then, was confined to the detection of this sleight of hand. He insists repeatedly on the necessity of watching this part of the process, and on the absolute impossibility of accepting their own account of the philosophical method they employ, which entirely eliminates intuitive perception of truth. In all their useful and careful analysis, Mill and Bain act, he says, as unmistakably on a belief in the validity of intuitions, in the mind's power to perceive directly certain objective truths, as I do, or any other Christian philosopher does. They use all the authority they have gained by successful deductions from intuition, in advocating principles which are not more subversive of religious philosophy than they are of the methods they themselves have employed.

So much for the general line of argument. The illustrations were many. The uniformity of nature with its leap to the future, mathematical reasoning with its conception of "must," the sense of duty, the "kinds" of happiness which J. S. Mill introduced into his Utilitarianism;—all of these involved a mental perception of objective truth, and not merely a passive impression. Some of them involved the conception of *ideas* which no sensible experience could generate. Several of these questions have special treatment in connection with a later part of Ward's scheme. But on the sole question of intuition, of the mind's power of directly witnessing to truths

over and above the consciousness of the moment, he isolated, as I have said, and insisted on Memory.

No doubt, at first sight the instance surprises. Why choose memory, which deals after all solely with experience, and is a fact of consciousness, against the experience philosophy? Why not take something directly concerned with the non-sensuous world? Because the instance of memory shows that so intimately present to the mind are its highest powers, its powers of active perception as opposed to passive feeling, that in prolonged experience itself, in sustained consciousness, that is to say, in a process at first sight entirely subjective, if it is so continued as to afford knowledge in any sense, there is an element of objective perception. Memory involves two things (1) the impression of a past experience. This impression is no doubt purely subjective. But it also involves (2) the decision "that past thing happened." And it is this last which is meant by the phrase "I remember." How account for it? How *can* you know it *unless* the mind declares it with true insight in the act of remembering? Professor Huxley took up the question and answered that we so often experience the truthfulness of memory that we come to trust it. But this only brought the point at issue into fuller light. "How do you *know* that you have found it truthful? You must begin by trusting it, *and believing such trust to be knowledge*, before you have any reason for supposing that memory has ever been accurate. Let us hear Mr. Ward:—

"[These philosophers] may" he writes, "deny to man all *other* intuitional faculties; but they must still ascribe to him that intuitional faculty which is called *memory*, and which indubitably no less needs authentication than the rest. This is a point of quite central importance, and to which we beg our readers' most careful attention. The distinction is fundamental, between a man's power of knowing his *present* and his *past* experience. Certainly he needs no warrant to authenticate the truth of the former, except that present experience itself. To doubt my present inward consciousness, as Mr. Mill most truly affirms, 'would be to doubt that I feel what I feel.' So far, then, the phenomenist and ourselves run evenly together; but here we may come to a very broad divergence. 'I am conscious of a most clear and articulate mental *impression* that a very short time ago I was suffering cold'; this is one judgment: 'a very short time ago I was suffering cold'; this is another and

totally distinct judgment. That I know my present *impression* by no manner of means implies that I know my past *feeling*.

"We would thus, then, address some phenomenistic opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible, and that the fact is proved by various experiments which you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know that you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply that you have the clearest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that present *impression* which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that the present *impression* corresponds with a past *fact?* See what a tremendous assumption this is, which you, who call yourself a cautious man of science, are taking for granted. You are so wonderfully made and endowed—such is your assumption—that in every successive case your clear and articulate *impression* and *belief* of something as past, corresponds with a past *fact*. You find fault with objectivists for gratuitously and arbitrarily assuming first principles; was there ever a more gratuitously and arbitrarily assumed first principle than your own?

"You gravely reply that you do *not* assume it as a first principle. You tell us you trust your present act of memory because in innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory have been true. How do you know—how can you even guess—that there is *one* such instance? Because you trust your present act of memory: no other answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of urging that *a priori* philosophers argue in a circle; whereas no one ever so persistently argued in a circle as you do yourself. You know, forsooth, that your present act of memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true; and you know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true, because you trust your present act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round and round a 'circle' incurably 'vicious.'"

Mr. Ward's insistence on the one instance of memory bore further fruit. It was really a test question once it was driven home, and Ward saw this. Before long he had split leading exponents of the Experience School into three on the subject. Huxley, we have seen, had attempted to explain our belief without the aid of intuition and fell into a vicious circle. J. S. Mill was too wary to follow suit. He saw that to give any justification of the belief, memory itself must first be judged trustworthy before the meaning of any sentence of the justification could be understood,—even, as Ward had said "its external bodily sound." Consequently he frankly admitted, after the

appearance of Ward's Philosophical Introduction on *Nature and Grace*, in which the point was first urged, that Ward had made good his point, and that the belief was "ultimate."[1] But he did not realise the consequences of his admission. The experience philosophy did not profess merely to show that experience and association have much to say to knowledge. Had it been so limited it would have been a true philosophy not a false; a step forward not backward. It asserted unconditionally that intuition was impossible, and that to use Mr. Huxley's phrase "it admits of no doubt that all our knowledge is a knowledge of states of consciousness." This being so, to admit an intuitive element in memory was to admit the fundamental principle of the system to be false. Mill, failing for the moment to view his system as a whole, while he candidly debated this isolated point, lost sight of the critical importance of his admission. But Mr. Bain saw it at once. He was in a difficulty. Huxley's explanation had failed; Mill's amounted to a surrender all along the line. Yet Ward's dilemma—memory either involves intuition or is no part of knowledge—called aloud for an answer. Bain contented himself with the admission that Mill's position was a surrender, and that the question was one to which he did not at present see an answer. "[When Mill] lays down," he wrote, "as final and inexplicable the belief in memory I am unable to agree with him. This position of his has been much dwelt on by thinkers opposed to him. It makes him appear, after all, to be a transcendentalist like themselves, differing only in degree. For myself I never could see where his difficulty lay, or what moved him to say that the belief in memory is incomprehensible or essentially irresolvable. The precise nature of Belief is no doubt invested with very peculiar delicacy; but whenever it shall be cleared up we may very fairly suppose it capable of accounting for the belief that a certain state now past as a sensation but present as an idea was once a sensation, and is not a mere product of thought or imagination" (*Criticism of J. S. Mill*, p. 121).

This adjournment of the debate was mainly valuable from its recognition of the incompatibility of Mill's admission with his general system. This point Ward pressed farther, and Mill answered again. Ward pointed out that once the mind

[1] See *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th edition, p. 209.

was allowed the power at all of intuitive perception, the strong ground of the Experience School, as a complete system, was gone. "There was," he wrote, "an imperative claim on him to explain clearly and pointedly *where the distinction* lies between acts of the memory and other alleged intuitions." Mill's answer to this was very remarkable as amounting really to an express surrender of Phenomenism altogether as a complete theory of knowledge, and a repudiation of the general principle which from Hume to James Mill had been the basis of a sceptical philosophy. "The distinction is," he replied, "that as all the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose memory, memory itself cannot admit of being explained. *Whenever this is shown to be true of any other part of our knowledge I shall admit that part to be intuitive.*"[1]

This answer had two noteworthy points. First, it expressly abandoned, as I have said, the exclusive "experience" theory. According to that theory it was the ultimate resolution of so-called knowledge to states of consciousness which was the sole *test* of its genuineness and trustworthiness. The inference to the existence of an external world was unsound, *because* that required something irresolvable into subjective consciousness. So too, *a fortiori*, as to the existence of God. Mill, on the contrary, expressed readiness under certain conditions to admit the intuitive element, and to desert this test. But further, his reply really admitted the whole intuitional principle which he professed to dispute. He did not face the dilemma which Ward had presented, or this would have been more evident. The dilemma is, substantially, this: The proof that supposed knowledge is real knowledge must be either its ultimate dependence on the mind's immediate and confident perception (intuitionism), or its reducibility to subjective consciousness (phenomenism).

By admitting one intuition he really admitted the validity of the former test, though he was not aware of it. He *professed* to *ground* his acceptance of this one intuitive belief not on the intuitional principle but merely on the impossibility of giving reasons for it which do not presuppose the belief itself. But how does such a ground prove it *valid?* It proves it indeed to be an *ultimate belief*, but why not an ultimate delusion instead

[1] On Hamilton, p. 210, *note*.

of ultimate *knowledge?* Unless the light of the immediate mental vision or intuition is a sufficient voucher, memory remains—an ultimate impression indeed, but not an ultimate element of *knowledge.* The only assurance that it is part of our knowledge is gained from the intuitionist principle, that the mind *can* by its own light *see* such ultimate truths. Mr. Ward points out the *ignoratio elenchi* of Mill's reply as follows :—

"Memory," Mr. Mill says, "must be assumed to be veracious, because as all the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose memory, memory itself cannot admit of being explained"; or, in other words (as he expressed the same thought somewhat more clearly in his original note), because "no reason can be given for the veracity of memory which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded." But a moment's consideration will show that this answer implies a fundamental misconception of the point we had raised. The question which *he answers* is, whether my knowledge of past facts (*assuming that I have such knowledge*) is on the one hand an immediate and primary, or on the other hand a mediate and secondary, part of my knowledge? But the question which we asked was totally different from this. We asked, On what ground my belief of the facts, testified by my memory, can be accounted *part of my knowledge at all?* We asked, in short, On what reasonable ground can my conviction rest, that I ever experienced those sensations, emotions, thoughts, which my memory represents to me as past facts of my life?

We say that the question to which Mr. Mill has replied is fundamentally different from the question which we asked. Let it be *assumed* that my belief in the declarations of my memory is a real part of my knowledge, and nothing can be more pertinent than Mr. Mill's argument: he shows satisfactorily that such belief must be an immediate and primary part of my knowledge, not a mediate and derivative part thereof. But when the very question asked is whether this belief be any part of my knowledge *at all*, Mr. Mill's reply is simply destitute of meaning. For consider. We may truly predicate of every false belief which ever was entertained—nay, of every false belief which can even be imagined—that "no" satisfactory "reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded." If Mr. Mill, then, were here professing to prove the *trustworthiness* of memory, his argument would be this: "The declarations of memory," he would be saying, "are certainly true, *because* they possess one attribute which is possessed by every *false* belief which was ever entertained or can ever be imagined."

The case of memory was, as I have said, dwelt upon repeatedly as giving the intuitionist principle foothold. Once its import was clearly realised Ward could advance steadily; if it was only half-realised there would be perpetual fallings back upon the old question in new forms. The ground gained once for all was this: The only conceivable basis for trusting memory is the principle that the mind can directly witness to objective truth; that is to say not only to a present mental phenomenon, but to past fact as well. It can declare not only "I feel that I felt cold two seconds ago," but also "I felt as a fact cold." This being so, intuitionism takes its departure at the narrowest possible angle from phenomenism. The mind's positive declaration, differentiating the purely rational faculties from those of association, is first shown in the very stronghold of the experience philosophy, in experience itself. The perception of objective truth is detected within regions at first sight wholly subjective. The difference between the blind and passive impression as to the past which serves the lower creation as a practical guide, and its rational counterpart in man, comes in the flash of light and sense of power which transform impression into perception, passive feeling into self-asserting vision.

But important as this truth is in the abstract, as establishing the principle of intuition on ground at first sight belonging to its opponents, from the very fact that it *could* be with some plausibility concealed, it obviously could not carry our knowledge far. It pointed out the rational character of human experience, and established the claim of the rational nature to assert by its own right and beyond appeal, where assertions were ascertained to *be* its genuine assertions, and not impressions or hasty inferences assumed to be assertions. But so far the intuition principle remained at rest in the "experience" camp, content with having vindicated its claim, but not interfering with the *general* character of the experience philosophy, as concerned with the phenomena of mental experience, rather than with truths beyond that experience.

The next step was to set the rational power in motion and to show that what was practically harmless to phenomenism while regarded merely as a faculty employed in regulating and ascertaining past phenomena, could in an instant step beyond the whole circle of truths known by experience. The power

of intuition — that mental limelight which helped in the analysis of sensitive experience, and seemed to Mill, in the case of memory, to be really reconcilable with a subjective philosophy, and not worth arguing against further—was suddenly turned away from the subjective and contingent, and focussed on the objective and necessary. If the mind has the power of certifying to the truth of its positive vision, the truths it brings to light in this new sphere cannot be mistaken or doubted. "Ought" and "must" are ideas as valid and facts as irresistibly true as past experience vividly remembered. This was the next step.

But a word more as to its import. It was the old story of Kant's synthetic *a priori* truths. As long as the mind, with whatever power of reflective certainty, could only analyse its own operations, and as long as valid propositions were mere equations, or statements of experienced truth, not much progress was made towards Theism. To know the infinite and absolute Godhead involved something different in kind from this. Experience and analysis might develop infinitely skilful walking power upon earth, but they gave no wings to fly heavenward. Where then in their simplest and most undeniable form were such wings to be looked for in the human reason? Where could it be pointed out that the mental light, whose authority was established, showed clearly facts or ideas not derived at all either from experience or from analysis? The answer lay in Kant's doctrine, and in his very words. Certain truths were known not *a posteriori* or from experience, and not analytically; they were *a priori* and synthetic. Mathematics and morals were the fields in which these ideas could be seen with clearest and calmest vision; "must" and "ought," with their practical applications, were the ideas themselves. Establish that the necessity of "must" belongs to a region outside contingent experience; that the sanctity and binding power of "ought" cannot be explained by the mere experience of the consequences of our actions to ourselves and others, and it is seen that the rational nature has taken flight from the ground; that it moves freely and securely, outside and far above the most developed and fully analysed groping of the association philosophy.

Geometry was the field chosen by Ward for establishing

the "must," as ethics was necessarily for the "ought." Mill himself had challenged the intuitionists in the field of mathematics, and had maintained that mathematical axioms did not necessarily obtain in the fixed stars.[1] It was Mill's work to show that "must" was a delusion, a mere disguised reproduction of "constantly has been." Mathematical axioms were generalisations from experience, and, as such, we could have no warrant for them beyond the regions of experience. They rested on precisely the same basis as the uniformity of nature. Our experience of both was constant, most intimate, without exception. The result was an inseparable association. "No stones are without gravity" and "no parallel lines ever meet" stood on the same basis. It is as inaccurate to say two and two *must* be four as to say a stone *must* have weight. Mill admitted the former to involve a deeper sense of necessity, but only from its being more constantly experienced. The difference was purely in degree and not in kind. Here, then, was a plain issue, and Ward fixed on it for his answer. He selected the truth "all trilateral figures are triangular" as his specimen instance, and, as usual, focussed the controversy on the fewest and most central points. The question was, Is the mind's declaration, "all trilaterals must be triangular," essentially similar to its declaration that nature is uniform, or does it present characteristics quite different in kind?

The key to Mill's position and his attempt to get rid of that idea so pregnant with consequences, so uncomfortable to the philosopher of experience, "must" or "necessary," will be found in the following passages of the work on Hamilton:—

> It is strange that almost all the opponents of the association psychology should found their main or sole argument in refutation of it upon the feeling of necessity; for if there be any one feeling in our nature which the laws of association are obviously equal to producing, one would say it is that. Necessary, according to Kant's definition, and there is none better, is that of which the negation is impossible. If we find it impossible, by any trial, to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity which the mind is capable of. Those, therefore, who deny that association can generate a necessity of thought, must be willing to affirm that

[1] Mr. Ward pointed out that this was the outcome of his words in the second volume of his *Logic*.

two ideas are never so knit together by association as to be practically inseparable. But to affirm this is to contradict the most familiar experience of life. Many persons who have been frightened in childhood can never be alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many a person is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a particular event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or reminiscences of suffering. If the facts which created these strong associations in individual minds had been common to all mankind from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associations were fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a necessity of thought—one of the necessities which are supposed to prove an objective law, and an *a priori* mental connection between ideas.

Here is Mr. Ward's criticism on this passage :—

We have always thought this passage to be among the weakest which Mr. Mill ever wrote. Firstly, the two instances which he gives in no way exemplify a necessity of *thought*, but only a necessity of *feeling* : the feeling of fear in solitary darkness and of grief in revisiting a particular place or in thinking of a particular person. Now many wild theories have doubtless been maintained by considerable persons ; but who in the world ever alleged that a necessity of *feeling* "proves an objective law, and an *a priori* mental connection between ideas" ?

But a more important fallacy remains to be mentioned. Mr. Mill's whole reasoning turns on the phrase, "necessity of thought," and yet he has used that phrase in two senses fundamentally different. A "necessity of thought" may no doubt be most intelligibly understood to mean, "a law of nature whereby under certain circumstances I *necessarily think* this, that, and the other judgment." But it may also be understood to mean, "a law of nature whereby I *think as necessary* this, that, and the other judgment." Now we heartily agree with Mr. Mill, that from a "necessity of thought" in the *former* sense, no legitimate argument whatever can be deduced for a necessity of objective truth. Supposing I felt unusually cold a few moments ago ; it is a "necessity of thought" that I shall now *remember* the circumstance : yet that past experience was no necessary truth. It is a "necessity of thought" again, that I expect the sun to rise to-morrow ; and many similar instances could be adduced. The only "necessity of thought" which proves the self-evident necessity of objective truth is the necessity of thinking that such truth is self evidently necessary.

The controversy then must fix itself on this one question, Is there a judgment of necessity in relation to mathematical truths different in kind from the mere impression of constancy

wrought by the uniform laws of nature, and introducing a mental element or factor "must," generically distinct from the experiential "constantly does"? Ward exhibits the contrast, beginning with its most obvious features, and later on drawing out its further and deeper elements. Here is his account of Mill's position:—

All my life long I have been seeing trilaterals which are triangular, while I have had no one experience to the contrary. So inseparable an association then—thus Mr. Mill argues—has been established in my mind between the ideas of trilateralness and triangularity, that I am deluded into the fancy of some *a priori* connection between them, independent of what is known by experience; I am deluded into the fancy, that by my very conception of a trilateral figure I know its triangularity. We shall have, as we proceed, to consider this argument in detail; but we will at once urge against it what seems an irrefragable argument *ad hominem.*

According to Mr. Mill, my having constantly experienced the triangularity of trilateral figures is merely one out of a thousand sets of instances, in which I have observed the unexceptional uniformity of the laws of nature. There is no other experimental truth whatever, he thinks, which rests on nearly so large a mass of experience, as does this truth, that phenomena succeed each other in uniform laws. To this universal uniformity, "we not only do not know any exception, but the exceptions which limit or apparently invalidate the special laws, are so far from contradicting the universal one that they confirm it" (*Logic*, vol. ii. p. 104).

Now the fact of my having constantly experienced triangularity in trilateral figures suffices (according to Mr. Mill) for my having knit the ideas of trilateralness and triangularity into such inseparable association that I delusively fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the other. Much more certainly therefore—so Mr. Mill in consistency should admit—I must have knit into such inseparable association the two ideas "phenomena," and "succeeding each other by uniform laws," that I necessarily fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the other. If, through my constant experience of triangular trilaterals, I am under a practical necessity of fancying that in every possible region of existence all trilaterals are triangular—much more, through my constant experience of uniformity in phenomenal succession, must I be under a practical necessity of fancying that in every possible region of existence phenomena succeed each other by uniform laws. Now *am* I under any such necessity, or under any kind of approach to it? We summon the defendant into court as witness for the plaintiff. "I am convinced," he says (*Logic*, vol. ii. p. 98), "that *any one* accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly

exert his faculties for the purpose, will . . . *find no difficulty* in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed law." Put these two statements then together. I find insuperable difficulty in fancying, that in any possible "firmament" there can be non-triangular trilaterals; but I find no difficulty whatever in fancying that in many a possible "firmament" phenomena succeed each other without fixed laws. Yet I have *experienced* the uniformity of phenomenal succession (according to Mr. Mill) very far more widely, and in no respect less unexceptionally, than I have experienced the triangularity of trilaterals. The impossibility, therefore, which I find in believing the non-triangularity of any possible trilateral, cannot be in any way imagined to arise from constancy of experience. In other words, Mr. Mill's psychological principle breaks down.

But the fact of this distinction was, when pressed home, admitted by Mill. Still with resourceful tactics he held his ground against the unwelcome and transcendental "must." That the *feeling* of necessity is stronger in mathematics than in physics he granted; but that arose, he said, from the fact that the experience of mathematical truth is coextensive with nature. That two and two makes four holds with respect to every object you have ever seen. That things equal to the same are equal to each other is proved, not by reference to certain classes, but to all classes of things with which we are familiar. Ward here answered him by an appeal to facts which he claimed to be unquestionable. He showed that there are immediate mathematical truths which it never occurs to us to observe, and yet which, on being pointed out, at *once* give rise to the idea of necessity. A conviction which arises on the contemplation of one solitary instance cannot be due to familiarity. And the case becomes stronger when we find the idea "must" extending to propositions which are so little familiar as to need lengthened proof to be admitted at all. Mr. Ward thus states the case:—

Mr. Mill's contention, then, is as follows: "The truth that all trilaterals are triangular, is known by every one with indefinitely greater freshness of familiarity than the truth that wood floats upon water." This is what he affirms, and what we deny, and it is precisely on this point that issue is joined.

As politicians would say, we cannot desire a better issue than

this to go to the country upon. We affirm as an indubitable matter of fact, that Mr. Mill is here contradicted by the most obvious experience. We affirm as an indubitable matter of fact, that ninety-nine hundredths of mankind not only do not know the triangularity of trilaterals with this extraordinary freshness of familiarity, but do not know it *at all*. Those who have not studied the elements of geometry—with hardly an exception—if they were told that trilaterals are triangular, and if they understood the statement, would as simply receive a new piece of information as they did when they were first told the death of Napoleon III. Then, as to those who are beginning the study of mathematics. A youth of fifteen, we said in our second essay, is beginning to learn geometry, and his tutor points out to him that every trilateral is triangular. Does he naturally reply—as he *would* if his tutor was telling him that *horses are of different colours*—"of course the fact is so; I have observed it a thousand times"? On the contrary, in all probability the proposition will be entirely new to him; and yet, notwithstanding its novelty, will at once commend itself as a self-evident truth. Lastly, take those who learned the elements of geometry when they were young, and are now busily engaged in political, or forensic, or commercial life. If the triangularity of trilaterals were mentioned to them, they would remember, doubtless, that they had been taught in their youth to see the self-evidence of this truth; but they would also remember, that for years and years it had been absent from their thoughts. Is it seriously Mr. Mill would allege, that they know the triangularity of trilaterals with the same freshness of familiar experience (or rather with indefinitely *greater* freshness of familiar experience) with which they know the tendency of fire to burn, and of water to quench it? or with which they respectively know the political events of the moment, or the practice of the courts, or the habits of the Stock Exchange? If he did allege this in his zeal for a theory, we should confidently appeal against so eccentric a statement to the common sense and common experience of mankind.

But is it not, then, Mr. Mill might ask, a matter to every man of everyday experience, that trilaterals are triangular? If by "everyday experience" he means "everyday *observation*," and his argument requires this, we answer confidently in the negative. Even if we could not lay our finger on the precise fallacy which has misled Mr. Mill, it would be none the less certain that he has *been* misled. It cannot possibly be true that the triangularity of trilaterals is a matter to every man of everyday observation, because (as we said just now) patently and undeniably the mass of men know nothing whatever *about* it. But Mr. Mill's fallacy is obvious enough to those who will look at facts as they really are. In the first place, putting aside that very small minority who are

predominantly occupied with mathematical studies, the very notion of a "trilateral" does not occur to men at all, except accidentally and on rare occasions. It is not because my eyes light by chance on three straws mutually intersecting, or on some other natural object calculated to suggest a trilateral, that therefore any thought of that figure, either explicitly or implicitly, enters my mind. I am probably musing on matters indefinitely more interesting and exciting; the prospects of the coming Parliamentary division, or the point of law which I am going down to argue, or the symptoms of the patient whom I am on my way to visit, or the probable fluctuation of the funds. The keen geometrician may see trilaterals in stocks and stones, and think of trilaterals on the slightest provocation; but what proportion of the human race are keen geometricians?

Then, secondly, still excluding these exceptional geometricians, for a hundred times that observation might suggest to me the thought of a trilateral, not more than *once* perhaps will it suggest to me the *triangularity* of such trilateral. Mr. Mill himself will admit, we suppose, that such *explicit* observation is comparatively rare; but he will urge, probably, that I *implicitly* observe the triangularity of every trilateral which I remark. We will make, then, a very simple supposition for the purpose of testing this suggestion, as well as for one or two other purposes connected with our argument. We will suppose that all *rose stalks* within the reach of human observation *had leaves of the same shape with each other.* On such supposition, the shape of its stalk-leaves would be a more obvious and obtrusive attribute of the rose than is triangularity of the trilateral; and yet, beyond all possibility of doubt, one might very frequently observe a rose, without even implicitly noticing the shape of its stalk-leaves. The present writer can testify this at first hand. In a life of sixty odd years, he has often enough smelt roses and handled their stalks, and yet he had not the slightest notion whether their leaves are or are not similarly shaped, until he asked the question for the very purpose of this illustration. And it is plain that if he has not observed the mutual dissimilarity of their leaves, neither would he have observed their similarity did it exist. Now, we appeal to our readers' common sense, whether what we said at starting is not undeniably true, viz. that every ordinary person is very far more likely to observe the shape of rose-stalk leaves, than to observe the number of angles formed by the sides of a trilateral.

At the same time, we fully admit that many a man may have *implicitly* observed the similarity of shape in rose-stalk leaves (supposing such similarity to exist) without having explicitly adverted to the fact until he heard it mentioned; and in like manner this or that man may have implicitly observed the

triangularity of various trilaterals. But such a circumstance does but give occasion to *another* disproof of Mr. Mill's theory. Suppose I have implicitly observed the former phenomenon. I hear the proposition stated, that the shape of all rose-stalk leaves is similar, and I set myself to test its truth by my former experience. I consult my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which I have looked at rose-stalks, and I come to assert, with more or less positiveness, that all those within my observation have had similar leaves. On the other hand, I wish, let us suppose, to test the proposition that all trilaterals are triangular. If Mr. Mill's theory were true, I should proceed as in the foregoing instance; I should contemplate my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which I have observed their triangularity. But the fact is most different from this. I do not consult *at all* my memory of past experience, but give myself to the contemplation of some imaginary trilateral, which I have summoned into my thoughts. And the impression which I receive from such contemplation is not at all that the various trilaterals *I have observed in times past* are triangular, but that *in no possible world* could non-triangular trilaterals exist. Observe, then, these two respective cases. *My process of reasoning* has been fundamentally different in the two; and the *impression which I receive* from that process will have been fundamentally different in the two; consequently the two cases are fundamentally different, instead of being (as they would be on Mr. Mill's theory) entirely similar.

Our readers will observe that we have just now twice used the word "impression," instead of such more definite terms as "cognition" or "intuition." Our reason for this is easily given. By the admission of Mr. Mill himself, every adult who gives his mind to the careful thought of trilaterals, receives the *impression* that their triangularity is a necessary truth; but Mr. Mill denies that this impression is a genuine intuition, and we could not of course *assume* what Mr. Mill denies.

Here we bring to a close the exhibition of our first argument against Mr. Mill, an argument which we must maintain to be simply final and conclusive, even if no second were adducible. According to his theory, the triangularity of trilaterals (or any other geometrical axiom) is a phenomenon known to all men with as great freshness of familiarity as the phenomenon that fire burns, or that water quenches it; or rather, the former class of phenomena is known to all men with incomparably *greater* freshness of familiarity than the latter. But such a proposition is undeniably inconsistent with the most patent and indubitable facts. This circumstance would of course be fatal to Mr. Mill, even though we were entirely unable to account for it psychologically; but (as we have further argued) it can be psychologically accounted for with the greatest possible ease.

A second argument has been incidentally included in our exposition of the first. The mental process, whereby I come to cognise the truth of a geometrical axiom, is fundamentally different from the mental process, whereby I come to recognise the truth of an experienced fact; whereas, on Mr. Mill's theory, these two processes would be simply identical.

From "must" he passed to "ought." The "must" of mathematical intuition carried with it two characteristics—the sense of power in the mind which decided, and secondly, the accompanying clearness of the conceptions involved. That every trilateral figure is triangular is a proposition which we not only assent to confidently, but feel in doing so that we grasp most fully the spacial relations with whose necessity it deals. With the ethical "ought" there is equal confidence, but there is at once the sense that the subject matter touches on something mysterious and beyond our full apprehension. "A son ought to honour his father." The mind affirms that as positively as it affirms that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. But this "ought" touches on something less clearly obvious than the necessity of spacial relations. What is that something? What is its import?

That there is in it something of mystery which needs clearing up is plain enough from the agreement of thinkers of different schools. All acknowledge the mystery which needs solving, however different the solutions proposed by each. The Scholastic *Synteresis*, Kant's categorical Imperative, the Moral Sense of Hutcheson, the "mathematical" morality of Cudworth, the theological explanations of the meaning of "right" and "wrong" by the Scotists, the utilitarianism and associationism of Mill himself, are all instances familiar to us of endeavours to trace out what *is* that something which the human mind so confidently recognises, and yet finds so hard to analyse, expressed in the words "moral worth," "moral obligation."

Mr. Ward's object was to show that this mysterious "somewhat" involved in Ethical truth is a still further and more pertinent illustration of the mind's power of perceiving truths beyond the regions of experience. "It is wrong to do murder." Here first of all we have "must" as before. Murder is *necessarily* wrong. It could not be otherwise. To take away life without a just cause would be wrong for any man. The

truth is necessary and universal. It has the element of "must." But it has also in the word "wrong" another idea. Is that idea—however apparently mysterious and complex—ultimately resolvable into simpler ideas already possessed by us? Yes, answer Utilitarians and some of the theologians. And Ward proceeded to examine their analyses and confute them.

Once more, as in mathematics, comes Kant's test of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. The theologians in question say "morally evil means what God forbids." But write down the sentence, "It is morally evil to disobey God." Is it an identical proposition? Is it equivalent to saying, "to disobey God is to disobey God"? Clearly not. Is it analytical? When I say, "Disobedience to God is morally evil," does the predicate contain what was already in the subject, as when we say "a triangle has three angles"? The answer is again negative. The proposition is synthetic and not analytic; "morally evil" remains consequently something further—something which this theological account fails to explain.

Again is the conception of the Utilitarians—that "evil" is tantamount to "injurious to the human race"—adequate? Apply the same test. Write down the statement, "It is morally evil to act in such a way as to injure the human race." It is clearly a synthetical proposition. "Injuring the human race" and "acting wrongly" are distinct ideas.

Test the propositions in another way. If they are analytical their converse is unmeaning, and obviously absurd. "I saw a triangle which had not three angles." "An act of disobedience to God was not disobedience to Him," or "an act beneficial to mankind was injurious to it"—such propositions are absurd. But is it absurd to say, "It was right under certain circumstances to disobey God," or "It was right to injure the human race"? We may, if we will, consider such propositions false, and universally false, but they are not unmeaning. Add the condition, "If God could command what is vicious," and the first proposition becomes true. Add, "If a higher duty command it," and the second is true. Whether such conditions can actually exist is a further question, but the hypothesis shows that the propositions are fully intelligible, and that "good" and "evil" are ideas which the proposed analyses do not explain.

And equally, according to Mr. Ward, do other analyses fail. The more the ideas are contemplated the more do their reality and yet their irresolvability assert themselves.

Correlatively we are conscious that, in limits, it is ours to choose in each case whether or no we will conform ourselves to the standard which our constant moral judgments reveal to us. In pointing this out he developed with great wealth of illustration the doctrine of "anti-impulsive effort," already referred to in an earlier controversy with Mill.

And here Mr. Ward called attention parenthetically to another truth of intuition which was essential to his scheme, although he never elaborated it fully. In his Essay on Causation he points out that Mill's attempt to support Hume's doctrine that causation is only succession—that all we mean when we say that fire causes warmth is that the close presence of fire is always immediately followed by the sensation of warmth—is untrue to the facts of consciousness. Just as the attempts to explain "necessarily does" as "always does," and "good" as "beneficial," are untrue to psychological facts, so is the attempt to explain causation as succession. And he shows it by the appeal to internal experience. No doubt if I look at another man, and see him strike a tree with an axe, and cut it down, all I see is the succession between the blow and fall of the tree. But let me strike myself, and first I am conscious that my will causes my arm to move; and secondly, I have the conviction, due to a complexus of sensations, that my blow was not merely followed by the fall of the tree, but exercised a power which, call it what you will, is a reality over and above the sequence of events. However far causation may extend, and even supposing that it does not hold good throughout external nature, it is plain that the idea of it, as something distinct from succession, exists. When we have most knowledge it is clearest—in the exercise of our own will. And the belief in its existence in external nature is in accordance with the analogy of our most intimate and thorough knowledge; while the phenomenist view has for its support only the analogy of external observation. The phenomenist decides to stop at the onlooker's view of the blow; the intuitionist takes that of the man who not only sees his own blow as an external phenomenon, but feels it as an act of which

he is conscious. "Whatever commences to exist has a cause" —this is the form in which Ward accepted the causation axiom; and it led back ultimately to the First Cause, which has no commencement.

Returning from this digression, he considered the prolonged experience of a man as a moral being, listening to the dictates of his moral nature as life proceeds, and conscious that he has the power to obey or disobey them. In proportion as we co-ordinate our experiences on this head,—of the consciousness of freedom, and of constant moral judgments,—we become aware of living in contact with a supreme Rule of nature; and inasmuch as responsibility for our free conformity to it or neglect of it is a further element of moral intuition, we rise to the conviction that that Rule is a law imposed by a Superior Being. While rejecting the conclusion that God's will is the source of the morality of acts, and determines the content of the moral Rule, he comes by the reverse process to the conclusion that this morality, which is intrinsic to the acts, and whose obliging force on ourselves we recognise, represents the will of a Being having rightful authority over us. We recognise the proposition "this is wrong" not only as a speculative truth, not only as a mere fact parallel to "this is sweet," but as a truth claiming control over our practical life. And further, the moral rule which is thus perceived as also a moral law, being necessary in itself, presupposes as its basis the necessary Being God. And thus the argument from Ethics and from Necessary Truth coalesce:—

"As time goes on, then," Mr. Ward writes, "this, that, and the other act are successively known to me as not permissible—as wrong, base, wicked, whatever their attractiveness to my inclinations. Again, this act is known to me as more virtuous than that, whichever of the two, exercising my liberty, I may choose to perform. In proportion, therefore, as I give more attention to the ethical conduct of my life, in that proportion the number of such necessary moral truths brought within my cognisance increases unintermittently and inexhaustibly. I thus obtain an ever-clearer perception of the fact that I am in contact with a certain necessarily existing and pervasive Supreme Rule of life; from which, indeed, as regards its actual injunctions, I cannot swerve without wrong-doing and wickedness. No other motive of action has any claim on me at all so paramount as the claim of this Rule. No other course of action is

so reasonable as that of conforming myself more and more with its counsels; nor can any other thing be so intensely unreasonable as the doing that which it pronounces to be intrinsically evil. We have already therefore arrived at a very remarkable and noteworthy conclusion. There is a certain purely invisible and metempirical standard which claims to be the only true measure and arbiter of man's whole conduct in this visible scene. Man is proverbially monarch of the visible world; and it is precisely man who is *de jure* subject to the authoritative judgments of an invisible tribunal.

"But as soon as I have arrived at the conviction expressed by that statement, a further step is strictly inevitable and irresistible. The notion of a Supreme Rule from which I cannot swerve without wickedness, passes inevitably and irresistibly into the *further* notion of a Law imposed on me by some Superior Being. The notion of an invisible tribunal, by which my actions are authoritatively praised or blamed, passes into the further notion of some Personal Judge sitting on that tribunal. To dwell on the earlier of the two convictions without passing into the latter—to remain content with the notion of a Supreme *Rule* without carrying it forward to the notion of a Natural *Law*—is as impossible psychically as to pass my life standing on one leg is impossible physically. That rule to which profound, continuous, unreserved allegiance is due from free and reasonable beings, cannot be a mere *abstraction;* it must be the Law of some personal Superior possessing rightful authority."

And if this Rule and Law consists of duties irreversible, as has already been shown, in the nature of things, as necessary and unchangeable as the truths of geometry, we have a vast body of Truth—truths of number, truths of spacial relations, truths of moral obligation and moral relations—holding good throughout the universe, and which omnipotence itself could in no way modify. Such a fact is either a startling limitation of God's power, or it is in some intimate manner connected with God's nature, and is unchangeable because God Himself is unchangeable: and this is the writer's conclusion. This vast body of necessary Truth presupposes, as he holds, the one Necessary Being God. "If there be Necessary Truth," he wrote, "there must be a necessary Being on Whom such Truth is founded."

The essay from which these extracts are made appeared in 1880, two years and a half before Mr. Ward's death. A pause of two years ensued before he attacked the final problem to which his whole series had been preparatory. He considered that the road was cleared. The mind's power of intuitive

certitude, and its power to rise above the regions of experience, were fully established. The analysis of our perception of moral truth, with its correlatives of freewill and moral responsibility, had been completed. The depths of man's moral nature, and the mysterious region of truth opened out by this analysis, had been touched on.

The next essay, "The Philosophy of the Theistic Controversy," gives the sense of a pause in the writer's thought, and of the adoption of a somewhat new method. Hitherto, except in the last essay on Ethics and Theism, the battle had been fought out in regions where abstract argument was absolutely conclusive and practically sufficient. The method of St. Thomas and Albertus in their philosophical debates had been so far absolutely adopted. Mr. Ward asked for no more than sustained attention and a clear head; and the immediate issues were so far from the ultimate and vital conclusions which separated him from his opponents, that he might well expect to get what he claimed.

But the essay on "Ethics in its bearing on Theism" seems to have brought before his mind the practical as distinct from the scientific bearing of his controversy. Thinkers who would follow him in his analysis of memory, or of mathematical truth, would pause before admitting that Ethical judgment presupposed a "metempirical rule," and that that Rule was the law imposed by a rightful superior. The great controversy was now coming to close quarters. Candour and mutual civilities were less likely to be the order of the day. Brilliant men of science as Mr. Huxley, mathematicians of genius as Mr. W. K. Clifford, whose ability was beyond question, would treat such extensive deductions from the facts of consciousness as preposterous. If, tacitly by some, avowedly by others, the old ground taken up by James Mill and the phenomenists, of the impossibility of all intuition, was being deserted, thanks in a measure to Mr. Ward's fifteen years of ceaseless importunity, the refusal to admit the force of the arguments for Theism on less vulnerable ground, and on the mere denial of their sufficiency, was a prospect immediately before him; and it weighed heavily. Could he hope to touch the leading agnostic men of science? No. And for the mass of waverers there would remain the *primâ facie* unanswerable plea, "If some

of the ablest men of the day say Theism is 'not proven' by reason, how can you call on us to hold it not only probable but indubitable." The sense of this difficulty is observable throughout the Essay.

While giving a *résumé* of the earlier part of his series he considers before going farther this practical objection, and endeavours to diminish its force. The most prominent of the agnostic thinkers at the moment were eminent in physical science. The first point to be noted was that the acuteness of a man of science is not displayed in the metaphysical analysis *even of what he maintains as true.* His special gifts are conspicuous in that further practical reasoning on which scientific discovery depends. A Huxley and a Tyndall do not reason exceptionally well in justification of their belief in nature's Uniformity. It is a presupposition in all their work, and they are naturally too impatient to spend time over justifying theoretically what nobody doubts. This is natural enough. But none the less it brings out the fact that the acuteness on which their authority rests is not established in the domain of psychology and metaphysics; that it gives them no special claim as authoritative judges of Mr. Ward's train of reasoning.

Correlatively, and as an immediate consequence, such a thinker tends to look on metaphysics as sterile, as yielding no improving or clearly fruitful or useful stock of fresh knowledge, overlooking the unanswerable argument that in *the last resort* it is metaphysical analysis which is the basis of the very foundation of physical science itself. Mr. Ward writes as follows on these two points:—

We cannot be surprised that any one who fixes his keen interest and attention on studies which have issued in results like these [namely the great facts disclosed by physical science], still less one who is himself occupied in relevant physical investigations, should become, as it were, intoxicated under such an influence. We cannot be surprised at his assuming, as a matter of course, that it is experimental methods, and no others, which can afford solid foundation of argument for important truth. No doubt, as we have been pointing out above, the whole cogency of a physicist's argument in each successive case rests in its last analysis on intuitive premisses; and without the assumption of such premisses, his experiments would be entirely valueless. Still, what his mind incessantly dwells on are not such premisses as these; on the contrary, he entirely

forgets them, or would even, on occasion, deny their existence. When, therefore, he hears of propositions the most extensive, being predominantly proved by intuitive assumptions—unless he is an unusually large-minded and dispassionate man—he is tempted to regard such a method of reasoning with angry contempt. Let us suppose, then, that such an argument is placed before him as that on which we have insisted, and which occupies so prominent a place in Theistic advocacy. "Whatever is known to me," we said, "as intrinsically and necessarily wrong, is also known to me intuitively as necessarily forbidden by some Superior Being, who possesses over me rightful jurisdiction." This proposition, if true, is manifestly one of unsurpassable importance, and our scientist asks us for its ground. We have, of course, nothing to reply, except that mental phenomena, if studied carefully and with prolonged attention, show the genuineness of this alleged intuition. Such a method of argument is one with which his own studies bring him into no sort of contact; and, again, it is one the validity of which is incapable of being tested in this world by any subsequent verification. For his own part, then, he could as readily believe, with the astrologers, that by studying the course of the stars one may obtain knowledge of future human events, as he could believe that by merely studying the human mind one can acquire knowledge of a Superhuman Being. His reasoning is, of course, poor and shallow enough, but it is surely very natural in any scientist who has not been carefully trained in different principles, unless, as we have said, he is unusually large-minded and dispassionate. Consequently (which is our immediate point), the fact that certain most brilliant and successful explorers of external nature deride the intuitional method as unsubstantial and even childish, constitutes no kind of presumption that this method may not, nevertheless, be, as we have shown that it is, the only possible foundation of human knowledge.

Lord Macaulay, in the article from which we have quoted, unintentionally, but effectively, confirms our reasoning. His own sympathies with physical science have quite incapacitated him for appreciating any less superficially tangible course of speculation. In most manifest sympathy with Bacon, he points out that the English philosopher "did not consider Socrates' philosophy a happy event." He adds on his own account that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest cultivated an "unfruitful wisdom"; "systematically misdirected their powers"; "added nothing to the stock of knowledge"; gathered in no other "garners" than of "smut and stubble." As to the great Christian thinkers—St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the rest—he does not even condescend in this connection to hint at their existence. We suppose Lord Macaulay's warmest admirers cannot read, without a blush of shame, various parts of the paper which we are criticising. Still, our point

remains untouched. If so accomplished a writer, and one so versed in human affairs, could—even in some chance moment of excitement or aberration—have expressed such sentiments as these, how much more easily credible it is that the exclusive votaries of physical science may be guilty of the like perverse and shallow injustice, towards a line of thought essentially differing from their own.

Mr. Ward next calls attention to the large amount of actual prejudice which comes to the assistance of these habits of mind, in preventing the typical man of science from doing justice to the arguments for Theism; and further, when it is remembered that in purely mental reasoning, as distinguished from experimental, not merely absence of bias but the positive *will* to see the truths proposed is essential to their apprehension, the authority of these men must fall below zero if it be admitted that they not only are without any special capacity and special wish, but are positively indisposed to accept the doctrines in question. This point—not be it observed as primarily an argument against their *power* of apprehending the truths in question if they should be eagerly anxious to do so, but as an argument against the rejection by them of such truths carrying special weight in virtue of their authority—he enforces repeatedly, and in various ways. The necessity of an active will he points out by an argument *a fortiori*. The sphere in which passion and prejudice are least likely to interfere is mathematics, and yet in mathematics themselves an effort of the will may be indispensable.

Now, many persons will say, as a matter of course, that, whatever truth may otherwise be contained in this doctrine, there is one region of thought, at all events, within which it can have no possible place—the region of pure mathematics. But, on the contrary, it is from that very region that we shall adduce what we consider one of our most apposite illustrations. Let us first take a geometrical theorem: *e.g.*, "the angle in a semicircle is a right angle." This theorem, we admit, as exhibited in Euclid, is "evidently" certain. Even here, no doubt, a continued exercise of Freewill is requisite, in order that I may carefully apply my mind to see the self-evidence of what I assume as axioms, and the validity of that reasoning which I base on those axioms. But, this process concluded, I have no longer the power of doubting the theorem. At the same time, there may still be important work for my Freewill to do in compelling my intellect fully to *realise* that theorem, which I have not the power to doubt. But now let

us enter a more advanced portion of the mathematical region—the doctrine of infinitesimals. The Rev. Bartholomew Price, *e.g.*, in his admirable work on that subject, lays down such propositions as these: "There may be infinite quantities infinitely greater than infinities"; "an infinity of the nth order must be infinitely subdivided to produce an infinity of the $(n-1)$th order"; etc. (*Infinitesimal Calculus*, pp. 16-20.) Mr. Price would consider that the truth of these propositions is as demonstratively established as is any geometrical theorem: and we entirely agree with him. But am I nevertheless—supposing I have mastered the demonstration—*necessitated* to accept them? Surely not. I have the power of allowing myself to be so bewildered by the strangeness of such propositions, as to withhold that assent which the adduced arguments, nevertheless, as I see, reasonably claim. I laudably therefore exercise my Freewill, in exciting myself to have the courage of my convictions; in compelling my intellect to disregard even insoluble difficulties which may stand in the way of a demonstrated proposition.

Finally, let us cite the passage in which after stating further elements in the modern philosophic temper which indisposes it even to consider the supernatural view of life with any will to apprehend or accept it, Mr. Ward describes the classes of men whom he hopes to affect and influence:—

Now, the more extreme and fanatical of the Phenomenistic Antitheists protest with excitement, and with a kind of fury, in the name of "suffering humanity," against such a view as this. "This life," they say, "is the only term of existence which we have any reason whatever to expect. And is this brief period of man's enjoyment to be poisoned and changed into a time of self-torture by the fantastical dream of an imaginary hereafter? Humanity forbid! Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Those who promote such theories concerning the obligation of present obedience to a Deity and the ever-impending peril of future woe, are simply odious conspirators against the happiness of mankind."

In truth there are a certain number of violent thinkers who cleave to the "great cause" of man's earthly enjoyment with a fanaticism as heated and blind as any class of religionists ever exhibited towards the specialties of their sect. Of such men it is hardly to be expected, without a kind of miracle, that the most cogent adverse reasoning imaginable shall produce on them its due effect. Still, it is by no means all Antitheists who are so inaccessible to argument: on the contrary, many are fully convinced, indeed, of their own tenets, but without being so simply intolerant

and contemptuous towards opponents. Then there are, perhaps, not a few who, while they are strongly impressed with the force of Antitheistic reasoning and find great difficulty in reconciling religion with their scientific convictions, shrink, nevertheless, from definitively taking their place in their irreligious camp, owing to their dread of the tremendous moral and social evils which would result from rejection of God. Lastly, there are many who have ever been Theists and earnestly desire so to remain, who, nevertheless, for the sake of their own future security, wish to understand how the prevalent Antitheistic arguments can be met. Here, then, is a rough classification of those thinkers to whom our course of reasoning in future essays will be directly addressed.

And in indicating the temper in which he proposes to deal with the subject for the sake of the more candid and sincere agnostic thinkers he adds the following noteworthy passage:—

Cardinal Newman says, somewhere, that he entirely refuses to be converted by "a smart syllogism." In a similar spirit speaks M. Laprune. Religious "Truth," he says, "when unknown or forgotten, despised, misconceived, is not brought into the mind by the all-powerful virtue of a syllogism. Neither the excellence of Truth nor the mind's dignity permits this." And certainly, if it be true, as we have alleged, that, by the very fact of engaging in Theistic controversy, we summon the Antitheist to a supremely energetic act of will, one sees plainly that anything like flippancy or overbearingness of tone in the conduct of that controversy, or, again, any peremptory challenging of instantaneous assent and submission may probably be productive of most serious mischief. The sincere inquirer must be allowed his full time for patient consideration and healthy resolve.

Thus did Mr. Ward complete the process of preparation both of his tools and of his material. The necessary first principles—intuition, necessary truth, causation, and the simplicity of the ethical idea—were all established. And the question of the dispositions necessary for the apprehension and realisation of his further argument had been suggestively treated. The undue authority of the Agnostic prophets had been discounted, and he had placed clearly before himself what kind of mind he would hope to influence.

The rest of the essay is little more than a synopsis of his scheme—a *résumé* of past essays and a forecast of future ones. In indicating arguments which he purported to develop he laid most stress on those from the moral nature, from

causation, and from necessary truth; but he gave no definite idea of his method of treating them. The two further points he touches on in the essay are, (1) his view that the normal mode of arriving at a belief in Theism is not argument, but that process of implicit reasoning which Cardinal Newman has described in the *Grammar of Assent*, and which the Jesuit, Father Kleutgen, has in a somewhat different form expounded in harmony with the traditional Scholastic teaching, and (2) that a true Philosophy of Theism does not isolate the proof of God's existence from the proof of other religious truths. In accordance with M. Ollé-Laprune's treatment of the subject in his work, *De la Certitude Morale*, which influenced him much at this time, he held that there are "four cognate doctrines jointly constituting the creed of a genuine Theist. They are (1) the necessary character of ethical truth, (2) Freewill, (3) the existence of God, (4) a future life of reward or punishment," and that "the proof of each one adds indefinite force to the proof of all the rest."

And here the series abruptly broke off. A page had been written on "Agnosticism as such," but there is nothing in the MS. which adds to the argument of which an analysis has here been given.

Two extracts must be given in conclusion, illustrative of Mr. Ward's treatment of Freewill, which excited more public attention than any other part of his work except that on Necessary Truth. I give them here rather than earlier, as they were in some sense an interruption of the general current of the argument above indicated.

Mr. Ward considered that the controversy had become obscured, owing to the fact that advocates of Freewill often claimed too much for freedom. He himself was disposed to consider that a very large proportion of life—in some men by far the largest—was passed in obedience to what he termed the "spontaneous impulse" of the will; and that the opponents of Freewill gave, on the whole, a true account of the genesis of that impulse. It did not necessarily represent merely the balance of emotion, but was often determined by habit, by fixed ideas, by a love or antipathy which was deeper than emotional feelings. If this much were freely conceded, he considered that the power of effort in a man, in opposi-

tion to his spontaneous impulse, became more luminously evident. Hold yourself passively, and the spontaneous impulse—compounded of habit, fixed ideas, emotion, and the rest, reacting on circumstances internal and external—wins the day. The active movement *against* this impulse reveals a distinct originative force which is unmistakable, and of which the determinist can give no account. He can, indeed, conceive motives acting on you as impelling forces; he cannot conceive the individual taking up the originating position and choosing his motive, and strengthening its power by his own original action. I select from his controversy with Dr. Bain and Mr. Hodgson the following extract as to the spontaneous impulse:—

My "strongest desire" at any moment is very far from being synonymous with my "strongest *emotional craving*" at that moment. We should hold a most shallow view, if we supposed that the will's spontaneous impulse is determined as a matter of course by the mere balance of emotional craving and excitement. Habits of the will, *e.g.* are also important factors in the result. Suppose I have acquired a firm habit of temperance, and an unwholesome dish is placed before me. My *sensitive appetency* may prompt me to indulgence: but my spontaneous, direct, unforced impulse, under the influence of habit, prompts me to forbearance; and I should be doing violence to the predominant impulse of my nature, if I succumbed to the solicitation. Or consider the case of paternal affection. A father who severely pinches himself for his son's temporal benefit may in many instants of the day feel more vivid emotional pain from his own privations than he feels of emotional delight at the thought of his son's well-being. Yet the spontaneous unforced impulse of his *will* is no less unrelentingly directed at that moment, than at others, to the continuance of his benefaction. Here again possibly, as in the former instance, is seen merely the result of *habit*; but we should ourselves be disposed to explain the phenomenon much more prominently by this or that man's natural temperament and mental constitution. Certainly habit is not the *only* reason why the spontaneous impulse of a man's will diverges at times from his preponderance of emotion. Consider what Dr. Bain calls the influence of "fixed ideas," "infatuation," "irresistible impulse." "There are sights that give us almost unmitigated pain, while yet we are unable to keep away from them."[1] In

[1] *Emotions and the Will*, third edition, p. 390. We are disposed to agree with Dr. Bain on every point as to the genesis of the will's spontaneous impulse. Our difference from him is the fundamental one, that we maintain confidently men's power of *successfully resisting* that impulse.

such cases the abnormal impulse of the will conquers the emotional repugnance. Enough, however, of such matters for the present occasion. We certainly think that this general question—an investigation, namely, of those psychological laws which determine the will's spontaneous impulse—is of extreme scientific importance, and that it has been very unduly neglected by psychologians.

The following passage, from an answer to Mr. Bain, published in *Mind*, gives the pith of Mr. Ward's contention as to the compound phenomenon on which he rests the proof of freewill, —or, to speak more precisely, the disproof of the doctrine that the will is determined in its action. He follows, as usual, the method of allowing the determinist's explanation to the furthest possible point, and then showing that there is a residuum which he cannot explain, and which is only accounted for by the conception of Freewill—of an originating power in the person himself, distinct from his passive impulses :—

I am a keen sportsman, and one cloudy morning am looking forward with lively hope to my day's hunting. My post, however, comes in early ; and I receive a letter, just as I have donned my red coat and am sitting down to breakfast. This letter announces that I must set off on that very morning to London, if I am to be present at some occasion on which my presence will be vitally important for an end which I account of extreme public moment. Let us consider the different ways in which my conduct may imaginably be affected, and the light thus thrown on the relative strength of my motives.

Perhaps (1) the public end for which my presence is so earnestly needed happens to be one in which I am so personally interested, which so intimately affects my feelings, that my balance of *emotion* is intensely in favour of my going. This motive, then, is indefinitely stronger than its antagonist. I at once order my carriage, as the station is four miles off and time presses ; and I am delighted to start as soon as my coachman comes round. Perhaps (2) the balance of my *emotion* is quite decidedly in favour of the day's hunting, because the public end, though intellectually I appreciate its extreme importance, is not one with which my character leads me *emotionally* to sympathise. Nevertheless, through a long course of public-spirited action, I have acquired the firm and rooted habit of postponing pleasure to the call of duty. Here, therefore, as in the former case, there is not a moment's vacillation or hesitation. My spontaneous impulse is quite urgently in favour of going. My balance of *emotion*, indeed, is in favour of staying to hunt ; but good habit, by its intrinsic strength, spontaneously prevails over

emotion; and the motive which prompts me to go is indefinitely stronger than that which prompts me to stay. Or (3) when I have read the letter, my will may possibly be brought into a state of vacillation and vibration. My emotional impulse is one moment in one direction and the next moment in another. Then, as I possess no firm *habit* of public spirit, I take a long time in making up my mind: the strength of my motives is very evenly balanced, whichever may finally prevail. Lastly (4), I have perhaps very little public spirit, and am comparatively fond of hunting; so that I do not even entertain the question whether I shall offer up my day's sport as a sacrifice to my country's welfare.

Now, all these four alternatives are contemplated by the Determinist, and square entirely with his theory. In each case my conduct is determined by my strongest present motive. There is, however, a fifth case which he does not—and consistently with his theory cannot—admit to be a possible one; but in regard to which we confidently maintain, by appeal to experience, that it is abundantly possible, and by no means unfrequent. It is most possible, we say, that I put forth on the occasion anti-impulsive effort; that I act resolutely and consistently in opposition to my spontaneous impulse, in opposition to that which at the moment is my strongest desire. Thus on one side the spontaneous impulse of my will is quite decidedly in favour of staying to hunt; or, in other words, the motive which prompts me to stay is quite decidedly stronger at the moment than that which prompts me to go. On the other side, my reason recognises clearly how very important is the public interest at issue, and how plainly duty calls me in the direction of London. I resolutely, therefore, enter my carriage, and order it to the station. And now let us consider what takes place while I am on my four miles' transit. During the greater part, perhaps during the whole, of this transit, there proceeds what we have called in our essays "a compound phenomenon"; or, in other words, there co-exist in my mind two mutually distinct phenomena. First phenomenon. My spontaneous impulse is strongly in the opposite direction. I remember that even now it is by no means too late to be present at the meet, and I am most urgently solicited by inclination to order my coachman home again. So urgent, indeed, is this solicitation, so much stronger is the motive which prompts me to return than that which prompts me to continue my course, that, unless I put forth unintermitting and energetic resistance to that motive, I should quite infallibly give the coachman such an order. Here is the first phenomenon to which we call attention—my will's spontaneous impulse towards returning. A second, no less distinctly pronounced and strongly marked phenomenon is that of unintermitting energetic *resistance* to the former motive of which we have been speaking. On one side is

that phenomenon which may be called my will's spontaneous, direct, unforced *impulse* and preponderating desire; on the other side, that which may be called my firm, sustained, active, antagonistic *resolve*. We allege, as a fact obvious and undeniable on the very surface, that the phenomenon which we have called "spontaneous impulse" is as different in kind from that other which we have called "anti-impulsive resolve," as the desire of wealth is different in kind from the recognition of a mathematical axiom. Our imaginary arbitrator will at once thus explain the distinction. On one side, he will say, is that impulse which results, according to the laws of my mental constitution, from my nature and external circumstances taken in mutual connection. On the other side, he will say, is that *resistance* to such impulse, which I elicit by vigorous personal action.

The scope of our argument, so far as we have gone, will perhaps be made clearer if at this point we expressly encounter an objection which has been sometimes urged against us in one or other shape. It may be thus exhibited.

"Doubtless a man's spontaneous impulse is infallibly and inevitably determined by his entire circumstances, external and internal, of the moment. But how can you prove that his *anti-impulsive effort* is not *equally* due to the combination of those circumstances? When the pious Christian receives an insult, what right have you to assume that his Christian forbearance is less inevitably determined by circumstances than is his spontaneous burst of indignation? And so on with every other illustration you have given."

We have again and again, as we consider, implicitly refuted this objection; but we may probably do service by setting forth such refutation explicitly. Our preceding argument, then, may be thus summed up. We are purporting to disprove the doctrine of Determinists—*i.e.* the doctrine that every man at every moment, by the very constitution of his nature, infallibly and inevitably elicits that precise act of will to which his entire circumstances of the moment, external and internal, dispose him. Now, we allege that this doctrine is disproved by taking into combined consideration these two facts: (1) In a large number of cases, I know, by certain and unmistakable experience, *what* is that act of will to which my entire circumstances of the moment dispose me. (2) In many of such cases, I know, by certain and unmistakable experience, that, as a matter of fact, I elicit some *different* act of will from this. By the very force of terms, that act to which my entire circumstances of the moment dispose me is in accordance with my spontaneous, direct, unforced impulse. If, then, I act at any moment *otherwise* than according to such impulse, I act in some way *different* from that to which my entire circumstances of the

moment dispose me. And if I ever so act, Determinism is thereby disproved. We do not pretend that Determinism is disproved merely because I act at times in opposition to what would be my more *pleasurable* course; for we entirely admit that my spontaneous impulse may often enough tend to the less pleasurable course. We do not pretend that Determinism is disproved merely because I put forth intense effort in opposition to some desire which urgently solicits me; for we entirely admit that my spontaneous impulse often *prompts* such effort. But if it be shown that I can successfully contend against my *spontaneous impulse itself*, then it is most manifestly shown that Determinism is false, because it is shown that I can act in some way *different* from that to which my entire circumstances of the moment dispose me. Determinists, therefore, are obliged to maintain, and do maintain, that no such thing is possible to man as anti-impulsive effort; that I can put forth no effort, except that to which my spontaneous impulse prompts me, and which we have called "congenial." To this we have replied that, as regards the more strongly accentuated cases, the phenomenal difference of kind between "congenial" and "anti-impulsive" effort is no less manifest than is the phenomenal difference of kind between the act of desiring wealth and the act of recognising a mathematical axiom. But this fact, if admitted, is of course conclusive against Determinism.

It is not easy to measure the part due to one thinker in the modifications and changes which time brings about in the world of thought. And the present writer prefers, for obvious reasons, not to attempt to estimate the degree of Mr. Ward's influence on the course of ethical and metaphysical thought in those problems with which he concerned himself. But a few words may be said as to its direction.

In two cases especially witness has been borne, as we have already seen, to the effect of Ward's polemic, by the chief representatives of the school he attacked—the case of the rational basis for trust in memory, and the case of the analysis of the Freewill controversy. In the former case he was held by many thinkers to have brought into vivid relief the necessity of an ultimate appeal to a power in the mind of immediate and active perception, which the school of Mill and Bain held to be non-existent; a power of Intuition to which knowledge is ultimately reducible, which is quite distinct from the "states of consciousness" to which the Experience School professed to reduce *all knowledge*. He very sharply separated "intuition" from the theory of "innate ideas," and thus introduced new definiteness

into an old controversy. The significance of memory was carefully limited to the proof that the mind possesses not certain primitive conceptions, but an original *power*, which the thinkers who had developed Locke's theory of the *tabula rasa* so far beyond Locke's own version of it could not account for. We have already seen that no agreement was come to among his opponents in their answers to his argument on this head—Mill, Bain, and Huxley, each taking up a different position.

In the case of Freewill both Mill and Bain bore witness, in the private correspondence given in this volume, to the fact that he had greatly simplified the issues of the controversy. That the successive momenta designated by him "spontaneous impulse" and "anti-impulsive effort" are genuine psychological facts they admitted. Further, Ward fixed and riveted the modification they had already introduced into Bentham's Utilitarianism, by emphasising the share taken in the formation of the spontaneous impulse of the will by other factors besides the degree of sensible pleasure which attracted it,—by habit, by fixed ideas, by refined tastes. Many of the advocates of Freewill placed his success on higher ground, and held his distinction to have brought also into relief the essentially different character of the determined impulse of the will, which is passive, and of the anti-impulsive effort, which is active.

On the necessity of mathematical truth again he was generally (I think) considered to have written conclusively. I have already cited Mill's own emphatic testimony to the force of his argument. Mill's original position which amounted to the view that two and two might make five in one of the fixed stars, which Ward attacked so unsparingly, cannot be said now to survive to any large extent, if at all. Also the force of Ward's appeal to the universality of belief in Nature's Uniformity, and to its necessity for the very elements of physical science, and yet its incapability of being proved on the Experience Principles, was generally recognised.

In each of these cases the criticism was mainly destructive. On the constructive side Ward met with a less general agreement. His contention that the anti-impulsive effort bears its own evidence of not being due to latent psychical conditions supervening on the original impulse, which he designated "spontaneous," appeared to some to be pressed too far. The

possibility that the effort was due to some such latent phenomenal cause needed patient examination, and a fuller and more careful analysis than it received at his hands. In the matter of Nature's Uniformity he did not attempt to construct or analyse the intuitional position; content with demolishing the Phenomenist ground. His argument from Necessary Truth to a Necessary Being, on which he laid such stress, was not accepted by any means universally, even among Theists. His argument from the sense of obligation to the existence of God, so cogent in the form in which Cardinal Newman states it in the *Grammar of Assent*, startled some thinkers in Mr. Ward's pages by its claim to the simplicity and obviousness of intuition. That it had great force was generally allowed by Theists, but the attempt to rank it with such truths as knowledge of the recent past—an attempt characteristic of his wish to divide all philosophical knowledge into intuitions and explicit inferences—seemed to his critics somewhat forced.

His contention that the ethical ideas "good" and "bad" are simple and irresolvable, was a contribution of acknowledged value to the Ethical controversy. It has been adopted in the exact form in which Mr. Ward expressed it for the first time, by several recent writers, and has been accepted by many as the most accurate statement of the intuitional position on the subject. It is interesting to note that the displacement of the old Experience Philosophy, which attempted to resolve these ideas into simpler elements compounded by association, and in some degree recognisable here and now, once they are pointed out, and the substitution in its place of the Evolution theory, with its appeal to associations fashioned and interwoven in the past life of the race, and therefore inaccessible to the living critic's observation and verification, synchronised almost exactly with the years of Mr. Ward's polemic. Those who believe in the force of his argument may indulge the hope that it had some share in bringing about a change of front, which was necessarily, to some extent, a confession of past inaccuracy.

Altogether, whether or no Mr. Ward laid down all the lines on which a complete Philosophy of Theism adapted to our own times could be constructed, most students of the subject have recognised the value of his suggestions towards such a Philosophy; while it has been still more widely recognised that

the thinkers who strove to undermine Theism in the name of phenomenism and determinism failed to save their system as a whole from his destructive analysis of its foundations,—or at least of those foundations which alone remain to the Experience Philosophy in its complete and thoroughgoing expression.

Appendix to Chapter XIII.

Mr. Ward's correspondence with Dr. Bain in 1879, in connection with the Freewill controversy, presents features of interest, and may suitably be given here. Bain proposed to reply to Ward's criticisms in the *Dublin Review* itself, so that the same readers should have both sides of the question before them. "I have rarely met an opponent," he added, in writing on the subject, "combining your ability and candour; and to have to deal with men of that stamp is a great relief and refreshment in the dreary polemic that occupies so much of the strength of those who make philosophy their life-work." Ward wrote in reply as follows:—

20 Marlborough Place, N.W.,
11*th May* 1879.

Dear Sir—The Editor is very well disposed to accept your proposal, and will send you through me a definite answer in *three days*. There is a certain other official whom he must consult. But I have no practical doubt that it will be as you suggested. I will write you again as soon as I have the final answer.

I shall be back at Weston in a week; but you will see that I have been able to move. In fact I am rapidly recovering.

I must again express my sense how very fair and straightforward is your proposal. I feel it a great advantage in more than one way (as I used to feel when controverting with Stuart Mill), that the argument on your side (and I trust on mine) will be so straightforward and (as the French say) "loyal."

I do not myself think that—when the *central* question is disposed of—there will be much remaining of *episodical* or linguistic discussion.—I remain, dear sir, faithfully yours, W. G. Ward.

I would suggest that it will conduce to decisiveness, if you will renew your acquaintance with my old article of April 1874, and also read that for July 1874. I hope by this time my articles have reached you.

Another letter, giving the editor's final answer, followed a few days later:—

20 MARLBOROUGH PLACE, ST. JOHN'S WOOD, N.W.,
15th May 1879.

DEAR SIR—I enclose the editor's letter which arrived this morning.

I would only add to it that if your remarks would naturally extend somewhat beyond the 16 pages—I hope you will not stint them—I can easily arrange with the editor for any number of pages not exceeding 20 or thereabouts.

I will take the opportunity of adding a (perhaps needed) explanation on my use of the term "effort."

By "effort" I mean "resistance to some desire."

By "*congenial* effort" I mean "resistance to a weaker desire in order to gratify a stronger."

By "anti-impulsive effort" I mean "resistance to my strongest present desire in order to pursue an end indicated by reason."

I think there is no difference between you and me as to what we should *mean* by the "strongest present desire." I think our difference is precisely this: you say that "anti-impulsive effort is impossible"; I say that "it is frequent."

I shall be greatly interested in receiving your paper. Will you kindly forward it to me at "Weston Manor, Freshwater, Isle of Wight," whither I return next Wednesday.

I am getting altogether back into good intellectual working order.

With many thanks for your courtesy.—I remain, dear sir, faithfully yours, W. G. WARD.

A difficulty arose as to the proposed arrangement, and the controversy was ultimately transferred to the columns of *Mind*. The proposal was Dr. Bain's.

ABERDEEN, *9th July* 1879.

DEAR SIR—As requested by the editor of the *Review* I send you his letter of the 14th May.

I have thought over your proposal, and have taken time since my arrival to go through the series of your articles, from which I begin to see the energy and elaboration that you have expended upon the great theses of controversy between yourself and your opponents. Any reply to your final article must have in view all that has gone before; and to be of any value at all must be carefully considered and can scarcely be short.

A war of pamphlets is one way. Another way is to transfer the debate to the columns of *Mind*, which was projected, *inter alia*, to give facilities for free discussion of all the contested matters of Philosophy. I do not think that I should find admission in the October number for a paper of any length, having to continue my papers on Mill, and to prepare a short notice of Spencer's Ethics; nor would I undertake to be ready so soon, now that I see the gravity of the issue as apprehended by you. I could, however, be in readiness for the following number, and could bespeak a place for my observations. It would, further, be allowable to show you the proof that you might append any short observations there and then, reserving a fuller reply if you saw fit.

On the whole, I prefer this course to writing a pamphlet.—Believe me, yours faithfully, A. BAIN.

A paper passed on either side. Bain wrote and Ward replied, raising further objections to his theory. A further paper by Ward in answer to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson on the same subject brought the following letter from Mr. Bain :—

ABERDEEN, 13*th November* 1880.

DEAR DR. WARD—Your paper in reply to Mr. Hodgson, which I have just received, is a reproach to me for my want of courtesy in not responding to your paper in *Mind* in answer to mine in the January number. The explanation of my long silence, either of writing privately or of rejoining publicly, is that my health has been failing for several years; and I found, last winter especially, that after the effort of that article in the January No. of *Mind*, I had to refrain from all labours of the pen during my heavy teaching labours in Aberdeen University. When the session was over I was occupied with arrangements for resigning my chair, and otherwise; and let the subject of our amicable controversy pass out of my mind. I am now released from teaching work, and have a certain fund of strength still; but having many demands upon it, in preparing a final revision of my numerous writings, I am not over eager to expend myself in avoidable controversy. I am, therefore, predisposed to the conclusion that we have both pretty well exhausted our respective sides, and would not add much to the elucidation of the great problem in dispute by prolonged argument. There are many points in Mr. Hodgson's statement that I would adopt; but not everything. I do not consider that he is so guarded as he ought to be in the use of the leading terms that enter into the controversy.

In a short article in *Mind*, vol. i., p. 393, I endeavoured to state what I consider the hinge of the difficulty of Freewill and Necessity, and I really am unable to add anything to that explanation.

I trust you will continue for years to come in a condition for philosophical discussion. You are probably ten years older than I am, but I shall not be doing the same work at your age, even if my life is prolonged till then.—With best wishes, I am, yours faithfully, A. BAIN.

I shall continue to take an interest in your discussions on the vast questions that so fiercely agitate our age.

Ward's reply ran as follows :—

NETHERHALL HOUSE, FITZJOHN'S AVENUE, HAMPSTEAD, N.W.
LONDON, 16*th November* 1880.

MY DEAR DR. BAIN—Many thanks for your extremely kind letter, which has just reached me.

I am greatly concerned to hear of your ill health, and should be most sorry if you were induced by any reference to me to overtax your energies in the slightest degree.

But in truth I am rather disposed with you to doubt whether much more remains to be said on the matter. It is my wish to think so, because I am so desirous of proceeding to the later portions of my theistic argument.

I am, for the moment, *hors de combat.* I have been suffering from vertigo, and on one occasion lapsed into total unconsciousness. The doctor tells me I must, for some time to come, avoid subjects which greatly exercise my mind.

With many thanks for your kind expressions, and with every best wish, I remain sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

CHAPTER XIV

TWO PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

Two intellectual friendships of Mr. Ward's later years have supplied this memoir with valuable psychological studies of its subject which may be inserted at this stage.

Baron Friedrich von Hügel, and Mr. Richard Holt Hutton of the *Spectator*, write of him from different points of view, and neither with entire intellectual sympathy. The friendship with Baron Friedrich von Hügel began in 1873, and became subsequently still more intimate when they were neighbours at Hampstead. Baron von Hügel's account of their intercourse which I subjoin, besides its great interest on other grounds, gives a penetrating analysis of what so many felt who came in contact with Mr. Ward—the sense of largeness of heart and of sympathy in one who took up a theological position which appeared at first sight almost identical with that of the school of Veuillot and Gaume. His account is the more interesting from the very wide difference in intellectual temperament and standpoint which it reveals in two men who were at once devoted to the Holy See, and in the highest degree absorbed by the intellectual life. There could scarcely be a better illustration of the compatibility of the Ultramontane position with the widest divergencies, where intellectual differences are accompanied by genuine humility and deference to the Church, and are not the outcome of a spirit of disaffection on either side. And their sympathy came, not as the more limited sympathy with Mill did, greatly from the avoidance of the delicate ground of discussion on those theological questions on which Ward was most sensitive, but perhaps mainly from their intense agreement in placing the ethical life far above all else.

This strong element of sympathy made it possible for the two men to discuss the most delicate and contention-provoking questions in spite of all differences. Baron von Hügel's confidence in the worth and reliableness of historical and Biblical criticism is manifest in his letter. His distrust of attempts hitherto made to reduce the intellectual elements involved in faith to an exact analysis would seem to be almost equally profound. Ward was sceptical where his friend was hopeful, and sanguine and deeply interested where he was distrustful. Ward looked on the results of historical criticism as most uncertain; while his confidence was great that the rational elements, both in the foundation and in the superstructure of Catholic belief, could be built up by logical statements closely pieced together, as a solid and visible place of refuge for the perplexed mind. An analysis of the foundations of religious knowledge and a logically-complete scheme of Church authority were, in his mind, the most important and most certainly obtainable of intellectual possessions for a Catholic; and they were, perhaps, the two subjects which least inspired his friend's intellectual efforts, though his devotion to the truths of faith themselves was as intense as Ward's. Baron von Hügel writes to me as follows:—

4 Holford Road, Hampstead.

My dear Ward—I have, as you know, shrunk long and often from attempting to give you my recollections of your father. Well as I knew him during the last nine years of his life (1873-1882), as well, perhaps, as a young man of twenty-one to thirty could know a man just forty years his senior; warm as is my admiration for him, and my gratitude for the very much I owe him of kindness, example, and stimulation, yet there are several circumstances which make it difficult for me to write upon the subject at all.

I was, for one thing, but eighteen at the time of the Vatican Council. I arrived then at maturity only considerably after the close, or at least the adjournment, of what he himself considered the main controversy of his Catholic life. To this hour I have not had a number of that terrible *Home and Foreign Review* in my hands; I know but the bare outlines of the history of the Congresses of Malines and Munich; I have never read through the Ward-Ryder controversy: what was lived and fought through by your father has been barely read over by myself. Then again, on this one set of questions, I was from the first in relations of friendly and respectful, but most frank and open conflict with him, and to

make the why and wherefore clear will require some dwelling upon my own ideas and requirements instead of those facts of his mind and life which are necessarily what alone you can care to have and I to give. And then, above all, how recent are all the events and persons involved! One shrinks from judging where even a preliminary survey is probably premature.

However, I will try and make these drawbacks subserve to make my remarks as impartial, independent, and reserved as I can with regard to that side of your father's mind and character which I had the privilege to know.

How well I remember my first stay with him at windy Weston, and our walks and talks upon the Downs! Almost as well as those later times when here, upon the Heath, he would as then discourse and draw me out and train me as to Theism and its proofs, grace and freewill, the nature and extent of Church authority, and this with a zest and a vigour, with an informality and personal unpretentiousness, with a genial, breezy defiance of all hesitation and uncertainty on any subject which was allowed a lodgement in his mind, such as I have never met with either before or since.

Indeed, it was this state of tension of mind and nerve which struck me from the first as a concomitant, more probably a part-cause, of his special strength and special weakness.

His separate courses at dinner, served in quick succession so as to avoid all delay; his sensitiveness to the vibration of the ground caused by one's approaching the part of the terrace on which, immediately after his dinner, he would be playing chess; his insisting upon getting out and crossing on foot a foot-bridge, when his carriage forded a shallow brook; and, later on, by the time our friendship had ripened into close intimacy, his suddenly breaking off in the midst of a sentence with an "excuse me, only a ten minutes' nap," and then and there throwing himself on our drawing-room sofa, and, at the end of that time, waking up refreshed and vigorous; all this, with numberless other little symptoms, meant one and the same thing,—an overwrought brain and overstrung nerves.

It was the same mentally. His inability to remain for an instant without definite occupation or amusement for his mind, or to conceive that any living being could so remain; his calling his youngest daughter into his study, with the explanation, "Margaret, *do* attend to poor Fish, amuse the poor dog, he is so dull, so bored!" his incapacity for imagining that a man could keep simply neutral in his estimate of a stranger, and could possibly avoid definitely holding him to be bad, if he did not definitely hold him to be good,[1] when of course neutrality is really all that is strictly possible, and all that is expected of us; his "imploring" Father

[1] See, *e.g.*, his *De Infallibilitatis Extensione*, 1869, p. 46.

O'Reilly, in his reviews of the latter's thoroughly historical Church and State articles, to take sides clearly on this and that minor point, as such declaration was of vital importance, when the real point would be, not the requirements of logic or of life, but the amount and nature of the evidence available; his instinctive shrinking and turning away—as rapidly as if a live coal had fallen upon his hand—from some discussion I was retailing to him from one of Dr. Lightfoot's dissertations, a discussion on a point of admittedly minor importance, as soon as it became clear to him that it did not even profess to lead beyond suspense or probability; and, in a somewhat different direction, his rushing out of our house bareheaded on my repeating to him, under pressure, the remark of a clerical friend, that he considered the Vatican Council had made a clean sweep of the Extreme Right as well as of the Extreme Left: all this hangs well together, and spells a man who could affirm and who could deny, but who could not suspend, who could revolutionise, but who could hardly reform his judgment.

Now, I take this all but unique intensity and impatience as the chief occasion, if not cause, of his most characteristic weaknesses and strengths.

It was the probable root of his strangely large incapacity for entering into minds and trials different from his own. How curious was his non-appreciation of the genius of Pascal! His *Pensées*, he told me, he considered "clever," "pointed," but they were only a *litterateur's* work to his mind. Pope Benedict XIV. was for him never much more than the dry lawyer. And of all George Eliot, he only appreciated her *Felix Holt*, decidedly her poorest production. And as he never could afford to suspend his own mind and realise a differing one, it is no wonder that he was continually addressing so many imaginary *alter egos*, and saw for every one only his own dangers and his own helps. Hence, what used so long to shock and pain me in him, so clearly zealous as he was for souls, his strange persistence in having everything theological "out" with everybody, his constant pitching upon the most problematical and provocative points before strangers, or sceptical or scrupulous minds, treating before them, say, of the materiality of hell-fire, or of the interior assent due to non-infallible Church decisions. It was simply that this method would have helped himself.

This was, again, the probable cause of his incapacity for history of all kinds. That "great empire over the affections" which the Bollandist Père de Smedt so rightly requires of the historian; that "abstraction from one's own ideas, so as to reach the degree of impersonality without which a man is no true historian" insisted upon by the Biblical scholar Abbé Loisy,—this kind of self-restraint would have been to him intolerable. Hence, too, his fear of the

historical spirit: as all suspense must mean negation, and as there was no logical reason why, if one thing were denied, another and another should not be so too, and as the real reason, the varying degrees and kinds of the historical evidence, was practically non-existent for him, an historical mind was to him, if at the same time believing, illogical, dangerous, ignorant of its own necessary consequences.

But if this intense occupation of his mind with itself was a cause of weakness, it was also, perhaps, the chief occasion of his strength. It was this that forced on his continuous attention his own moral shortcomings, the phenomena and problems of his own mind for his own mind, the persistent search after the first principles of thought and action. It was the unceasing stimulus which set his splendid mental powers in motion, and made of him the formidable answerer of himself in the person of his *alter ego*, J. S. Mill; which, by deadening the outer world to him, rendered possible, indeed, in a manner easy, that noble unworldliness of his; which kept ever before him the wide upland reaches of moral and spiritual perfection; and which helped him to attain to his deep and constant realisation of the supreme importance of the purification and direction of the will. And so he trudged onwards, with one and the same ever-deepening, dogged instinct, which no remonstrances on the score of what was "moderate" or "suited to Englishmen," or other cries and shibboleths, could daunt or even disturb, from Mill to Arnold, from Arnold to Newman, from Newman to Rome, as in each case the teacher and pattern of a higher and deeper moral and spiritual life. And here I have reached my two direct obligations to him.

He was such a true psychologist and ethical philosopher, so open and just towards all the phenomena of his own mind; never was there a man with less of routine or conventionality about his thinking:—a living mind, a breathing soul; indeed he breathed too fast. And how reverently yet comfortably free he was, in this the one subject that was really within and not simply outside his mind! How emphatic he used to be against the conception of orthodoxy in philosophy in the same sense as orthodoxy in theology; against the conception of the Church's direct doctrinal *magisterium* being in philosophy other than negative! How clear and wise he was in his repudiation of the position that, in pure thought, there is no half-way house between Agnosticism and the Catholic Church, when Christianity itself is but contingent and historical, and Theism necessary and philosophical! How strong he was on the superior strength and applicability to our times of the moral psychological proofs for God's existence as compared with the extrospective arguments, say those from Final Causes! "Mind," he would say, "the two arguments to urge, for fifty years to come, are

the arguments from conscience and from the persistence, in this weak and wayward world, of conscience's chief exponent and fullest realisation, the Catholic Church." How brave and true he was in his constant grasp of the fact that the argument from Design, as dealing with finite effects, does not, cannot get beyond an *indefinitely* great First Cause; a step only towards Theism, which requires proofs of an *infinite* mind: and, again, in his constant admission, as complete as Lotze's, that the existence of evil baffles all and every attempt at philosophical explanation! How interesting is his, I think largely new, distinction between Atheists and Anti-theists (Agnostics) as applied to the question of Invincible Ignorance, and his inclination to admit, exceptionally and for exceptional times, the latter within its borders, at least for a considerable time, and certainly in the sense that a man might, through his own past fault, find himself, for a while, in involuntary suspense about these points! How subtle and true to life was his discrimination between what a man really thinks and what he thinks he thinks, and his insistence that, before God, only the first of these often very different things really matters!

And, then, how much he did by his penetrating rousing words, and by the noble standard of all his moral aims and ideals, towards helping one to find, in spite of many obstacles and prejudices, in the highest realisations of the Catholic spirit the deepest responses to all the noblest cravings of the human heart; nor was it a small service to learn, by practical experience, how utterly public-spirited and truly spiritual were the motives and final ends of the extremest of Ultramontane thinkers.

In one word, he was that in philosophy, including the largely psychological grace and freewill questions, which, on historical subjects, at no price would he be or allow others to become, and this although his splendidly ethical and spiritual temper of mind would, one would have thought, have been of itself both a protective and stimulant to considerable intellectual liberality all round. But this was not the case.

And this brings me to my third and final obligation to him, perhaps my greatest, though it was unintentional and indirect. I can say of him, in my smaller way, what Cardinal Newman said of Dr. Whately: "He emphatically opened my mind, and taught me to think and to use my reason." For his was a mind that would not tolerate evasion or mechanical repetition; and if in philosophy and the religious life I owe much to him directly, in historical and Church Authority matters I learned as much indirectly. And this was all the more possible, because never was there a man who less attempted to practically advise or to direct: and indeed the very few semi-conscious indications of this kind which he ever gave me proved, when tested by experience, to be thorough failures.

I learned from him, with a vividness and finality which I wish I could convey in words, two equally important things. The one was that your father's position in these latter questions was most genuine and necessary for him; and that a party with some such views and aims will and ought ever to exist and flourish in the Church; the second was, that it was and ever would and ought to remain but a party, one legitimate but only one out of two or more legitimate ways of viewing these matters,—that it would have been, in the long run, as impossible, short of stultifying our natures and losing all hold of Reason and of Faith, for me to see like Dr. Ward as for Dr. Ward to see like me. It was long before I ceased to put this down to my ignorance or naughtiness; but much evidence in the actual practice and experience of life has quietly and comfortably convinced me that all that is best within me would be crushed and ruined by accepting your father's temper of mind on these matters as binding on myself.

And yet the differences are so common and yet so unregarded, so general and practical, so prior and subsequent to all definite theory, so dependent, in the case of your father and myself, on the twin energies and perceptions of my mind being—at least one of them—different from his own, that it is as difficult to draw them out clearly, as it is easy, in the practice of life, to at once feel both the existence of the differences, and their importance for the helping or hindering of similar minds and characters.

It used to strike me so strangely to notice in your father, how the more remote a conclusion before him was from the certain premiss, the more anxious and emphatic he would be in insistence on its being "certain if anything is certain," on its "unspeakable importance," on suspense in the matter as "truly alarming." And yet I found he was but following out the natural workings of his own mind. Only by getting a perfectly water and air-tight vessel of authority could he conceive it possible to keep every particle,—which meant any particle,—of the Faith. The fight with the enemy was on the frontiers, hence a shed or a tree-stump there was in a sense more important than all the treasures of the capital. It was strange to notice four consequent peculiarities, characteristic of his argumentation in these matters.

He would, for one thing, always argue as if a particular Definition or Church pronouncement were not only true as far as it went, but as if it were so completely coextensive with the full truths of which it necessarily gave but *some* negative or positive determination, that it would bear arguing from in any direction and to any distance. Again, he would no doubt shrink from no logical conclusion from his premisses, however startling or paradoxical such conclusion might be, but he would as certainly refuse to patiently consider each new group of facts which each new link in his chain

of reasoning brought successively into view. And not only was he thus fair *intensivé* (though not *extensivé*) to his logic but not to the facts, but even his logic—though all rapid, resourceful, burning with earnestness, it held one at the time as in a vice—was, I think, in two respects far from perfect, even as logic pure and simple. Nothing would be more common than for him to argue for this or that power for the Church on the ground of its being necessary for her very existence as a Religious Teacher. But to a close observer it never lasted long before he had slipped in quite another argument: that this or that further power was desirable and useful for restraining men argumentatively constituted like himself. Now the argument from necessity is cogent, the argument from desirableness is not: such additional powers cannot be proved by this method, a method which showed how utilitarian was the basis of what looked so like the offspring of pure thought. And again, his constant insistence that the Church is infallible as to the limits of her own infallibility lost all its cogency when made to cover the claims put forward in documents, the *ex Cathedrâ* character of which was exactly one of the points in debate.

No doubt there is such a thing as un-catholic Liberalism, and it was and is one of the characteristic errors of the age; excesses were committed by the parties opposed by your father, and the subsequent history of a good many of their members tends to throw doubt on at least the completeness of their principles. Personally, I have never been anything but an Ultramontane, in the old and definite sense of the word, ever since I have been a convinced Catholic at all; I have been ever glad of the Definition of 1870, and the fanaticism of such men as Friedrich Michelis and Johannes Friedrich was at all times as repulsive to me as it could be to your father. But from all this it surely does not follow that your father really got to the bottom of these delicate complex questions, or that he and his did not largely occasion the very evils they specially perceived and, I think, but very partially understood. Catholics were not, either then or now, divided simply between the two extreme wings, the *Ultras* and the *Extras*, as they have been wittily called. The large majority no doubt belong to the centre, and to that centre I belong myself. St. François de Sales and Fénelon in the past, Bishop Fessler, M. Poisset and Father Hilarius, Cardinal Newman and Father Ryder in our time, would, in various degrees and ways, represent this position.

But the difference on these points is but a consequence; I should like to try and get at the cause. Is it not this, that minds belong, roughly speaking, to two classes which may be called the mystical and positive, and the scholastic and theoretical? The first of these would see all truth as a centre of intense light losing itself gradually in utter darkness; this centre would gradually

extend, but the borders would ever remain fringe, they could never become clear-cut lines. Such a mind, when weary of border-work would sink back upon its centre, its home of peace and light, and thence it would gain fresh conviction and courage to again face the twilight and the dark. Force it to commit itself absolutely to any border distinction, or force it to shift its home or to restrain its roamings, and you have done your best to endanger its faith and to ruin its happiness. Such a mind need not have a touch of Liberalism about it, for it would be specially capable of learning the constant necessity of purification of the heart and will, for the sake of its work, and how much more for the sake of its fuller end; and, again, of suspending final assent to its conclusions in proportion as the Church or the body of theologians speak definitely and formally on the question in debate. But, indeed, such a mind would generally be more in danger of personal conceit than of objective Liberalism, and would naturally tend to find the true worth of man in his character and dispositions and his culminating happiness, even hereafter, in the determination and satisfaction of the will.

Now all this would seem to fit in so well with the requirements of our time. For what is the all-important *apologia* for religion wanted in our days? Nothing more nor less—as one of the chief officials of the Vatican Council was fond of insisting to a close friend of mine—than the demonstration, by a large number of actual realisations, of the possibility within the Catholic Church of the combination of a keen, subtle, open-eyed, historical, critical, and philosophical spirit with a child-like claimlessness and devoted faith. Now this, all the theorising in the world cannot replace, though it can easily for a time suppress or drive it elsewhere.

For not a paper demonstration, however able, that the theories of Darwin or of Welhausen will not do, or could be modified and made to do; not a narrowing and disfiguring of research to simply controversial issues or restricting it to regions where no conflict can arise,—nothing of all this is what is chiefly wanted. We want something less ambitious but deeper and perhaps more difficult; the encouragement and development of a Wallace and a Lotze, *quâ* devoted observers of nature and of mind; of a Delitzsch, *quâ* reverently candid student of Scripture; or, again, the reproduction of a Petavius and a Mabillon, of a Vercellone and a de Rossi. Clad in his one intellectual *chaussure*, the seven-league boots of theological speculation, your father was utterly impatient of the noble patience which alone can build up such work and men, or even of such patience as alone could test and gauge their worth. He would speak at times as though men of this class were people who undertook this kind of thing at their own risk and peril, and who could be tolerated only if they

reported themselves periodically to the ecclesiastical police. And yet such labourers are so much wanted: the historical spirit and the spirit of observation of the world within and of the world without are modifying, enlarging, restating the problems and the solutions of all around us. And such labourers,—you will not get them, if you do not give them air and elbow-room and warmth; and, in the long run, they have ever found all these conditions within the Church. Much has been done, especially in France and Belgium, in this direction since 1870, the war and the Council have helped to clear the air; much in the direction of producing the work and the men, and leaving the future, if it cares and can, to substitute a perfect theory of the relations of Faith and Science for these workers' working hypotheses. Instead of the Congress of Munich we have had the two International Scientific Congresses of Catholics of Paris in 1888 and 1891. The Paris Institut Catholique and the Brussels Bollandists; the *Bulletin Critique* and the *Analecta Bollandiana;* the standard historical and critical work of such scholars as Père de Smedt, Abbé Duchesne and Abbé Loisy—all join in replacing the din and heat of premature, more or less dangerous and unreal controversy by the silence and light of life and work. The standards of work and criticism of the seventeenth century have again been taken up, after more than a century of theories, disporting themselves largely *in vacuo;* the historical Church has again got true historians.

How impatient your father would have been of all these remarks! How "unspeakably" beside the mark he would have declared them all to be! And, indeed, the sort of work and men I am thinking of,—he would not have noticed their presence within the Church, unless they took to theorising and furnishing him with fresh materials for alarm and elaborate counter-theories.

It might again be urged that I am treating your father as unique, whilst he was nothing but one from among many able spokesmen of a widespread movement which culminated in definitions absolutely binding upon all Catholics. But this objection is more plausible than true. If we take into account only the necessarily restricted number of men who have taken up a carefully thought out and permanent position in these difficult, complex, still largely problematical questions: and if we pass over among them such men as Father Knox in England, and Drs. Scheeben, and Von Schäzler, and Father Schneemann in Germany, perhaps also Père Ramière in France, of whom at least the first four were, on their own admission, learners on these points from your father—it will be seen how quite exceptional was the length to which he carried his theory. Take his *De Infallibilitatis Extensione* (1869) and its seventeen Theses. According to his own admission there, the very Theologians and Roman Congregations to whom he wanted to

attribute quasi infallible authority, refused to endorse thesis after thesis of his. Take again his attitude on the *ex Cathedrâ* character of the *Syllabus*. He first obliges every Catholic to accept it *sub mortali;* he next takes off this obligation; he finally re-imposes it. Take, finally, the Vatican definition. He never made any secret of how much he cared for the question as to the *Object*, the range of Infallibility, and how little comparatively for that as to its *Subject*, its organ; of how backward he thought, on the first question, the opinions of the large majority of the Bishops of the Council; and of how disappointed he was that the Council, whilst giving a most moderate definition as to the *Subject*, left the question of the *Object* exactly where it was before your father began insisting that it was *the* great Catholic question of the age.

And of this I am very sure so great a difference in degree as there was between your father's Ultramontanism and my own, results, practically, in a difference in kind, and reacts most powerfully upon one's whole temper of mind, and one's method of attacking problems and looking at things without and within.

And yet how well we got on together! This came, I think, from my always discussing questions with the living man, and rarely reading the comparatively dead letter of his articles on Church authority matters, and, indeed, so even in discussion keeping chiefly to philosophical and ascetical matters. It came from his striking readiness (during those last years at all events) to put up with much that was *caviare* to him, or even "dangerous," if only he was persuaded that one habitually tried to put character above intellect and faith above reason. "I cannot make out, my dear sir, whether you are a Liberal or not; I incline to think *not*" he said to me after many a year of friendly but emphatic divergence. "If only I could find traces in him of the self-denying spirit, and of a love for souls, I could put up with the rest," he said of a man whose views were especially calculated to alarm him and many others. But most of all, perhaps, it came from my knowing him too well to fall into a most natural and common but most thorough mistake about him. There was an habitual pain in his mind at perceiving how many of the assailants of his position on Church Authority inclined to treat him either as an amusing *enfant terrible*, or, again, as a sheer fanatic: "they have theories and excuses to cover every kind of intellectual defect and excess, only our position is to be held to be sheer nonsense, to be outlawed from all discussion" he would say again and again. He did not see the many reasons for this mistake; I doubt whether he, even for one moment, realised how easy it was for a simple reader of him to think that: "he only does it to annoy because he knows it teases"; indeed, how could he realise it if he at all was what I have tried to show him to have

been? But, all but inevitable, a mistake it was for all that. It was completely absent from our intercourse. My constant conviction of his seriousness and reasonableness in the face of his own requirements helped largely, I think, to make that intercourse what it was.

I wish I could think that this paper of mine would help towards a better comprehension of one to whom I owe so much, one so penetrating and swift of mind, so massive and large in sympathy and will, a man every inch of him, a friend of friends, a father and a playfellow to one so all but utterly unlike himself. But the little I can do is now done.—Yours very sincerely,

FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL.

Mr. Hutton's account of Ward, published in the *Spectator* shortly after his death, though less personal than Baron von Hügel's, is very graphic, and conveys a somewhat similar impression of keen ethical sympathy between the two men amid considerable intellectual differences:—

"Ideal Ward" was his Oxford nickname; "Squire Ward" was his title in the Isle of Wight, where he had estates; "Dr. Ward" was the description by which he was best known to the Catholic theologians; while his friends knew him simply as Mr. Ward. Oddly enough, each of the names applied to him by comparative strangers represented something really characteristic in him, and something also that was almost the very antithesis of that characteristic. There was an ideal element in him, but much more that was in the strongest sense real, not to say realistic. There was something in him of the bluff and sturdy manner of the English Squire, and yet nothing was more alien to him than hunters, hounds, partridges, and stubble-fields. There was a good deal in him of the theologian and the doctor, but yet any one expecting to find the rarefied atmosphere of philosophical and theological subtlety would have been astonished to find how substantial, not to say *solid*, theological and philosophical propositions became in his hands.

The name "Ideal Ward" often raised a smile, for anything less like æsthetic idealism than Mr. Ward's manner it would be difficult to conceive. Yet in one sense, Mr. Ward certainly was a thoroughgoing idealist. His ideal of intellectual authority was as high as it well could be. No man who was so keen and precise a thinker, —who loved, indeed, a good philosophical disquisition not less, but much better, than he loved a game of chess, and he loved a game of chess heartily,—had a more honest love of authority, and a more ardent belief in it, than Mr. Ward. In his very last book, he traverses all the favourite prepossessions of philosophers, by

saying that, in his belief, the principle of authority is so far from being "adverse to the true interests of philosophy," that it is, on the contrary, "the only *conservator* of those interests"; and he gives a very plausible reason for his belief. Philosophers, he said, will never come to any good, without being checked in the hasty adoption of wild premisses, and the hasty inference of unsound conclusions from partially true premisses, by the distinct warning from a higher source, as to where the quicksands of falsehood begin. An authority, he thinks, which fixes the limits within which alone speculation is legitimate, puts just the sort of pressure on philosophy which is requisite to give an edge to thought. For ourselves, we agree entirely with Mr. Ward, though we disagree as to the authority by which the pressure should be administered. Nothing seems to us more certain than that the speculative faculty of man is not adequate to its vast work unless and until it accepts limits from a source which cannot be called speculative, because, whether it come from within or without, it must be held to be the "categorical imperative" of a divine law. Until we have made up our minds where the moral law comes from,—whether we are or are not at liberty to explain it all away into elements of error and emotional misapprehension,—whether the sense of moral freedom, of right and wrong, of sin and remorse, be trustworthy or not,—whether, in short, the origin of our most commanding instincts be spiritual, or fanciful and illusive,—till then, speculation is far too vague and indeterminate to be worth attempting; and the answer to these questions is, after all, not really speculative, but precisely of the same kind as the answer to the question whether this or that man is our moral superior,—whether we ought to welcome his influence or to resist it. So far, then, we quite agree with Dr. Ward, that speculation *in vacuo* is not for man, that human speculation should start from fixed points given us by authority from above,—though we do not think, with him, that that authority is the authority of an external and historical institution. But we have referred to the subject only to point out what an amount of iron Dr. Ward's belief in an actual authority really put into his speculations,—what a tonic it gave to his reasoning,—how firm it made his convictions, what strength it lent to his illustrations, and what fixity to his conclusions. His was a mind of high speculative power, but of speculative power which was always referring back to the fixed points of certainty from which he started, and which attempted to deal only with the intermediate and indefinite world between these fixed points. And his source of strength was also his source of weakness. He had so many dogmatic certainties which (as we believe) were mistaken, that he seemed to have all the sphere of higher knowledge spread out clear and sharp in a sort of philosophical ordnance map, and held immovably hundreds

of fixed beliefs which he freely admitted to be unattainable, and even incredible to a Protestant. Never did a mind of great power luxuriate so heartily in the bars of what an outsider thought his intellectual prison. "That," he would virtually say, "seems to you a prison-bar, does it? Now, look at me; I have got fast hold of it, and it keeps me from falling out of the window out of which I have seen you Protestants fall so often. I like it. It is a good, strong support, which the Church has been good enough to provide me with. It keeps me from attempting all sorts of insoluble problems. It leaves me plenty to speculate upon, with fixed, determinate points, which prevent my speculation from being barren and shadowy. But you, without these bars, as you call them, you are like a surveyor who has no known data from which to calculate the unknown elements of his problem. Indeed, your speculation is not determination of the unknown from the known, but like an attempt to solve an equation in which there are more unknown quantities than there are conditions which fix their value." In this sense, then, Mr. Ward was a genuine Idealist. His ideal of the intellectual authority to be exerted over the mind by the Church was a high one, and it was to him a source of strength, and not of embarrassment.

But in another sense, "Ideal" Ward seemed a term almost applied in irony. Never was there a thinker or a man who seemed to live on such definite and even palpable convictions,—to whom the vague and indefinite, even though steeped in a haze of bright sentiment, seemed so unwelcome. As an Oxford tutor, he was said to be always wrestling with men's half-thoughts or illogical inferences, often trying to make them ignore, perhaps, *that* half which was deepest rooted in their own minds, though less visible to him than the half which he undertook to develop. It is said that Dr. Newman converted him to Anglicanism almost by a single remark,—namely, that it would have been impossible, if the Primitive Church had been Protestant in our modern sense, that the Church of the third and fourth centuries should have been what it was,—that the growth of Catholicism could not have been from a Protestant root. That is true enough, of course; but how impossible the Anglicans of those days appear to have found it to realise that the unspiritual, no less than the spiritual, elements of the Early Church—the tendencies rebuked by our Lord, no less than the tendencies fostered by him—were among the seeds out of which the historical Church grew! Ward's powerful mind had therefore enormous influence over those whose real starting-point he grasped, but he constantly failed to influence others, for sheer want of insight into the many half-discovered doubts which played round the admissions into which he was able to draw them. Thus, on poetic minds like Clough's, it is probable that Ward's influence

was not wholly salutary. He put too much strain on the clear convictions, and allowed too little for, indeed endeavoured too little to get a sight of, the many prolific half-thoughts which had hardly risen above the horizon of the young thinker's mind. He applied a vigorous logic to what was palpably admitted, but failed to see the large penumbra of impalpable and yet most influential doubt.

And it was a curious thing to compare the real man with the "Squire Ward," of the Isle of Wight nomenclature. No man more hearty, frank, and with a more real hold on such of the physical enjoyments of life as were to him physical enjoyments, can be imagined. He had nothing of the hermit, or the monk, or the rapt pilgrim through visionary worlds about him. His pleasures were as definite and as intelligible as any squire's, but he had no love for any of the ordinary agricultural amusements,—no pride in "the land," no interest in crops, no pleasure in the chase. He enjoyed trudging about on the plain road talking theology, or a game of chess, or a good opera-bouffe, better than any orthodox squirearchical amusement in England. Indeed, he enjoyed the former amusements very much, and none of the latter at all. He had a great sense of humour, and the humour which he enjoyed was as bright and clear and definite as was his reasoning itself. It was, indeed, strange to contrast the impalpable character of Ward's chief interests with the extraordinarily palpable way in which they represented themselves to him. His philosophy, theology, and music were as real to him as real property is to others,—a great deal more real than real property was to himself.

For many of the later years of his life, Mr. Ward had the opportunity of comparing his own deepest convictions with the convictions, or no-convictions, of many of the ablest doubters of the age. He was one of the founders of the now deceased Metaphysical Society, where he met Anglican Bishops, Unitarians, sceptics, physicists, journalists, all sorts of thinkers, on perfectly equal terms; and probably no one among them knew what he thought so well, and made it so distinct to his brother metaphysicians, as Mr. Ward. There, indeed, he was "Dr." Ward, and his position as a Doctor of Theology, with a degree conferred by Pio Nono, gave him a position hardly inferior in professional weight as an authoritative Catholic divine to that of Cardinal Manning himself. And no man in the Society was more universally liked. The clearness, force, and candour of his argument made his papers welcome to all,—for in that Society nebulousness was almost the rule, weakness chronic, and inability to understand an opponent's position, rather than want of candour, exceedingly common. From the time, indeed, that Mr. Ward ceased to become a regular attendant at the Metaphysical Society, the Metaphysical Society

began to lose its interest, and to drop into decay. Such was the attractive power of at least one strong and definite philosophical creed.

It is well known that Mr. Ward, though an ardent disciple of Dr. Newman's, did not in his later years belong to the same school of ecclesiastical thought. Indeed, he was amongst the strongest of the so-called Vaticanists, as it was natural he should be; while Cardinal Newman belonged to the school which dreaded premature definition, not to say even over-definition. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that Mr. Ward did not up to the last cherish the deepest admiration for his old leader, which, whether in public or in private, he hardly found enough opportunity to express. His mind, indeed, was one of the most modest, as well as of the most grateful to those from whom he had learned anything, with which the present writer ever came in contact; and to Cardinal Newman Mr. Ward always seemed to feel that he owed his intellectual life. To represent him as in any sense estranged in spirit from his old master by his ecclesiastical differences of opinion, is one of the greatest blunders which have ever been current in the theological world. His friendships were unusually deep and tender, and the tenderness of his love for Dr. Newman is a matter of which all his friends had the fullest and the most absolute knowledge. To not a few in various communions his friendship will be a very great and keenly-felt loss.

CHAPTER XV

CLOSING YEARS

1871–1882

THE closing years of any life which we have followed with sympathy, have a peculiar interest; and I shall not need to make any apology to those who have cared to read this narrative so far, for giving, at the present stage, somewhat minute details of the habits and life of the subject of my memoir.

In 1871 Mr. Ward finally left Old Hall. A compromise was effected between a home so far from the Isle of Wight, and the vicinity of "secular" Cowes; and a house was built on his Freshwater property.

Weston Manor stands within a mile of Tennyson's house, Farringford, but much higher. It is close to the "ridge of the noble down" which stretches from Freshwater Bay to the Needles, a familiar and favourite resort of Mr. Ward's during many years, and the scene of many a walk and theological talk with Father Faber in the past. In accordance with the taste of its owner the house was as exposed as possible to every current of fresh air. For some years, before the trees had succeeded in making headway against the pitiless Isle of Wight gales, it looked as if it had been dropped bodily from the clouds on to the bare rock. Periodical storms—and there were some memorable ones in the seventies — did much damage to the grounds. In the course of one of them the stable gates and gate-posts were blown down. Another occasion is well remembered on which an intruder, who had built a carriage shed without leave on some of Mr. Ward's land, was judged and condemned by a furious tornado before the law had been invoked against him. Carriage and shed

were blown bodily into the Solent, a distance of some hundred yards. Shrubs planted and sheds erected in the summer were levelled to the earth by the winter blasts, and for many years the commencement of a storm was heralded by the agitation visible in the drawing-room carpet. These and other penalties were paid for the coveted supply of fresh air and high winds. A beautiful view across the Solent of what an Isle of Wight wag called "the adjacent island of England" would have been to many a compensation for these somewhat rough conditions. By Mr. Ward it was welcomed, as an additional attraction indeed, but of secondary importance to the unstinted supply of oxygen.

Here, for twelve years, with the exhilarating breezes and picturesque scenery which he used to seek on the top of the Needles' Down, supplied to the full on the terrace outside his study, Mr. Ward carried on the work of his life, read and talked theology, wrote philosophy, and interested himself in the Catholic Mission which he founded. A sayer of caustic things—a *quondam* visitor at Weston—was asked to describe the characteristics of the house, and he replied, "It is windy and dogmatic."

But there were at Freshwater opportunities for intellectual intercourse and enjoyment of a kind very different from the dogmatic. Tennyson, the near neighbour of Mr. Ward, soon became his intimate friend. A man almost unknown to fame, but of great ability, the Rev. Christopher Bowen, the father of the present Lord Justice Bowen, who died at eighty-eight after an old age almost unexampled in vigour, was another neighbour and an acquaintance of many years' standing. Mrs. Cameron, a lady of known versatility and originality of mind and character, the friend of Darwin, Sir Henry Taylor, Herschell, and many other lights of science and literature, was also a Freshwater acquaintance and friend. Mr. G. F. Watts built himself a house within an easy walk of Weston. The presence of such persons meant also the frequent visits of others of like calibre; and Mr. Ward, little as he at any time mixed in society, keenly enjoyed a talk with Mr. Bowen or one of his sons, or a visit to Farringford, whence he would perhaps bring back to dinner old friends whom he found staying there, as Mr. Jowett, the Master of Balliol, or Lord

Selborne; while he appreciated the life and activity which centred round Mrs. Cameron, who would address him as "Squire Ward," and who, although she never succeeded in inducing him to follow the example of Darwin and Herschell, and allow her to photograph him, used to amuse and startle him when they met by her originality and enthusiasm.

Such surroundings helped to keep up that double life which Ward ever led—the one so ecclesiastical in its interests, the other so free and unconstrained that a casual acquaintance might be surprised to find that he was a member of the "rigid dogmatic Church."

It was the conspicuousness of these two different sides in his Freshwater life which explains Tennyson's tribute to him as the "most liberal" (or as he afterwards worded it, "most generous") "of all Ultramontanes," and the poet's suggested epitaph on one who had caught much of Ward's own spirit, his chaplain, Father Haythornthwaite,

> Here lies Peter Haythornthwaite,
> Human by nature, Roman by fate.

Let us describe Mr. Ward's habits more closely, neglecting to observe neither side. His daily routine was precise and methodical. Rising at half-past six, he went to chapel at seven for meditation or mass. The number of his meditation books, and the numerous pencil references in them, show how systematic a work this was with him. He breakfasted at eight in his study, reading at the same time the evening paper of the previous day. He went to chapel again at nine. Then he read and answered his letters—nearly always answering by return of post. Then came the serious work of the day—the philosophical essay on which he was engaged, or the address to the Metaphysical Society, or the Theological controversy, or the reading necessary for any of these works. The other fixed items in his programme were a walk and a solitary luncheon in his study at one o'clock, a drive at two, and then another walk. He generally came to the drawing-room for five o'clock tea, and dined with his family at half-past seven.

The interests and habits which filled in this skeleton of routine will best be given as they struck the present writer

when he came to Weston from time to time after periods of absence. The general features, both of habits and of conversations, and the things actually said, shall be faithfully recorded; although sayings belonging to various occasions, of which the details are forgotten, must be here grouped together.

Perhaps it is after a year spent by me in 1878 at the Gregorian University in Rome. I arrive in the afternoon, and the message comes that I am to go to his study at 4.30. I appear, as I think, at the appointed time, and, after cordial greetings, he points to the clock and observes that I am two whole minutes late. The talk with me is to last a quarter of an hour. He is using his dumb-bells, which have taken the place of the riding of an earlier date. He does not pause in this gymnastic exercise, but begins at once a conversation about Rome. The professors at the Collegio Romano—Caretti, Ghetti, Palmieri, Ballerini—are discussed. The length of the course and the nature of the work are elicited with great rapidity.

Then there is a general order to "flow" on the whole subject of Roman life and education. The particulars are drunk in with eagerness. "Intensely interesting," "indefinitely important," are the exclamations which follow. Then closer inquiries as to the scholastic system pursued there, —and these are very characteristic. Absolute deference to authority in matters of doctrine, absolute reliance on scholastic tradition in theology are vindicated. This, of course, he trusts I find in Rome. But is there any tendency to *substitute* current formulæ for real thought? Is an argument in philosophy, pure and simple, tested by the weighty names of its advocates, or forced upon the student in the name of orthodoxy? If so, all this is "intellectually deplorable." "More intolerable than any Eastern slavery" was a phrase he used of the attempt to invest purely philosophical opinions with the semblance of authority; and to allow formulæ learnt by rote to supersede genuine thought was to make the mental attitude utterly unreal. What, then, was the state of the Roman University in this respect? Were the *Concorsi*[1] mere intellectual tournaments, or did they help one to get to the bottom of things? Was the

[1] The *Concorso* was the periodical public disputation customary at the Roman College.

Repetitore[1] a mere juggler who could escape from any difficulty, or had he a real mastery of his subject?

The quarter of an hour is past before the subject has been pursued far; the dumb-bells are put down, and he returns to his study-table on which lie in order five books, each with a marker in it. One of them is Father Kleutgen's work, *La Philosophie Scolastique;* another, a volume of Newman's *Parochial Sermons;* a third, Planché's *Reminiscences;* a fourth, *Barchester Towers;* the fifth, Sardou's comedy *Les vieux garçons.* "My working powers are getting so uncertain," he explains, as he takes up Planché's *Reminiscences,* "that I find I have five different states of head, and I keep a book for each. Kleutgen is for my best hours in the morning, Newman comes next, then Planché, and then Trollope; and, when my head is good for nothing, I read a French play."

We meet next at a punctual half-past seven dinner. "When you left me," he begins, "I read a great deal of Planché." Some of the anecdotes are delightful. One of the "supers" in Macready's time at Covent Garden, who used to speak Shakespeare's lines without understanding a word of them, had, as Ratcliff in *Richard III.,* to give the answer—

> "My Lord; 'tis I. The early village cock
> Hath twice done salutation to the morn."

He gave, with immense emphasis, the first line only. Even an English audience laughed outright at the effect of the response to the words "who's there?"

> "My Lord, 'tis I, the early village cock."

He is in the humour for anecdotes and we have some more. An Irish friend, who has recently been staying at Weston, has recalled memories of the Young Ireland Party of 1847. "John Mitchel of the *Nation,* and a handful of friends," Ward reminds us, "were for physical force; and the 'moral force' people were very indignant with them. The 'physical force' people held a meeting in Dublin, and the hall in which they met was surrounded by 'moral force' people, who threw brickbats at the windows. In the end the physical force people were conveyed from the hall by a side door tremb-

[1] The *Repetitore* was the "coach" for the public disputations.

ling and in fear of their lives, protected by priests. It was an Irish bull in action."

He has another story to tell, this time of his Irish friend himself, who, glowing with patriotism and pride of ancestry, described to him how his ancestor, an Irish king, rather than fall into the hands of the enemy, made a funeral pile and burnt himself, his wife, and all his descendants to the fourth generation on it, so that not one was taken. "The mystery of our friend's birth," he adds, "remained unaccounted for."

Ireland leads to Cardinal Cullen, whose crusade against round dances at the Dublin balls is discussed. Some one is quoted as thinking the objection extravagant, and Ward epitomises his opinion thus, "He thinks, in short, that to object to a *gallop* a man must himself be a *canter*." The conversation grows a little desultory. A recent speech of Disraeli's comes on the *tapis*, in praise of which Ward is eloquent. Some one remarks incidentally that Bright is *hors de combat* with "water on the brain." "Bright may be dizzy," he replies, "but Dizzy is certainly bright!"

One of the party observes, changing the subject, that the services at the Weston Chapel have been much more largely attended since the introduction of English devotions. This leads to an argument. Some of the company are for keeping exclusively to the Latin liturgy. Ward, on the contrary, takes a strongly utilitarian view,—whatever appeals to the largest number and makes them devout is best. And he appeals to the increase of the congregation as a decisive argument for the English devotions. He condemns the tyranny of students of liturgy and students of art. "Let us have popular hymns in the popular tongue. Let the ornaments in the Church be such as the people like. None of your cold marble statues. Give me a nice dressed up doll—a big Roman painted doll." His interlocutor remarks incidentally and somewhat sententiously, "What rare things are good taste and real knowledge in art, or ritual, or music." Ward sees his advantage. "As you say, most true. Perhaps only one in a hundred can appreciate really good taste in such things."—"Not one in a thousand," replies the other. "Very well," Ward replies, his premisses complete, "you tell me that certain practices—liturgical, musical, artistic— are in better taste than certain other practices.

I have no doubt they are. I know nothing about such things, and you know much. You have good taste. By all means, then, if you have a priest to yourself in a desert island have such practices observed. Have difficult and high-class music. Have cold artistic statues. Have nothing but Latin services. They appeal to you, they do you good. Keep to them. But you come to our populous towns, where every possible influence is needed to make the poor better and more religious, and you tell me to keep exclusively to practices which *I* had supposed could benefit only one in a hundred, and which you—who know much better—say can benefit *less* than one in a thousand. Something is to be done which appeals to you and to the artistic few, and which leaves the vast multitude, who stand in far greater need of such help than you do, totally destitute of it. I call that intolerable selfishness."

This subject naturally leads to A. W. Pugin, whose mediævalism Ward strongly condemns on a similar ground. But he adds, "all the same, I have great sympathy with Pugin. He was very like me. He was a man of one idea, and so am I. His idea was Gothic Architecture, mine is devotion to Rome. I remember his coming into the Sacristy at Old Hall College, and seeing Dr. Cox vested in an old French cope. He said he was going to offer prayers for the conversion of England. 'What is the use, my dear sir,' said Pugin, in a tone of deep depression, 'of praying for the conversion of England in that cope'? On another occasion at St. Barnabas's, Nottingham, he was showing to an Anglican friend the rood screen he had erected. 'Within,' he said, 'is the holy of holies. The people remain outside. Never is the sanctuary entered by any save those in sacred orders.' At that moment a priest appeared within the sanctuary in company with two ladies to whom he was showing the screen. Pugin, in acute excitement, said to the sacristan, 'Turn those people out at once. How dare they enter?'—'Sir,' said the sacristan, 'it is Bishop Wiseman.' Pugin, powerless to do anything, sank down on a neighbouring bench and burst into tears."

Dinner can scarcely pass without some reference to Oxford and Newman—a subject which ever arouses deep feeling. "Was there ever anything in the world like Newman's influence on us?" he repeats for the hundredth time. And

the scene at Littlemore, during the farewell sermon on the "Parting Friends," often described before, is told with even fresh pathos.

After dinner he retires early to his study, and a message, half an hour later, summons me for further conversation. I find him in high good humour, buried in a French play, the third he has read in the course of the day. "This is a delightful play," he explains. "Truly French. The height of romance and self-devotion, as long as it can be combined with breaking a large proportion of the ten commandments. Achille and Clairette love each other. Achille is married to Jeanne, Clairette to Jacques. Jeanne and Jacques, discovering the state of affairs, not unnaturally raise objections. Jacques captures Clairette, and further meetings with Achille are impossible. Ineffectual attempts on the part of the lovers to solve the difficulties of the situation by schemes of murder and indefinite lying. After much difficulty one meeting is contrived. Achille says that life is intolerable while Clairette is the wife of Jacques; Clairette does not care to live away from Achille. Escape is found impossible. 'Then,' says Achille, 'if we cannot live together, let us die together. You can see the window of my room from your house. Take this pistol. At eleven o'clock to-night I shall wave a lamp near the window three times, and after the third time I shall say "Clairette," and you will say "Achille"; and at that moment we will shoot ourselves.'"

He points to a large cupboard full of French plays. "I read these things so fast now," he explains, "that I sometimes get through six in an evening, being fit for nothing better—that is, I read as much as I want to, and master the plot. I therefore wrote to Stewart to send me every French play that has ever been written. I am leaving them to you in my will." [1]

The rest of the conversation is on things dramatic. The autumn opera season, and the prospect of Mr. and Mrs. Bancroft moving from the Prince of Wales Theatre to the Haymarket especially interests him.

Looking in at about eleven next morning I find with him

[1] These plays were kept until within a year of his death. He then resolved to burn them.

a well-known thinker of somewhat liberal views in theology, who is staying in the neighbourhood. My father's face shows that he is deeply interested in his visitor's conversation, which soon reveals views somewhat similar to M. Renan's on the origin of Christianity. The contrast between the modern myth theory and the last century theory of fraud interests Ward particularly. His visitor's statements are becoming more and more out of accord with Ultramontane orthodoxy. Suddenly, to my father's evident disappointment, he breaks off in the midst of the development of some startling position, and says, "I ought not to say these things to *you*."—"Please go on," entreats Ward, with earnestness, "of course I am saying anathema all the time, but *please* go on."

The visitor leaves shortly, and I am told to take myself off and come back for a walk at one. We are starting on the stroke of the clock, when he pauses for a moment. He thinks that Tudno, his daughter's Pomeranian dog, who has found his way into the study, looks dull, and something must be done to amuse him. "I am so incompetent in these matters. I don't know what does amuse a dog. Send for A. B. (the dog's mistress) and she will see to it; and now let us start."

It is very wet. A year or two ago this would have made no difference to the scene of the walk; but now, he explains, his doctor objects to his getting wet through, and a wooden shed has been built some 200 yards long, and open to the air; and here we walk and take up the threads of former conversations. On the way to the shed we meet a priest who is staying in the neighbourhood, and is on his way to call. He turns back and walks with us. The state of the mission is discussed, and plans for its future. My father, then, turning to me, alludes to a letter he has shown me already about matters theatrical in London, and adds very earnestly, "There is one thing I long to see before I die."—"What is that?" asks the priest, who thinks that plans for the Freshwater mission are still the theme of discussion. "One thing, and then I shall sing my *nunc dimittis*." We wait to hear it. "If I can but see," he continues, in tones of deep earnestness, "the Bancrofts at the Haymarket Theatre I shall die happy." The priest is somewhat puzzled and alarmed, and soon takes his leave, and we continue our walk. Later in the day the

weather clears, and he summons us in a state of great excitement to come and look at the sunset, which he says is "most noble."

That evening he goes, after dinner, to Farringford, the only private house in which he ever spent the evening during the last fifteen years of his life, and comes back with stories of kindly disputes on the Inquisition and the Armada, which were adjourned till the following morning, when Tennyson and his eldest son were coming up for a walk.

No picture of Mr. Ward at this time would give him "in his habit as he lived," without reference to two phases of his thought and conversation which were at opposite poles,—the one his deep sense of the melancholy aspect of life, the other the relief he found in talking elaborate and fantastic nonsense. His sense of the amount of unhappiness in the world was constant; and although his faith and religious habits became, he said, more and more supporting as life went on, he never got rid of the habitual trial to which he was subject from the thought of the more terrible side of religion, the judgment of the reprobate, and the difficulties, sometimes apparently almost insurmountable, which beset the probation of many of our fellow-creatures. "Such is life" was a phrase which would come at any moment, after gay conversation as after grave, in a tone of resigned sadness.

"It is most true," he wrote to his eldest daughter Mary in February 1881, in reply to remonstrances on the score of pessimism, "that I fail grievously in realising the extent of God's love to us. Facts are so perplexing and disheartening to me. You speak, of course, concerning God's love not to this or that chosen person (for why should I consider myself one of those chosen persons), but to all the redeemed, *i.e.* to all mankind. Yet the vast majority of men are placed by Him in the most disadvantageous circumstances as regards their hope of achieving their true end. If you can tell me of any Catholic writer who faces and satisfactorily treats this difficulty you will confer on me the greatest possible service. It seems to me that, as a rule, they shirk it altogether. Cardinal Newman is the only one I happen to know who really confronts it, and he simply speaks of it as a most awful mystery and difficulty." In another letter he speaks of the subject as giving him a "kind of

physical pain"; and certainly the problem of the existence of evil was a constant cloud on his mind. "Life as a whole," he often said, "is a most melancholy thing. Looking at it naturally it is a constant struggle with an enemy who we know must beat us in the end. And the supernatural view is sad as well. Look at the numbers who are said by theologians to be lost. No doubt it is through their own fault, but nevertheless it is a terrible thought."

He felt, indeed, that faith brought the highest happiness attainable on this earth, and should give peace to the individual by teaching him to leave all in the hands of a just God. But a reasoned optimism was to his mind utterly unreal. So far as we are able to judge by our reason, a keen vision of facts must lead to melancholy. The cheerful view of life which many a man of the world takes, meant simply the refusal to look at life as a whole. Melancholy was not morbidness, but a consequence of being alive to facts as they really are. He held with Byron that

> The glance
> Of melancholy is a fearful gift;
> What is it but the telescope of truth
> Which strips the distance of its fantasies
> And brings life near in utter nakedness,
> Making the cold reality too real?

The strain of an overwrought mind would bring a reaction, and he used sometimes to take refuge in talking utter nonsense for an hour at a time. It was often brought forth, however, with the deepest mock seriousness. At times the "method in his madness" was so elaborate, that an onlooker, who did not know him, would have been utterly puzzled. Nonsense was talked with such intense gravity and such elaborate logical sequence, that a stranger would think that he must have missed the drift of the words. One could not tell from his face when he began to speak whether some deeply-interesting psychological observation or moral reflection was coming, or one of these inventions of elaborate "Alice-in-Wonderland" narratives. When he began we tried to shut him up, but he continued with such persistency, and the stories became so ludicrous from the gravity with which he went on, regardless of remonstrances, to treat the particular one he had in hand as about

the most interesting thing in the world, that in the end the resolution of his listeners not to encourage him by their laughter, generally broke down.

I remember one specimen which in the end fairly overcame the gravity of Father Dalgairns who was staying with us at the time, and to whom it was principally addressed. After some interesting discussions on the principles involved in the monastic system, which were illustrated by observations made at the Dominican Convent at Stoke, where Ward had been visiting his eldest daughter, he remarked, "On my way to Stoke I spent a couple of days at Trentham." Then, with a seriousness which led us to expect some illustration of the opinions he had been expressing, he continued, "the most remarkable thing about the village of Trentham is that it is *not* the birthplace of Jeremy Bentham." Every one began to protest against such nonsense; but he proceeded, "You don't believe me? I assure you it is so. I made inquiries, and there is no doubt whatever about it." Further protests, which were again useless. "I found out more than this," he continued. "I was staying in the pretty old-fashioned inn of the place with a dear old landlady, a Mrs. Bright, who must have been some eighty years old, and knew all the history of the neighbourhood. She told me that her inn had originally been a private house, and there seems not the least doubt that it was the identical house in which Jeremy Bentham wasn't born. I believe that my room was the very room, but that is only a vague tradition. About the house there seems to be no doubt." And so he would go on for half an hour.

This particular joke we were not safe from for years, and it came up when least expected in some new form. Once it disappeared for nearly a year, and we thought it was forgotten. "Where do you think I went last week?" he asked one day; and I expected to hear of a new opera of interest. "To see our old friend Mrs. Bright." I had forgotten the name. "Don't you remember? At Trentham." We tried to burke the story, but in vain. "Yes, but you don't know what a curious visit it was. By a most singular coincidence I went there on the 26th of July. Now the 26th of July is the anniversary of the very day on which Jeremy Bentham wasn't born." Further vain remonstrances. "The

world doesn't forget as easily as one is apt to think." This was said with a touch of sad seriousness. "Jeremy Bentham was a great man. You have no idea of the number of people —and the *kind* of people who didn't come in honour of the occasion. The Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of London, the Dean of Westminster, and a considerable number of minor clergy—I daresay upwards of a hundred—didn't come. It was very remarkable."

Father Haythornthwaite, Mr. Ward's chaplain and constant companion during his last years, gives me some interesting notes of remembered habits and conversations, some of which I subjoin.

"Mr. Ward's feeling for the Church of England" he writes "in its practical and devotional working, apart from its doctrinal teaching, is a matter in which he would have run counter to the narrow and ignorant prejudices inherited by one born and bred a Catholic. 'I never got anything but good,' he has said to me over and over again, 'from the Church of England.' He had himself been one of her ministers, he had known them by hundreds, and strongly as he felt all the defects of the Anglican system, violently as he would show up the contradictions, the absurd illogicalness of her position and teaching, he had nothing but respect for her teaching representatives. Once his wife was arranging a dinner-party and was pondering where to place the Rector of a neighbouring parish. 'My dear,' chimed in her husband, 'put him somewhat near me. I dearly love a parson.'"

Speaking of the melancholy which was habitual to Ward, Father Haythornthwaite remarks how it would show itself when to strangers he appeared full of brightness and happiness. After a dinner-party, at which he had been the life of the company, he would be found in his study in a state of brooding melancholy or even in tears.

"As he walked alone," he continues, "he often hummed snatches of song. 'The old squire must be a 'appy gen'lman, sir,' said a poor tenant to me, 'he do allas seem to be a singing to hisself so.' What a startlingly-different tale was told one when one got at that restless mind, perpetually racked by gravest questions as his body was ever discomforted by ill health. Pessimistic views of life, and the remembrance of death, coloured all his thought. 'I don't think the thought of death is absent from my mind for five minutes in the day,' he said to me. Truly

the saving uses of Christianity were never so apparent as they were in his case. The sense of God's presence, in which he lived, and the graveness of his under life, made all life a serious and a deeply-interesting business. His property was a trust lent him by God, of which he was only a steward. His talents the same, to be worked, as a miser would work a mine, but in God's service. That there was so much evil in the world only aroused his energies in an endeavour to lessen it. No man disliked fighting so much as he did, yet his life was fated to be a prolonged battle in his vigilant self-discipline and in his writings against what he considered to be doctrinal errors.

"His piety was warm, tender, and full of unction; sometimes he would himself read the household night prayers at ten P.M., and the earnestness of his tones and the beauty of his reading voice could not but deeply impress all joined in prayer with him. Perhaps the sublimest image in my own memory is that of his face at the moment of Holy Communion. His gray head was thrown back, his eyes closed, and in all the lines of a glowing face were written absolute faith, and utter trust in Him he was receiving into his heart.

"Allied to love of God was love for his fellow-men. His ear was always open to the cry of human distress. So ready was he to assist the needy, and full of simple trust in stories told him that conscientious persons had need to be doubly careful of cases put before him. A poor woman from the East End of London wrote to him for a sewing machine. He answered her application, and sent her the asked-for sum of money; and it was amusing how, during the next few weeks, constant posts brought him similar requests. Happening to mention to me this strange and sudden need for sewing machines at the East End, I was just in time to stop the flow of an indiscriminate charity. Afterwards he got me to examine into all cases of charity put before him before relieving them. But though an ounce of prudence was thrown into his almsgiving, it did not diminish it. On one occasion I asked him to give me a pound or so to help a poor man whose bread bill was hanging like a millstone round his neck. 'Two pounds? How much does the man owe altogether?'—'£10,' I replied, whereupon he went to his cheque book and wrote a cheque for the full amount, saying, 'For heaven's sake, let us put the poor man out of his misery at once.' When I afterwards told him of the man's enthusiastic gratitude, his eyes filled with tears."

Both Father Haythornthwaite and others who were thrown constantly in Mr. Ward's society bear witness to the power which his unswerving ethical standard, applied with relentless logic, had in creating a moral atmosphere in his house. It was not

until he was gone from earth that they fully realised the support he had been to them in this respect. The position which a parent holds with young children—their sense that right is what he approves, wrong what he disapproves—Mr. Ward held for many who had reached middle age, and held intellectually their own independent views. The chilling breath of "public opinion" did not touch them so long as they were secure of his approval. And it was hard to adopt even the most universally received and plausible maxims under which worldliness disguises itself in the presence of one whose penetrating insight detected at once the underlying weakness, and so heartily despised it. "Purity of intention" he wrote down as his favourite virtue; and both for himself and for others he would in a moment strip bare the real motive of action, able to endure an acknowledged fault, but unable to be patient in the presence of want of candour and habitual self-deception.

Mr. Ward's interest in his property did not increase after he had gone to live in the Island; but his attention to all business connected with it was methodical and punctual. There is a good deal of character in the business interviews of which his agent, Mr. Coverdale, has sent me the following notes.

My acquaintance with your father originated more or less accidentally. Being somewhat anxious upon a matter of business touching his estate, he consulted the late Mr. Barclay of the London Joint Stock Bank, in whose judgment he placed great reliance. Mr. Blount had only that morning mentioned my name to Barclay in connection with another property. The result was a letter asking me to call upon your father at Hampstead. The interview was somewhat characteristic. After the usual civilities and an invitation that I would remain for luncheon, he suddenly broke out: "But to the point, I understand that you have much to do and must not take up your time. Unfortunately I am not a man of business, indeed I hate it, and as for my estate I don't care in the least for it, except in so far as it enables me to carry on my work." The object of my visit was then discussed curtly, but with a precision and clearness which at once made me regard him as a man of business, notwithstanding his denial of the fact.

When the matter on which your father was consulting me was drawing to a close, he one day said to me, in his usually terse way, "I want to know if you will undertake the management of my property. I know very little about it; Mrs. Ward can tell you more than I can." My position as agent was then settled.

When I went to Weston Manor on business, my visits to his study were, as a rule, of short duration; punctual to a degree, precise and very methodical. He was always prepared with the various items he wished to discuss, duly jotted down in a book kept for the purpose. He quickly caught up a point, discussed it if necessary, or decided it promptly. Mere details he dismissed at once.

My position as his agent gave me ample scope for noticing Mr. Ward's truly charitable disposition. "Just let me see how I stand," he would say in answer to an appeal. A dive into a drawer brought up his bank book, which as a rule formed his law of charity. I don't mean to say that he gave indiscriminately or without judgment, but he never, to my knowledge, refused when he had the means, and the object seemed a worthy one.

Mr. Coverdale adds an anecdote illustrative of Mr. Ward's thoughtfulness for the comfort of others:—

My first visit to Weston Manor was made with the brougham and pair of horses which had been kept for estate purposes, and which I at once suggested should be sold. "But," said he, "it is a very long drive from Cowes, and the weather in this island is often very rough."—"I prefer, notwithstanding, to substitute a dogcart," said I. "Oh, but think of your health," was the reply. On one occasion he said, "I think you want a little rest; draw £50 or £60 from the estate account and go abroad." If I did not accept the generous offer it was not from a moment's hesitation as to its meaning. I mention these two of very many instances of his never-failing kindness.

A few words must be said as to Ward's friendship with Tennyson. Their first introduction to each other by Dean Bradley about the year 1868, was not a success. "They did not," Dean Bradley tells me, "thoroughly understand one another"; and as Mr. Ward was not living in the Isle of Wight at that time there was no opportunity for closer intercourse. But after the foundation of the Metaphysical Society in 1869 and the completion of the building of Weston Manor in 1871, an intimate acquaintance began which led ultimately to a warm friendship. In a letter to Mr. Jennings, written and published in 1884, a niece of Lord Tennyson's thus refers to the intercourse between the two men in the past:—

Green grows the grass over the grave of a valued Freshwater friend of Lord Tennyson's whose mortal remains lie in his own churchyard close to Weston Manor, the house built by him, and in which the last years of his life were passed. I speak of

Mr. Ward, famous as one of the leaders of the Oxford Movement and well known in later times, not only as a shining light in the Roman Catholic Church, of which he became a member, but to the world of letters in general as among the deepest thinkers of the day. Not alone at the Metaphysical Club to which they both belonged, but in the familiar intercourse they interchanged in their respective homes at Freshwater, did the authors of *In Memoriam* and of the *Ideal of a Christian Church* commune together of the mysteries of faith and philosophy, each keeping firmly to his own standpoint, whilst giving earnest heed with that freedom from prejudice a truly liberal mind alone can give to the arguments of the other. They had not a few things in common in their mental calibre, and a close resemblance in that childlike simplicity which is ever an attribute of the truly great. But there was one point on which they differed, *toto coelo.* Whilst the Laureate cherished trees and flowers as if they were really endowed with the acute sensations attributed by Dante to his living wood, and loved to listen in the early morning to the song of the birds in the trees overshadowing Farringford, Mr. Ward preferred the open expanse of Weston Manor to his well-wooded seat near Cowes, and was reported to have offered a reward of a guinea for every nightingale's head brought to him there, being well-nigh distracted by the loudness of their song.

In truth the difference here referred to was typical of a deep mental difference, which to the end prevented them from completely understanding each other intellectually, though they came to value each other more and more, and to find out how much they had in common in their moral enthusiasms, in their unworldliness, in their simple devotion to truth. Tennyson's love of trees and his love of all nature were a part of the intensely sensitive perceptions and concrete mind of the poet, in marked contrast to Ward's imperfect observation of the concrete, and love of the abstract and mathematical. Tennyson would note every flower in his garden, each variety in the song of each bird, every peculiarity in their habits with most exact and loving observation. His imagination was always of the kind described by Mr. Ruskin in *Modern Painters* as most perfect. Ruskin gives three ranks, "the man who perceives rightly because he does not feel, and to whom the primrose is very accurately the primrose because he does not love it. Then, secondly, the man who perceives wrongly because he feels, and to whom the primrose is anything else than a primrose: a star or a sun or a fairy's shield or a forsaken

maiden. And then, lastly, there is the man who perceives rightly in spite of his feelings, and to whom the primrose is for ever nothing else than itself—a little flower apprehended in the very plain and leafy fact of it, whatever and how many soever the associations and passions may be that crowd around it."

Mr. Ward had in regard to nature enthusiasm and imagination; but it was of the second class. He perceived wrongly because he felt strongly. And, consequently, minute beauty did not appeal to him, because he could not perceive it at all; though the greatness of mountain scenery and the pathos of a summer's sunset would overcome him. He could not, as we have seen, distinguish one tree or flower from another. A bird was an object of vaguest knowledge to him. It was primarily a thing which made a noise and kept him awake. Neither was sufficiently apprehended to be appreciated, and painful feelings were associated with both. Trees shut out the fresh air, shut out the grand views which he loved, however little he marked their details. Birds kept off sleep. Tennyson, on the other hand, perceived accurately while he loved—nay, the more accurately because he loved nature and it suggested so much to him. It was his love of the starling which made him note both the fact and the fancy contained in the line—

> The starling claps his tiny castanets.

I recollect his pointing out to me the change in the call of the cuckoo in June, and repeating the old lines he learnt as a boy—

> In April he opens his bill,
> In May he sings all day,
> In June he changes his tune,
> In July away he does fly,
> In August go he must.

Nothing escaped him in nature, animate or inanimate. Every plant that he saw, every species of heath, heather, and bracken on the downs near Aldworth, the song of every bird, the habits of every living creature were noted by him. The last time I ever saw him, when I was staying at Aldworth a month before his death, he had just made a discovery—slight enough

in itself, but suggestive of his customary watchfulness—that the rabbits which frequented the garden looked at the chalk line on the lawn-tennis court as marking out a space forbidden to them. He pointed out signs of their having been running all round the court, right up to the boundary line, but nowhere within it. This type of mind—inductive in its reasoning, filled with minute observation of facts—accorded little with the deductive, mathematical, essentially abstract character of Mr. Ward's intellect. And even in metaphysics, where each was at home, they approached the same problems from somewhat different standpoints. With Ward the coherence of first principles and of reasoned deductions was so much: while with Tennyson metaphysical thought was not argumentative, but rather the penetrating with the rapid glance of intuitive and imaginative genius behind the phenomena. For Ward a coherent logical system was the great desideratum; to Tennyson a great assumption satisfying to the reflective imagination was so much, and he tended, like Cardinal Newman, to pass from close and detailed observation of phenomena to a theoretic idealism; while Ward, who saw so much less of concrete matter, was a thoroughgoing realist.

Such in general was the contrast:—on the one hand we have the poet who loved his birds and his trees, whose eye nothing in external nature escaped, whose imagination threw a limelight on facts by which they were only more accurately seen, whose conversation corresponded with the complexity of the concrete world, intermittent, full of observation abounding in facts, from which, however, any far-reaching conclusions were drawn with the care and caution of a true inductive reasoner, theoretical only in the region of purest metaphysics, mistrustful of logical completeness in a survey of the immense and manifold world, seeing by momentary lightning-flashes what he could not entirely recover or express when the lightning had past; and on the other hand we have the enthusiastic, comprehensive, abstract thinker, who worked everything into a theory, who applied quick as thought abstract principles to all conceivable subjects,—as mathematics may deal with problems of space and measurement applying to the whole universe, however diverse its material contents may be,—brilliant and complete in expression, delighting to range without let or hindrance in his

conclusions from a tendency to its full realisation, from simple axioms to the most complicated yet most certain geometrical theorems, rapid in movement, impatient of facts which seemed to him to divert attention from principles, loving the startling, free, and rapid mental exercise which could settle at once a spacial problem which would apply to the planet of Jupiter or to the region of fixed stars—and physically loving the fresh air, the large expanse of horizon, the wide vistas of the surrounding country, delighting in the large scenic effects which filled him with great thoughts and feelings, treating smaller things either as non-existent or as somewhat irrelevant obstacles.

Along with the intellectual contrasts between the two men there were, however, a similarity and sympathy in plainness of speech, in simple candour, in enthusiasm for the moral aims of life, in unworldliness, in love of truth, in appreciation of intellectual brilliancy of all kinds, a sympathy which was expressed in great part in the beautiful lines written by Tennyson after Ward's death. They were, latterly, close friends and on almost playful terms. Tennyson loved Ward's plainness of speech, even if his sentiments were intolerable. He told me that in the days when the question of persecution was debated at the Metaphysical Society he said to Ward: "'You know you would try to get me put in prison if the Pope told you to.' Ward could not say no." Lord Tennyson added, "he only replied 'the Pope would never tell me to do anything so foolish.'"

On one occasion a friend of Tennyson's was speaking of the untruthful tendency of Catholic casuistry. "Well, the most truthful man I ever knew," Tennyson replied, "was a strict Ultramontane. He was grotesquely truthful," he added. He paid a tribute likewise to Ward's combination of intense seriousness with simplicity and love of fun. "He was the most childlike and the least childish man I have known," he said. It has been said of Tennyson that he always "said the thing that was in his mind," and his Freshwater neighbour here closely resembled him. They told each other plain truths or adverse opinions with great frankness. "Your writing, Ward," Tennyson said, after vainly endeavouring to decipher a letter, "is like walking sticks gone mad." Tennyson sent Ward his *De Profundis* when it appeared; but Ward, who had beforehand

said that it was sure to be a poetic flight far above his comprehension, declared, when he had read it, that he could not understand a word of it. "You really should put notes to such poems," he said. But the "Children's Hospital" in the same volume, with its simple pathos, struck a true chord of sympathy. Ward wanted no notes to it, and cried as he read it.

His fixed opinion that he could not understand poetry kept him from ever attempting to read Tennyson's poetry as a whole, and he said it was of no use for him to look at *In Memoriam.* I caught him out unawares here. A few months before his death he was inveighing against the cant of consoling a man by reminding him that other people suffer as much as he does, and I repeated the lines—

> That loss is common would not make
> My own less bitter, rather more:
> Too common! Never morning wore
> To evening, but some heart did break.

"How beautiful," he said, "where do they come from?"—"From *In Memoriam,*" I replied. "Dear me," he answered, "I thought I could not understand *In Memoriam,*" and he asked me to write down the lines that he might keep them in his pocket. Another story has been related to me by one who was present, indicating that more of Tennyson's thought and genius appealed to Ward than he was prepared to admit. Tennyson asked him to come down to Farringford and hear him read *Becket* before it was printed, and compare ideas on the poet's treatment of the Catholic Saint and Archbishop. Ward went, —convinced, as it afterwards appeared, that the whole play would be simply "out of his line," but prepared to hear it patiently through. Gradually, however, in the course of the reading his features lighted up, and marks of evident interest and admiration appeared. At the end of the play he broke out into enthusiastic praise. "Dear me! I didn't expect to enjoy it at all. It is splendid. How wonderfully you have brought out the phases of his character as Chancellor and Archbishop. *Where did you learn it all?*"

For Mrs. Tennyson, whose conversation he used to say reminded him of Newman's in Oxford days, he had a deep

admiration; and he had a cordial affection for her eldest son. Their feeling for him was expressed in the letter written to me by Hallam Tennyson after his death. "His wonderful simplicity of faith and nature," he wrote, "together with his subtle and far-reaching grasp of intellect make up a man never to be forgotten. My father and mother and myself will miss him more than I can say. I loved him somehow like an intimate college friend."

How fully Tennyson did take in the character of a man intellectually so different from himself, is seen in the lines he wrote after Ward's death. I will write them down both in their original and in their final form. They ran at first thus:—

> Gone, lost to earth, whom lost I hope to find,
> Most liberal of all Ultramontanes, Ward.
> I knew thee most unworldly of mankind,
> Most subtle in tierce and quart of mind with mind,
> And hail the cross above thy hallowed sward,
> Mute symbol of thy service to the Lord.

They were finally recast as follows—

> Farewell, whose living like I shall not find,
> —Whose faith and work were bells of full accord,—
> My friend, the most unworldly of mankind,
> Most generous of all Ultramontanes, Ward.
> How subtle at tierce and quart of mind with mind,
> How loyal in the following of thy Lord!

The portion of the year not spent by Mr. Ward in the Isle of Wight was passed in houses taken from time to time on or near Hampstead Heath. The only exception to this rule was a tour in Wales in 1874, on part of which I accompanied him, and in which his intense enjoyment of the scenery near Llandudno, and still more at Bangor and Llanberis, was a thing not to be forgotten. Its beauty stimulated his ideas, he used to say, in the controversy with J. S. Mill and Bain; and he showed me the places on the Great Orme's Head, at which particular arguments in favour of Freewill or Necessary Truth had suggested themselves to him, in the course of his daily walks.

With the curious hopefulness which accompanied his pessimism, he used to predict of each new house at Hampstead

that it would be the inauguration of a "new epoch" in his existence, and to describe all its advantages,—how he could be near London and yet not in it; could see his friends without the interruptions of work incident to a party staying at Weston; could have talks with men like R. H. Hutton, who were inaccessible in the Isle of Wight; could enjoy, in spite of proximity to London, the fresh air and scenery of the Heath; and, above all, could go every night to the play or opera. Until the last few years, when doctors were imperative on the necessity of care, he liked nothing better than to go on a bright and frosty evening to the play, and, on returning, to sit out on the heath until past midnight, looking at the lights of London and talking over the play itself. Both the heath and the play were great assuagers of all evils, physical and mental, but the play came first. When I wrote to him in 1879 congratulating him on the improvement in his health wrought by the Hampstead air, he replied, "You philosophise wrongly about my health. The Haymarket is the region whence salvation cometh. Hampstead is only the *sine quâ non*. Long live Captain Armit;[1] of whom, however, you have probably never heard."

The midnight visits to the heath were discontinued about 1875, and he began to cut short the evenings at the theatre, leaving soon after ten; but he did not cease to go frequently to play or opera until his last illness in 1882.

The last time I went to the opera with him was at the Lyceum Theatre in the autumn of 1881. An autumn season had been undertaken by Mr. J. Hayes, and Mr. Ward attended the performances very regularly. The opera on this particular evening was Rossini's *Il Barbiere di Siviglia*. He enjoyed it immensely, and repeated the remark which he had frequently made during the *opera buffa* series ten years earlier at the same theatre, that the lighter Italian operas—such, for example, as the *Barbiere*, or Donizetti's *L'Elisire d'amore* or *Don Pasquale*—were far more effective in a theatre of moderate size than at Covent Garden. "They are lost at Covent Garden," he said, "and there is a drawing-room-like effect here, which is in keeping with the piece."

[1] One of the *dramatis personæ* of some play.

He was delighted with the Figaro of Signor Padilla, and said he hardly remembered a better Figaro since Ronconi. When the scene came in which Bartolo and Basilio go out together, and Signor Zoboli and the Basilio of the evening, whose name I forget, went through the usual "gag" —each making polite speeches and begging of the other to go through the door first, and finally each simultaneously accepting the other's invitation, so that they are squeezed together in the doorway, he went, as usual, into a roar of laughter. A few moments afterwards he said, very seriously, "Do you know, I have seen that joke time after time for nearly sixty years, and probably seven-eighths of the people who played it are dead." And a little later he resumed, "It is to me at my age a most solemn thought. I remember as far back as De Begni's performance of Figaro in 1825, and, ever since then, year after year, I have seen all the same 'points' made in the acting and singing—Rosina's *bigliétto*, Figaro's constant gossip, all the Count's rather fruitless scheming, and then the whole thing ending joyfully with "*Almaviva son io, non son Lindoro*" followed by the charming finale; and now here are all the same jokes, the same scene, the same story, and generation after generation of singers who have gone through it all, who have succeeded each other in presenting these living pictures, has passed away—gone over to the majority, and before many years are gone I shall have to follow them." He reverted two or three times in the course of the evening to the same thought.

The daily walks on Hampstead Heath were generally taken in company with some friend who came out from London, or with Baron or Baroness von Hügel, who were near neighbours. Sometimes he went out alone, and the solitary walks were the occasion of many an act of kindness to the poor. On one occasion he came home, and, on taking off his cloak, he was discovered to be coatless. He had given away his coat to a poor man whom he had met half clothed in the bitter weather. On another occasion he was heard saying as he came in, "Who will undertake to dispose of these toys for me?" and he was found with a number of dolls, pin-cushions, penny whistles, ninepins, and Noah's arks. It transpired that he had met a poor person selling toys, and that, acting on advice

received from Father Keogh not to give away indiscriminately but to buy, he had invested in a large number of these articles.

Cardinal Vaughan once spoke of Mr. Ward in public as "the champion of unpopular truth," and there is no doubt that this was his own view of himself. His controversial career and his constitutional depression gave him an habitual feeling that his life was a constant struggle against opposition and difficulty, and the marks of affection and respect which multiplied during these last years kept him in a constant state of surprise. "How extraordinarily kind," "really how touching," were the exclamations which followed a kind letter or a kind message. "Dear me," he once said, "I really think I am becoming quite popular. How very odd." He probably got more pleasure from his friendships during these years than at any earlier time. Some were old friendships, long in abeyance and now renewed, as with Mr. and Mrs. de Lisle, or with Canon Macmullen. Friendships belonging to a more recent date were those with Mr. and Mrs. Tennyson, already spoken of, Baron and Baroness Friedrich von Hügel, Mr. R. H. Hutton, and Miss Simeon, afterwards Mrs. Richard Ward. A letter to Miss Simeon, who had been in frequent intercourse with him at Freshwater, and sought his advice on matters of religious opinion and practice, is worth giving. Miss Simeon shared her father's liberal sympathies, and the letter is valuable as expressly stating what those who knew Ward always felt —that his vehement attacks on *liberalism* were aimed in reality *simply* at the non-supernatural view of life which he often found united with liberal-Catholic opinions, and which he considered to be in strict logic connected therewith:—

WESTON MANOR, *5th December* 1872.

MY DEAR MISS SIMEON—I take it as a great compliment and favour that you write so openly and at such length. I suppose now we have got as far as argument will go and may "shut up" (as the slang is), I will only, therefore, say a few final words chiefly of explanation. I am delighted that you agree on the whole so much with Father Newman's sermons, and also (I infer so from your note) with the extracts from his other works contained in my article. I think people's true mind is indefinitely better expressed by what they like than by the *formulæ* they use.

I think you understand that I for one have no kind of dislike to ecclesiastical liberalism (as I call it), except so far as it indicates

"religious liberalism." I think the former consistent in itself with even saintliness; but I cannot but think most differently of the latter. . . . The only question you raise on which you have as yet had no argument from me is on the relation between intellectual cultivation and personal perfection. I had a controversy on the subject with Father Roberts some eight years ago in which I consider (though he does not) that he ended by admitting every essential doctrine which I maintained. I don't want to bore you with further controversy, but if ever you care to look into the question I will gladly send you the pamphlets. Perhaps you will allow me to say expressly what I have already implied, that I don't think your *formulæ* at all do justice to your real feelings and views, though of course I am very far from entirely sympathising even with the latter.

I must again thank you for your extraordinary good nature. I earnestly hope, some time or other, you will go into a retreat. I will trouble you now no more. So with these three unconnected sentences I conclude.—I remain, my dear Miss Simeon, with every best wish, very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

A few letters written during these years to other friends give an indication of the subjects which occupied Ward's mind. The question as to how far inspiration protects the Scriptures from error, in matters other than faith and morals, was then less burning than it is now. But the following letter, belonging probably to the year 1874, in reference to a pamphlet by his old opponent, Father Ryder, shows that he recognised its growing importance, and was not disposed to be stringently conservative in the matter. It is interesting, moreover, as indicating his view, very practical at the present hour, that the modifications in current theological teaching which the advance of science must make necessary, are best effected by discussion in privately circulated pamphlets. The danger of scandal to the weak, and the unseemly wrangle which popular controversy on subjects essentially unfit for popular treatment is apt to bring, are thus avoided. Father Ryder's pamphlet dealt, among other things, with the antiquity of the human race, and the difficulties raised by geological discoveries against the Biblical account of this matter.

ALBION VILLA,
HAMPSTEAD HEATH, LONDON, N.W.,
29th June.

MY DEAR FATHER RYDER—I have read your paper with intense interest [did you happen to read an article in the *Dublin Review* of

July 1871, by Bishop Hedley? If not, do look through it, "Evolution and Faith"].

In the midst of my profound ignorance on physical subjects, two things are clear to me—

(1) That the work you are labouring at imperatively requires to be done; and has been, in fact, from cowardliness much too long deferred.

And (2) that I can fancy no way of doing it so unobjectionable as privately printing papers for distribution among the clergy, as you have done.

There is very little in the way of opinion on which I should dare to venture, for even theologically (putting aside my *physical* ignorance) I have never studied the doctrines about Inspiration. I confess I am startled about pre-Adamite men, and specially feel a distaste for your postponing their extinction to the Deluge, so that there should have been numbers of men mixing with Adam's descendants who were not born in original sin, nor (I suppose) raised to the supernatural order, nor redeemed by Jesus Christ.

Supposing science necessitates the supposition of pre-Adamite rational animals,—why should these animals have been *men?* I daresay there is some theological objection to any other hypothesis which does not occur to me.

As to the "Unanimis Consensus Patrum"—I should have thought the problem you raise entirely external to the "res fidei et morum," on which that "consensus" has authority. And as you say the case of Copernicanism seems conclusive on this.

What specially impresses me in your paper—apart from its great ability and learning—is its apparent *truthfulness.*

A writer like A. B. always gives me the impression (ignorant as I am of physics) of being an artful dodger. Of all evils to our cause the prevalence of this spirit would be the greatest. Far better that we be silent than that we speak otherwise than with honest sincerity, as you have done. So it results that I think you have begun (1) a necessary work, (2) in the best external shape, and (3) in the best spirit. This will do pretty well.

I should like to know to whom I may show your paper. Dalgairns? Hutton?

The idea about inspiration being in some sense vision (p. 26), came (I fancy) from Hugh Miller. I don't quite like your application of it in its entirety.

I shall be off the stage before these questions become prominent. In fact their probable prominence will just about synchronise with your full maturity. Perhaps you are the theologian destined to deal with them.

So ends a most scrappy and fragmentary, but very cordially interested letter.—Very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

The subject is continued in a letter of 1st July.

ALBION VILLA,
HAMPSTEAD HEATH, LONDON, N.W.,
1st July.

. . . I am very anxious to know what *Father Coleridge* thinks of it, and shall be most grateful if you are able and willing to tell me. Oddly enough . . . when he wrote in the *Dublin Review*, he was decidedly more rigid than myself about Scripture. One or two expressions of the kind occurred in the MS. of his articles, which I induced him to omit.

As a general rule I find the Jesuits very rigid as to any change in the traditional ways of teaching with reference to modern difficulties, though I fancy the other orders are even more so.

Going back to your *wakeful nights*—did you ever try *chloral* for sleep? Many doctors now recommend it, though many denounce it. There is no doubt, at all events, that it is far less injurious than the old hypnotics. I take it now and then without being aware of any injury from it. Huxley is a zealot for it.—Very sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

In 1878 decreasing strength and increasing infirmity warned Mr. Ward that if he wished to complete his defence of Theism against the school of Mill and Bain he must resign the editorship of the *Dublin Review*. The last number under his auspices appeared in the October of that year, and was prefaced by the following letter from Cardinal Manning, written on occasion of his retirement from the editorship:—

MY DEAR DR. WARD—You will hardly need any words of regret from me on your resignation of the editorship of the *Dublin Review*. I have so often and so recently expressed to you in private how great I believe to be the services you have rendered to the Faith and to the Church, that personally you can need no further assurance. But I feel it due to you to bear a public testimony to the work that you have done in the last sixteen years.

When my predecessor, the late Cardinal, transferred to me his rights in the *Dublin Review*, he attached to his gift the condition that I should ensure its perpetuity. I at once sought your help. You were among the first to whom I turned to find an editor and contributor. After a short interval, you consented to undertake the whole burden and responsibility of editor; and from that time, through sixteen years, I can attest how unremitting has been your labour in defending and in spreading not only the Faith, but the principles and opinions which surround the Faith. And of these I must especially note your articles in defence of Catholic education

and of Catholic philosophy, in refutation of modern philosophical and metaphysical theories. In the course of this period three special subjects of great moment have been forced both by events and by anti-Catholic public opinion upon our constant attention,—I mean the Temporal Power of the Holy See, the relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers, and the Infallibility of the Head of the Church. In all these your vigilant and powerful writings have signally contributed to produce the unity of mind which exists among us, and a more considerate and respectful tone even in our antagonists. I cannot attempt to enumerate the many subjects on which you have rendered valuable aid; nor to estimate what has been the effect of the *Dublin Review* in raising our literary standard. The principle and spirit which has governed the *Dublin Review* in all these years, has been to represent fully and faithfully the guidance of the Sovereign Pontiff in his authoritative acts, by teaching neither less nor more, and, so far as possible, by reproducing his own words. Few are aware as I am at how much cost and sacrifice you have persevered in this laborious work, so long as health permitted you; and now, in retiring from the office of editor, I hope you may have many years of health and strength to labour still for us and for the Faith. In this desire I am confident not only many friends, but many who know you only by your writings, and many who have even been opposed to you, will heartily join. May God grant to you and to your home every good gift.—Believe me, always, my dear Dr. Ward, yours affectionately in Jesus Christ,

HENRY EDWARD,
Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
2nd Oct. 1878.

Mr. Ward's reply ran as follows:—

MY DEAR LORD CARDINAL—In your Eminence's most kind letter, you recall to my mind the circumstances under which I became editor of the *Dublin Review.* You will not have forgotten how actively I laboured, in co-operation with you, to bring about an arrangement, under which I should have occupied a less prominent position. But this project broke through. And no other course then seemed feasible, except that I should undertake the office of editor and do the best I could with it; relying on your generous promise of support and co-operation, in which you have never failed me.

I felt keenly my own manifold incompetence for the honourable but at the same time most responsible task with which I had been entrusted. In fact there were only two promises which I could venture to make. I promised (1) that I would devote my very best energies ungrudgingly and unremittingly to the work: making

it the one substantial business of my life, so long as I retained my office. And I promised (2) that—as regards those momentous questions which are a Catholic editor's chief anxiety—the one norm and rule of our doctrine should be the teaching and intimations of the Holy See, so far as I could apprehend these by careful study. I am particularly gratified by your pronouncing, that we have maintained as essential "neither less nor more" than the Holy See teaches. From the first it has been my strong conviction, that it is hardly a less evil to treat open questions as though they were closed, than to treat questions on which the Supreme Pontiff has expressed or intimated a judgment, as though they were matters for free discussion. Whether the *Review* under my guidance would do any greatly effective work towards the development and invigoration of Catholic thought—I was extremely doubtful. But I thought I could engage, that whatever work of the kind it *should* do, would at least be in the right direction.

In this respect, too, I possessed an inestimable security, through your appointment of three priests who were to act as ecclesiastical censors. One of these—Rev. Father Eyre, S.J.—has retained this post during the whole period of my editorship. I have to thank him with especial earnestness for the indefatigable zeal and care with which he has discharged the wearisome duties of his office; and for his valuable advice on several anxious occasions. The other two places in the censorship have been occupied successively by various accomplished theologians whom you have named. I have to thank them all for the important assistance they have rendered me, by correcting what was doctrinally erroneous, by warning me whenever they accounted my course contrary to ecclesiastical prudence, and by drawing my attention to passages, which were expressed with exaggeration or were otherwise liable to misapprehension.

One reason, which alone would have made me profoundly distrustful of my power to edit a Review, is my incompetence on all matters of literature and secular politics. It has been the chief felicity of my editorial lot, that I have obtained the co-operation of one so eminently qualified to supply these deficiencies as Mr. Cashel Hoey. It was once said to me most truly, that he has rather been joint-editor than sub-editor. One half of the *Review* has been in some sense under his supreme control; and it is a matter of extreme gratification to look back at the entire harmony which has prevailed from the first between him and myself. In the various anxieties which inevitably beset me from time to time, he has invariably shown himself, not only to be a calm and sagacious adviser, but even more, to be the most cordial and sympathetic of friends.

I must also express sincere gratitude to my contributors. Some

of them indeed have given me assistance of inappreciable value; and that with a considerateness for my difficulties and perplexities, of which I have been keenly sensible.

It would have surprised me more than a little, if, at the commencement of my editorship, I could have known that its termination would be crowned by such a letter of approval as you have given me: a letter emanating from him who has a right (if any one) to speak with authority. After making every allowance for your kind partiality—I cannot but feel that I may still take your words as a most consoling testimony. I trust I may take them as a proof to myself, that my humble labours have not failed of doing real service to the only public cause worth labouring for,—the promotion of God's interests in the world.

No other arrangement could personally have been so acceptable to me as that which your Eminence has made, in regard to those in whose hands the *Dublin Review* will henceforth be placed. And the language of extraordinary kindness, with which you have now honoured me, is but the last of many instances in which your approval has been a most powerful support against those feelings of discouragement and despondency with which I always tend to regard my own exertions. It is the simple truth (as you well know) that I should more than once have entirely broken down and resigned my editorship in despair, had it not been for your Eminence's encouraging assurances.—Begging your Eminence's blessing, I remain, my dear Lord Cardinal, ever your affectionate servant, W. G. WARD.

In the following year Leo XIII. appointed Mr. Ward, in recognition of his services, a *commendatore* of the Order of St. Gregory the Great. The remaining four years of his life were occupied, so far as health made work possible, almost exclusively with philosophical writing. The only exception was the work of editing and republishing a selection from his devotional and doctrinal essays from the *Dublin Review*.

A correspondence which interested Ward more deeply than any other in the later part of his life belonged to these very last years. His correspondent was M. Ollé-Laprune, the author of the philosophical work *De La Certitude Morale*. M. Ollé-Laprune was professor of philosophy at the Ecole Normale, in Paris, and published in 1880 the work already referred to, a copy of which he sent to Mr. Ward. A contributor to the *Correspondant*, and in daily contact with the free-thinkers of the Ecole Normale, his views were far more akin to those of Lacordaire or Montalembert than to those of Veuillot. The intellectual

sympathy which disclosed itself between the two writers was a fresh evidence of the liberal attitude which was natural to Mr. Ward in matters relating to philosophy. He did not indeed forget the importance of guarding the claims of authority to protect the philosophical principles which enter into dogmatic theology,—a matter with which M. Ollé-Laprune was less concerned; but their correspondence shows, before all things, Ward's sympathy with a broader view than that of many of the Neo-Scholastics.

For those interested in this aspect of Ward's career, the letters on both sides will have an interest. M. Laprune's are very long, and are given in an Appendix. I subjoin four of Mr. Ward's own letters:—

WESTON MANOR, FRESHWATER, I. W.,
16*th August* 1880.

DEAR SIR—I have to thank you very much indeed for your volume on *Moral Certitude.* I have now read as far as page 148; and my impression is that the doctrines which it so clearly sets forth are *the very* doctrines which, more than any others, will enable us Theists honestly to confront and solidly to refute contemporary infidelity. . . . I send you an article which I published in January last, and which I hope may interest you. I am now engaged in defending freewill against more than one opponent. I am very grateful for the kind expressions concerning me, which you sent me in company with your volume.—I remain, dear sir, with great respect, faithfully yours, W. G. WARD.

On reading my letter again I think I have been very far from expressing, with sufficient clearness, the *very great* sympathy and admiration with which I have read your volume as far as I have gone.

WESTON MANOR, FRESHWATER, I.W.,
26*th December* 1880.

DEAR SIR—When last I wrote to you I had read carefully about half your volume on *Moral Certitude.* Very soon afterwards I had an attack of head-weakness (to which I am most subject), which prevented me from pursuing my study until about three weeks ago. I have now finished the whole volume, and must not fail to thank you heartily for the extreme interest and pleasure it has given me. As to the last chapter especially, it seems to me almost the most important thing I have ever read as regards the special exigencies of contemporary Theistic controversy. I am now busy reading your work on *Malebranche*, and deriving from it (I hope) very great profit. Partly from your book and partly

from another which I have accidentally met with, *M. Robert* on *Scepticism,* I find there is a Catholic philosophical school in France, the existence of which (so narrow is my reading) I did not suspect. I shall esteem it a very great favour if you will mention to me *which* of such books you would especially recommend; also, is there any *periodical* which I could take in which would keep me *au courant* of French thought on such matters?

I have taken the liberty of forwarding you a few reprints of my recent articles, as I did not quite understand from your former letter whether you had seen those articles. The illness I just mentioned will prevent me from contributing another before *next July;* but in that article I hope to draw attention to your volume, and make on it a few sympathetic comments.

If I may speak quite frankly there is one particular which I desiderate in it. You *quote* J. S. Mill's argument based on the *moral and physical evils of the world;* but you do not, I incline to think, answer his objections with that completeness and distinctness which their importance and prevalence deserve.—I remain, dear sir, with much respect, sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

WESTON MANOR, FRESHWATER, I.W.,
24*th July* 1881.

MY DEAR SIR—I have been reading again with great attention your last letter. I have to thank you for it extremely. It has been the means of making me acquainted with a number of French Catholic philosophical works which will be of immense service. On getting those you have mentioned I find in them references to others; and I have now some thirty or forty volumes, the possession of which I owe to you.

It seems to me (as far as I have yet had time duly to look at them) that they may be all in some sense called "Cartesian" rather than Scholastic. One of my own strongest convictions is that Catholics will not be able duly to meet the intellectual necessities of the time unless their philosophical basis be far larger than that recognised *in the Seminaries.* And I fear that Leo XIII.'s Encyclical may possibly do some incidental harm in the midst of much good. I have been greatly pleased by a paper on it in the *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne* last month. On the other hand, I venture to think it of much greater importance than your school (if I may so call them) apparently consider it, to strengthen the bonds between Dogmatic theology and Philosophy.

One other remark: I have been reading with immense interest Margerie's work on the *Existence of God.* But neither he nor any Catholic I know, except Cardinal Newman, regards the existence of *moral evil* in the *shape we witness* as so great a difficulty as I think it is. In England (I think) it is the one *cheval de bataille* of the

infidels. To me the world seems *on the surface* to be not a place of *equitable probation* but of unmitigated *favouritism;* some men being so exceptionally helped in their moral struggle and others so hopelessly handicapped. To me all other religious difficulties *put together* do not seem so great as this by *itself.* It seems so near a contradiction in terms to say that the Creator of such a world as this is at once Omnipotent and Just.

Excuse this *talk* in this *detestable handwriting.* Please don't take trouble to decipher it.

Is there any hope of our ever meeting? I wish you could come and pay us a visit here. Though my handwriting is so bad my *talk* is still (in my 70th year) very vigorous, and I am sure I should derive from you so very much instruction.—I remain, my dear sir, with great respect, sincerely yours, W. G. WARD.

Pray think about paying us a visit.

NETHERHALL HOUSE, HAMPSTEAD,
3rd February 1882.

MY DEAR SIR—You will have received by this time my article on "The Philosophy of the Theistic Controversy." I wish to express my regret that from an accidental oversight I omitted to mention one point connected with you which I had actually entered into my preparatory notes. I should have explained that one principal part of your meaning about God being cognised through *faith* is that such cognisance arises in the mind spontaneously, universally, irresistibly. This seems to me among the most important of Theistic facts. I hope that otherwise you may not be dissatisfied with my humble comments on your volume.

On receipt of your last letter I ordered the *Revue des deux Mondes*, in order to read Janet's commentary on your volume; which commentary I find very weak in my judgment. Can you kindly tell me where I shall see your answer. . . . —Ever sincerely yours,
W. G. WARD.

This letter was probably the last ever written by Mr. Ward in connection with his philosophical work. He was strongly impressed at this time with the fact that death was at hand. "I keep asking myself Sydney Smith's question," he used to say, "Which of the many uncomfortable ways of removing one from this world will nature employ in my case?" He was constantly repeating the lines—

> Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti;
> Tempus abire tibi est.

Old friends had been dying lately, and he had been drawing

nearer to those who remained. Ambrose de Lisle and Oakeley—friends the thought of whom carried him back many years—passed away in 1879. Dean Stanley died in 1881. Death had been busy too with his own relations. His brother Henry and two sisters died in the seventies. His aunt, Miss Emma Ward, well known in the Isle of Wight for the nearly seventy years during which she had taken a leading part in the charities in the island, died in 1880.[1] With Oakeley and de Lisle intimacy had been revived shortly before their death, and during the years 1880 and 1881 there were meetings—farewell meetings they proved to be—with other old friends. Jowett came to see him, as I have said, from Farringford. Macmullen, long separated from him by differences of opinion, came to him at Hampstead. In 1881 Archdeacon Browne of Bath and Wells—"Beauty" Browne of Oxford memory—visited him at Weston. "I had not seen him" writes the

[1] A word may be added in memory of Miss Emma Ward of Westhill, to whom Mr. Ward was sincerely attached. From the time of her mother's death in 1813, when she first kept house for her father at Northwood, until her own death in 1880, her life was one of constant acts of charity. It was said of her that she would forego any of the comforts of her daily life rather than fail to help a deserving case ; and for several years near the end of her life she gave up her carriage and horses, spending the money thus saved entirely on charitable objects. She was a Tory of the old school, intensely loyal to the Throne, and devoted to the people of the Isle of Wight. On the day of her funeral all the shops in Cowes were shut, and large numbers of the townspeople followed the funeral procession. Some characteristic traits during the last days of her life are worth recording. The wedding of a friend of hers was to take place in two days' time, and she remarked, "I hope I shall not die for two days. It would be such a bore for the A. B.'s to have to put off their wedding." The Queen was constant in her inquiries during Miss Ward's last illness, and called at Westhill a few days before her death. Although scarcely able to move, Miss Ward could not bear that there should be any delay in the expression of her loyal thanks, and dictated at once a letter to one of the ladies-in-waiting, Lady Ely. "Miss Ward," the letter said, "although very feeble, is quite able to appreciate the gracious kindness done to her, and begs at the close of her long life to express her heartfelt gratitude for the many proofs of regard she has received from the Royal Family, beginning so far back as the year 1811, when H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester was her father's guest. And she is now more honoured still by Her Majesty's most kind interest, who she hopes will condescend to receive this expression of her loyal and deep affection for herself." The *Court Circular* of February the 2nd referred to her death in the following terms: "On Saturday, Sir John Cowell attended the funeral of the late Miss Emma Ward of Westhill, Cowes, on the part of the Queen. Her Majesty had made several inquiries for Miss Ward during her illness. Miss Ward was universally respected and beloved for her great kindness and benevolence during her long life."

Archdeacon "since he lived for a short time in Sussex Square [in the fifties] till we were staying one winter at Shanklin, in 1881, when he invited us to spend twenty-four hours with him. He sent his carriage to meet us at Carisbrooke, and we were much struck with his patriarchal mode of life. His chaplain and agent dined at his table. He called the former, although he seemed almost a boy, 'Father.' His bright daughter had ridden to hounds that morning. Every bedroom had its patron saint, and before day broke we heard him wending his way to his beautiful chapel. He asked us to come to visit him at Hampstead the next spring, but alas! before we arrived in London he was with his Saviour."

Mr. Ward was taken ill in February 1882, and although he was supposed after a week to be convalescent, the doctors detected, a month later, signs of an internal disease which rendered his recovery improbable. He removed to Winchester in April for change of air and scene, and revisited, close upon the end of his life, in company with his old schoolfellow, Lord Selborne, who came to see him there, the scenes of his boyhood. Here he seemed to be moving slowly towards recovery, and was able to go to Hampstead at the beginning of June, in the course of which month the unfavourable symptoms became more pronounced, and his memory began to fail him. The present writer visited him about the third week in June, and although he was not yet confined to his room the gravest fears were entertained as to ultimate recovery.

A few sayings and incidents belonging to this time are worth recording. A glimpse at the persistence of his moral discipline was given by a remark to one of his daughters. "Is it too late to hope to make a radical change in one's character after thirty?" she asked. "Dear me, I hope not," was his reply as though he were quite startled. "I am over seventy, and there are several vital and quite radical changes in *my* character which I am hoping, please God, to make."

To the present writer he remarked, "If ever I recover I shall take one lesson to heart which I have learned in thinking over my past life during my illness, and that is to make more allowance than I ever did for the inevitable differences between one mind and another." He also made the remark, that it had been a great help to him in his illness to find that the

temptations against faith which had tried him in earlier days appeared to have passed away.

One day, about a fortnight before his death, he found his memory so bad that conversation seemed to break down. He could not remember the most ordinary words or events. I asked him, as memory of early life is proverbially strongest, to try and dictate to me some of his old mock-heroic verses of Winchester days which I had often wished to have. He did so, to his own surprise, without any difficulty.

He was confined to his bed for nearly two weeks before his death—being moved occasionally from room to room. He suffered acutely, his great strength of constitution making the struggle for life a hard one. Some one remarked that to watch him during these weeks was like seeing a great ship breaking to pieces and going down in the storm. The habitual thoughts of his life were with him as long as he retained consciousness —up to the night of Monday 3rd July; and when partly wandering in mind he sent for one of us to talk over points which he thought of great importance for the defence of Christianity in coming years. He then described a fit of acute pain he had had a short time previously, and showed unmistakably that his mind was failing, speaking of Figaro in Rossini's *Barbiere* as an old friend of his. He dictated to his servant, within a week of his death, an account of his sufferings, that others, he said, might know what they might have to go through. Father Haythornthwaite administered the last sacraments to him, and Canon Purcell of Hampstead was frequently at his bedside. He was constantly troubled with the idea that his illness was a great nuisance to those who nursed him. "I fear," he said, "that I am a great bore to every one." He was sensitively grateful for the numerous inquiries made by his friends, and particularly pleased on hearing that his old friend Archbishop Tait had called to hear the last news of him. On Sunday the 2nd of July he asked what day of the week it was, and on being told, remarked that something would happen on Thursday—the day on which he actually died. The servant to whom the remark was made was so much impressed by it that when the doctor said that Mr. Ward could not live through Tuesday night, he insisted that Thursday was the day named by him, and on which he would die. Wednesday was

spent in total unconsciousness, and in an apparently comatose state, and at 8.30 on Thursday morning he moved his head and looked up suddenly with an expression full of intelligence. The nun who was nursing him hastened to call Mrs. Ward, who had barely reached the room when the end came without a struggle. After death his features assumed a look of singular peace and beauty which those who saw him will not readily forget.

His remains were carried to the Isle of Wight where he was buried, a very large assemblage of Catholic clergy—many of them old pupils—attending the funeral. Bishop, now Cardinal, Vaughan preached the sermon, and paid a tribute both to their personal friendship and to Mr. Ward's influence in the Catholic Church which he characterised as in some respects unique.

On the day following the funeral Tennyson visited his grave in company with Father Haythornthwaite, and was deeply moved. A cross of fresh flowers had been placed to mark the spot until the monument should be erected.

Tennyson quoted Shirley's couplet:—

> Only the actions of the just
> Smell sweet, and blossom in their dust.

And then, standing over the grave, he recited the following stanzas:—

> The glories of our blood and state
> Are shadows, not substantial things:
> There is no armour against fate,
> Death lays his icy hand on kings.
> Sceptre and crown
> Must tumble down,
> And in the dust be equal made
> With the poor crooked scythe and spade.
>
> The garlands wither on your brow,
> Then boast no more your mighty deeds:
> Upon Death's purple altar now
> See where the victor-victim bleeds.
> Your heads must come
> To the cold tomb.
> Only the actions of the just
> Smell sweet, and blossom in their dust.

Mr. Ward was buried with his face to the east in the little Catholic churchyard at Weston Manor. Over the grave, on a massive stone octagon base, a tall churchyard cross of Gothic design has been erected. Besides the figures of Our Lady and St. John on either side of the gabled Rood, there is in a niche on the eastern side of the shaft of the cross, a figure of St. Paul the Apostle.

The inscription, engraved on a brass-plate, and let into a panel on the east side of the base, runs as follows:—

✠ HAC · SUB · CRUCE · QUIESCIT [1]

EXSPECTANS · REVELATIONEM · FILIORUM · DEI

GULIELMUS · GEORGIUS · WARD

FIDEI · PROPUGNATOR · ACERRIMUS [2]

UT · PLENA · INTER · VICTORES · PACE

IN · AETERNUM · FRUATUR

DEUM · CUI · SERVIVIT

ADPRECARE

OB · IN · DIE · OCTAVA · SS · APOSTOLORUM · PETRI · ET · PAULI

ANNO · AET · LXX · SAL · CIƆIƆCCCLXXXIJ.

[1] The following translation is suggested by Mr. Everard Green, F.S.A., who assisted in the composition of the epitaph. "Under this cross is resting, looking for the revelation of the sons of God, William George Ward, a most valiant champion of the faith; for whom do thou beseech God whom he served, that among conquerors he may ever taste perfect peace."

[2] The words *propugnator acerrimus* occur twice in the Roman Breviary: first of St. Athanasius (2nd May, lectio IV.) and next of St. Gregory Nazianzen (9th May, lectio VI.), and the word *propugnator* occurs twice in the Collect for St. Stephen, King of Hungary (2nd September). I am indebted for these references to Mr. Everard Green.

CHAPTER XVI

AN EPILOGUE

THE survey of any prolonged controversy generally brings with it an accompanying sense of unsatisfactory results. It is a record of frequent misunderstandings. Like the old religious wars, religious controversies are fruitful in the noblest enthusiasm partially misdirected, in an excess of heat over light, in battles on behalf of one great truth undertaken against those who are urging another great truth, halves of the whole truth in reality, and yet regarded as irreconcilably opposed,—for the blackness against the whiteness of the particoloured shield. Champions devour each other for the greater colour of God, and the cynical man of the world remarks, "How these Christians love one another!" and finds his plausible excuse for disparaging religious faith and leaving it alone. Or at best he compares their enthusiasm to that of Don Quixote, and charges them with expending their zeal in valiantly overcoming windmills, which their imagination has transformed into opponents of a sacred cause.

That disinterested zeal for the noblest ideals is preferable, even if occasionally misapplied, to indifference and selfishness, is only a partial answer to the difficulty. Why not, asks the cynical critic, expend your zeal more fruitfully? in practical benefits whose utility to mankind is confessed;—in building hospitals, visiting the poor, housing them, clothing them, feeding them? Why wear yourself out in constructing huge logical edifices, and sounding within them the war trumpet, and defending, amid the din and turmoil of a siege, fortresses which, when full analysis and explanation have done their work, in course of time melt away like the vision of Prospero.

And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a wrack behind.

If we conceive a small insect which could trace one by one the fortunes of each grain of the cloud of pollen which we see in a Swiss pine forest in the spring, the result of his observations would probably be as sceptical as the conclusions of Mr. Ward's philosophical mice. The mice could conceive of no independent first cause; the insects would see no order or purpose. They might follow the course of hundreds of grains, and find the result mere waste. Yet it is grains of pollen —though so small a proportion to those which are wasted —which are the means of perpetuating the beautiful types in the botanical kingdom. We care little for the incidental waste in the process, when we realise how necessary it is to organic life.

And so it may well be with a life of controversy. Suppose that nine-tenths or even more of what has been written fails of the precise effect which its author hoped for, the residue which takes its place in the production and development of organic thought, and which does so in consequence of the series of experiments which a life of active thought alone can ensure, redeems that life as fully from any sense of ineffectiveness, as the fragrance and beauty of the pine forest or flower garden rebuke the sceptical and captious pertinacity of the insect philosopher, who has registered his thousand instances of wasted pollen-grains. Why, instead of the laborious process of following the course of grain after grain to disprove its effectiveness, did he not look simply at great visible results? Why did he not note and thank the pollen which has fertilised, and leave the rest alone?

How far and where and how has the Catholic Revival, and Mr. Ward's share in it, represented thought which has fertilised and proved productive? This is the question in answer to which I would attempt to make, as a kind of epilogue, a few very brief notes, as suggestions of what it would be as yet premature to assert more fully and positively, and referring primarily to religious thought among Englishmen.

Let us take, first, the ethical side. The persistency of Catholic Christianity as an exponent and as a realisation, in the person of its saints, of the highest and purest ethical

standard, was a matter urged by many of the champions of the Catholic Revival and repeatedly by Mr. Ward himself. The tendency, on the other hand, of the movement which began with the Reformation, to destroy by its individualism the living Catholic tradition which preserved the primitive Christian ethos untainted, and kept up an impassable barrier between Christian ethics and the standard of the natural man, was a view forced upon the leaders of the Revival in France and Germany;—alike on Stolberg, Schlegel, Lacordaire, and Montalembert. There can be little doubt that this thought has impressed serious thinkers of our own time as a grave and significant one.

The prevalence of Catholic devotional works, as those of St. Francis de Sales, Fénelon, Père Grou, not only among English churchmen with Catholic sympathies, but among others in this country, implies beyond doubt a new influence of the spiritual lights of the Catholic Church as models and guides in the devotional life. And the point especially urged by Mr. Ward in this connection,—the value of a continuous living society which should preserve the impalpable ethos of a truly spiritual ideal of life, which should keep it untainted by the maxims of an unbelieving generation; the functions of a visible Church as helping the affections and imagination against an importunately visible world; of a Church which should assimilate the spiritual wisdom of a St. Francis and a Fénelon, and exhibit the atmosphere which fostered their sanctity—this is a conception which many have accepted in some measure, and have yet hoped to see it realised outside the Roman communion.

Then, again, on the intellectual side, the idea which inspired de Maistre and his contemporaries,—of the Church as the principle of construction, the organised foe to intellectual and social anarchy, as the normal preserver, too, of the accumulated wisdom of the past, and the safeguard against the unreality of an excessive individualism (as contrasted with individuality), —this would appear to be a powerful force in that important movement in the Anglican Church which found its voice in *Lux Mundi*. "The Church," rather than "the Bible," as in idea the foundation and rule of faith, is accepted in words by many who share little of the opinion of the early Tractarians as to the necessity of making the idea actual, or entering frankly into any relations with a living authority, whether

in Rome or England. The dissolvent tendency of private judgment, and its voluntary renunciation of the constructive thought of the Christian Church in the past, are admitted in a measure by such thinkers. And Mr. Ward's share in enforcing the further logical consequence which they reject, —that the constructive principle is only thoroughly safeguarded by devotion to Rome, was beyond question considerable. Many who do not concur with the details of Ward's analysis of papal infallibility will agree with the testimony of Cardinal Manning already cited as to the effect of his writings in promoting unity among Catholics themselves in this respect.[1]

Then, too, the pregnant truth which from Bonald to Newman has been found influencing Catholic thought, that exhaustive logical analysis is not the normal test of the validity of practical beliefs, including the deepest religious convictions, will be found quite as characteristically in Dean Church's Lectures on the Psalms, or in some of Dr. Liddon's works, as in those of De Bonald or Ward or Newman. It is to be found likewise in various forms and degrees in the mysticism of Thomas Hill Green, in the broad Church writings of F. D. Maurice, in the speculative poems of Tennyson. And while its source is partly Kantian, the Catholic Revival has undoubtedly contributed much to its exposition, vivification, and application.

These lines of thought which the Catholic Revival brought into new prominence, and which Mr. Ward urged in his own way, have had their effect, then, even in our own country, and outside the Roman communion. They were sources of sympathy which helped to make more effective the fight, shoulder to shoulder, of Dalgairns and Ward with other Christian thinkers in the Metaphysical Society, who were external to the Roman Church. Catholic thought had often touched men unconsciously where it had not done so consciously.

Again, the new prominence of the argument from conscience in the Catholic analysis of Theism—a prominence synchronising with the Catholic Revival of this century—was a bond of union which would have been looked for in vain between a Calvinist and a Catholic of the seventeenth century;

[1] See p. 408.

while the spirit of open-minded appreciation of all phases of religious conviction which had been fostered by the *Correspondant* in France, and which Mr. Ward so heartily adopted in his dealings with English philosophers, introduced an element necessary to co-operation—the readiness to give and take. Dr. Martineau would think it possible to gain the assent and assistance of Catholics in his great plea for Theism and the Moral Law; while Ward and Dalgairns were emphatic in urging the benefit which Catholic thought must derive from adopting many of the positions of the great Unitarian thinker in these fundamental problems.[1] The presumption—special to times of intellectual stagnation—that the highest and purest faith necessarily brings with it an intellectual analysis which is entirely satisfactory, and can dispense with the ordinary conditions for exact and thorough philosophy, was no longer admitted. A genuine Catholic philosophy was felt to have much to gain from such a work as the *Types of Ethical Theory*, as St. Thomas Aquinas had learnt from Aristotle's Metaphysic, and as Albertus Magnus had adopted many of the positions of Maimonides.

Turning back to the new influence of the Catholic ideal of spirituality as represented by its typical exponents, it is admitted by most thinking men that the Catholic Church in communion with Rome is its natural home. The corruptions of Rome, her lapse into superstition, her identification with a retrograde movement incompatible with the normal progress of the age, is the lament of many who recognise this. The anti-Roman position which is most consonant with patent facts is that of Dean Church and of the Newman of 1833, that the state of Christendom is anomalous, and that the purity of Christian faith has failed, and irrational superstition supervened, where faith should normally be strongest and purest—in Rome itself. "Sir," said Dr. Johnson, "I would be a Catholic if I could, but an obstinate rationality prevents me": and it is the idea of a plain incompatibility with enlightened thought

[1] An analogous example of frank and hearty admiration is to be found in a paper of Rev. Dr. Braig, parish priest, in the *Philos. Jahresbericht der Görres-Gesellschaft für* 1884, pp. 23 *seq.*, which is all the more significant because Hermann Lotze's system (the subject of the paper) contains a larger number of positions finally unacceptable to a Catholic thinker than do the writings of Dr. Martineau.

which is pleaded by the best thinkers as the motive for resisting a claim so obviously strong *primâ facie.*

To this incompatibility the Vatican Council is supposed by many to have set the final seal. For some years of the Oxford Movement the Council of Trent was looked on as the expression of the abuses into which Catholicism had fallen, and its work of reformation was not known or understood by the average Tractarian.[1] A somewhat similar fate has befallen the Council of the Vatican. Mr. Gladstone's attack on it was sympathetically echoed by many who did not even care to read Cardinal Newman's reply; and a writer of evident ability referring, in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1892, to the Vatican Council, has committed himself to such sentiments as the following: "It is Döllinger's undying merit to have stood forth—eventually single-handed and alone—against the most astounding infatuation in which any religious community in civilised times has ever indulged, to have vindicated the rights of reason and conscience against the most undisguised attack ever made on them."

It would not be in character with the present work to enter on a full examination of the bearing of what is known as Vaticanism or of the Vatican Council itself on modern Catholic thought; but it may be worth while to call attention to a few facts closely connected with the subjects dealt with in this volume, the significance of which different readers will no doubt estimate differently, but which are certainly not consistent with such indictments as I have cited.

The state of the case will be all the more easily understood by freely conceding from the first that Döllinger's protest at

[1] See *e.g.* even Froude's *Remains* (vol. i. pp. 307 etc.), where he talks of Trent as "the atrocious council." It is interesting to note in what light the prospects of Rome were regarded in Germany at the end of last century. Herder wrote, "The Church of Rome resembles but an old ruin, incapable of sheltering any new life"; and Nicolai "Only among the common superstitious herd the Roman faith may possibly manage to continue in precarious existence, before science and culture it will never again hold its own." Even Goethe wrote, "The Council of Trent has long ere this ceased to live in the minds of thinking men; the period of conquests seems to me to have for ever passed away from the Catholic Church" (see Jannsen, *L. F. Graf von Stolberg*, vol. i. p. 1). These prophesies were followed within 30 years by the conversion to Rome of 50 or 60 men of the greatest distinction in Germany itself.

the Munich Congress of 1863 against the unhistorical and uncritical spirit of certain Catholic divines had, in many quarters, considerable justification. Enough has been recorded in these pages, especially in reference to France, to show how prominent a phenomenon at that time was the combination of a thoroughly unhistorical and uncritical spirit with an urgent and sometimes aggressive insistence on the papal claims. The words already cited of so weighty an authority as Père de Smedt,[1] with reference to M. Ch. Barthélemy, the almost universal reaction at the present time, among Catholic thinkers, against such histories as that of the Abbé Darras, the account, given earlier in this volume, of Abbé Gaume and his friends, the characteristic passages cited from the pages of the *Monde* and the *Univers*, the view entertained by so devoted a Roman as Mr. Ward himself as to the intellectual narrowness of some of the Neo-Scholastics, all illustrate the prominence in the sixties of what was stigmatised as Ultramontane narrowness. And that it was a powerful force at the time of the *Syllabus* few will deny.

The real question is, Have the men who were responsible for such a line gained by the Vatican Council, and have its decrees in any sense endorsed their views? Is the Roman Church since the Council committed to the general line of a school which was unhistorical and uncritical, and are its members, therefore, unfit, from an intellectual point of view, to cope with the crucial questions of contemporary thought? Any one who attempts to answer this question must at least bear in mind certain broad facts.

The present Pope, who has exercised his prerogative so frequently in the direct guidance of Catholics, and has, in this respect, given especial prominence to the duty of Ultramontane loyalty which the Vatican Council emphasised, has notoriously encouraged historical studies, and encouraged their pursuit in the most absolutely candid and critical spirit. His saying is well known that if the gospels had been written in the spirit of partisanship we should never have heard of St. Peter's fall or Judas's betrayal. His opening the Vatican Archives to Protestant as well as Catholic students, his encouragement and approval of Pastor's extremely plain-spoken history of the

[1] See p. 119.

Popes,[1] both by placing the Vatican Archives at his disposal, and by the Brief of commendation addressed to the author after the appearance of his first volume, are noteworthy evidences that he has meant what he said—that history is to be pursued by its own methods and independently of its giving such results as are most acceptable to the Catholic controversialist.

And while the historical spirit is receiving direct encouragement in the Vatican itself we have the important fact to which Baron von Hügel calls attention in his letter to me already cited[2]—the growth since the Vatican Council of a school of Ultramontane critics, Biblical and historical, whose accuracy and eminence are beyond dispute. To mention only names well known to English scholars, we have Professor Bickell,[3] of Innsbruck, whose eminence as a Biblical critic and Hebraist is uncontested. In 1870 he was known as the author of a pamphlet in behalf of the proposed definition of papal Infallibility. Abbé Loisy again, Professor of Exegesis at the Institut Catholique in Paris, is known in Germany and England, as well as in France, as a critic of the first rank.

[1] An English translation of this important work has been published by Father Antrobus, of the Oratory (John Hodges, Charing Cross, 1891). It is significant to notice, in the Postscript added by Prof. Pastor to his 2nd vol., the hearty recognition which the Protestant Prof. Burckhardt, the greatest living authority on the history of the Italian Renaissance, accords to Pastor's "mighty undertaking"; and then to remark the petulant vehemence with which a small old Catholic special-pleader such as Herr von Druffel attacks the same book.

[2] See p. 373.

[3] A distinguished Oxford critic to whom Bickell's name was well known as a Hebrew scholar and Biblical critic recently said in astonishment to a friend of the present writer's, "You don't mean to say that Bickell is a *Roman priest?*" Such a remark is worth mentioning as a sign of the times, and of the extent to which the idea of modern Catholicism as essentially uncritical prevails among educated Englishmen. See on the other hand in the Oxford Professor William Sanday's *The Oracles of God*, Longmans, 1891, pp. 20, 21—"A controversy [on Capellus's first great book, 1624] arose in which the set of opinion throughout the Reformed Churches was so strong that . . . a later work by Capellus (the *Critica Sacra* published at Paris in 1650) could only be published by the help of his son who had joined the Church of Rome. It was in that Church that the view which is now universally held to be the right one (the late addition of the vowel points to the originally purely consonantal Hebrew Biblical text) found its ablest advocates. The writer indeed, who laid the foundation of Old and New Testament criticism, was a member of that Church, the Oratorian Richard Simon." See also p. 80, *n.* 1—"There is an admirable school (of historical critics) at Paris, at the head of which is the Abbé Duchesne, one of the first

Père de Smedt and the Bollandists were recognised both as loyally Roman and as accurate and critical students of Church history even before Leo XIII. had set his seal on the movement of which they are representatives. Abbé Duchesne, again, the editor of the *Bulletin Critique*, is known in this country as a critical scholar of admitted reputation: and he is known to his friends as the most loyal of Ultramontanes. In Italy we have the same phenomenon. De Rossi's reputation, for example, is European. Is then the claim so glibly made in the spirit of undisguised hostility to Rome that the men whom impartial judges rank as our best critics have been anti-Roman, for a moment tenable? Could the student who compares Reusch's *Bibel und Natur* with the Biblical works of Abbé Loisy give the palm either for acquaintance with the true critical method or for candour and thoroughness to the anti-Vaticanist?[1]

On the other hand, while the opponents of the decrees certainly had not the monopoly of intellectual and critical acumen, had the school of Veuillot the monopoly of fanaticism? Does Professor Friedrich's history of the Vatican Council breathe that calm impartiality which we look for in the true historian? Was Döllinger—great historian as he was—free from fanaticism almost as great as Veuillot's on the other side when he wrote: "As regards the dogmatic question, it is now clear and certain for me that the entire edifice of papal omnipotence and infallibility rests upon cunning and fraud, force and violence, in various forms, and that the stones which went to this building, are but a series of forgeries and fictions, and of conclusions and consequences drawn therefrom,—a series stretching through all the centuries, beginning with the fifth." Again, how can we believe that he even attempted to ascertain the real scope and meaning of the definition? No doubt he had not seen when he wrote, and probably never saw, the record of its preparation which was published in

theological scholars in Europe, M. le Blaut, M. Tixeront, and the Abbé Batiffol; in Germany, Bishop Hefele, Professors Kraus, Funk and Schanz; in Rome, Cardinal Hergenröther and the veteran De Rossi, who in 1885 lost the companionship of another distinguished Christian archæologist, Garucci."

[1] It is a curious fact that until the changes made recently, in a new edition, showed that Reusch had become aware of his shortcomings, his work was by no means abreast of the best criticism of the time at which it was written.

1890, and which proves conclusively how intentional were the phrases which pointed to a moderate interpretation; but Bishop Fessler and Newman had said enough to suggest the possibility of the view which we now know beyond question to be the true one. It did not even define what Fénelon so strenuously urged,—the Pope's infallibility in dogmatic facts; and yet we find Döllinger writing as follows: "If my bishop were to declare: I absolve you from excommunication, on condition that you shall believe and profess what Bossuet *and Fénelon* . . . taught concerning the Pope—who would be more ready and willing than I?" (the italics are my own). And finally, what are we to think when he says in so many words, that "no one possessing a scientific culture of mind could ever accept the decrees of the Vatican Council."[1]

The reader of this volume has the materials before him for judging of the correctness of the last two of these assertions, and may, if for no other reason, well doubt the moderation or justice of the first. Indeed, it has been well said that such a view would involve our holding the influence and sway of Rome to be a standing miracle. The shallow sceptic's contention, happily now almost obsolete, that Theism itself is but the invention of tyrannous, greedy priests, is here applied to explain and exhaust a phenomenon which has somehow managed to rally to itself and to keep, through the storm and stress of passions within and without, the enthusiastic loyalty of so large a proportion of Christendom. Again, was Döllinger even as a critic abreast of the times? Would not his known unqualified disparagement of Wellhausen have been cited as incurable narrowness had he been a Vaticanist and not an anti-Vaticanist?[2]

It is not to my purpose to pursue these questions further. They are set down to suggest the general conclusion to which

[1] *Declarations and Letters on the Vatican Decrees*, pp. 135, 121, 112 of German original.

[2] In a review in the *Academy* of the *Declarations* (30th May 1891), written from anything but a Catholic's standpoint, it is well said: "Dr. Döllinger appears to hold that the Church was infallible up to 1870, but after that time, after the time it disagreed with himself, it became fallible and erring, the victim of tyranny and fraud."

the facts recorded in this book appear also to tend. The true proportions of any event are best seen at a little distance, and we are still too near the Vatican Council to understand its bearings completely. The present writer makes no attempt to estimate the relative strength of the various schools of thought in Catholic Europe at the present hour. But the events succeeding the Council to which he has referred, seem to throw grave doubt on the assumption so current in England that the utterances of the Old Catholics and of Döllinger himself on the subject, were the voice of the candid and critical remnant. They would seem likewise to favour the suggestion already made in this volume that the grounds of the opposition to the Council on the part of the German students were wider and less deep than they were supposed to be; that their attitude was partly due to disaffection caused by the excesses of that section of the Ultramontane party whose influence was so great at the time of the *Syllabus*, and with whom Pius IX. was considered personally to sympathise; that Döllinger's opposition to the dogma on historical grounds was in part occasioned by the form in which it was stated by some of its most prominent advocates. It may be remembered that the Mayence school, the most prominent representatives in Germany of the modern Ultramontane movement, adopted, in the person of Dr. Scheeben, who had become Professor of Dogmatics at Cologne, the most extreme position of Mr. Ward as to the extent of infallibility.

The consistency of the Ultramontane position itself, both with the historical spirit and with a large-minded and moderate temper of mind, is a matter more readily tested practically than theoretically. *Solvitur ambulando.* Such men as Fénelon or Muratori, who lived before the extreme exponents of Ultramontanism had begun their work, or the more recent writers of whom I have spoken, whose prominence has come since the Vatican Council, and after the decline of the influence of the more extreme party, are living examples more decisive than any argument can be. The Vatican decision killed, indeed, the dangerous revival of Gallicanism which had allied itself with the indifferentism of the extreme Liberal Catholic position. It killed a movement, the chief danger of which, even in Mr. Ward's eyes, was not that it would get rid of the traditional

intellectual formulæ of the schools, but that it would sap the foundations of the Catholic spiritual life. It emphasised, by localising the centre of authority beyond dispute, the necessity of the spirit of obedience, and of looking to Rome as the centre of unity. But its effect on directly intellectual problems has not in fact proved to be in a direction opposed to freedom and thoroughness. The best intellectual work of the early years of the present century in Germany itself had been done by men whose Ultramontanism was unquestioned, such as Stolberg, Görres, and Möhler. The enforcement in 1870 of the theological position of these men was not, on the face of it, likely to prove in itself unfavourable to real thought or to the historical spirit. A movement which had the enthusiastic sympathy of a Bickell could scarcely have been too incompatible with enlightenment of intellect to be accepted by a Reusch. That a phase of the new Ultramontanism was in fact so injurious to the interests of intellectual life in the Church, may make the work of dissociating that phase from the Vatican definition itself in the imagination of rough-and-ready exponents of English public opinion a slow one; but no careful student of the period can identify the two.

This view of the case, which has at least received confirmation of late years, harmonises with that which nearly twenty years ago was indicated by Cardinal Newman.

"Whether," he wrote to the Duke of Norfolk in 1874, "the recognition of the Pope's infallibility in doctrine will increase his actual power over the faith of Catholics, remains to be seen and must be determined by the event. . . . There is no real increase [in his authority]. He has for centuries upon centuries had and used that authority which the Definition now declares to have ever belonged to him. Before the Council there was the rule of obedience, and there were exceptions to the rule; and since the Council the rule remains and with it the possibility of exceptions."

And again he says, "All are not Israelites who are of Israel, and there are partisans of Rome who have not the sanctity and wisdom of Rome herself. . . . There are those who wish and try to carry measures, and declare they have carried when they have not carried them. How many things, for instance, have been reported with a sort of triumph on one

side, and with irritation and despondency on the other, of what the Vatican Council has done; whereas the very next year after it, Bishop Fessler, the Secretary General of the Council, brings out his work on *True and False Infallibility*, reducing what was said to be so monstrous to its true dimensions. When I see all this going on those grand lines in the Greek tragedy always rise on my lips—

> Οὔποτε τὰν Διὸς ἁρμονίαν
> θνατῶν παρεξίασι βουλαί.

And still more the consolation given by a Divine Speaker that though the swelling sea is so threatening to look at, yet there is One who rules it and says, 'Hitherto shalt thou come, and no farther; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed.'"

The assault on Christian faith which we see around us draws its strength, as we daily see, from three sources. There is the historical criticism of Christianity, which Strauss had begun in the days of the Oxford Movement, and which Renan popularised in our own time; there is the directly Biblical criticism of the Old Testament represented by such men as Welhausen; and there is the agnostic metaphysic, or denial of metaphysic, in its various forms. The number is daily growing in England as elsewhere of those who feel the necessity that Christian thinkers should deal not only reverently and cautiously, but also frankly and fully with each of these branches of study; and, if in the first two departments, the writers already mentioned have been examples of the compatibility of Ultramontanism with such a spirit, in the region of pure thought Mr. Ward's own career may be read as a similar example. His worst enemy never accused him of either want of candour or want of thoroughness in that side of psychology and metaphysic to which he devoted himself. In the one subject, except mathematics, in which he professed to reason with due independence, he was characteristically broad, and liberal in the best sense, without wavering for a moment in his Ultramontane loyalty. The recognition he won in this department from such men as Mill and Bain, as well as from Catholic thinkers in France and Germany, has been recorded in these pages; and the points which his lifelong insistence pressed into the recognised statement of these great problems

—the grains of pollen which fertilised—have been traced in a previous chapter.

Those who indulge the hope that the Catholic Revival may prove to be what it has been so often in the past, a new budding forth of Christian life, in a fresh climate and under fresh conditions, blossoming widely, and bringing with it the flower of intellectual as well as ethical greatness; who see in the Catholic Church the great instrument for the preservation of the belief in the supernatural which is now on the decline all around us, take note of these signs. If Catholic ideals and principles are spreading apace, and if the great organised society of the Catholic Church raises no barrier against those minds which now feel that they must in honesty face the problems of the times with perfect frankness, the fight shoulder to shoulder of all Christian thinkers in defence of this cause so vital to the welfare of humanity, must become in some degree a Catholic Movement. The sympathy in heart and aim must grow from a common enthusiasm and a common work; and the study of such great examples as Fénelon and St. Francis of Sales, or in our own century, Lacordaire, will do more to break down the barrier of intellectual prepossession than any controversial discussion can effect by itself. One evening at the Metaphysical Society was a more unanswerable answer to the old-fashioned Churchmen who thought that Ultramontanes were uncandid and insincere than ten years of controversial writing could have been.

And, further, we have reached a time when theoretical controversy, indispensable though it be up to a certain point, has grown so intricate as sometimes to injure the sense of true proportion, and to obscure the vision of patent facts. The living Catholic Church, visible and continuous, with its roll of Saints, its hold on the minds of the people, its work in making them realise the supernatural, the exhibition in it of the intellectual virtues as well as the moral, this is a tremendous fact. It is emphatically "in possession," and to realise its significance is an indispensable condition to any sound judgment on the religious controversies of the hour. The continuous exhibition within any society of the highest types of goodness amid an evil world is a beacon light which all travellers may follow without fear. All may rest content that the seeker for

religious truth should follow this light, whether they hold its source to lie in a spirituality which can be perfectly found only in one society, or think that it may be found in more. The more closely the light is approached, the more clearly will this difference of opinion be decided.

This work has been the story of a life, and the record of many controversies. That neither aspect of it is without its value in the long run has, I trust, sufficiently appeared. Sound and vigorous thought is seldom lost on the few who determine the advance of the intellectual life of Europe. But for the many who look for courage in the example of the strong men who have gone before us, the worker is yet more than his work. Christian biography, even apart from the records of its greatest heroes,—the Christian saints,—may do a work which abstract controversy cannot do. A life with one unswerving purpose remains, in spite of the shadow of human defects, a source of strength and light to other lives. It speaks more eloquently than argument to the power of the convictions which sustained it, and to the nature of the influences which formed the character. Again, controversy, unless it be carried on in a spirit of earnestness and absolute candour, may sometimes, for the moment, distract attention from the light and lead astray from the path. But the radiance of example, of truthfulness of intellect, of self-abandoning pursuit of goodness, shines for all alike and unmistakably. It lights up the home in which such lives are passed, which has fostered them, and in which they have found their rest. It shows that home to others from afar; it reveals to those who draw near to it its true character.

Note.—The reader will find in Appendix A, p. 435, some details of the preparation of the Vatican Definition, illustrating what has been said in this chapter as to Dr. Döllinger's misrepresentation of its scope.

APPENDIX A

I SUBJOIN the *pièces justificatives* of the important crisis described pp. 261 *seq.* in the deliberations on the definition of Papal Infallibility.

I first extract from the diary of one of the Bishops (see p. 259), who favoured the more stringent view of papal infallibility, an account of Cardinal Bilio's unexpected opposition to the *formula* originally proposed, as defining too much. This passage is incorporated in the *Collectio Lacensis*, and will be found in volume vii. at p. 1699.

Schema capitis IV., sive capitis addendi, ab eminentissimo Bilio compositum et a sancto patre Pio IX. probatum erat, quapropter inopinatum omnibus accidit quod idem Cardinalis in sessione deputationis die 5 Maii, feria V. (mane) quum nemo patrum adversus schema loqueretur, ipse contra illud argumentum coepit: non plus definiri posse de infallibilitate papae quam definitum sit de infallibilitate ecclesiae; de ecclesia autem hoc tantum definitum esse,—eam esse infallibilem in definitionibus dogmaticis stricte sumptis, ergo quaeritur, inquit, num proposito schemate infallibilitas papae non nimis extendatur. Non negavit Cardinalis, imo tanquam certissimum asseruit, Papam infallibilem quoque esse in factis dogmaticis, in canonizatione sanctorum, aliisque paris momenti rebus. Addidit sese vehementer cupere ut in hoc concilio Vaticano definiretur, Ecclesiam infallibilem esse non solum in definitionibus dogmaticis stricte sumptis, sed etiam in factis dogmaticis, in canonizatione sanctorum, in approbatione ordinum. Sed quum nunc de infallibilitate Papae definienda ageretur antequam actum esset de infallibilitate Ecclesiae, illud incommodi habere schema quod plus diceretur quam oporteret.

The words then proposed,—limiting the definition of papal infallibility to those rare occasions when something is proposed to the whole Church as strictly "de fide divina," its contrary being not only "erroneous" but "heretical,"—characterised the "object" of the infallible utterance as "quid in rebus fidei et morum ab universa Ecclesia fide divina credendum tenendumve vel rejiciendum sit."

With respect to the formula proposed on 8th June, which formed the basis of what was finally defined—in which the phrase "fides divina" was omitted, and the vaguer phrase "matters of

faith or morals" was allotted to the sphere of infallible definitions—an Annotation of the commission, given in the official record, calls attention to the fact that its more vague and comprehensive wording does not in fact decide either more or less than the moderate formula of May the 6th; but it avoids such objections as had been urged; for instance that of *appearing* to deny papal infallibility in dogmatic facts. All it makes a "dogma of faith" is that a papal definition determining what is "de fide divina" is infallible. Theologians are agreed in extending the sphere of infallibility somewhat farther, and thus it is "theologically certain" that the "dogmata of divine faith" do not cover the whole sphere of pontifical infallibility. As to how much farther it extends, opinions, as we have seen, differ. Dogmatic facts, and the canonisation of saints, are almost universally included; and many theologians, with Mr. Ward himself, extend the sphere to censures falling short of the censure "heretical."

The very important "Annotation" on this subject (Adnotatio IV. 8th June) will be found at p. 1644 of the seventh volume of the *Collectio Lacensis*. It runs as follows:—

Quod ad ipsam definitionem pertinet, sensus formulae quae nunc proponitur eatenus indeterminatus est quatenus quaeri potest quaenam sit definitio quaestionis fidei, num ea tantum qua aliquid fide divina credendum proponitur, an eae quoque quibus de facto dogmatico decernitur aut censura minor infra haeresim infligitur etc. Sed huic dubitationi per ea quae de objecto infallibilitatis addita sunt, quantum hic satis est, respondetur. Si enim in alia constitutione objectum infallibilitatis ecclesiae determinabitur eo ipso etiam objectum infallibilitatis Romani Pontificis declarabitur. Sin vero nulla talis definitio fiet, de objecto vi hujus decreti judicandum erit secundum ea quae nunc jam de Ecclesiae infallibilitate communiter tenentur: nempe dogma fidei esse Romanum Pontificem non posse errare quum fide divina credenda proponit, et theologice certum esse, eum etiam in aliis rebus declarandis ab errore immunem esse. Unde patet per hanc formulam *nec plus nec minus definiri quam in prius proposita definiretur*; sed per hanc formulam genericam vitari videntur incommoda quaedam in priori a nonnullis inventa.

That the fathers were determined to prevent even the appearance of anything further having been decided than is explained in this Annotation, is seen in the official record of the same day (8th June). One of the fathers said, in discussing the proposed formula in its original shape, "Schema non placere quum sensus ejusdem sit ambiguus et quod definiri non intendatur tamen definiatur, sc. infallibilitatem et R. Pontificis et Ecclesiae ad ea etiam extendi quae damnantur nota quae haeresis nota sit inferior. Quare declarandum esse videri esse dogma fidei Pontificem in decretis fidei et morum eadem infallibilitate gaudere qua gaudeat Ecclesia, et eodem modo quo

Ecclesiae, etiam Pontificis decreta, quae ad idem objectum extendantur, esse irreformabilia" (p. 1688).

This proposal is, as we know, substantially embodied in the decree as ultimately drafted. In its final shape it declared "Romanum Pontificem ea infallibilitate pollere quâ divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit."

On 22nd May, when it was decided not to retain the formula which appeared to deny that infallibility could extend beyond strict definitions of divine faith—the denial of which is heresy—Cardinal Bilio's proposal for an historical introduction, emphasising the scientific "subsidia" used by the pontiff, was made. "Proposuit, we read, "ut historicus quidam prologus illi capiti praefigeretur quo ostenderetur qua ratione summi Pontifices fidei magisterium in Ecclesia exercere semper consueverint, simulque falsae suspicioni praecluderetur aditus, quasi Romani Pontifices absque consilio, deliberatione et scientiae subsidiis in rebus fidei judicandis procedere possint" (p. 1701).

In the same direction is the first "Annotation" of 8th June.

Utile visum est inserere capiti nonnulla ad rectam intelligentiam dogmatis accommodata, nempe: Summum Pontificem doctoris munere non sine commercio et unione cum Ecclesia fungi; nunc per Concilia nunc per se decreta edere; antequam definiat, Scripturam et traditionem consulere; denique donum infallibilitatis non hoc sensu personalem esse ut ei abstractione facta a suo munere conveniat" (p. 1644).

The words of the historical introduction which carried out these suggestions have been already cited in the text (p. 262).

APPENDIX B

THE subjoined letters from M. Ollé-Laprune are the replies to Mr. Ward's letters to that thinker, cited in Chapter XV. The incidental reference, in the second letter, to the passage-at-arms between the writer and M. Jules Ferry, throws an interesting light on the state of things in the France of 1881.

BAGNÈRES-DE-BIGORRE, VILLA DES TILLEULS,
19 *septembre* 1880.

MONSIEUR,—Je suis fort touché de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser, et je vous remercie bien vivement. L'approbation que vous donnez à ce que vous avez lu de mon livre, m'est singulièrement précieuse, et c'est pour moi un encouragement, en même temps qu'une satisfaction bien grande, de vous entendre me dire que les doctrines exposées dans cet ouvrage sont celles qui, plus que toute autre, nous mettent à même de réfuter l'incrédulité contemporaine. Vous êtes, en pareille matière, un juge éminemment compétent, vous qui discutez avec une si admirable vigueur les théories contraires avec vérités morales et religieuses.

J'avais remarqué dans la *Dublin Review*, dont je suis le lecteur assidu, l'article très important que vous avez bien voulu joindre à votre lettre ; je suis heureux d'en avoir maintenant cet exemplaire et de le tenir de votre main.

J'espère qui si vous rencontrez dans la lecture de mon ouvrage quelque proposition qui vous paraisse inexacte, vous voudrez bien me la signaler. Les critiques ou les observations d'un penseur si clairvoyant sont d'un grand prix. Si votre approbation m'encourage, les réflexions dont vous aurez la bonté de me faire part me donneront le moyen d'améliorer mes théories, et votre lettre si gracieuse me permet d'espérer que vous ne me refuserez pas ce secours. Je vous remercie par avance de l'honneur que vous me ferez et du profit que je trouverai dans vos critiques.

Vous me demandez, monsieur, si je suis Catholique. Les dernières pages de mon livre, si vous y êtes parvenu maintenant, vous ont donné la réponse. J'y rends à l'Eglise Catholique un hommage où ma foi se déclare. Je suis Catholique, je le suis profondément, je le suis de tout

mon esprit et de tout mon cœur. Bien que je n'aie eu en vue dans mon livre que ce que j'appelle la foi morale et naturelle, je pense que mes assertions ont dans l'ordre surnaturel des applications faciles à voir.

Je suis avec le plus vif intérêt votre lutte contre les adversaires du *libre arbitre.* Vous rendez à la vérité un éminent service.

Depuis longtemps, monsieur, je vous connaissais. Vos articles dans la *Dublin Review* et votre beau livre *On Nature and Grace* m'avaient inspiré pour le Docteur Ward de profonds sentiments d'admiration et de sympathie. J'avais remarqué aussi l'hommage mérité que l'un des penseurs le plus énergiquement combattus par vous, Stuart Mill, vous avait rendu, et je me suis plu à le rappeler dans une des notes de mon livre. Je suis heureux que ce livre m'ait amené à vous connaître mieux maintenant et d'une manière personnelle. Je me félicite des relations qui s'établissent entre nous ; elles sont pour moi un honneur, et je sens tout le profit que j'en recueillerai.

Veuillez agréer, cher monsieur, l'hommage de mon respect, et me croire cordialement tout votre. LÉON OLLÉ-LAPRUNE.

J'espère que, si vous avez quitté l'île de Wight, ma lettre vous sera renvoyée où vous êtes maintenant. Pour moi, je dois rester à Bagnères-de-Bigorre jusqu'à la fin du mois ; je passerai le mois d'octobre à Pau, coteau de Turançon, Basses Pyrénées. Après cela, je reviendrai à Paris pour reprendre mes cours à l'Ecole Normale Supérieure. J'habite à Paris, rue Gozlin, 31.

COTEAU DE TURANÇON, PRÈS PAU,
28 *février* 1881.

CHER MONSIEUR,—Je vous demande pardon de faire une si tardive réponse à votre excellente lettre. De vives inquiétudes, causées au commencement de l'année par la santé de mon père, m'ont empêché de vous répondre au moment où vous avez écrit, et, depuis que mes inquiétudes sont dissipées un travail pressant a pris et absorbé tous mes moments. Je regrette vivement de n'avoir pu plus tôt vous adresser mes remerciements. Je suis singulièrement touché des choses que vous me dites. A peine remis d'une maladie fort pénible, vous avez voulu, monsieur, reprendre et poursuivre jusqu'au bout la lecture de ma *Certitude Morale*, et, cette lecture achevée, vous vous êtes hâté de me dire vos impressions. Je vous en suis extrêmement reconnaissant. Je ne saurais vous dire assez quel prix j'attache à vos jugements. Connaissant, comme je le fais, vos travaux, vos belles études sur les plus hautes questions de la philosophie, vos sérieuses et profondes discussions des systèmes contemporains, et l'esprit qui anime tout ce que vous écrivez, je sais ce que vaut un témoignage d'estime et de sympathie venant de vous. Quand vous me dites notamment que vous avez remarqué le dernier chapitre de mon livre, je suis heureux, sans vanité aucune, de vous entendre parler comme vous le faites de l'importance de ces pages qui me tiennent fort au cœur, en effet, et où j'ai mis le résultat de mes plus intimes et de mes plus chères réflexions. Vous les croyez utiles. C'est pour moi une très douce satisfaction de recevoir ce témoignage d'un juge tel que vous.

Je comprends bien que le *Scepticisme* de M. Robert vous ait frappé. C'est un livre sérieux et intéressant. J'en ai eu connaissance au moment où je venais de terminer l'impression de ma *Certitude Morale.* Sans nous connaître le moins du monde, et sans nous douter que nous poursuivions d'une manière différente, il est vrai, des objets d'étude analogues, nous nous trouvons, M. Robert et moi, être arrivés au terme en même temps. Cela est curieux. C'est le signe de l'importance de la question au temps présent. C'est le signe d'un certain mouvement d'esprits qui a des caractères communs. Peut-on nommer cela une école? Y a-t-il une école philosophique catholique, dont ces livres révéleraient l'existence? Il y a, dans l'Université de France, un certain nombre d'esprits profondément religieux, sérieusement et hautement chrétiens. N'appartenant à aucune des écoles, qui ont la faveur en ce moment, ils combattent le positivisme, l'athéisme, le panthéisme, l'idéalisme. Jusque là ils ne diffèrent pas beaucoup de certains spiritualistes qui defendent avec vigueur les vieilles doctrines. Mais ce qui distingue les penseurs et les écrivains dont je parle, c'est qu'ils répudient nettement le rationalisme ; ils sont, et, dans l'occasion, ils se montrent franchement chrétiens, catholiques. Ce ne sont pas des adeptes de ce qu'on a bien nommé la *philosophie séparée.* Leur philosophie est chrétienne, et se déclare telle. Aussi le groupe dont le livre de M. Robert et le mien vous ont révélé l'existence, a bien les caractères que vous notez. Seulement cela ne constitue pas une école proprement dite. Ces penseurs se connaissent à peine entre eux, ou, s'ils ont des relations mutuelles, ils n'exercent guère d'influence les unes sur les autres. Aucun n'est le maître, aucun n'est le chef. Il n'y a point de direction commune donnée à tous par un esprit qui serait comme le centre d'où partirait le mouvement. Chacun obéit à sa raison chrétienne, à sa conscience, et fait de son mieux son œuvre, luttant contre les erreurs du temps présent, tâchant d'éclaircir tel ou tel point obscur. Ce qu'ils ont de commun leur vient de la doctrine chrétienne elle-même, non d'une école philosophique. Ils doivent à leur instruction universitaire une connaissance familière de Descartes et du 17e siècle ; mais ils usent librement du cartésianisme. Ils consultent volontiers Saint Thomas d'Aquin, et, même avant que le Pape Léon XIII. eut publié son Encyclique, ils avaient pour le grand docteur catholique plus que du respect ; ils croyaient bon et salutaire de l'étudier, et ils l'étudiaient ; mais leur philosophie n'est pas à proprement parler le Thomisme. Ce sont des hommes, au courant de toutes les doctrines philosophiques qui ont agité le monde depuis trois siècles, très attentifs aux efforts de la philosophie contemporaine, désireux de defendre les grandes vérités si étrangement attaquées aujourd'hui : ils se livrent à cette œuvre sans former une école, mais ils sont chrétiens, ils sont catholiques. Ils n'ont pas seulement souci de ne pas heurter les dogmes. Ils sont animés de l'esprit chrétien. Je ne sais, monsieur, si je réussis bien à vous faire connaître ce groupe de philosophes qui vient d'attirer votre attention. Remarquez qu'il ne s'agit pas ici de la philosophie du clergé. Bien que j'aie des rapports affectueux avec plusieurs membres de la communaute de Saint-Sulpice, par exemple, je ne connais pas assez la philosophie de cette illustre maison pour en parler pertinemment. Du reste il y a là un Anglais bien distingué, qui serait à même de vous renseigner,

M. Hogan. Je ne vous parle pas non plus de la philosophie chez les Jésuites : leurs *Etudes littéraires*, revue mensuelle que vous connaissez certainement, vous indiquent leurs tendances et vous signalent leurs travaux. Je vous parle seulement du groupe de philosophes appartenant ou ayant appartenu à l'Université de l'Etat, et hautement chrétiens et catholiques. Vous me demandez de vous faire connaître des livres et une revue périodique qui vous permettraient de suivre ce mouvement d'idées. Parlons d'abord des livres. Je ne vous cite que ceux dont les auteurs sont non seulement chrétiens mais publiquement déclarés comme tels. M. Charaux, professeur de philosophie à la faculté des lettres de Grenoble, a publié plusieurs écrit importants, entre autres la *Méthode Morale* et la *Pensée et l'Amour* (que je signale dans la préface de mon livre). M. Desdouits, professeur de philosophie au lycée de Versailles, a publié (à la librairie Thorel, à Paris) des ouvrages que vous pourriez aussi consulter. M. Amédée de Margerie, ancien professeur à la faculté des lettres de Nancy, a quitté l'Université de l'Etat, et il est maintenant Doyen de la faculté des lettres à l'Institut Catholique de Lille : il y fait un cours de philosophie. Il est l'auteur d'une *Théodicée* (2 vols., chez Didier, à Paris) où vous le trouverez nettement chrétien et catholique. Plus anciennement, M. Th. H. Martin, Doyen (honoraire maintenant) de la faculté des lettres de Rennes, avait rendu de très grands services à la philosophie chrétienne par sa savante étude sur le *Timée*, par sa *Philosophie de la Nature* (2 vols.), par ses *Essais sur la Science et les Sciences*, et il travaille et écrit encore.

Voilà, monsieur, quelques noms. Je ne vous ai point parlé du P. Gratry, mort depuis bientôt dix ans, et très bien connu de vous. On ne peut dire qu'il ait fait école. Mais il a très certainement exercé une profonde influence sur les esprits. Il a contribué, plus que personne peut-être, à faire aimer et goûter la philosophie chrétienne. En un sens très vrai, mais large, il a été le maître de plusieurs, qui ne reproduisent pas d'ailleurs ses doctrines particulières et qui jugent librement ses plus chères théories. Son âme a répandu dans l'air un souffle généreux, chaud, vivifiant. Beaucoup d'esprits en ressentent encore l'influence.

Le groupe de penseurs que j'ai essayé de vous caractériser, a-t-il un organe spécial, une revue périodique où l'on puisse chercher ses tendances, et ses travaux ? Non, pas à proprement parler. Plusieurs ont écrit dans le *Correspondant* ou dans le *Contemporain ;* mais aucun, je crois, d'une manière suivie ni pendant un temps très considérable. Et d'ailleurs ces revues ne sont pas des revues proprement philosophiques. Les *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, surtout depuis leur récente réorganisation sous la direction de M. Xavier Roux, sont peut-être destinées à devenir l'organe du groupe en question. M. Martin de Rennes lui donne les études qui occupent sa laborieuse vieillesse. M. Charaux écrit aussi dans ce recueil. Il y a annoncé et analysé ma *Certitude Morale*. On m'a demandé d'y écrire moi-même, et je suis fort disposé à le faire, quand j'en aurai le loisir.

Vous le savez, monsieur, ce ne sont pas ces doctrines qui sont aujourd'hui en honneur. Néanmoins elles reçoivent un accueil non seulement respectueux, mais sympathique, quand elles sont enseignées

avec sincérité, et avec quelque talent. L'Université de l'Etat, malgré la guerre déclarée par M. Ferry à tout ce qui est *clérical*, n'a pas banni de ses chaires ce noble enseignement. Elle s'ouvre de plus en plus aux autres doctrines ; on y trouve souvent surtout un certain spiritualisme vague, non sans élévation, mais sans précision, fidèle encore aux grandes vérités morales, mais tenté et déjà ébranlé par les philosophies qui dominent aujourd'hui dans le monde. Pourtant un philosophe très franchement et très hautement spiritualiste peut se faire écouter et applaudir : aussi M. Caro, à la Sorbonne. Un philosophe chrétien peut obtenir à l'Ecole Normale supérieure, le respect, la sympathie, au point d'être publiquement vengé par ses élèves le jour où la presse hostile l'insulte. C'est ce qui m'est arrivé, et dans des circonstances bien remarquables. Ayant manifesté ma sympathie à des religieux expulsés en vertu des trop fameux décrets du 29 mars, et ayant protesté, simplement, correctement, mais hautement, contre cette violation du droit et de la liberté religieuse en signant un procès-verbal des faits accomplis durant l'expulsion, j'ai eu l'honneur d'être frappé par M. Jules Ferry. Cela s'était passé dans les Pyrénées à Bagnères-de-Bigorre, le 16 octobre ; mon cours à l'Ecole Normale devait recommencer après la Toussaint ; le Ministre m'a suspendu pour un an. Catholique notoire, et clérical publiquement compromis et frappé comme tel, j'ai été dans les journaux l'objet de toutes sortes d'attaques. Le *XIXe. siècle* m'a loué perfidement de m'être fait aimer cependant à l'Ecole Normale ; mais comment ? Parceque, disait-il, j'avais eu l'habileté de laisser mon cléricalisme à la porte. Alors mes élèves ont spontanément protesté dans une lettre rendue publique, et ils ont rendu à leur maître un éclatant témoignage, déclarant qu'ils savaient bien ses convictions, et que lui ne les dissimulait point. Je vous demande pardon de vous donner tant de détails sur un fait qui m'est personnel ; mais cela vous peut servir : vous voyez par là que la jeunesse de cette Ecole Normale (d'où sort l'élite des professeurs des lycées de l'Etat) est capable de supporter un enseignement chrétien, que dis-je ? de s'attacher à un maître chrétien. N'en concluez pas que tous ces jeunes gens qui ont suivi mes leçons, aient adopté ma doctrine, et retenu l'esprit qui inspire mes conférences. J'espère avoir fait quelque bien ; mais je ne méconnais pas que la philosophie chrétienne n'est point aujourd'hui en honneur.

Vous trouverez dans ma *Certitude Morale* la description d'un état d'esprit que je crois assez commun. C'est avec pages 336-338. La *Revue Philosophique* (revue mensuelle chez Germer-Baillière) vous permettrait aussi de juger de ce qui est actuellement à la mode. La philosophie anglaise attire beaucoup les regards. Kant d'une part, les positivistes anglais d'autre part, voilà les maîtres du jour.

J'ai toujours eu une profonde sympathie pour le mouvement d'idées qui se produit en Angleterre contrairement à ce positivisme. J'aimerais à m'en rendre un compte exact. J'ai souvent songé à en entreprendre l'étude et à composer avec des documents précis une série d'articles pour le *Correspondant*. Le loisir m'a manqué. On ne connait guère en France que la philosophie anglaise positiviste. Stuart Mill, Alex. Bain, Herbert Spencer, ce sont comme des dieux. Carlyle était certainement connue ; et sa philosophie avait été mise en lumière par M. Taine ; et puis on va

s'occuper beaucoup de lui parce qu'il vient de mourir. Mais l'attention se concentre plutôt sur les autres. Je serais curieux de connaître par le détail la lutte contre ce positivisme soit chez les protestants soit chez les Catholiques. Il y aurait un grand intérêt, ce me semble, à retracer cette histoire. Vous y auriez une place d'honneur, vous qui avez avec tant de courtoisie, mais avec tant de vigueur, combattu Stuart Mill, vous que Stuart Mill cite deux fois avec honneur, ainsi que je me suis donné le plaisir de le rappeler dans mon livre. Je connais aussi un peu les écrits de M. Saint-George Mivart. Je ne parle pas du Cardinal Newman : vous avez vu, par mon livre, combien je l'ai étudié, combien je lui dois, et quelle satisfaction j'ai éprouvée à déclarer que je lui dois beaucoup et que je lui suis profondément reconnaissant.

Ainsi, monsieur, pendant que vous désirez être renseigné sur ce que vous nommez une École philosophique catholique en France, j'ai à l'égard de l'Angleterre une curiosité analogue, et le temps seul m'a manqué, et malheureusement me manque encore, pour mettre à exécution mes projets d'étude. J'espère qu'il ne me manquera pas toujours.

Vous m'annoncez, monsieur, une chose qui excite toute ma reconnaissance. Vous avez le dessein de parler de ma *Certitude Morale* dans la *Dublin Review*. Rien ne pouvait m'être plus agréable. Déjà le n° de *Janvier* contient une notice concernant mon livre. Mais c'est court, c'est une indication, il n'y a presque point d'appréciation. Vous, cher Monsieur, vous me dites que vous voulez faire sur cet ouvrage de sympathiques commentaires. Je ne sais comment vous remercier de l'honneur que vous songez à me faire. Cette annonce me cause une profonde satisfaction.

Je regrette bien que votre santé vous empêche d'écrire en ce moment dans cette excellente *Dublin Review*. J'aime tant vos articles. C'est si sérieux, si étudié, si consciencieux. Vous savez si bien analyser et discuter. Vous avez eu la bonté de me renvoyer vos derniers articles tirés à part. Je vous en remercie mille fois. Je regrette de ne vous avoir pas dit assez clairement que j'avais reçu déjà le premier envoi. Le second, comme le premier, est arrivé à bon port, et je suis heureux d'avoir ainsi ces remarquables articles, publiés à part. Vous avez fait une admirable campagne contre les adversaires du libre arbitre.

Je viens de m'occuper d'Aristote. C'est encore un sujet qui a pour vous de l'intérêt. Je commence l'impression d'une étude sur la *Doctrine Morale d'Aristote*. Je me suis beaucoup servi de vos remarquables éditions anglaises, Sir Alex. Grant, Moore, Congreve, etc.

Je vous remercie vivement, cher Monsieur, de la critique que vous m'adressez ou plutôt du regret que vous m'expressez à propos d'un passage de mon livre. Vous trouvez qu'ayant signalé l'argument de Stuart Mill fondé sur *les maux moraux et physiques du monde*, je ne réponds pas à l'objection avec assez de netteté et n'y insiste pas comme elle le mériterait. Vous avez raison ; j'ai pensé que ce n'était pas de mon sujet, vu que je ne me proposais pas en cet endroit de prouver l'existence de Dieu ; mais je trouve avec vous que de tels arguments ne peuvent être indiqués sans qu'une discussion sérieuse et complète en établisse aussitôt la non-valeur. Ils produisent de l'effet, ils ont, à vrai dire, une réelle importance. Il faut montrer par un examen complet qu'ils ne sont pas concluants. Je vous remercie donc, Monsieur, et chaque fois que vous

voudrez bien me signaler ce qui dans mes écrits vous aura semblé insuffisant ou fautif, vous me trouverez sincèrement reconnaissant.

Je termine en vous offrant toutes mes excuses. Je me suis laissé aller à causer avec vous, et voilà une lettre extraordinairement longue. Quand je pense que vous êtes à peine sorti d'une maladie pénible, et que vous êtes encore fatigué, je suis confus de vous imposer la lecture d'une si longue lettre. J'espère que vous voudrez bien me pardonner cette sorte d'indiscrétion. Le désir de répondre à vos questions d'une manière complète et sérieuse m'a entraîné. Vous ne verrez en tout ceci qu'une preuve de la profonde estime et de la vive sympathie que vous m'inspirez. Je fais bien des vœux pour que votre santé se raffermisse, et je vous prie d'agréer, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de mes sentiments de grand respect, et, laissez-moi le dire, de cordiale confraternité ; car nous servons la même noble cause, et nous pouvons nous saluer par ces belles paroles chères aux premiers Chrétiens : Ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μεθ' ἡμῶν.

LÉON OLLÉ-LAPRUNE.

Permettez-moi de vous donner mon adresse ordinaire : 31, rue Gozlin, à Paris. Je serai de retour à Paris le 16 mars.

Pour ce qui concerne la doctrine de St. Thomas d'Aquin, vous avez pu voir, par mon livre, combien j'aime à la faire connaître et comment mes théories s'en rapprochent sur des points très importants. Vous pourrez voir de même que, dans cette étude sur *Malebranche* (que vous voulez bien prendre la peine de lire), mon admiration pour Malebranche ne me fait point accepter ses théories exagerées, et c'est plutôt à la manière de Saint Thomas (mais de Saint Thomas lui-même, non de quelques-uns de ses adeptes ou commentateurs) que je tâche d'expliquer la connaissance. Plus je lis Saint Thomas, plus je l'admire et plus je trouve qu'il est bon de l'étudier profondément et de se mettre à son école.

PAU, COTEAU DE TURANÇON,
17 août 1881.

CHER MONSIEUR—Je suis confus et désolé de mon long silence. Vous m'avez écrit deux fois, et quelles lettres ! combien gracieuses et charmantes ! Vous m'avez envoyé votre très remarquable article. Vous avez, à la fin de ce travail, parlé de mon livre sur la *Certitude Morale* en termes extrêmement flatteurs. Et moi, je ne vous ai pas donné le moindre signe de vie. Veuillez, je vous en prie, me pardonner. Vos lettres me causent une très vive satisfaction ; je suis très honoré et très heureux de ce commerce epistolaire qui s'est établi entre vous et moi ; et cette fois j'ai été très particulièrement touché de l'aimable et cordiale invitation que vous avez bien voulu me faire. Si je ne vous ai pas écrit tout de suite pour vous exprimer mes sentiments, c'est que j'ai été très occupé. Quand j'ai reçu votre lettre du 3 juillet, j'étais à Vichy, et, tout en prenant les eaux, je mettais la dernière main à un *Essai sur la Morale d'Aristote* que vous allez recevoir ces jours-ci. En arrivant ici, j'ai donné tous mes soins à un autre travail ; j'ai achevé la préparation d'une édition classique très sérieuse du 8e livre de la *Morale à*

Nicomaque qui figure maintenant sur le programme de nos classes de Philosophie. Tout cela m'a absorbé, si je puis ainsi parler, et maintenant encore je ne puis me donner le plaisir de causer longuement et tout à l'aise avec vous, comme je le souhaiterais. J'ajourne encore la réponse détaillée à la partie philosophique si intéressante de votre dernière lettre. Je n'y touche que brièvement, me proposant surtout aujourd'hui de vous remercier, cher monsieur, de toutes vos amabilités.

Je pense comme vous que les Catholiques, pour faire face aux nécessités intellectuelles de l'heure présente, ont besoin d'une base philosophique plus large que celle qui est reconnue dans les Séminaires. Je crois aussi qu'il y a une manière étroite d'entendre le retour à la philosophie de Saint Thomas, et que la pensée de Léon XIII pourra être mal interprétée ; je dis avec vous que l'Encyclique peut faire accidentellement quelque mal au milieu de beaucoup de bien. Je reviendrai en détail sur cette question dans une autre lettre. J'examinerai aussi la remarque très juste que vous faites au sujet de l'union entre la philosophie et la théologie. Vous dites que ce que l'on peut appeler notre Ecole ne resserre pas assez les liens. C'est vrai. J'examinerai avec vous les raisons de cela. Enfin je suis bien frappé de ce que vous dites à propos du mal moral. Oui, les philosophes catholiques et en général les philosophes spiritualistes ont l'air d'escamoter (si l'on peut employer ce mot) la difficulté, ou bien ils ne la voient pas. Le Cardinal Newman la voit. Je connais les passages auxquels vous faites allusion. Vous la voyez aussi. J'aime cette manière franche d'aborder les questions. Nous avons trop communément je ne sais quelle peur des difficultés qui nous fait fermer les yeux. Les ennemis, qui les ont bien ouverts, sourient sans doute de notre sécurité où ils soupçonnent quelque poltronnerie.

Je voudrais méditer sur ce grave sujet et chercher le moyen de répondre comme il faut à la grande objection du mal moral. Je me propose de penser très sérieusement à cela. Mais, pour cette étude et pour bien d'autres, de quel recours me serait un entretien avec vous ! Le désir que vous m'exprimez si gracieusement, cher monsieur, je le ressens aussi. Depuis que nous sommes en correspondance, une profonde sympathie mutuelle nous a rapprochés l'un de l'autre. Nous avons causé par lettres de philosophie, mais ce n'a pas été un commerce purement intellectuel ; il s'y est mêlé quelque chose de cordial, parce que nous sommes dévoués à la même noble et sainte cause, et que des chrétiens, des catholiques ne peuvent s'entretenir de ces intérêts sacrés sans que leur âme se montre. Nous nous sommes donc connus peu à peu mutuellement, nous avons vu ou entrevu nos âmes, pour ainsi dire, et des liens affectueux se sont formés entre nous. Voilà que maintenant vous m'appelez auprès de vous. Vous me faites un grand honneur ; et bien volontiers, je vous assure, je répondrais à votre appel si je le pouvais. J'aime les beaux sites et je suis presque passionné pour la mer. Ce n'est pas cependant le beau spectacle dont vous me parlez qui m'attirait auprès de vous et me ferait accepter l'hospitalité si gracieusement offerte. Ce que je serais heureux de trouver à Weston Manor, dans ce beau manoir, c'est le maître du lieu, c'est l'éminent écrivain, le vénérable défenseur de la philosophie chrétienne, le vaillant catholique, si jeune, si jeune d'âme, si jeune par l'intelligence, par le courage, par le cœur, malgré la suite d'années qu'il

a consacrées au service de la vérité. J'ai un particulière sympathie pour le mouvement catholique en Angleterre. Quelle joie ce serait pour moi de voir de près un Catholique tel que vous, de causer avec lui dans l'intimité, et quel profit ce serait pour mon esprit ! Mais il faut que je renonce, pour le moment au moins, à cette satisfaction. Je suis, vous le voyez, bien loin des îles anglaises. Nous sommes, Madame Ollé, nos deux enfants et moi, auprès de mes parents. Nous irons ensuite dans la montagne aux eaux de Saint Sauveur. Après cela nous irons en Provence dans la famille de ma femme, et nous reviendrons encore ici avant de rentrer à Paris. Voilà nos plans pour cette année. Mais votre invitation m'est extrêmement précieuse, et je vous en remercie du fond du cœur, et c'est pour moi un grand regret de ne pouvoir pas y répondre.

J'ai été très touché (je tiens à vous le redire) des quelques mots qui terminent votre beau travail sur la *Libre Volonté.* C'est trop aimable à vous d'avoir voulu remplacer ainsi l'article où vous vous proposiez de parler de mon livre et que vous aviez été obligé d'ajourner. Merci, cher monsieur, merci.

L'ensemble de vos articles sur la Libre Volonté forme une sorte de livre, et très considérable. J'aime ces études approfondis et cette manière sérieux, consciencieuse de discuter.

Dans mon *Essai sur la morale d'Aristote*, je me suis donné le plaisir de citer votre beau livre *On Nature and Grace.* Vous verrez aussi quel cas je fais des travaux des Anglais sur Aristote. Je vous fais hommage de cet ouvrage. Je vous enverrai aussi l'édition classique quand elle sera imprimée.

Veuillez agréer de nouveau tous mes remerciements et bien sincères et bien vifs, et puis recevez, cher Monsieur, toutes les assurances de mon très respectueux et tout cordial dévouement. LÉON OLLÉ-LAPRUNE.

Si vous avez quelque chose à m'envoyer ou si vous voulez bien m'écrire, veuillez adresser l'envoi ou la lettre à *Paris, 31, rue Gozlin.* Ce sera le plus simple et le plus sûr. On me renverra la chose là où je serai.

APPENDIX C

THE letters in this Appendix, from my father to Cardinal Newman, were placed at my disposal by the kindness of Father Neville, after the rest of my work was in type. They serve to fill in somewhat minutely the account of the relations between my father and Cardinal Newman given in Chapter VIII.; and some of them are, as the reader will perceive, of great interest.

The first, belonging to the year 1851 or 1852, gives Mr. Ward's impressions of the effect of his early lectures on philosophy at St. Edmund's. Newman had asked for his assistance in some theological question of which he was writing. Mr. Ward writes, making one or two suggestions, and then continues as follows:—

I have myself but little time just now to give active help in the cause, as I am at work in the College (a result of the new regime), and am lecturing to forty young gentlemen (the divines and philosophers) on Butler's *Sermons* and topics cognate thereto. I find at first the anxiety very great, lest I should in any way entrench on orthodoxy, fall into some condemned propositions, etc. etc.; and this keeps me on the continual *qui vive*, recurring to books and authorities, not to mention the labour of looking through their answers. But it is extremely interesting, both in itself and in its result of bringing me into such close acquaintance with the rising staff of the Archdiocese. The new President, meanwhile, is going with Dr. Whitty over Ushaw, Stonyhurst, and St. Beuno's, the Welsh Jesuit College, in order to enlarge his ideas and acquire hints. I can hardly express how providentially things seem turning out here, and all by immediate providence, as it would seem.

A letter of April 1854, in which Ward consulted Newman on the subject of one of his lectures on Theology proper, ends as follows:—

It would really be *the greatest favour* if you can give me any masses or prayers. Of course every one magnifies his own doings, but I do *strongly* think I am doing a great work. My position, however, is *most insecure*. Dr. A. B. tried hard to overset me; and the President, who likes it, yet is easily impressed from without. I may mention,

however, he told a friend of mine that the increase of *piety* which my lectures had caused among the students was remarkable.

Excuse my shameless egotism, and believe me affectionately yours,

W. G. WARD.

Newman wrote a little later intimating his belief that Ward, as a layman, was in a false position in giving directly theological lectures. Ward's reply was as follows :—

OLD HALL, *Low Monday* [1855 *or* 1856].

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—You will be kindly glad to hear my news, which bears in a certain degree on the subject of your letter. The Cardinal has brought back [from Rome] a *plenary indulgence* once a month for myself and family, for the express reason *stated in the document*, that I "*do nothing except* dedicate myself to study for the purpose of benefiting the Church, and assisting in the studies of the seminary of Westminster." The Cardinal told me he obtained it for the express purpose of obtaining the Holy Father's sanction to my work here.

I think the following facts will show you that *if* I teach here *at all*, it must be Theology :—

1. The first little course I gave was wholly philosophical, as I had had no express permission to teach Theology.

2. When the Cardinal in the following year begged me to teach again, the President said to me : "I only make this condition,—that your teaching shall be *wholly* theological, for we have no time here for philosophy." I agreed *on condition* that either he, or, in his absence, some other priest, should always be present. To this he agreed, and so it has always been.

3. When he wished me to be permanently placed here, he intended to give me the title of "Professor of Dogmatics." I eagerly deprecated it, and chose that of "Assistant Lecturer," whereby I said I could teach as much theology as he liked, only as *his assistant*.

4. When the Bishop of Southwark applied for my doctor's degree he expressly stated that what I taught in the seminary was *dogmatics;* adding, however, that a priest was always present. I urged upon him that he should fully state this to the people at Rome.

5. In speaking to him on the subject, I asked his opinion as to the propriety, in a normal state of things, of a layman so lecturing. He (not surely an over-liberal mind) said, "In a *normal* state of things I see no harm with a priest present ; in the *present* state of things I should dispense with the priest."

6. The Cardinal, on being told by his nephew, who came here for a month to attend them, that the whole dogmatics of the College were in my hands, answered, "I am delighted to hear it."

7. Dr. Newsham of Ushaw saw my questions up to last July, and begged me, if I possibly could, to publish the lectures themselves ; engaging in that case that he would immediately make them a text-book at Ushaw.

8. Those in the College who have disliked it have always objected, not that there is too *much* but too *little* Theology in them; not understanding (as I should say) that you can't teach scientific Theology except on a philosophical basis.

Nor do I believe much, if any, of the feeling arises from my being a layman, but from my being a convert, non-Edmundian, and introducing so complete a revolution in the style of study.

What God intends to do about this matter, He knows. It is possible, indeed, the whole thing may be knocked on the head. But, any way, it seems to me I was plainly called on to do what I have; and I acted under Faber's advice, as my director, in every particular from first to last.

To enter further into the subject of your letter would be too egotistical, while you are so full of business and that so anxious.

In commoda publica peccem
Si longo sermone morer tua tempora.

But, in fact, I *could not* study philosophy except in its connection with, and as part of, theology; I don't care a straw about it in any other point of view. I have difficulty even in *believing*, and impossibility of *understanding*, that a person of active mind, who believes in and cares for religion, and may choose his subject, can occupy his mind principally about anything else. I really can't; and, as I told Faber (who says it's the same with him), feel I should simply lose all love of God and be damned if I were to try.

However, I'll bore you no more. With every best wish for your success in your truly noble work.—Believe me, ever affectionately yours,

W. G. Ward.

A letter of 1857, when Ward had decided to resign his professorship at St. Edmund's, ran as follows:—

Wednesday.

My dear F. Newman—I have been wishing to answer your most kind letter received on Saturday, but have been prevented by a mass of business, collegiate and other.

I have been pondering, with some interest, on your comparison between your own movements and mine. I think my difficulty in entering into your University views, and your disapproval of my position here, both arise in some degree from the same difference of view; the same, indeed, which tended at one time to make me an Arnoldian, to which you, I think, were never the least drawn;—I mean this, that I never have been able to understand (even as a theory, apart from the question of agreement or disagreement) the opinions which I find so generally prevalent as to the essential distinction between ecclesiastical and secular education.

However, my humble divergence has probably troubled you little enough; whereas, I assure you, it has been a very real pain to me, the

thought of your disapproval of my work here. You may remember you first mentioned it in a letter some three years ago.

In one respect your "position" in Dublin has been as "false" as you think mine here, though in a most different sense. For you have been called Rector and made responsible, while having very far from a real control over the course of events. The Cardinal was speaking here the other day in extremely strong terms on the subject, and regretting deeply that you had not been made a bishop as was proposed.

However, I am extremely glad — not selfishly alone, but on public grounds—that we are now likely to get some more Theology out of you. I suppose you will think of looking at your MS. on Faith again.

If I may speak of myself, I shall certainly be a most different man all my life in consequence of my work here. I should never have had the perseverance of keeping along a steady line of reading and thought except for the interest and excitement of an immediate object, and I should never have had any trust in my own ideas, had I not seen them practically influential on a small scale. If I were to live till the age of one hundred and fifty I should not have more than time to write out various matters which in one way or other possess my thoughts.

Various circumstances combined to move us. We have outgrown this house. Again, three sons makes a very different figure from no son; and points to duties connected with what now promises to be a permanent habitat for a Catholic family. Again, as children grow up, I am anxious to have more time for attending to their education than I can manage in the immense pressure of work here. Again, the Trebizondian[1] prospect is personally formidable.

You hear Manning is Provost of Westminster?

You have seen or heard of J. B. Mozley's book against Baptismal Regeneration?

I met T. Mozley in town the other day, who spoke very severely of the Government Colleges in Ireland.

I hear that among the poor of Dublin you are perfectly idolised, and also (of course) among your students. To them, what a calamity! Paper and time at an end simultaneously.—Ever affectionately yours,

W. G. Ward.

P.S. — I hope you will come some time and see us in the Isle of Wight. It would be such an extreme gratification to us. Mrs. Ward's affectionate respects and thanks for your letter of to-day.

The following letter, dated Mid-Lent Sunday 1859, gives the first indication of the differences which arose between Ward and Newman in connection with the *Rambler*. It will be observed that Ward's impression as to Newman's attitude was based on "rumours," and "statements" made by third persons, and that Newman's reply for the time took the impression away. The incidental kindly reference to Mr. Simpson also has its interest:—

[1] Archbishop Errington of Trebizond was, as we have seen, one of Ward's chief opponents at this time.

NORTHWOOD PARK, COWES,
Mid-Lent Sunday, 1859.

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—Thank you so much for your most kind and satisfactory letter. It is no use going into the various rumours, statements, etc., which had made me fancy your opinions had so greatly changed, because your letter dissipates the whole illusion.

The conversation with Simpson, to which I referred, took place early in February. *A propos* of what I said, either he, or Macmullen who was present, added, "As to Acton, his principle is that whatever is *true* in speculation ought to be *said* at any time; and we ought to take on *faith* that it *must* do good," or words to that effect. The very thing this which you represent (in various parts of your works) as characteristic of the *heretical* spirit; that intellectual investigations may be carried out, simply according to the laws of the intellect, without any sense of *responsibility* and obligation of considering results, etc. etc.

To my mind the principle above stated has been implied in the whole course of the *Rambler*, ever since Simpson has had it.[1] The intellect is then applied to religion, not for the purpose of securing that its truths may be presented more effectually and to a greater number of people, and so influence more their lives and practice: no; but "for the sake of intellectual completeness, that one part of our opinions may harmonise with another; that we may be above the scorn of intellectual Protestants," etc. These latter things are good, surely, because they tend to the promotion of true religion and for no other reason; whereas the *Rambler* principle seems to me that they are simply good in themselves and for their own sake. I never could find *sanctification* stated explicitly or implicitly as the end of religious investigations. This is part (but only a comparatively small part) of what I meant by the *Rambler's* detestable principles; and then it struck me that here we have the "blind leading" not "the blind" but the comparatively clear-sighted; for I should think the stupidest Catholic living who makes his sanctification the great work of his life, is likely to understand the *lie*, the *bearing*, the *relative importance*, of Catholic truths far better than men so minded.

I had no personal feeling against Simpson, whom, on the contrary, I think a most simple, real, candid, and agreeable man. Acton I never even saw.

May not the intellect's office in religion be put a little beyond what you state? Suppose, *e.g.*, the heretical intellect had been perfectly idle, still is it not true that the fulness and freshness of Apostolic tradition must have faded away, unless the intellect had reflected on it and put it into shape?

Pray don't think of answering this; which I only mean for a diffuse way of saying "thank you." I have now time on my hands and feel life (to say the truth) duller and heavier than I could have imagined, so that

[1] It is to be noted that the period here referred to precedes Newman's editorship of the *Rambler*. Later on (see Chapter VI.) the *Rambler* nominally ceased to exist, and was replaced by the *Home and Foreign Review*, of which Sir John Acton was editor.

writing off a kind of squib is a selfish amusement. I wish to God I could see my way to the proper way of enduring life under my present circumstances.—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

A letter of the same year, 28th November 1859, refers to Ward's first acquaintance with Sir John Acton, who was at that time one of the conductors of the *Rambler*, and became afterwards editor of the *Home and Foreign Review*:—

I was glad (he writes) to make Sir John Acton's acquaintance. He dined with me on Friday in Simpson's company. I never saw him before, and we compared notes between his present and my past knowledge of you.

The following letter of the same year, 1859, referring to Ward's forthcoming work *On Nature and Grace*, returns to the subject of a difference of thought and sympathies which Ward began to recognise between Newman and himself, and which henceforth continued. Ward's reference to his distaste for his life at Northwood is a further illustration of the account already given in Chapter IX.—

67 OXFORD TERRACE, HYDE PARK,
LONDON, W.

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—I was very much amused (as you must have intended me to be) at the notion that *your* works are to be helped into immortality by *mine*.

But, speaking seriously, I shall be very glad (suppose I am able to get so far as publication) that as many *excerpta* as possible from your works may adorn my pages, as a kind of quiet testimony to the fact that I owe to *you* my *whole* intellectual self, whatever its value. Indeed I thought, if I were to publish, of stating as much in so many words in my preface. I cling the more eagerly to this fact, in proportion as I fancy myself to recognise (of course with the deepest regret) a growing divergence of view in various most important matters, between you and myself.

It is not my book, thank you, which had anything to do with knocking me up: for the *latter* half of it I had very little to do beyond putting into words my notes of old lectures: and the former half was finished by the end of January.

There certainly seemed reasons for going to live in the Isle of Wight, and Providence seemed to point it out when I had *three* sons born. But I begin seriously to doubt whether it was not a total mistake. I find myself liking *nothing* there. I dislike the house, the grounds, the occupations, the prominent position, and the society; the Bishop won't let me have anything to do with the spirituals, and I can't work up the least interest in the temporals. . . .

It is a most curious fact that the *only* period in my life when I have felt *thoroughly in my right place*, was when almost every one thought me plainly in a wrong one, viz., at St. Edmund's. But I could not have

staid there without giving up my work, for my health was quite destroyed at last by the exertion. Even Dr. Errington said the work was more than one man could do. *En revanche*, at Northwood, when I am exhausted with study (which with me always takes place at the end of two hours at latest) I have nothing upon earth to do or think of. But of myself far too much. . . .

As to the Hippolytus question, of course I know nothing about the matter. But you know *Döllinger* wrote a book on the matter which the *Guardian* represents (if I rightly remember) as (1) professing entirely to clear Catholics; and (2) as really succeeding in the attempt.

Excuse my length, specially all the talk about myself; and believe me, ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

The following letter refers to the subject of Newman's letter quoted in Chapter IX. on the true analysis of Moral Obligation in its relation to the proof of Theism:—

Freshwater, Isle of Wight,
11*th July* 1860.

My dear F. Newman—I am most grateful for your kind letter, and extremely glad that you think there is a *rapprochement* between us on the matter you mention. Last October I wrote to you, you will remember, that I hoped what I had written might be something of a *concordat*.

For myself I have always held strongly that the perception of right and wrong is the *strongest of all grounds* for our belief in God's existence. I can't be mistaken in my impression of my own past opinions, because I remember distinctly saying this to my class six years ago when we were on the "de Deo." The main difference, I think, between you and me has ever been, that you regard the perception of right and wrong as pointing to a personal *Imposer of Obligation*, whereas my own notion has been that it points to a personal *Embodiment of Sanctity*.

You may be kindly interested in hearing of our personal circumstances. We are actually driven from Northwood by the impossibility which I find of preserving my health there. In the spring I had a very bad illness, and could only recover by going for a month to Old Hall. Since that time I have not been able to stay one entire *week* at Cowes without relapsing; consequently, as Mrs. Ward cannot at present move, I have to come out here two or three days in every week. As soon as she is able to travel we *must* go back to Old Hall *en masse;* for, after the money we have laid out here, it is impossible (for the present at least) to engage any other house.

It is most singular that God thus *forces* me back to Old Hall; it makes me fancy that He may possibly have more work for me to do there. Certainly it is the only place towards which I ever felt as a home; and I have come to the opinion distinctly, that (in my case) the notion of living on my property is a complete fallacy. I am utterly incompetent to all the duties implied by that term.

Paper fails, or I might egotistically proceed. With many thanks for your letter, ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

The following is the letter of 15th February 1861, of which the preparatory notes have been given in Chapter VIII. on the subject of Catholic and Christian education. It refers incidentally to a letter on the subject addressed by Ward to the *Weekly Register* :—

23 Gloucester Square, Hyde Park,
London, S.W.

My dear F. Newman—We have ended by taking this house for a term of years, and alternating between it and Old Hall.

My being here is the cause why I did not receive your letter till this morning. I am more pleased by it and grateful for it than I can express; I never even dreamt of your concurrence with my "Register" letter. As I have already been so long answering it, I will not delay longer in doing so, though the result must be that I shall have to express myself so briefly as to have an appearance (most foreign to my intention) of positiveness and peremptoriness. But I am very much hoping, after Easter, to pay you one day's visit. My riding arrangements have hitherto made that impossible except when I am ill; but now I am constructing an edifice of my own near here, and shall be able to ride at any hour, so that I could manage to go down to Birmingham after I have ridden, and return the next day but one *in time for* riding.

(1) I am certainly extremely surprised at your concurrence about the *immense* spiritual danger of classical studies in the last of the three shapes I mentioned. And I think I had reason for such surprise; for it was to be expected that one thinking so would have urged it much more prominently (when advocating such studies) than you have done, and would have devoted far more space to the definite consideration of suitable safeguards.

(2) If I were an infidel, I should still think that an education could no more be called "liberal" which did not contain a profound study of Christian thought (and by consequence of Christian doctrine which is the mainspring of that thought) than one which omitted classical antiquity. I can't even *imagine* any argument which would show the essentialness of the latter to "liberal" education, which would not, with any candid infidel, equally show the former. And this includes, *e.g.*, St. Paul and the Psalms. As to the gospels, on what possible view is Xenophon's *Memorabilia* a "liberal" study, and the gospels not far more so?

(3) But since we are Christians this latter ought *not* to be on *equal* terms with paganism, but should be (not of course the exclusive) but the paramount and animating element of the whole, so that everything else shall be subordinate and (as it were) illustrative.

(4) This alone, I mean nothing but this, would supply (to my mind) any real safeguard against the dangers of classics. I think very strongly that no possible amount of moral supervision could do the work. Heathen principles are inculcated (unconsciously, no doubt, but) by an intellectual process. If you could secure half an hour's careful meditation on some doctrinal book every morning, this would be an immense deal, for it would, in fact, be an intellectual training.

But nowadays you can't do this; and classical education without it is

(to my mind) simply the road to the devil. I mean, of course, unless you supply the place of such meditation by some very careful intellectual training; and such training, I think, must very prominently include a living, practical, energetic study of Christian doctrine.

This is directly opposed to what you say in your last University book, where you say that laymen are to study *evidences*, and *not* to study *doctrine*. I should far rather say the reverse.

(5) I think that the "narrow" seminary system, if it were but efficiently carried out instead of most wretchedly, would be quite as "liberal" as the opposite system, which includes classics and excludes theology. But neither has the least claim to be called "liberal"; one, however, being a "narrow" road to heaven, the other a narrow entrance into the broad path. . . .

Pray excuse my writing so very bumptiously. But I am rather harried to-day, and to include explanations, softenings, apologies, etc., would be too long.

I am so very grateful to you for your constant kindness, and greatly rejoice and thank God for your remembering me in your prayers.

Mrs. Ward's affectionate respects.—Ever affectionately yours,

W. G. WARD.

A letter of Ward's, dated 23 Gloucester Square, 13th December 1861, expresses regret that he had missed seeing Newman, who had called on him on the previous Wednesday, and refers again to the growing differences between them. It is endorsed by Cardinal Newman thus:—

N.B., 22*nd December* 1861.—Observe how he persists, in spite of all I have written, all I have proved, all I have challenged him to prove, to say that we seriously differ from each other.

In April 1862 comes a very curious letter concerning a student at St. Edmund's, who appears to have tended more or less to infidelity under the influence of Mill's writings. The incidental quotation from Mill's letter to the student in question is of great interest, as showing that Mill's readiness to accept the hypothesis of a Creator with finite power, which surprised so many readers of his posthumous Essays, had been expressed by him in writing in 1861. Ward's letter ran as follows:—

OLD HALL, near WARE,
16*th April* 1862.

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—Excuse my troubling you in the very middle of Holy Week; but, in fact, you will find I am not troubling you, only preparing you for a future task.

A Mr. A. B. entered as student at St. Edmund's two years ago, and left suddenly without cause assigned, by direction of his confessor, one year ago. Within the last three months it has appeared that he fell in here with Mill's *Logic*, and became absolutely *addictus jurare in verba Millii;* and Mr. Munro (whom you may know) wished me to see him. I

earnestly begged him at once to communicate with *you*, as I have never had any success with such thinkers, I suppose you will say because of my inability to understand other people. And in this case, no doubt, such is the reason. But Mr. M. answered that Mr. A. B. was more disposed to me because of my civil language in regard to his idol; and also, that as I have read Mill attentively, I was more to the purpose. Well, I have failed most egregiously, and Mr. A. B. evidently thinks me a perfect goose. Under these circumstances he is really desirous of more justice being done to theism than I can do, and will be extremely obliged if you will answer any letter which he sends.

I find, to my surprise, from a letter of Mill's which he showed me, that Mill inclines to believe in a finite Creator, instead of being the simple atheist I had thought him. Oddly enough for him, he says that "if a man's moral needs require the doctrine, there is nothing in reason to oppose it." The unanswerable objection to an infinite Creator is, of course, the existence of evil.

When I saw Mr. A. B. I said (1) that my own hope of his having a successful termination to his inquiries turned altogether on the question whether he would continue exercises of prayer, etc.; and (2) on the philosophical question at issue with Mr. Mill (like Dr. Abernethy), I referred him to "my book." The parts of the latter to which I referred him appear to him most weak and inconclusive; and as to the former I enclose you part of his last letter.

He is a person undoubtedly of cold temperament, and has studied no philosophy at all except Mill's. I incline to think him also very puzzle-headed, and carried away by a little knowledge. On the other hand, he is extremely good-tempered, and is very pleasing in his manner and address. He was converted from Protestantism about three years since.

Mrs. Ward's kindest regard.—I remain, my dear Father Newman, ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

After next Monday our address is again 23 Gloucester Square, Hyde Park, London, W.

The two following letters may be read in connection with the pathetic letter cited near the end of Chapter X., and written in 1875. They show the pain which the separation from Newman was causing to Mr. Ward, while it was in process of taking place; and the account, in the second letter, of Ward's relations with Manning, Faber, and Cardinal Vaughan has special interest. Ward's expressions, moreover, in the same letter, as to the extensive additions to the current theological treatises which would be required to meet the questions first raised by *Essays and Reviews* in reference to Scripture criticism, and since then so fruitfully developed, are not to be overlooked:—

Old Hall, near Ware,
Easter Day, 1862.

My dear F. Newman—I am so extremely sorry to hear the bad account you send, and be assured you have ever (as who can have more

claim ?) my best wishes and prayers. I will only ask you to let me have one line, whenever you may be able, without any inconvenience, to hear from this Mr. A. B., to whom I will write at once, and beg him to postpone writing to you.

I had been meditating a day's stay at Birmingham in the course of a month or so, if you had an hour to spare for talk. I have a great and growing sense of discomfort as to my divergence from you; and whenever you were thoroughly well and at leisure should much like at least to give myself the chance (by unreserved and confidential talk) of seeing what error there may be in my present ways.

Sincerely hoping you may soon be better.—I remain, my dear F. Newman, ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

23 Gloucester Square, Hyde Park, W.,
22*nd June* 1862.

My dear F. Newman—Thank you very much for your kindness. I will say just one word or two in closing the matter.

I really don't think you can feel, more strongly than I do, the dreariness of Catholic disunion. . . . For myself, I should say I have even a *morbid* longing for intellectual guidance. I never imagined I could get it, *e.g.* from Faber or Manning (most deeply as I sympathise with their practical work and revere them personally), and the more I see of them the less possible I find it. Herbert Vaughan, who is my greatest friend, and, to my mind, about the finest character I ever came across, is not intellectual, and (with a self-knowledge truly rare) knows himself not to be so. It is from no wish to find disagreement that I find it. . . .

I have been interesting myself by a little class in St. Paul's [Epistles] with some of my old pupils, for I must get a knowledge of the New Testament different in kind from my present, before I begin writing strictly theological work. It is most touching and interesting work; but here, again, what new difficulties are opened at every step! I suppose the Church will have to develop quite a supplemental *corpus* of theology in reference to such questions as those touched in *Essays and Reviews*. By the way, Faber tells me you greatly prefer *Justiniani* to *Estius*, and so does he. I confess my own experience has led me to the opposite opinion. I am most anxious to read Döllinger's volume, but, alas, don't know German! —Ever affectionately yours, W. G. Ward.

The following letter, referring to a notice of Archbishop Whately, contributed by Newman to the *Weekly Register*, tells its own tale:—

Old Hall, Ware,
18*th October* 1863.

My dear F. Newman—I think I can't be mistaken in attributing to you the second of the three notices on Whately in the *Weekly Register*, and in thinking that "lived here" is a misprint for "loved him."

As you and I most unhappily are not always in agreement in these days, it is a particular pleasure to express how greatly I have been touched with the said notice, specially considering the shameful things

he used latterly to say against you. Also, I am always glad of such sentiments as that with which you conclude. I find with many (and I fear it is growing) a way of speaking about Protestants, and the certain damnation of every individual among them who dies without being received into the Church, which makes me shudder. The Pope's late Encyclical to the Italian bishops is most invaluable to quote on this head. Have you observed its strong wording? "*Notum nobis vobisque est eos* qui invincibili ignorantiâ laborant, qui naturalem legem . . . sedulo servantes ac Deo obedire parati posse aeternam consequi vitam."—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

Is not Montalembert's second speech extremely shallow, even from his own point of view? Does it not somewhat savour of Spurgeon?

The next letter is probably the last of their continuous correspondence, which was interrupted by Ward's opposition in 1864 to Newman's proposed Oxford Mission. It refers to the Essay, analysed in Chapter VII., on Montalembert's speech at Malines on "Liberty of Conscience":—

OLD HALL, WARE,
4th January 1864.

MY DEAR F. NEWMAN—I have been much doubting whether I would send you the accompanying pamphlet, for fear I might seem to be *fishing* for an opinion which you might be unwilling to express. On the other hand, however, it occurred to me that you might possibly hear of it from others and might think me inconsiderate or unkind for not having sent it you. I have only, therefore, to say that if you don't wish to give an opinion on it or even to read it, I shan't take it in the least amiss.

You will see from its form that it was written for the *Dublin Review*. But when in type, most (though not quite all) who saw it thought that in a country like England it might kick up a row. I am quite disposed to think them right; and at all events profoundly distrust my own judgment in all practical matters. I therefore withdrew it.

The last paragraph of the final note was added afterwards. If you care to look up the authorities for "persecution" they are certainly extremely strong.

My own notion in writing the article was that every one knew that the Catholic Church had sanctioned "persecution"; but that few Englishmen had considered how much is to be said for it.—Ever affectionately yours, W. G. WARD.

Mrs. W. joins me in every best Christmas wish.

You may remember in our Oxford days I never could understand the doctrine of "toleration." I once said to Dr. Arnold about James Mill "May it not be said that truth gains by both sides being advocated?" Arnold replied very briskly and vivaciously, "I'd give James Mill as much opportunity for advocating his opinion as is consistent with a

voyage to Botany Bay." I think no Catholic was ever more simply "persecuting" than Arnold, *e.g.* my quotation from him in note to p. 20.

The letter is thus endorsed by Cardinal Newman:

My dear Ward—Thank you for your pamphlet. I don't see that Montalembert, when he says, "I experience an invincible horror," need mean more or does mean more than is implied in what Cardinal Soglia calls "tritum illud sermone adagium 'ecclesia abhorret a sanguine,'" giving it his adhesion. If that abhorrence of the Church implies a sense of injustice so may lawfully Montalembert's. If it does not, so need not Montalembert's. You say he is "cloudy," so are orators often; but their cloudinesses surely are to be taken *in meliorem partem.* J. H. N.

The following letters and fragments of letters from Cardinal Newman to Mr. Ward are given, in conclusion, in chronological order. The majority of them are not directly connected with the matters dealt with in Mr. Ward's letters just cited. The two exceptions to this are the letters of April 1857 (part of which is cited in Chapter IX.) and of October 1859.

The first letter was written by Father Newman soon after the second Achilli trial.

Edgbaston, Birmingham,
4th July 1852.

My dear Ward—Thank you for your kind letter. It confirmed what I hear in every quarter. Suspense is painful, and for the two last days of the trial I was in suspense. Since then I have not had a shadow of uneasiness, as every one who has seen me will tell you. I doubt not we shall see that what has happened is, under the circumstances, the completest triumph. I have been in Ireland or you should have heard from me sooner. I hurried from London to console people here, which I managed to do, and then set off to Ireland to attend the meeting of the University Commission. Thank Mrs. Ward for her most kind message. She and you must not forget me in your prayers.—Yours affectionately,
John H. Newman.

The circumstances under which the following letter was written, and part of the letter itself, have been given in Chapter IX. Newman was on the eve of retiring from his connection with the Catholic University of Ireland.

The Oratory, Birmingham,
17th April 1857.

My dear Ward—I have just received Mrs. Ward's letter, and write to you at once. Thank you for your kind inquiry after my health, which, thank God, is excellent; but at my time of life, and after so long a spell of hard work, I never should have cause to be surprised if I had some sudden visitation,—paralysis.

You have no need to inquire about your subscription to the University. I don't know to whom you can have made the promise to subscribe, if to me I release you from it at once. But even if I set about it I could not tell you what it was, or how long unpaid. I have nothing to do with the accounts myself; and though some few sums have been paid me, I have at once passed them on into the bank. Nor do I know *who* can tell you —for I cannot make out that any accounts are kept at all. There is no secretary, no board of finance. . . .

How singular it is that you should disapprove of my work at Dublin, and that I should think you in a false position at St. Edmund's, and that, while you are thinking of moving from St. Edmund's to the Isle of Wight, I should be returning from Dublin to Birmingham! My letters of resignation have gone to the Bishops, and have been accepted, as far as my answers hitherto go; and I doubt not, as far as residence goes, my connection with the University is drawing to a close (*though I don't wish this known*). However, you, I suppose, do not change in your views about St. Edmund's, nor can I in mine about the University.

Mrs. Ward does not say anything about your health. I take no news to be good news.—God bless you, my dear Ward, and believe me to be, ever yours affectionately in Christ, JOHN H. NEWMAN.

The following letter refers to a pamphlet by Mr. Ward, called "Attrition, Contrition, and Sovereign Love":—

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM,
13*th February* 1858.

MY DEAR WARD—Thank you very much for your pamphlet. I can't be supposed to have done more than read part of it during the few hours during which I have had it, but I have read enough to see that every priest in England who reads it, whether he ultimately agrees with you or not, has reason to be thankful to you. For I don't scruple to say what, looking at it as a practical matter, I have a right to say, that you are doing us all a great benefit, which is the more necessary because priests, as other men, when they have been engaged in a work for a long time, get into a routine, and forget the views and lose the feelings with which they set about it.

For myself personally I can only say that, as a matter of feeling and view, your doctrine is that to which my mind has always turned and turns, and that I think the contrary view methodistical.

Also, it is the view I have always supposed to be the Catholic one. When I was at *Propaganda* they gave me their Busembaum, and only the other day I turned up notes of mine with extracts from him in which I find the following: "Non sufficit attritio existimata tantumlicet inculpabiliter. Qui non habet propositum efficax, id est cum quo non possit consistere affectus erga mortale, non est sufficienter attritus."—Ever yours affectionately, JOHN H. NEWMAN.

The following is part of a letter (to which Ward's reply has been given in this Appendix) written on receipt of the proof sheets of Ward's *Philosophical Introduction on Nature and Grace*:—

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM,
20th October 1859.

MY DEAR WARD—I thank you very much for your book. I see you have most kindly preserved some, or rather many bits of my writings in it. This is a great pleasure to me as showing your affectionate feeling towards me; also it flatters me that some fragments of what I have written will be preserved for posterity (unless this is too human a satisfaction), as passages of the old Greeks are preserved in Clement of Alexandria or Theodoret. . . . I observe, you indirectly question one passage. I will look over it again carefully, and if I feel it to be open to your criticism I will guard it. Of course I had no intention of saying that "few Christians of uncultivated intellect have the moral power of avoiding mortal sin."

I shall read the whole book with great interest, not the least that portion to which you direct my attention; but I shall read it very slowly, as one reads a spiritual book, not only from the greater satisfaction (at least) I have in so reading a book of the kind, but because I am obliged to lie fallow from overwork, or at least I have wished to do so ever since I left Ireland. I want a good year's rest and can't get it; but I am more in the way of it than I have been. I mean to read not as a business but as a pleasure.

I am very sorry you are so knocked up yourself. Is it not your book has done it? Judging by myself I should say that sensible pleasure in hard writing or reading is not a proof that it may not be injurious to one's health, as turtle and venison may be good but unadvisable;—though I have not always pleasure.

They say that what is said about one's self comes to one's own knowledge after every one else. I knew that the article you speak of[1] had annoyed the Ushaw people, but nothing more. It is most difficult in writing so to guard every expression that it can't be criticised. I never can be surprised if it turns out that I might have used better phrases here and there, but I have no misgiving about my real meaning as being sound dogmatically. . . .

The following may be read as a P.S. to the remarkable letter given in Chapter VIII. describing Newman's feeling of pain in literary composition:—

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM,
29th June 1862.

MY DEAR WARD—Thank you for sending me the paragraph. I will write to the *Record*, but I have little hope they will publish it.

By the bye, curiously enough the other day I pitched on a passage

[1] Probably the article in the *Rambler*, "On consulting the faithful in matters of doctrine."

in a letter of mine to Wood of the date of 1833, which is almost in words the same as I wrote to you lately about my own distress in composition. I quote it: "Rome, 17th March 1833—When once back I hope never to stir again. The truth is I have no taste for travelling, and it is scarcely more than a pure trouble while it lasts. Even when most satisfactory it causes the same anxiety as I feel when composing (*e.g.*, a sermon or anything else) something, namely, which I wish to have got through, which is an irritation while it lasts, and which has its enjoyment and τέλος in the ἔργον produced, which is subsequent to the ἐνέργεια."

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